	CONTROL BLOCK:
01	FILI 9 RI PI 3 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O I	SOURCE SU SI DOCKET NUMBER SO SO EVENT DATE 14 15 REPORT DATE 83
0 2	At 1153 in Mode 1, it was reported that the Channel "D" Reactor Building
0 3	High Pressure bistable tripped. This created an event contrary to Technical
0 4	Specification 3.3.1.1. No effect upon the plant or general public as redun-
0 5	dant Reactor Protection Channels were operable. This is the first occurrence
0 6	of this type reported.
0 7	
0 6	
09	COOR COOR SUSCOSE COMPONENT COOR SUSCOSE SUSCO
	TO REPORT YEAR 7 9
10	The cause of this event is attributed to a buildup of dust on the shaft of
	Reactor Building pressure switch BS-62-PS. The switch was disassembled.
12	cleaned, reassembled, and returned to service at 1455 following satisfactory
13	completion of SP-112. Calibration of the Reactor Protection System.
14	100
1 5	STATUS STATUS OTHER STATUS OF DISCOLERY
16	Z 3 Z 3 NA NA NA
11	O O O Z D NA
	OI OI OI OI OI
	LOSS OF DESCRIPTION NA 1176 206
	NEC USE CHILY NA NEC USE CHILY
. •	J. Cooper PHONE (904) 795-6486

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Report No.:

50-302/79-086/03L-0

2. Facility:

Crystal River Unit #3

3. Report Date:

10 October 1979

4. Occurrence Date:

16 September 1979

5. Identification of Occurrence:

One reactor protection channel (Channel "D" Reactor Building High Pressure) inoperable contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.1.1.

6. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 1 Power Operation (72%)

7. Description of Occurrence:

At 1153, it was reported that the Channel "D" Reactor Building High Pressure bistable tripped. The affected channel was placed in the tripped mode at 1252. Further investigation revealed that Reactor Building pressure switch BS-62-PS had failed. Maintenance restored operability. BS-62-PS was returned to service at 1455 following post-maintenance testing.

8. Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event is attributed to a buildup of dust on the shaft in Reactor Building pressure switch PS-62-PS.

9. Analysis of Occurrence:

No effect upon the plant or general public as redundant reactor protection channels were operable.

10. Corrective Action:

The pressure switch was disassembled, cleaned, reassembled, and returned to service at 1455 following satisfactory completion of SP-112, Calibration of the Reactor Protection System. Reactor Building pressure switches associated with redundant channels "A", "B", and "C" will be inspected as soon as possible for generic implications. (Reference: W/R 9958)

11. Failure Data:

This is the first occurrence of this type reported.