

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL RECORDED INFORMATION)

1 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
3 9 14 15 25 26 30 37 38

1 | X | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 2 | 7 | 18 | 9
3 50 51 58 59 64 65 68 69

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 | On August 24, 1978, while the Unit's A/E was conducting a review of cable splices made
 3 | inside containment, it was discovered that certain safety related valves did not have
 4 | cable splices, as indicated in the TMI-2 FSAR, but were instead connected to terminal
 5 | blocks as initially installed.

9 | I | C | 11 | A | 12 | F | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16 |
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

17 | 7 | 8 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 24 | 26 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 29 | T | 30 | 1 | 32 |
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | Z | 25 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

0 | The cables to these valves were overlooked by the A/E at the time modifications were
 1 | being performed. The cables requiring splicing have been identified. Those required
 2 | for heatup were spliced and fitted with heat shrink tubing prior to heatup. The re-
 3 | mainder requiring splicing and heat shrinking was accomplished prior to critical-
 4 | ity.

5 | G | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | D | 31 | Review of cable splices by A/E | 32
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | _____ | 36 | NA | 36
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

3 | 1 | 44 | Weekly News Release | 45
44 45 46 47 48 49 50

NAME OF PREPARER J. R. Stair PHONE: 215-929-3601 Ext. 118

7905020178

GPO 1974-26

NARRATIVE TO LER 78-51/1T-1

In response to the TMI-2 FSAR, Supplement 3, Question 042.22, and to IE Bulletin 78-02, Met-Ed stated that cables inside containment connected to equipment required for a safe shutdown of the Unit were removed from terminal blocks, butt spliced and covered with heat shrink tubing. Contrary to this, while conducting a review of the cable splices on August 24, 1978, the Unit's A/E (Burns & Roe) discovered that certain safety related valves did not have cable splices as assumed. This situation is considered reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i.

The following valves did not have cable splices made: DC-V114, WDL-V1095, NM-V104, SV-V54, DH-V1, DH-V171, RC-V149, RC-V1, RC-V3, RR-V79 and RR-V26A through E. The cables to these valves were not identified by the A/E at the time modifications were being performed to the other required cables and were, therefore, missed. Except for RR-V79 and RR-V26A through E, these cables were butt spliced and fitted with heat shrink tubing prior to reaching criticality. RR-V79 and RR-V26A through E will not have their cables modified because they are not required for safe shutdown per GDC 57, and because their motor control center breakers are locked open.

To allow for entry into Mode 4 on 8-27-78, for M.S. Relief Valve testing, the valves were repaired or were to be administratively controlled in their conservative position. The intention was to place NM-V104 and SV-V54 in their ES positions which is closed, and open the breakers. However, due to a communications misunderstanding, this information was not fully understood by Operations Personnel, and TMI-2 entered Modes 4 and 3 with NM-V104 open and SV-V54 closed but with its breaker closed. Upon discovery on 8-28-78, the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 was entered, and the two valves were closed and their respective breakers opened.