NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | N Y J A F 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE (7-14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15-25) | LICENSE TYPE (26-30) | CAT (57-58)

CON'T

01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 (7) | 0 9 2 6 7 9 (8) | 1 0 0 9 7 9 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER (60-68) | EVENT DATE (69-74) | REPORT DATE (75-80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | SEE ATTACHMENT

03 |

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09 | SYSTEM CODE: S F (11) | CAUSE CODE: A (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE: E (13) | COMPONENT CODE: X X X X X X (14) | COMP. SUBCODE: Z (15) | VALVE SUBCODE: Z (16)

(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 7 9 (21-22) | — (23) | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 6 (24-26) | / (27) | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 1 (28-29) | REPORT TYPE T (30) | — (31) | REVISION NO. 0 (32)

ACTION TAKEN: X (18) | FUTURE ACTION: F (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) | HOURS (22): 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: S 4 2 0 (2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | SEE ATTACHMENT

11 |

12 |

13 |

14 |

15 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) | % POWER: 0 5 2 (29) | OTHER STATUS: NA (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32): Architect-Engineer

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35): NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36): NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE: Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39): NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18 | NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41): NA

1130 016

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19 | TYPE: Z (42) | DESCRIPTION: NA

7 9 0 1 1 0 3 7 9

PUBLICITY

20 | ISSUED: N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45): NA

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER: W. Verne Childs

PHONE: (315) 342-3840

GPO 911-228

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-056/01T-0

During normal operation, the plant staff was informed by the Architect-Engineer that certain cabling associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inboard steam supply isolation valve and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) did not meet the separation criteria required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This discovery was made as a result of the Fire Hazard Analyses being conducted by the Architect-Engineer.

The six (6) cables in question which could affect the control of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI System steam supply (23-MOV-15) are located in the same cable tray as some ADS cables. Discovery of this condition is considered a reportable event under the circumstances described in Technical Specification Appendix A, Paragraph 6.9.A.4.1.

The only manner in which improper operation or an undesired situation could result is an event which could cause simultaneous failure of both ADS and HPCI cables to the extent that both systems would be inoperable.

In order to preclude spurious closure of 23-MOV-15, the valve has been deenergized at the motor control center by racking out the breaker. In addition, to satisfy the requirements of primary containment isolation, the outside isolation valve for the HPCI system (23-MOV-16) is being maintained in the closed position (this it its normal position) and checked daily as required by Technical Specification Appendix A, Paragraph 3.7.1.

In addition, the Architect-Engineer informed the plant that other (third party cables) could affect the operation of this valve because of their proximity to both HPCI and ADS cables. There are at present, two alternate solutions to correct both the problems set forth in this report. One solution is to reroute the cables. The second solution is to install a redundant ADS control system. The advantages and disadvantages of these corrective actions are being reviewed in detail. The solution decided upon will be implemented during the forthcoming refueling outage.

In view of the arrangement of the valve noted above, the event does not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.