

ENCLOSURE

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANT, ALL UNITS

UNACCEPTABLE QA DOCUMENTATION FOR

GLAZER STEEL MATERIAL

10CFR 50.55(e) REPORT NO. 1 (INTERIM)

NCR HNP-A-058

On July 17, 1979, TVA informed NRC-OIE inspector W. B. Swan of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR 50.55(e) regarding questionable QA documentation on steel received from Glazer Steel and Aluminum (Glazer), Knoxville, Tennessee. This is the first interim report on this deficiency. We anticipate transmitting the final report to NRC-OIE on or before February 16, 1980.

Description of Deficiency

On July 5, 1979, two shipments (two truckloads) of steel procured to ASTM A-6 and A-36 requirements for general use as QA material arrived at Hartsville Nuclear Plant from Glazer with the steel in bundles but with no heat numbers attached. A Glazer driver proceeded to attach identification tags showing heat numbers to the bundles. TVA QC employees questioned the driver and he indicated he did not know exactly which tag went with which bundle. TVA then refused to accept delivery of the two truckloads. The steel was then returned to Glazer, tagged by Glazer, and returned to Hartsville Nuclear Plant where it was placed in the nonconforming materials storage area.

Since Glazer indicated that one truckload was all one type of material (1 inch by 20 feet round bar) of one heat number, and the other truckload was three types of material (7/8 inch by 20 feet round bar, 1 inch by 20 feet round bar, and 3/8 inch by 8 inches by 20 feet flat bar) with one heat number per type, it is possible that the proper heat numbers could be or have been placed on the material bundles by properly authorized employees. The truck drivers are not authorized employees, however.

Glazer employees indicated in discussions with TVA employees that mill tags are removed upon receipt of steel and Glazer tags are substituted with proper heat numbers noted thereon. They further indicated that attachment of identification tags showing heat numbers on arrival at the destination point was standard practice. Also, TVA performed a QA survey of Glazer on June 25, 1979, and determined that the Glazer QA program was unacceptable due to insufficient procedures in material identification and control. From this survey, action was initiated to remove Glazer from the TVA listing provided to construction sites of suppliers approved to furnish QA materials requiring Certified Material Test Reports (CMTR).

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This deficiency is reportable due to the question TVA has about documentation and certification of material received at Hartsville and other TVA nuclear plants. TVA has no problem with material shipped directly from the steel mill to TVA nuclear plant sites wherein Glazer acted as an "arms length" broker. Direct or "drop shipped" material was indicated by Glazer to amount to 80 or 90 percent of all Glazer shipments to Hartsville Nuclear Plant.

Cause of the Deficiency

The cause of the deficiency is an inadequate material identification and control program at Glazer.

Safety Implication

This is still under investigation. At this time, TVA has no knowledge of any material received which was other than specified.

Corrective Action

Glazer was removed from the TVA CMTR listing provided to construction sites. Other corrective action will be addressed in the next report on this deficiency.

Means Taken to Prevent Recurrence

QA material will henceforth not be obtained from Glazer unless it is shipped directly from the steel mill to the site until such time that an adequate level of QA is achieved and maintained at the Glazer warehouse.

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