METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603 TELEPHONE 215 – 929-3601

April 28, 1976
GQL 0634

RECEIVED
MAY 3 1976
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attn: R. W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Sirs:

Docket No. 50-289
Operating License DPR-50

In our letter GQL 1632, dated November 3, 1975, regarding missing Inservice Inspection baseline data, we committed to a liquid penetrant examination of two six-inch by six-inch patches of Reactor Vessel Closure Head cladding to be performed during the present outage.

Since that time, the ASME Code Committee has approved the deletion of all cladding inspection requirements. This change will be reflected in the Summer, 1976 Addenda to the Code. This information is per telephone conversation between Mr. J. Gorman (MPR Associates) and Mr. O. Heddon, of the ASME Code Committee, on April 8, 1976.

The deletion of cladding examination from code requirements will be a basis for incorporation of the same deletion into a future proposed technical specification change for the Inservice Inspection Program. With the anticipated deletion of these examinations from the technical specification, we feel there is no justification for recreating a baseline that will not be used again, especially when the attendant radiation exposures are considered. Consequently, we do not plan to perform this inspection.

All other commitments for examinations this refueling outage have been met.

Sincerely,

R. C. Arnold
Vice President

RCA:JJM:eg

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY SUBSIDIARY OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION

POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANIA 19603 TELEPHONE 215 – 929-3601

May 7, 1976
GQL 0660

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Inspection Progress
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Docket No. 50-289
Operating License No. DPR-50
IE Bulletin 76-05

This letter and the attached enclosure are provided in response to your IE Bulletin 76-05, and is being submitted one day late in accordance with the May 7, 1976 conversation between our Mr. Moran and your Mr. Spessard.

With regard to the Westinghouse Service letter referenced in the bulletin, we had not received it prior to receipt of the bulletin. Please be advised, however, that we have subsequently established communications with Westinghouse regarding the details of this matter, and will continue working with them, as may be appropriate, until this matter is resolved.

We believe our actions as presented in the attached enclosure are sufficiently responsive to the concerns raised by the subject bulletin. Should you, however, have any additional questions or concerns, please contact me.

Sincerely,

R. C. Arnold
Vice President

RCA:JJN:dlm

Enclosure

File: 61.0016.0003.0053

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Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Docket No. 50-289
Operating License No. DPR-50

POOR ORIGINAL

Response to IE Bulletin 76-05

We have found that there are a number of BFD relays in use on safety related systems. The relays are used in two applications:

1. The "Y" relay located on DHP Westinghouse Circuit Breakers and

2. The control relays for the 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators.

The relays on the DHP circuit breakers have a molded coil (Coil number 506C322G02). We believe these coils are not subject to the failure mentioned in the IE Bulletin and therefore no further action is required. There are 29 breakers on the 1D and 1E 4KV busses. Each breaker has one relay.

There are 34 BFD relays on each diesel generator (68 total). Each relay is believed to have the coil indicated as "defective" by the IE Bulletin (Coil style 503C428G21). Many of the relays are energized for long periods of time. Failure of some of the relays could affect the operability of the diesel generator.

Our discussion with Westinghouse indicates that the coils/relays are not subject to failure/sticking at normal voltages (125 VDC ± 10%). Reliable operation could therefore be expected up to 137 VDC. Our battery charger float (normal) voltage is 130 V ± 1V. Equalize charge is set at 135 volts ± 2 volts. The battery is normally put on equalize when specific gravity readings drift down, or following the refueling interval load test. The duration of the equalize charge is normally 24 to 48 hours.

Two continuously energized relays on the A Diesel Generator were checked. They were selected because they represent the worst case regarding aging.

The CF1 coil outside temperature was measured as 80°C with an ambient temperature of 22°C. The supply voltage was measured as 129.6 VDC.

Relay Designation	Physical Condition	Dropout Time
CF 1	Showed some signs of heat aging. The black spool piece was broken or broke during disassembly. The nylon sleeve was discolored and brittle.	19.8 MS
CF 2	Showed some signs of heat aging. Nylor sleeve discolored.	20.1 MS

1490 030

A functional test was performed on all the BFD relays in the A Diesel Generator cabinet. All relays responded properly to the test.

The relay coils show adverse effects from the heat; however, we believe the degree of degradation does not indicate imminent failure, even considering the number of relays in the system. We will evaluate ventilation of the cabinet.

We plan to replace all the subject relays during the next refueling.

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