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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During routine surveillance testing of the MSIVs, inboard valve V2-80A in the "A" main steam line was successfully closed but when positioned to open was found to be only partially open. This was verified by both the valves' position lights and main steam flow indication. The valve was then positioned to closed and was verified to have closed properly by observing main steam flow indication. The valve position lights, however, indicated that the valve was still partially open. Maintenance personnel investigated the occurrence and observed that the actuator spring plate was binding on its guide rods.

The actuator is designed such that either air or spring force is capable of closing the valve. Tech. Spec. Section 3.7.D.1 requires that these valves be operable during reactor power operation. Although V2-80A was capable of closure pneumatically, the design bases of MSIVs requires that they be capable of operating on both air and spring force during reactor operation. The plant was maintained as allowed by Tech. Spec. Section 3.7.D.2 when V2-86A the outboard MSIV in main steam line "A" was closed. This valve was maintained closed during the time V2-80A was declared inoperable. Based on the above, there were no adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public. A similar occurrence was reported to the Commission in RO 79-11/3L.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to the spring plate binding on the guide shaft(s). The surface of the guide shafts was smoothed. The valve was successfully stroked several times, verified operable and returned to service.

During the upcoming refueling outage, V2-80A's actuator will be dismantled and examined for wear. Guide rods and spring plate bushings will be inspected and repaired as required. The guide rods and spring plates of all other MSIVs will be examined for wear and disassembled and repaired as necessary.