NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	LICENSEE CODE (1)	N Y J A F 1
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 01	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 9 0 7 7 9
	REPORT DATE (9)	1 0 0 4 7 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 SEE ATTACHMENT

09	SYSTEM CODE (11)	R B
	CAUSE CODE (12)	E
	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	E
	COMPONENT CODE (14)	I N S T R U
	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	X
	VALVE SUBCODE (16)	Z
(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	7 9
	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	0 6 5
		/
	OCCURRENCE CODE	0 3
	REPORT TYPE	L
	REVISION NO.	0
	ACTION TAKEN (18)	A
	FUTURE ACTION (19)	Z
	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	Z
	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	Z
	HOURS (22)	0 0 0 0
	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	Y
	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	Y
	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	N
	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)	G 0 8 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 SEE ATTACHMENT

15	FACILITY STATUS (28)	C
	% POWER (29)	0 0 2
	OTHER STATUS (30)	NA
	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	A
	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)	Operator Observation
16	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	Z
	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	Z
	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	NA
	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)	NA
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER (37)	0 0 0
	TYPE (38)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (39)	NA
18	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER (40)	0 0 0
	DESCRIPTION (41)	NA
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE (42)	Z
	DESCRIPTION (43)	NA
20	PUBLICITY ISSUED (44)	N
	DESCRIPTION (45)	NA
	NRC USE ONLY	

1139 152

NAME OF PREPARER W. V. Childs

PHONE: (315)342-3840

7910100453

GPO 917-926

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-065/03L-0

During normal startup operations, the Rod Sequence Control System failed in such a manner as to not allow normal control rod insertion or withdrawal. The scram function for control rods remained unaffected. The Rod Sequence Control System maintained control of the rod withdrawal sequence by not allowing any motion, thus the system performed its intended function as required by Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 3.3.B.3.a.

Since the Rod Sequence Control System maintained control of the withdrawal sequence as noted above, the event did not represent a significant hazard to public health and safety.

Investigation revealed a failed relay on one of the printed circuit boards associated with Control Rod Group 3. Replacement of the relay restored normal operation of the system.