



SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT □ 6201 S Street, Box 15830, Sacramento, California 95813; (916) 452-3211

September 12, 1979

Mr. R. H. Engelken  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region V Office of Inspection & Enforcement  
1990 North California Boulevard  
Walnut Creek Plaza, Suite 202  
Walnut Creek, California 94596

RE: Operating License DPR-54  
Docket No. 50-312  
Reportable Occurrence 79-10

Dear Mr. Engelken:

In accordance with Technical Specifications for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Section 6.9.4.2b, and Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.b.2. the Sacramento Municipal Utility District is hereby submitting a thirty-day report of Reportable Occurrence 79-10.

On August 29, 1979, during normal routine operations, it was noticed that the back-lighted push buttons (BLPB's) for breaker 52-3B18 were not lit. The light bulbs were changed but the BLPB's still did not light up. A check of the breaker revealed that the D.C. control power switch was in the off position. The switch was placed in the on position and since the 52-3B18 breaker feeds the "B" NSCW pump, applicable Operational Readiness Verification Surveillance Tests were performed.

The configuration of the 480-volt switchgear is such that two breakers are mounted vertically in a common cubicle. Access to the control power switch is obtained through the back of the cubicle. The back of the cubicle is common to both of the breakers, and the D.C. control power switches are mounted in close proximity of each other. On the day of the occurrence, preventive maintenance was being performed on breaker 52-3B17. This breaker shares the same cubicle as 52-3B18. It is believed that the D.C. control power for the 52-3B18 breaker may inadvertently have been turned off during the preventive maintenance work on the 52-3B17 breaker.


It is the District's contention that this occurrence was an isolated case. In addition, since the BLPB's in the control room indicate whether D.C. control power is available, loss of D.C. control power to a breaker is readily detectable. Control room personnel monitor the control panels regularly and it is unlikely that loss of control power to SFAS equipment would be undetected for any appreciable length of time.

7909210 342

984010

There were no power reductions or plant transients associated with this event.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. J. Richman". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above the typed name.

J. J. Mattimoe  
Assistant General Manager  
and Chief Engineer

JJM:RJR:RWC:HH:slk