LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Value
01	LICENSEE CODE (2)	N Y J A F 1
01	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0
01	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
01	CAT (5)	
01 (CON'T)	REPORT SOURCE (6)	X
01	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3
01	EVENT DATE (8)	0 8 3 0 7 9
01	REPORT DATE (9)	0 9 1 2 7 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 Please See Attachment

03

04

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Line	Field	Value
09	SYSTEM CODE (11)	S H
09	CAUSE CODE (12)	B
09	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	C
09	COMPONENT CODE (14)	Z Z Z Z Z Z
09	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	Z
09	VALVE SUBCODE (16)	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 9	—	0 4 6	/	0 3	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
F	Z	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 Please See Attachment

11

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13

14

POOR ORIGINAL

Line	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
15	G	0 0 0	NA	D	Notified by A/E

Line	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
16	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Line	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
17	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Line	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
18	0 0 0	NA

960076

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

Line	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
19	Z	NA

7909180 379

PUBLICITY

Line	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)
20	N	NA

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER W. Verne Childs PHONE: 315-342-3840

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-046/03T-0

While in a cold shutdown condition and during a study being performed by the Architect Engineer, the Architect Engineer identified deficiencies in the design of the cable separation between the ADS System and the HPCI System. Specifically, the study determined that cable No. 1HP1ARC103 which is the control cable for the HPCI System Steam Supply inside isolation valve (23-MOV-15) and cable Nos. 1LKDAR020 and 021 which are thermocouple extension cables for the HPCI System Steam Line Leak Detection System were physically routed in some areas within the same cable tray sections as those cables which provide power to those safety relief valves utilized as ADS valves.

Since the ADS and HPCI Systems are considered diverse counterparts and as such are considered as Division I and Division II, respectively, the isolation system for the HPCI Steam Line should be physically separated from the ADS System. The Architect Engineer and FitzPatrick taff have been in contact with the Nuclear Steam Supply System Vendor and it appears that while the cable routing currently used does not appear to disagree with the Nuclear Steam Supply Vendors design specification for Electrical Equipment and Separation of Safe-Guard Systems, the conflict should be eliminated by rerouting the cables in certain areas.

In order for this event to cause a decrease in safe-guard equipment capabilities, the subject cables would be required to undergo a phenomenon known as a "double hot short" or be simultaneously destroyed by a significant fire. In view of this, the event did not represent any significant hazard to the public health and safety.

A plant modification was implemented to reroute portions of the control cable for 23-MOV-15 and the thermocouple extension cables for the HPCI Steam Leak Detection System. This was completed prior to plant startup. The new cable routing was verified to meet the separaton requirements for Division I and Division II cables and following installation logic functional tests were conducted with satisfactory results to verify proper installation of the cables.