

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Iv:

Docket No. 50-155 Docket No. 50-255

Consumers Power Company ATTN: Mr. R. B. DeWitt Vice President Nuclear Operations 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 79-27 provides information with regard to the sequence of events that followed incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures at two PWR units.

Sincerely,

Steen W. Rouf farames G. Keppler

Enclosures:

 IE Information Notice No. 79-27
 Recently Issued IE Information Notices

cc w/encls:

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON D.C. 20555

November 16, 1979

IE Information Notice No. 79-27

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES AT TWO PWR PLANTS

Description of Circumstances:

In recent months two incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures have occurred. In both instances, the units were cooled down and placed in the residual heat removal mode with existing procedures.

Event of June 25, 1979 at the Doel 2 Nuclear Power Plant in Belgium

The first event occurred on June 25, 1979, at the Doel 2 nuclear power plant in Belgium. The Doel unit is a 390 Mwe Westinghouse two-loop reactor. The event consisted of a rupture of several tubes in the loop B steam generator. The resultant leakage between the primary and secondary systems was estimated to be 125 gpm. The event started when the plant was heated up after a shutdown caused by a malfunction of the main steam isolation valve. At the time of the incident the primary coolant pressure was: 2233 psi and the temperature: 491°F. The reactor remained subcritical throughout the event.

The first indication of abnormal behavior was a rapid decrease of the primary system pressure (approximately: 28 psi/min.). This was followed by the sequence of events listed below:

Time, min.

 Increase of charging flow demand, requiring startup of a second charging pump.

1.8

Automatic isolation of the CVCS 1.

Shut off of the pressurizer heate pressurizer. DUPLICATE DOCUMENT 1435 108

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