Facility: DRESDEN   **Exam Date: April 8 - 17, 2019**

Admin JPMs	1 ADMIN Topic and K/A	2 LOD (1-5)	3 Attributes							4 Job Content		5 U/E/S	6 Explanation
			I/C Focus	Cues	Critical Steps	Scope (N/B)	Overlap	Perf. Std.	Key	Minutia	Job Link		
SRO-A1.1 A-N-1-S	Conduct of Operations 2.1.8	3						X	X			~~E~~ S	NRC: Section II Additional Compensatory Required should be answered either yes or no, either is not acceptable. The key is the term required. If compensatory measures are not required per the procedure or TRM, then this should be "No". The Key does not have the Fire Marshall (Designee) Authorization signed and dated in Section II. Response: Compensatory actions are/are not required, key updated. Key corrected to include signature and date. Revised wording of initial condition 5. Revised initiating cue to specify which attachments are to be completed. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Revised standard for step 2. Annotated step 6 as critical. Revised standard for step 13 to N/A and updated key. Annotated step 22 as critical and reworded standard. For all Admin JPMs, left the actual testing environment blank on the JPM summary sheet to allow for testing in the Simulator or Classroom.
SRO-A1.2 A-N-2-S	Conduct of Operations 2.1.20	2							X			~~E~~ S	NRC: Could not assess SY-AA-101-132 as it and a key were not provided. Assuming this material is safeguards information, otherwise would have been considered UNSAT. Response: Safeguards info. Revised initial condition 4 to read 24 hours from now. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Reworded cue after step 1 to actions vice manipulations. Created 2nd cue sheet to hand out to examinee.
SRO-A2 A-N-3-S	Equipment Control 2.2.12	3						X				~~U~~ S	NRC: The initiating cue requires the applicant to determine. "what actions (if any) are required". The performance standard for JPM Critical Step 6 just indicates, "Reports that the surveillance does NOT meet all acceptance criteria and declares system inoperable." What Tech Specs/ ODCM actions are entered? This is knowledge that must be demonstrated to make this an SRO level JPM. LOD 3 with determination of TS/ODCM requirements.

													Response: Replaced JPM with Review Calculated Drywell Leakrate And Identify Tech Specs. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section.
SRO-A3 A-N-4-S	Radiation Control 2.3.13	3										S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Revised note prior to step 1 regarding performance order of JPM steps. Moved content from the element column of steps 3, 4 and 6 to the standard column of those steps.
SRO-A4 A-N-5-S	Emergency Procedures/Plan 2.4.41	3					X					E S	NRC: Performance standard for Critical Step 2 should be to complete initial roll call on NARS line within 15 minutes of classification of event. **TIME CRITICAL** Response: Removed reference to MSIV closure from initial conditions. Added 2/3 RB vent rad level rising to initial conditions. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added information to note following step 1 for clarification of classification methods. Added cue stating verifier not available for NARS form. Updated KEY with values form weather data handout. Identified non-critical information on KEY (highlighted but not circled) NRC: JPM does not require applicant to transmit NARS form. Emergency classification is only time critical applicant action. All NRC comments identified during the validation are incorporated.
RO-A1.1 A-N-1-R	Conduct of Operations 2.1.18	2		X								E S	NRC: Initial conditions require applicant to, "complete the log for the pump data on Appendix A, Unit 2 NSO MODE 1, 2, and 3 REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE LOG, using the data provided above." The JPM lacks critical steps to complete the total leakage block assessing whether or not total leakage exceeded TS/surveillance acceptance criteria. Enhancement since the total value of leakage does not exceed surveillance acceptance criteria. Establish a range of calculated values to the tenth place. Response: Ranges calculated, added to JPM. Step to determine Total Leakage added. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Revised wording in note prior to step 1.

RO-A1.2 A-N-2-R	Conduct of Operations 2.1.25	2											S	NRC: This JPM does not adequately discriminate an operator's competency. LOD 1. Validation time appears to be too long based on required operator actions. Response: JPM determined to be acceptable during onsite validation. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. NRC: LOD reassessed as 2 following validation.
RO-A2 A-N-3-R	Equipment Control 2.2.12	2	X					X					E̶ S	NRC: In what capacity are the candidates provided the SBLC Tank Boron concentration in order to verify the acceptance criteria in TS 3.1.7, Figure 2 is met? Key does not include the page with SBLC tank temperature recorded. Response: Added SBLC Tank boron concentration to initial conditions. SBLC tank temperature is provided in the DOS (previous to the pages in the KEY) that is supplied to the examinee. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section.
RO-A3 A-N-4-R	Radiation Control 2.3.11	2											E̶ S	NRC: A range of calculated answers should be established based on the potential number of decimal places used by the applicant for each calculated value. **FREE SAMPLE** Response: Ranges calculated, added to JPM. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added note clarifying why procedure step 4 is N/A. Added step for signing that calculations are complete.

Simulator/In-Plant JPMs	1 Safety Function and K/A													
S1 S-N-a	1 201003 A2.02	3											S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Identified steps 4, 10, 16, 18 and 21 as critical. Identified step 15 as not critical. Reworded the element of step 18 to match step 7. Added "by one or more of the following" to the standard of step 20. Added a KEY for step 23.
S2 S-N-b	2 295031 A1.08	2											S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Identified Step 1 as a critical task. Added note that step 9 will also satisfy the task in step 1. Added additional examiner cues for steps 6 and 7. Revised estimated completion time to 15 minutes.
S3 S-N-c	3 239001 A4.01	2											S	NRC: None Response: Added mark up to the DOS through I.4.a for document preparation. Added operator stationed at 902-5 panel to initial conditions. Added to notify Unit Supervisor to initiating cue. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added cue for step 4. Added cue for step 14.
S4 S-N-d	4 206000 A1.08	2											S	NRC: JPM title is incorrectly listed as S-N-c on the summary page. **FREE SAMPLE** Response: Corrected JPM Number on summary page. Added to notify Unit Supervisor to initiating cue. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added cues for CRS and EO if asked about HPCI status. Created Attachment 1 for contingency if examinee uses DOP 2300-03 to start HPCI. Changed step 6 standard to reflect verifying the 2-2301-8 open. Identified step 8 as critical. Change wording in step 9 standard to match step 1. Added cue after step 8 for RPV pressure status.
S5 S-N-e	5 223001 A4.10	3		X									E	NRC: Step 5 in the JPM would only require the applicant to *verify* the 2-1601-58, TORUS M-U VLV is closed. Since there is no verifiable action associated with this step, nor does it direct a field operator to take an action, this cannot be credited as a critical step per NUREG 1021, Appendix C, B.3. There remains an adequate number of critical steps in this JPM even with step 5 not considered critical, therefore this is considered an

															S	enhancement. Response: 2-1601-58 is normally open. This is a verifiable action and a critical step in this JPM. Added power level to initial conditions. Added to notify Unit Supervisor to initiating cue. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added procedure step number to standard and cue for step #2. Added note prior to step 4 for clarification of critical step. Annotated steps 5 and 6 as not critical. Added cue after step 6 for TS verification. Annotated step 14 as not critical. Added note regarding expected alarm. Added note prior to step 19 for clarification of critical step.
S6 S-N-f	6 262001 A3.01	2		X											E S	NRC: Note prior to JPM Step 1, cues the examiner to provide the applicant with a copy of DOP 3700-02. This should be DOP 5370-02. Cue following trip of 2B Bus Duct Blower should say "another NSO will complete _DOA_ 6700-20 actions." Response: Corrected cue prior to step 1. The procedure for a 480V breaker trip is DOP 6700-20. Added M1E1 checklist has been completed to initial conditions. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section.
S7 S-N-g	8 400000 A4.01	2													S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added procedure step numbers for EO action cues.
S8 S-N-h	9 261000 A4.06	2								X					E S	NRC: JPM Summary page incorrectly lists the KA Number and Importance. It _should be_ listed as 261000 A4.06, 3.3/3.6. Response: Corrected K/A on JPM summary page. Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section.
P1 S-N-i	2 295031 EA1.08	3													S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added note after step 6 for tank cover information.
P2 S-N-j	7 212000 K4.03	3													S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Annotated step 7 as not critical and reworded to be a verify step. Added note after step 16 for role play if wrong component is operated.
P3 S-N-k	1 201001 A2.06	2													S	NRC: None. Response: Added task standard in "Information For Evaluator's Use" section. Added cue prior to step 2 for indicated dP. Added cue after step 7 for off going filter dP.

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1. (ES-301, D.3 and D.4)

2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1–5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)

3. In column 3, "Attributes," check the appropriate box when an attribute is **not met**:
   - The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
   - The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
   - All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
   - The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
   - Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
   - The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
   - A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).

4. For column 4, "Job Content," check the appropriate box if the job content flaw **does not meet** the following elements:
   - Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
   - The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant's understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)

5. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.

6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

Facility: DRESDEN							Scenario: ILT –N-1		Exam Date: April 2019
1 Event	2 Realism/ Cred.	3 Required Actions	4 Verifiable actions	5 LOD	6 TS	7 CTs	8 Scenario Overlap	9 U/E/S	10 Explanation
1								S	Revised role play to limit possible cueing. Added SM role play. Changed to verify 2A FWRV in manual, vice take manual control of 2A FWRV.
2		X			X			E̶ S	NRC: Stopping HPCI from injecting should be indicated by a shaded in block on the D-2 as this is a required action. Various methods for securing HPCI as sub-bullets can be left open as the method to stopping HPCI is at the applicant's discretion. Response: Stopping HPCI from injecting is now indicated by a shaded bullet. Added role play for field status. Added major alarms and indications expected for transient. Added actions for crew to secure HPCI flow to the torus.
3								S	Added role play for field status.
4								S	
5			X			XX	X	E̶ S	NRC: **Clearly define boundary conditions for critical tasks**. When must control rod insertion have started to take place? What verifiable actions will the crew take to complete CT RPV-5.12? This CT is not listed in the D-2, how and when is it assessed? CRITICAL TASK RPV 5.12 is considered UNSAT based on no verifiable action to accomplish. D-2 indicates RPV level band should be maintained between -164 inches and level lowered to in DEOP 400-5 step 9. This band should be -162 inches and level lowered to IAW DEOP 400-5. Add failure of SBLC to inject to the D-1 under Event 5. NRC: Initial conditions changed from previous 2 exam overlap, therefore acceptable per NUREG 1021, App. D, C.1.f. for a Major Event. (2017, Scenario 1) Response: Revised several minutes to 3 minutes for role play. Removed RPV-5.12 from the critical task list on D-1. Identified where RPV-5.12 would be critical if turbine bypass valves are lost. Added CT RPV-5.5, Core oscillations will occur if Alternate Boron Injection is not directed. Corrected D-2 references to -164". Failure of SBLC and power oscillations added to D-1 under event 5.
5	0	1	1	0	1	2	4	E̶ S	NRC: See above comments.

Facility: DRESDEN					**Scenario: ILT –N-2**			**Exam Date: April 2019**	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation
1								S	Normal Operations. Added additional detail from procedure for normal evolution. Revised role play for when SBO is in cooldown mode.
2								S	Reactivity Event Added role play for QNE to verify core thermal limits.
3					X			S	Added additional detail from procedure for taking a rod OOS. Revised event completion criteria.
4					X			S	Added role play for field status of equipment. Split step for closing Core Spray pump discharge and suction valve into two steps.
5								S	
6		X					X	~~E~~ S	NRC: Crew should contact the QNE per DOA 0202-03, Step 6. Add to D-2 as a required action. Response: Contacting the QNE added to D-2 as a required action. Added discussion for if a pump speed mismatch occurs.
7						X	X	S	NRC: Initial conditions changed from previous 2 exam overlap, therefore acceptable per NUREG 1021, App. D, C.1.f. for a Major Event. (2016, Scenario 2) Response: Added bullet for CRS to direct a scram. Revised bullet to manually run recirc back to minimum.
8						XX XX	X	S	NRC: Initial conditions changed from previous 2 exam overlap, therefore acceptable per NUREG 1021, App. D, C.1.f. for a Major Event. (2016, Scenario 2) Response: Revised criteria to begin event. Added specific hard card actions. Revised event completion criteria.
8	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**2**	**5**	**5**	**S**	NRC: See above comments. Annotated PC-1.1 may not apply based on crew actions.

Facility: DRESDEN							Scenario: ILT –N-3			Exam Date: April 2019
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S		Explanation
1								E̶ S		NRC: D-2 incorrectly lists PCV 2-3201A, should be PCV 2-3201C Response: Corrected EPN for PCV 2-3201C. Added expected alarms to D-2. Revised bullet that Aux Oil pump must be stopped manually.
2								S		Reactivity Event Response: Added note for feed flow limit.
3					X			E̶ S		NRC: Specific TS 3.3.1.1 function (2.b) should be indicated in the D-2. Response: Added reference to TS 3.3.1.1 table 3.3.1.1 -1 function 2.b to D-2. Added TRM requirement for rod-block function. Added procedure used to insert a half scram.
4								S		Removed sim op direction for causing CRD hi-temp alarms to come in. Revised role play for field observations. Added role play that RVWLIS flow is normal. Clarified field operator response time to 2 minutes for role play.
5		X			X			S		NRC: TS 3.6.1.3, Cond A requires both required actions A.1 and A.2 be entered. This TS is considered UNSAT as not all conditions to be entered were listed in the D-2. Response: Added A.2 required action to D-2. Changed open block to solid block for TS applicability.
6								S		Response: Added detailed torus cooling hard card actions.
7			X			X		S		NRC: Clearly define bounding condition for CT. Per App D – D.1.c, "the performance standard for a CT includes two parts: 1) expected actions, 2) safety-significant boundary conditions that clearly identify at what point a CT must be accomplished." What verifiable actions will the crew take to complete CT RPV-5.12? This CT is not listed in the D-2, how and when is it assessed? CRITICAL TASK RPV 5.12 is considered UNSAT based on no verifiable action to accomplish. Response: Time to insert control rods =. Removed RPV-5.12 from the critical task list on D-1. Identified where RPV-5.12 would be critical if turbine bypass valves are lost. Leaving 3 CTs. Clarified when CRS directs WEC to take actions.
8						XX		S		Added loss of Bus 23-1 and 28 to D-1. Added role play for Bus 29. Changed initiating IC to an open bullet. Revised scenario completion criteria.
8	0	1	1	0	2	3	8	E̶ S		NRC: See above comments.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Facility: DRESDEN   **Scenario: ILT –N-4 (FREE SAMPLE) (Low Power)**   **Exam Date: April 2019**

Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scenario Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation
1								~~E~~ S	NRC: Normal evolution performed by ATC. 301-5 and D-1 indicate that this is a normal evolution for the BOP operator. D-2 indicates that the ATC takes all verifiable actions. Response: Swapped responsibilities for BOP and ATC on D-2. Added role play for SM to provide direction if required.
2					X		X	S	Response: Added detailed procedure steps for RWM actions. Added discussion on what operator is looking for when assessing control rod drive stall flow.
3		X						~~U~~ S	NRC: No actions on the D-2 are indicated as required (dark square) for any applicant during this event including an immediate action step to start the standby pump. Response: Corrected bullets for BOP and CRS to dark squares for required actions (DOA entry and pump start).
4							X	S	
5					X			S	Revised TS call to RPS EPA breaker. Split event 4 into 4 and 5 for the IRM and unrelated TS call, revised D-1. Renumbered the remaining events in the scenario.
6							X	S	
7								S	
8						XX		S	NRC: Critical Task 1.2 should be reworded to indicate when conditions are met enter DEOP 400-02, Emergency Depressurization. Response: Reworded Critical task 1.2 as suggested. Replace CT RPV-2.1 with RPV-2.3 with a relief valve failed closed. Added failed closed ERV to D-1. Revised initiating criteria for the event. Revised role play for field observations to simplify the reports. Added actions for failed ERV to D-2.
8	0	1	0	0	2	2	4	~~E~~ S	NRC: See above comments.

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

2   Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) **OR** if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.

3, 4   In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is **no** verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)

- opening, closing, and throttling valves
- starting and stopping equipment
- raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure
- making decisions and giving directions
- acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should **not** be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3))

5   Check this box if the level of difficulty is **not** appropriate.

6   Check this box if the event has a TS.

7   Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started **only.**

8   Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f)

9   Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.

10   Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

- In column 1, sum the number of events.
- In columns 2–4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
- In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
- In column 6, TS are required to be ≥ 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
- In column 7, pre-identified CTs should be ≥ 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)
- In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
- In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

Facility: DRESDEN								Exam Date: April 2019	
Scenario	1 Event Totals	2 Events Unsat.	3 TS Total	4 TS Unsat.	5 CT Total	6 CT Unsat.	7 % Unsat. Scenario Elements	8 U/E/S	11 Explanation
1	5	0	1	0	2	1	12.5	E	All enhancements have been made to scenario post validation.
2	8	0	2	0	5	0	0	S	
3	8	0	2	1	3	1	15.3	E	All enhancements have been made to scenario post validation.
4	8	1	2	0	2	0	8.3	E	All enhancements have been made to scenario post validation.

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5   For each simulator scenario, enter the **total** number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

          This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6   For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

         a.   <u>Events</u>. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.

         b.   <u>TS</u>. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)

         c.   <u>CT</u>. Check that a scenario includes at least two pre-identified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

7   In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: $(\dfrac{2 + 4 + 6}{1 + 3 + 5}) \, 100\%$

8   If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is ≤ 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9   In column 11, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

Facility: DRESDEN					Exam Date: April 2019
OPERATING TEST TOTALS					
	Total	Total Unsat.	Total Edits	Total Sat.	% Unsat.	Explanation
Admin. JPMs	9	1	6	2		
Sim/In-Plant JPMs	11	0	3	8		
Scenarios	4	0	3	1		
Op. Test Totals:	24	1	12	11	4.2	SATISFACTORY

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

1.   Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the "Total" column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter "9" in the "Total" items column for administrative JPMs. For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.

2.   Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.

3.   Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.

4.   Total each column and enter the amounts in the "Op. Test Totals" row.

5.   Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory (Op. Test Total Unsat.)/(Op. Test Total) and place this value in the bolded "% Unsat." cell.

     Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:
- satisfactory, if the "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is ≤ 20%
- unsatisfactory, if "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is > 20%

6.   Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the "as-administered" operating test required content changes, including the following:
- The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
- The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
- CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including post scenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
- The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
- TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).