

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: ①

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 N Y J A F I 00-00000-0000 411111
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 ⑤

CONT
01 L 05000333 090679 100379
7 8 REPORT SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 ⑨

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

02 Please See Attachment
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09 S F X Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
7 8 SYSTEM CODE 9 10 CAUSE CODE 11 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 COMPONENT CODE 13 COMP. SUBCODE 14 VALVE SUBCODE 15 16

⑬ 17 179 064 03 L NC
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 EVENT YEAR 23 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 24 OCCURRENCE CODE 27 REPORT TYPE 30 REVISION 32

ACTION TAKEN ⑮ FUTURE ACTION ⑯ EFFECT ON PLANT ⑰ SHUTDOWN METHOD ⑱ HOURS ⑳ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED ㉓ NRPD-4 FORM SUB. ㉔ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER ㉕ COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ㉖

10 Please See Attachment
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15 C 003 NA A Operator Observation
7 8 FACILITY STATUS 9 % POWER 10 OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32

16 Z Z NA NA
7 8 ACTIVITY CONTENT 9 RELEASED OF RELEASE 10 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36

17 000 Z NA
7 8 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 9 NUMBER 10 TYPE 11 DESCRIPTION 39

18 000 NA
7 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES 9 NUMBER 10 DESCRIPTION 41

19 Z NA
7 8 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 9 TYPE 10 DESCRIPTION 43

20 NJ NA 1123 016
7 8 PUBLICITY 9 ISSUE 10 DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY 58 69

NAME OF PREPARER W. Verne Childs

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-064/03L-0

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During normal startup operations, while conducting Operations Surveillance Test F-ST-4E titled "HPCI Sub-system Logic Functional Test," which was being conducted to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specifications Appendix A, Table 3.2-2, the motor on the systems Condensate Storage Tank suction valve failed. At this time reactor pressure was between 100-150 psig.

After extensive review by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC), it was determined that the failed motor should be replaced by an identical motor from the system's torus suction valve (23-MOV-57). This latter suction valve provides an alternate and secondary source of water to the HPCI system. It was further directed by the PORC that 23-MOV-57 be placed in the open position in order to allow the HPCI system to take suction from the torus if required. In addition, the other torus suction valve (23-MOV-58) was to be verified closed to satisfy primary containment isolation requirements contained in Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 3.7.1. Subsequently, the motor was removed from 23-MOV-57 as directed by the PORC, however, the valve was not placed in the open position. This condition was discovered approximately five hours after reactor pressure was increased above 150 psig, thus, the torus was not automatically available to the HPCI system for a five-hour period during which system operability was required by Technical Specifications. Since the condensate storage tank suction valve to the HPCI system was in its normal open position, and both condensate storage tanks were nearly full, some 300,000 gallons of water was available to the HPCI system in the event its operation was required. In view of this large reserve of water in the condensate storage tanks, the HPCI system would have operated normally. Minimal safety significance occurred from this event since the system would have operated automatically for a period of more than one hour before manual opening of the torus suction valve would have been required.

As soon as the condition was discovered, 23-MOV-57 was placed in the open position and the position was logged on a daily basis until the motor was replaced and proper operation was demonstrated. The motor was replaced on September 14, 1979 and found acceptable by completion of Operations Surveillance Test F-ST-4D titled "HPCI MOV Operability Test."

Investigation into the cause of not opening the valve at the proper time revealed the plant's management did not adequately communicate to the plant's Operations and Maintenance personnel the importance of placing the valve in the open position prior to the commencement of the repair. This point was brought to the attention of the Shift Supervisor and the significance of this event has been discussed with the Operations Department.

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