

# CERTIFIED

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ISSUE DATE: 9/24/79

ACRS-1667

FOIA EXEMPTION 5

MINUTES OF THE  
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2  
ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS

August 8, 1979  
Washington, D. C.

A meeting of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident Implications Regarding Nuclear Power Plant Design was held in Washington, D.C. at 1717 H St., N.W. on August 8, 1979. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the underlying causes contributing to the accident. Notice of the meeting appeared in the Federal Register, Vol. 44, No. 143, Tuesday, July 24, 1979 (attached). The outline for discussion and list of attendees are attached. Information was received from Mr. R. Szalay of the Atomic Industrial Forum concerning industry activity as a result of Three Mile Island. Copies are available at the ACRS office. No requests to make oral statements were received from members of the public.

Introduction - M. Carbon, Chairman

Dr. Carbon began the meeting by noting the purpose of the meeting was to consider the underlying causes which may have contributed to the accident which occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station on March 28, 1979. Items to be discussed at the meeting included several aspects of the NRC regulatory review process, its structure and organization as well as NRC's role in several related aspects of nuclear power plant operation, such as operator training, qualification, and response to accident situations.

Role of the NRC in the Licensing Process - Roger Mattson, NRR

Dr. Mattson began his presentation by describing the role of NRC in the licensing

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process. NRR safety reviews consist of a detailed review of the information provided by applicants in safety analysis reports. The required minimum scope of information is described in general terms in the Commission's regulations in 10CFR50.34. The nature of the Staff's review is indicated in part by the required findings for issuance of a construction permit in 10CFR50.35.

The actual scope and depth of the Staff's technical reviews have evolved over the years as the Staff's experience and expertise have increased, as operating experience has accumulated. The current scope of the review is best described in the Standard Review Plan. Each of the sections of the plan spell out the areas to be reviewed, the acceptance criteria to be applied, and guidance as to the procedures used to conduct the review. There is a wide variation between and among the sections regarding the scope and depth of review and methods used.

The NRC review is basically an audit of the applicant's design and design methods, intended to provide reasonable assurance that the Commission's criteria and regulations are met. The Staff does not track every element of the design. Every item in the Standard Review Plan is not necessarily checked on every review.

Dr. Mattson noted that the Staff reviews treat only those components and systems directly related to safety. In general, systems and components whose functions are not relied upon in the analysis of design basis events and anticipated transients in the safety analysis report are not reviewed, except to assure they are sufficiently separate from and independent of safety-related systems so that failures in the nonsafety-related equipment do not prevent the operation of safety related equipment.

There is considerable variation in the extent to which the Staff independently checks the designers calculations. In some cases, designer calculations are checked against the Staff's own calculations as in the case of ECCS performance calculations. In other areas, reliance has been placed on applicants' statements that designs have been performed in compliance with ASME and other code requirements. More use is being made of benchmark problems in the engineering area to gain more assurance that the applicants' methods are acceptable. It was also noted that the amount of actual site visits by NRR to inspect hardware has increased.

In response to a question by Dr. Carbon, Dr. Mattson noted that there is very little review of operating and maintenance procedures. There is some review of operator training in the context of the operator licensing program, but the technical and design reviewers make no review of procedures.

Ultimately, reliance is placed on the licensee, the vendor, and the architect engineer, and their quality assurance programs to adequately and consistently implement the design of the plant. The NRC concept of regulation presumes that a large percentage of the design detail will never be checked by the regulating body. A conscientious industry with good quality assurance is needed \_\_\_\_\_ for this concept of regulation to succeed. The Staff believes that a criteria-based audit review is basically a workable system.

It was noted that several areas are in need of upgrading including identification of operating experience, more definitive consideration of operator actions, the review of operating procedures, and more definitive considerations of non-safety equipment. Recommendations concerning these areas will be forthcoming in September.

In response to questions, Dr. Mattson noted that the review process will undergo a number of changes. He believes that the review process will be supplemented in the course of the next several years by a dedicated, retrospective review of designs already in operation and designs already under construction. At the end of this period of retrospective review, new review requirements will be applied to future designs and will define an acceptable audit review for the future. This retrospective review could take two to four years, two years being the approximate time scale it will take to implement the short-term lessons learned, four years being the time scale it will take to implement some of the longer term items.

#### Organizational Structure

Dr. Mattson noted several areas where the organizational structure that implements the review could be improved. He noted reviews are split along technical and project lines. This leads to compartmentalization and specialization of technical review into discrete areas. He noted this approach has not worked as well as it should. He noted a number of deficiencies resulting from a compartmentalized review including:

- . a lack of uniformity across cases
- . inconsistency in depth and technical content of reviews between branches
- . inadequate integration of cross-system interfaces
- . an insufficient awareness by technical reviewers of the relationship of their part of the review to the overall safety of the plant.

Several other operational weaknesses were also noted. Better transition needs to be established between those staff reviewers who perform the operating license reviews and those responsible for the plant during power operation. The TMI-2 accident has also highlighted the important interface between plant operations



and plant design and analysis. Control room layout, operator training, and operating procedures should all have significant cross-fertilization with the design and analysis of plant system

Dr. Mattson noted that for a new design, the audit review takes on a somewhat different character. The entire standard review plan can be applied for such a design.

#### Emergency Planning

Dr. Mattson discussed NRC's role in emergency situations. The NRC's role during and following an accident and the capabilities needed to carry out the activities to implement that role have been under accelerated review since TMI-2. The Task Force on Emergency Planning was established by the Commission on June 7th to critique the NRC's current emergency planning process and to develop a comprehensive action plan. A draft Task Force report has been issued and will be finalized in the near future.

The Emergency Preparedness Task Force report indicated the NRC has not adequately defined its role in emergency response. NRC's response during the accident was an ad hoc response. Emergency planning cuts across several NRC office lines during the process of generating guidance to licensees, however, there are no effective NRC-wide procedures in place or organizational arrangements established to assure that adequate guidance results. This lack is particularly important in view of the many interfaces involved, including the licensee, the state, local authorities and other federal agencies.

The emergency plans of all power reactor licensees have been reviewed by the licensing staff in the past for conformance to the general provisions of

Appendix E to 10CFR50. Recently, additional guidance has been developed, primarily in Regulatory Guide 1.101. This guidance has not been fully implemented. The NRR Staff plans to undertake an intensive effort over the next year to improve the preparedness by licensees at all operating power reactors, and those reactors scheduled for operating license decisions within the next year. This effort will be closely coordinated with the parallel effort by the Office of State Programs to improve state and local response plans. The Staff effort will include upgrading emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 and the implementation of the related recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force.

Similar action plans are under development by each of the affected offices within NRC. Through these plans there needs to be much better definition of accident response roles and better training of the technical and management staff of the NRC for crisis situations like TMI-2.

#### Operator Training and Qualifications

Modifications to the existing training program and examination process for reactor operators will incorporate the lessons learned from TMI-2. Emphasis will be placed on the use of simulators, both as a training device and an examination tool. In the future, each applicant for an operator's license will undergo training on a simulator representative of his facility. The operating portion of the NRC license examination will be conducted on a simulator, an evaluation will be made of an individual's ability to manipulate the controls and to diagnose and respond to abnormal emergency situations.

An applicant for a senior operator's license will have his ability to direct the

activities of reactor operators evaluated during a simulator exercise. Annually, individuals will be required to return to the simulator for training in routine and non-routine operation and for recertification of their ability to carry out the responsibilities of their license.

The curricula for training programs will require greater emphasis on thermodynamics, hydraulic, fluid flow, and heat transfer. Question relating to these subjects will be incorporated into the NRC written examination.

Experience requirements for applicants for senior operator licenses will be increased through further guidance as to what is acceptable power plant experience. In addition, once a plant is operating, an applicant for a senior operator's license must have, at least, three months continuous on-the-job training as an extra man on-shift.

The Lessons Learned Task Force has recommended the addition of a shift technical advisor to the control room operating staff. The role of the shift technical advisor will be to supply additional analytical capability on-shift to support the shift supervisor's command and control functions. The shift technical advisor will have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a science or engineering discipline supplemented by specific training in the response and analysis of the particular plant for transients and accidents. The shift technical advisor is also to perform a routine engineering function as part of the plant operations organization, including the feedback of operating experience.

It was noted that for a person with no previous nuclear experience prior to obtaining an operators license, several requirements must be fulfilled. This person would be required to go through a twelve week fundamentals course and a three month

design lecture course to familiarize the person with the NSSS design. Also required would be a four month simulator course combined with an observation course at an operating power plant. A one year on-the-job training program is also required. An equivalent of approximately two years of training prior to obtaining a license in the power plant is required.

#### Licensee Technical Support

Current practice is for the NRC to review at the DL stage of licensing each applicant's technical resources available to provide back up support for the operating organization. The final safety analysis report is required to provide an organizational chart showing the management of technical support and headquarters structure. It also identifies qualification requirements for headquarters staff personnel. However, once a plant goes into operation there is no further rereview of technical support provisions by the NRC. There is no regulatory guidance that consistently covers the capabilities or role of technical or management personnel during an emergency. As a follow-up to the TMI-2 accident, the Staff is conducting an overall review and evaluation of the management and technical resources available to utilities who own and operate nuclear power plants to handle unusual events or accidents. As a start, the NRC requested all power reactor licensees to provide specific and detailed information that describes the capability of their management and technical staffs. The information was requested in a June 29 letter from Mr. Denton to all power reactor licensees. The deadline for response was July 30th. On the basis of a cursory examination of this information, the Staff is concluding that there will be changes in the requirements for this kind of support personnel.

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#### Command and Control Function

This item was addressed in the Short-term Lessons Learned Task Force report in Section 2.2.2a on control room access. Only a licensed senior operator may direct the activities of licensed operators, hence the shift supervisor is in charge unless relieved by a senior licensed management representative or another shift supervisor. The Staff's position in this regard is for licensees to develop and implement procedures that establish a clear line of authority and responsibility in the control room in the event of an emergency. The line of succession for the person in charge shall be established and limited to persons possessing a current senior reactor operator's license. The plan shall clearly define the lines of communication and authority for plant management personnel not in direct command of operations, including those who report to stations outside the control room.

#### Studies to Correlate Plant Performance with Management Capabilities

Following the completion of a survey to review management and technical resources currently available, it may be possible to derive a correlation between management and technical capabilities, on the one hand, and plant performance on the other. There is some history of NRC evaluating licensee performance. These include an effort in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement designed to develop techniques for evaluating regulatory performance of licensees (or the ability of the licensee to meet regulatory requirements and to avoid the reportable events that appear to be directly under the control of the licensee). Another I&E effort which may be related to this concern is the performance appraisal inspection. Such inspections provide a perspective for evaluating management performance. Performance appraisal inspections are thorough critical reviews of licensee

facilities by a select group of NRC inspectors. Inspections are aimed primarily at the licensee's total control of plant activities. As of the meeting date, only four such inspections had been performed.

Role of NRC Inspector, His Effectiveness, and Can His Effectiveness Be Increased?

Mr. Jordan of I&E noted that the role of the NRC inspection program is providing reasonable assurance that the public health and safety are protected by monitoring licensing activities throughout the facility's lifetime. At facilities under construction, the role is satisfied by an inspection program which verifies that the facility is constructed in accordance with the construction permit and SAR. Verification is done through an auditing program, only a small fraction of what the licensee does is checked. For operating facilities, the inspection program determines that the facility is operated in accordance with the licensing conditions, the technical specifications, and NRC rules and regulations.

The inspection programs for both facilities under construction and for operating facilities are complemented by vendor inspection programs which examine quality assurance measures employed by the nuclear steam system suppliers, architect engineers, and major contractors and suppliers. The I&E program is small in terms of the manpower devoted to it compared to the size of the organizations examined. All NRC inspections are an overlay on the licensee's effort. The licensee has the responsibility for safe operation and safe construction of the plant. The inspector checks the licensee, but does not assume the licensee's primary responsibility.

The NRC inspection efforts are both planned and reactive. The planned program is

implemented through detailed procedures which provide a consistent inspection effort. The reactive program responds to a licensee event report, or a particular problem at a facility.

Inspectors are instructed to examine licensees' activities for apparent unreviewed safety questions when no regulatory requirement has been violated. Individual inspectors who conduct inspections include the specialities of reactor operation, quality assurance, nondestructive examination, safeguards and security, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring. Specific plant problems may require inspection specialists in electrical instrumentation, metallurgy, mechanical engineering or other engineering skills. Approximately two man years of inspection effort are spent on each operating reactor facility.

Mr. Jordan noted that an inspector spends approximately 30% of his available time in the field inspecting. An inspector spends 60% of his time reviewing records in his office and approximately 10% of his time preparing for the next inspection and writing up the results of previous inspections and reviewing items of noncompliance.

Mr. Jordan described how an inspector is able to give attention to safety rather than enforcement of regulations. One way is through an independent inspection effort, where the inspector is not constrained by his detailed procedures. 20% of the inspectors effort is under his own direction where he uses his personnel skills to look into areas where a problem might be. During the independent inspection, he is free to look beyond the regulations. Inspectors are also trained in a program that stresses safety as opposed to stressing the regulatory requirements.

Mr. Jordan noted the performance appraisal team is an additional inspection effort on top of the regular program. The team conducts special inspections at selected facilities which provides an evaluation of the licensee performance and also reviews the implementation of the inspection program on the national scale. This team is limited in size. Only a few facilities are inspected on an annual basis.

In recent years, there have been two major areas for increasing inspector effectiveness. The first is the development of a formalized inspector training program to improve technical and inspection skills. The second area is the adoption of a revised inspection program which places a resident inspector at each operating site and at construction sites in the later stages of construction.

A unit inspection program has been submitted to Congress as a supplement to the 1980 budget. This program will increase the number of tests of the licensee's program by NRC inspectors. Under the unit inspection program, for the first time, some elements of licensees' activities will receive 100% inspection. Areas which will receive 100% inspection over a given time interval include line-up of safety equipment, changes to emergency operating procedures, direct observations of control room activities. Surveillance testing and maintenance inspection will also be substantially increased.

Dr. Lawroski noted that I&E may have to broaden its thinking and start to monitor nuclear suppliers such as NSSS vendors. Inspectors would look at designs and monitor areas where possible technical problems are described to assure they receive proper attention.



### Depth of Knowledge of NRC Inspectors

Inspectors must attend and successfully complete technical courses in their specialty area, or complete an equivalency exam in the course of being assigned responsibility for performing inspections in that area. Qualification of an inspector for a given area is performed by regional evaluation, in addition, to the training program. There is an on-the-job type training program where one inspector accompanies other inspectors in a specialty area.

Typically, a qualified reactor operations inspector will have reactor operating experience. Such experience would be considered a necessary part of his job skills before being hired for a particular job. Inspectors attend a reactor systems course, a simulator course, and then an advanced systems course. Inspectors also attend an effectiveness-type training course on inspection skills. Inspectors are typically graduate engineers with five to ten years industry experience. The same level of qualification and training is required for other inspectors.

### Response to Accident Situations

Changes have already been made in the communications area of the incident response as a result of the Three Mile Island experience. These include manning the Incident Response Center by a duty roster from the I&E headquarters technical staff. A hotline has been installed from each reactor facility to the I&E headquarters office with a branch back to the regional office. Significant incidents are reported directly to headquarters. The headquarters duty officers would then communicate back to the regional duty officer.

A second separate telephone system is being installed. This second line will be used for communicating radiation detection and health physics information in the event of an accident.

Final Questions

Dr. Mattson was asked about whether he thought in terms of technical support groups for both normal and abnormal situations, there is any minimum size user organization. Too small an organization may not have the resource capabilities necessary to run a plant. Dr. Mattson noted that in the past, technical capabilities are looked at more for normal operation than for accidents. A study by the quality assurance branch may state minimum acceptance criteria for technical capabilities. Such direction may take the form of a regulatory guide.

Dr. Mattson made a very general statement in response to questions that it was his opinion that the highest level of utility management seems to be of higher conviction that constructive change needs to occur and that larger utilities with larger corporate resources seem to be more convinced that constructive change needs to occur. He noted this may be an oversimplification and there are probably many exceptions to the rule.

There have been dissenting viewpoints within NRC. The question was resolved some time ago. There have also been dissenting viewpoints in vendor organizations such as the difference in opinion in B&W about the significance of the Davis-Besse incident. Dr. Mattson was asked whether the Staff was taking any steps that would require users or vendors to call differences of opinion to the Staff's attention. Dr. Mattson responded by saying as a general matter 10CFR21 was designed to accomplish some of these things that appear necessary. However, Part 21 may not have been sufficiently well stated or explained to accomplish that function. It may be concluded that Part 21 (Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance) isn't a good vehicle for assuring the identification of differences of opinion.

The meeting adjourned at 5:00 P. M.

Copies of all visual aids and handouts provided during this meeting are on file in the ACRS office. A complete transcript of the open portions of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., or can be obtained from ACE Federal Reporters, Inc., 444 N. Capitol St., Washington, D. C. (202-347-3700).

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(iii) The failure to comply with the terms of any representation made by the credit union to the central credit union or the Facility in any application, certification or other communication; or

(iv) The insolvency of, or appointment of a trustee or receiver for, the credit union; or

(v) An assignment for the benefit of creditors of the credit union; or

(vi) The closing or suspension or revocation of the charter of the credit union, or the taking possession of its business, by any governmental authority; or

(vii) The credit union's use of the proceeds of any advance for a purpose other than the purpose for which the advance was made; or

(viii) The withdrawal of the credit union from membership in the central credit union. 10 The occurrence of any of the events described in subparagraphs (9)(i) through (9)(viii) hereof shall constitute a default under this agreement. The term "insolvency" in subparagraph (9)(iv) has the same meaning as it is given in 12 CFR 700.1 (k). The central credit union with the approval of the Facility may waive a default under this agreement and may reinstate the maturity date on any repayment obligation created hereunder which becomes immediately due and payable as a result of any such default.

(10) Upon the occurrence of a default under this agreement, or at any time thereafter, the central credit union shall have all the rights and remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code and under this agreement, including but not limited to the following: the central credit union may—

(i) Take or retain possession of the collateral, or any part thereof,

(ii) Collect the proceeds of the collateral,

(iii) Notify obligors on the collateral to make payments to the central credit union,

(iv) Sell or otherwise dispose of any part or all of the collateral at public or private proceedings,

(v) Buy the collateral or any part thereof, and

(vi) Retain the collateral, or any part thereof, in satisfaction of any part or all of the obligations secured by the collateral. 10 The proceeds of the collateral, including the proceeds of sale or other disposition thereof, shall be applied by the central credit union (A) first, to the reasonable expenses of collecting such proceeds and money and of taking, holding, and selling the

collateral, including the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred, and (B) then, to the payment of amounts due on all repayment obligations created hereunder. Any surplus then remaining shall be paid or returned to the credit union. If there is a deficiency, the credit union shall be liable for the deficiency. If the central credit union is indebted to the credit union, the central credit union shall have the right to set-off such indebtedness against all amounts due the central credit union on all repayment obligations created hereunder, without regard to when such indebtedness may be due and payable.

#### Credit Reporting

(11) The credit union shall file such reports and provide such information as may be required from time to time by the Facility or by the central credit union with approval of the Facility.

#### Construction and Modification

(12) This agreement shall be construed under and governed by the law of the District of Columbia, including the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted and amended from time to time by the District of Columbia, and the terms used in such Code shall have the same meaning when used in this agreement. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code in this agreement are to such Code as adopted and amended from time to time by the District of Columbia. Unless the Uniform Commercial Code or the context of this agreement otherwise requires, the terms defined in the rules and regulations prescribed by the NCUA Board on behalf of the Facility shall have the same meaning when used in this agreement.

(13) This agreement may be modified from time to time by the NCUA Board. Any such modifications shall be published in the Federal Register and shall become a part of this agreement as of the effective date specified in the Federal Register. The modification shall apply to all advances of Facility funds after such effective date. All such modifications are a part of this agreement, including modifications that occurred prior to the signing of this agreement.

(FR Doc. 79-22751 Filed 7-23-79; 8:45 am)  
BILLING CODE 7530-01-01

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

### Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design; Meeting

The ACRS Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident—Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design, will hold a meeting on August 8, 1979 in Room 1046, 1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555.

In accordance with the procedures outlined in the Federal Register on October 4, 1978, (43 FR 45926), oral or written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far in advance as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the meeting for such statements.

The agenda for subject meeting shall be as follows: *Wednesday, August 8, 1979, 1:00 p.m. until the conclusion of business.*

The Subcommittee may meet in Executive Session, with any of its consultants who may be present, to explore and exchange their preliminary opinions regarding matters which should be considered during the meeting and to formulate a report and recommendation to the full committee.

At the conclusion of the Executive Session, the Subcommittee will discuss with representatives of the NRC Staff, the nuclear industry, various utilities, and their consultants, state and local officials, and other interested persons, the implications of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident, including the underlying causes contributing to the accident.

In addition, it may be necessary for the Subcommittee to hold one or more closed sessions for the purpose of exploring matters involving proprietary information. I have determined, in accordance with Subsection 10(d) of Pub. L. 92-463, that, should such sessions be required, it is necessary to close these sessions to protect proprietary information (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4)).

Further information regarding topics



to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the Designated Federal Employee for this meeting, Mr. Richard K. Major, (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EDT.

Background information concerning this nuclear station can be found in documents on file and available for public inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555 and at the Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Street, Harrisburg, PA 17126

Dated: July 17, 1979.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee, Management Officer.

(FR Doc. 79-22864 Filed 7-23-79; 8:45 am)

BILLING CODE 7580-01-M

#### Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Regulatory Activities; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory Activities will hold an open meeting on August 8, 1979 in Room 1046, 1717 H St., N.W., Washington, DC 20555. Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register on June 27, 1979 (44 FR 37568).

In accordance with the procedures outlined in the Federal Register on October 4, 1978 (43 FR 45926) oral or written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far in advance as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the meeting for such statements.

The agenda for subject meeting shall be as follows: *Wednesday, August 8, 1979. The meeting will commence at 8:45 a.m.*

The subcommittee will hear presentations from the NRC Staff and will hold discussions with this group pertinent to the following: (1) Proposed Regulatory Guide 1.136, Revision 2, "Materials, Construction and Testing of Concrete Containments." (Pre Comment)(2) Proposed Limited Revision of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50, "Air Locks." (Pre Comment)

Other matters which may be of a predecisional nature relevant to reactor

operation or licensing activities may be discussed following this session.

Persons wishing to submit written statements may do so by providing a readily reproducible copy to the Subcommittee at the beginning of the meeting. However, to insure that adequate time is available for full consideration of these comments at the meeting, it is desirable to send a readily reproducible copy of the comments as far in advance of the meeting as practicable to Mr. Gary R. Quittschreiber, the Designated Federal Employee for the meeting, in care of ACRS, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555 or telecopy them to the Designated Federal Employee (202-634-3319) as far in advance of the meeting as practicable. Such comments shall be based upon documents on file and available for public inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the Designated Federal Employee for this meeting, Mr. Gary R. Quittschreiber, (telephone 202/634-3267) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EDT.

Dated: July 18, 1979.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

(FR Doc. 79-22862 Filed 7-23-79; 8:45 am)

BILLING CODE 7580-01-M

[Docket No. 50-321]

#### Georgia Power Co., et al.; Notice of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 67 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-57, issued to Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Electric Membership Corporation, Municipal Electric Association of Georgia and City of Dalton, Georgia, which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Appling County, Georgia. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure setpoint from >1000 psig to >800 psig on low electrohydraulic control oil pressure.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The

Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR § 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated May 14, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 67 to License No. DPR-57, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Appling County Public Library, Parker Street, Baxley, Georgia 31513. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 17th day of July 1979.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
Vernon L. Rooney,

Acting Chief, Operating Reactors Branch No. 3, Division of Operating Reactors.

(FR Doc. 22794 Filed 7-23-79; 8:45 am)

BILLING CODE 7580-01-M

#### OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

##### Privacy Act of 1974; Proposed New Routine Use

AGENCY: Office of Personnel Management.

ACTION: Proposal for a new routine use for an existing system of records.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this document is to give notice, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(11) of the Privacy Act of 1974, of intent to establish a new routine use, for limited duration, covering the disclosure of information to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) from the Central Personnel Data File (CPDF) for current Federal employees.

COMMENT DATE: Any interested party may submit written comments regarding the proposal. To be considered, comments must be received on or before August 23, 1979.

OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION

MEETING OF ACRS  
SUBCOMMITTEE TO DISCUSS UNDERLYING CAUSES  
CONTRIBUTING TO THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT

August 8, 1979

1:00 PM - 6:30 PM  
1717 H Street, Wash., DC - Rm. 1046

- 1) 1:00 P.M. - NRC Regulatory Review (R. Mattson/V. Stello)
  - a. Scope of NRC review
    1. How detailed is the NRR review in the areas of design, operations, operations procedures, in maintenance, etc. For example, does the staff review the significance of measuring pressure vessel level by pressure gages?
    2. What design areas are not looked at?
    3. Is the scope of this review too broad or too narrow? Is the depth too extreme or too shallow?
    4. If the review is considered inadequate because of breadth or depth; what are the deficiencies; how serious are they; what should be done to correct them; what would the cost be, etc.?
  - b. Philosophically, is the system of placing reliance for safety on the user a good one? Is it adequate? How does it compare with other nations?
  - c. There has been a series of errors in seismic design recently. Does this mean that the system has broken down in this area? If so, why? In what other areas may there be deficiencies and what other areas may be receiving inadequate attention?
  - d. What is the role of the NRC Inspector? Is he effective? Can his effectiveness be increased?
  - e. What depth of knowledge should the NRC Staff have in such areas as construction, hardware, plant behavior, operations, maintenance.

II. Technical Qualifications and Management Structure of User Organizations (R. Mattson/b. Lee)

- a. What is the latest thinking regarding reactor operator training and qualifications including the role and qualifications of the shift supervisor and the shift safety engineer?
- b. What kind of technical support groups are needed by user organizations for normal and abnormal operations? Where should they be located? How large should they be? In what broad technical areas should they have competence, etc? How much should a utility rely upon a reactor vendor or architect engineer for technical support in abnormal situations?
- c. What are the role, authority and responsibility of people above the shift supervisor in providing technical direction for the handling or recovery of a reactor in the case of a serious accident? What qualifications should these people (plant superintendent, site manager, vice-president for power production) have?
- d. Have studies been made to correlate plant performance with management capabilities (however, they might be defined)? Would such studies merit consideration, if they have not already been made?
- e. What is the current thinking of industrial groups on the above topics?

III. What is NRC's Role Regarding Item II above? (R. Mattson)

- a. What should NRC's role be regarding the training and testing of utility personnel?
- b. What is the NRC role and what capability should the NRC have to respond to accident situations?
- c. How will this role be meshed with that of utility and industrial groups?
- d. Are new laws/rules needed to provide for suitable coordination?

IV. 2:30 PM - General Discussion

*Original*

TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS

August 8, 1979  
Washington, D. C.

ATTENDEES LIST:

ACRS

- M. Carbon, Chairman
- M. Bender
- W. Kerr
- W. Mathis
- C. Siess
- S. Lawroski
- H. Etherington
- W. Lipinski, ACRS Consultant
- R. Fraley, DFE, ACRS Staff
- R. Major, ACRS Staff

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- W. Minners
- H. K. Rug
- J. Milhoan
- G. Holahan
- R. Tedesco
- R. Mattson
- E. Jordan
- R. Cudlin
- J. Conran
- J. Hesner

Washington Public Power Supply System

- A. Kimmins
- J. Holder

The News World

- T. Azrs
- F. Christofferson

AJF

- F. Graham
- R. Szalay

ITNA

- M. Tillotson
- J. Schneider
- R. Pierce

Others

- K. Layer, BBR
- R. Leyse, EPRI
- R. Sunta, Nucleonics Week/Inside NRC
- W. House II, Bechtel
- D. Knith, RMC
- R. Borsum, B&W
- L. Shuloc, UCS
- D. Berick, Envir. Policy Inst.
- T. Martin, NUTECA

Others

- Jill A. MacNerce, UPI
- Richard E. Gallagher, BPC
- George White, MSU
- Donald F. Knuth, KMC
- W. Wade Larson, Boston Edison Co.
- Noel Shirley, GE
- Jane Gurin, Oak Ridge
- George White, Middle South
- Douglas R. Jaquette, Stone & Webster
- Donald N. Rasch, EPA
- Steve Wywkoys, McGraw-Hill
- Alan J. Weisbard, SPP&T

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