ES-301

# Administrative Topics Outline

Form ES-301-1

Facility: ANO-2		Date of Examination: 4/22/2019		
Examination Level: RO 🛛 SRO		Operating Test Number: 2019-1		
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*	Describe activity to be performed		
A1. Conduct of Operations	R, N	Determine flow rate using 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System Attachment K, RCS level vs RWT level.		
2.1.25 RO (3.9)		A2JPM-NRC-ADMIN-RCS		
A2. Conduct of Operations	R, D, P	Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure		
2.1.23 RO (4.3)		A2JPM-NRC-ADMIN-CNTMT2		
A3. Equipment Control 2.2.23 RO (3.1)	R, M	Determine any limits for CEA positions using the COLR ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-PDIL		
A4. Radiation Control 2.3.7 RO (3.5)	R, M	Review the RWP/Survey Maps and determine RWP limits, and Dose rate work location. A2JPM-NRC-ADMIN-RWP4		
Emergency Plan				
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).				
<ul> <li>* Type Codes and Criteria:</li> <li>(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom</li> <li>(D)irect from bank (≤ 3 for ROs; ≤ 4 for SROs and RO retakes)</li> <li>(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (≥ 1)</li> <li>(P)revious 2 exams (≤ 1, randomly selected)</li> </ul>				

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# Administrative Topics Outline

Form ES-301-1

Facility: ANO-2		Date of Examination:	4/22/2019	
Examination Level: RO SRO	$\boxtimes$	Operating Test Number:	2019-1	
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*	Describe activity to be performed		
	R, M	Fatigue rule calculation.		
A5. Conduct of Operations		ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-WORK	2	
2.1.5 SRO (3.9)				
A6 Conduct of Operations	R, P	Verify RPS trip set point determina inoperable MSSV	ation for	
A6. Conduct of Operations 2.1.25 SRO (4.2)		ANO-2-JPM-NRC-MSSVINOP		
	R, M	Determine operability of a safety r system.	elated	
A7. Equipment Control		ANO-2-JPM-NRC-EFWTS2		
2.2.37 SRO (4.6)				
	R, D	Review and approve Containment gaseous release	purge	
A8. Radiation Control		ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-PURGE		
2.3.6 SRO (3.8)				
	R, M	Classify an event, Time critical		
A9. Emergency Plan		ANO-2-JPM-NRC-EAL16		
2.4.41 SRO (4.6)				
NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).				
<ul> <li>* Type Codes and Criteria:</li> <li>(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom</li> <li>(D)irect from bank (≤ 3 for ROs; ≤ 4 for SROs and RO retakes)</li> <li>(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (≥ 1)</li> <li>(P)revious 2 exams (≤ 1, randomly selected)</li> </ul>				

(A1)

# ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

UNIT: <u>2</u> REV #: <u>001</u> DATE:						
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations						
TASK: Determine flow rate using 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System Attachment K, RCS Draindown Graph.						
JTA#:ANO2-RO-EOPAOP-OFFNORM-186						
Alternate Path       Yes:       No:       X       Time Critical       Yes:       No:       X						
KA VALUE         RO:         3.9         SRO:         4.2         KA REFERENCE:         2.1.25						
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:						
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:       X						
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):						
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform_						
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:						
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:						
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:						
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 Minutes						
REFERENCE(S): 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System Attachment K, RCS Draindown Graph.						
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:						
EVALUATOR'S NAME:						
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:						
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:						
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:						
Start         Stop         Total Time           Time						

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured.

Shutdown Cooling is in service.

RCS draining from Head removal level to 24" above the hot leg is in progress to a Hold up tank.

Nozzle Dams are NOT installed.

SIT Outlet valves are closed

Time 0700 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 160"
- Holdup Tank level = 18%

Time 0800 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 65"
- Holdup Tank level = 25%

## TASK STANDARD:

Determined Gallons Drained between 2800 and 3200 gallons and Drain Rate between 46.67 to 53.33 GPM.

Determined that the Online Holdup Tank can be used for the complete drain to 24"

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System Attachment K, RCS Draindown Graph.

Calculator

## SIMULATOR SETUP:

NA

EXAMINER'S NOTES:

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine Gallons Drained, and Average Drain Rate using 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System, Attachment K RCS Draindown Graph.

To complete the RCS drain to 24", Can the current Holdup tank **HOLD** the entire volume of the RCS drain **OR** will another Holdup tank have to be placed in service to complete the drain?

Start Time: \_\_\_\_\_

	PER	FORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	1. (Step 1.1) (Step 1.1.1)	To obtain gallons drained, <b>PERFORM</b> the following: <b>DRAW</b> vertical lines through initial and final RCS Levels to intersect horizontal axis and tank curve.	Applicant drew lines on RCS levels to determine amount of level change in the first hour. Examiner Note: Applicant may also draw lines on Holdup tank levels to determine amount of level change.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	2. (Step 1.1.2)	<b>SUBTRACT</b> initial value from final value on horizontal axis.	Applicant subtracts values from horizontal axis and determines gallons drained between 2800 and 3200.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	3.	Determine drain rate	Applicant determines number of minutes draining by performing the following: 1 hours X 60 min/hr = 60 min. Determine drain rate by performing the following: 3000 gallons / 60 min = 50 gpm. Acceptable range = 46.67 to 53.33 GPM.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4. (Step 1.1) (Step 1.1.1)	To obtain gallons drained, <b>PERFORM</b> the following: <b>DRAW</b> vertical lines through initial and final RCS Levels to intersect horizontal axis and tank curve.	Applicant drew lines on RCS levels to determine amount of level change to complete the RCS drain to 24". Examiner Note: Level change in gallons is ~ 32,000 gallons	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)						
	5. (Step 1.2) (Step 1.2.1)	To obtain expected RWT or 2T-12 level change, <b>PERFORM</b> the following: <b>DRAW</b> horizontal lines from points on tank curve to right axis.	Applicant drew lines from Holdup tank initial level (18% or 8000 gallons) to tank level axis and drew point from total drain volume (8000 + 32000 = 40000) to tank axis 90%.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
(C)	6. (Att. K page 4 and 2104.0 14)	Determine if the final level for the online holdup tank will exceed the tank capacity.	Applicant determines that the online holdup tank can be used for the entire drain evolution. Examiner Note: The final tank level should be ~ 90%. The applicant may also refer to OP-2104.014 setpoints pg. 10 that states the high level alarm for Holdup tanks is > 94.5%.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	END					

# **EXAMINER'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured.

Shutdown Cooling is in service.

RCS draining from Head removal level to 24" above the hot leg is in progress to a Hold up tank.

Nozzle Dams are NOT installed.

SIT Outlet valves are closed

Time 0700 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 160"
- Holdup Tank level = 18%

Time 0800 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 65"
- Holdup Tank level = 25%

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine Gallons Drained, **AND** Average Drain Rate using 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System, Attachment K RCS Draindown Graph at 0800.

Gallons Drained: <u>2800 to 3200</u> Gallons

Average Drain Rate (Average letdown flow): \_\_\_\_\_\_46.67 to 53.33 \_\_\_\_\_\_ GPM

To complete the RCS drain to 24", Can the current Holdup tank **HOLD** the entire volume of the RCS drain **OR** will another Holdup tank have to be placed in service to complete the drain?

CAN USE CURRENT HOLDUP TANK for entire drain, OR MUST PLACE ANOTHER TANK inservice to complete drain: <u>Can use current Holdup tank for entire drain</u>

# **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured.

Shutdown Cooling is in service.

RCS draining from Head removal level to 24" above the hot leg is in progress to a Hold up tank.

Nozzle Dams are NOT installed.

SIT Outlet valves are closed

Time 0700 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 160"
- Holdup Tank level = 18%

Time 0800 conditions are:

- RCS Level = 65"
- Holdup Tank level = 25%

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine Gallons Drained, **AND** Average Drain Rate using 2103.011 Draining the Reactor Coolant System, Attachment K RCS Draindown Graph.

Gallons Drained: \_\_\_\_\_ Gallons

Average Drain Rate (Average letdown flow):\_\_\_\_\_ GPM

To complete the RCS drain to 24", Can the current Holdup tank **HOLD** the entire volume of the RCS drain **OR** will another Holdup tank have to be placed in service to complete the drain?

CAN USE CURRENT HOLDUP TANK for entire drain, OR MUST PLACE ANOTHER TANK inservice to complete drain:

NAME:	START:	STOP:
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MANCE MEASURE	ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERF
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UNIT:         2         REV #:         004         DATE:						
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations						
TASK: Determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure						
JTA#: ANO2-RO-EOPAOP-OFFNORM-186						
Alternate Path Yes: No:X Time Critical Yes: No:X						
KA VALUE         RO:         4.3         SRO:         4.4         KA REFERENCE:         2.1.23						
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:						
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:       X						
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):						
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform						
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: X SRO:						
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:						
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:						
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 10 Minutes						
REFERENCE(S): OP-2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, Containment Evacuation Checklist						
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #:						
EVALUATOR'S NAME:						
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:						
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:						
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:						
Start     Stop     Total Time       Time						

#### (A2)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling was lost at 0605 today.

CET's and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 0605 when SDC was lost:

- RCS CET temperature is 172 °F
- RCS pressure is 240 psia
- PZR level is 41%
- RCS heatup rate is 4.33 <sup>0</sup>F per minute.

#### TASK STANDARD:

Determined Saturation temperature the RCS pressure to be between 397 and 397.405 <sup>o</sup>F

Determined time to boil to be between 51.96 to 52.15 minutes.

Determined time to start containment evacuation between 0626 and 0627.1

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 32, Containment Evacuation Checklist. Steam tables.

SIMULATOR SETUP:

NA

**EXAMINER'S NOTES:** 

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Start Time:

	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST STANDARDS (Circle One)						
	Procedure Note: CETs and ATS will NOT be operable with Reactor Vessel Head removed.						
	1. (Step 2.A)	evacuation and closure as not applicable.		N/A SAT UNSAT			
		A. <u>IF</u> RCS in Lowered Inventory <u>AND</u> CETs <u>NOT</u> available, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 4.B of this Attachment and INITIATE CNTMT evacuation and closure.					
	2. (Step 2.B.1)	<b>IF</b> CETs or RVLMS ATS operable, <b>THEN DETERMINE</b> time to boiling as follows:	Examinee documented the heatup rate given in the initial conditions. (4.33 <sup>0</sup> F/min)	N/A SAT UNSAT			
		1) <b>DETERMINE</b> and <b>RECORD</b> RCS heatup rate. <sup>0</sup> F/min heatup rate					
(C)	3. (Step 2.B.2)	DETERMINE and RECORD saturation temperature using steam tables and present RCS pressure. <sup>0</sup> F saturation temperature (T <sub>SAT</sub> )	Using the steam tables and current RCS pressure Examinee determined that the staturation temperature for 240 psia is between 397 <sup>0</sup> F and 397.405 <sup>0</sup> F	N/A SAT UNSAT			

	PER	FORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)		
(C)	4. (Step 2.B.3)	CALCULATE for time to boiling: $\frac{\{TSAT\} - \{RCS temp\}}{= time to boiling}$ $\frac{\{t3\}}{\{heatup rate\}}$ $\frac{\{F\} - \{F\} = \_}{minutes}$ $\{F/min\}$	Examinee calculated the time to boiling to be between 51.96 to 52.15 minutes	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	5. (Step 2.B.4)	<b>RECORD</b> time to boil (t3) in step 2.E.	Examinee recorded time calculated in step 2.B.3 in step 2.E.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	6. (Step 2.C)	<b>RECORD</b> time SDC was lost {t1}.	Examinee recorded time from initial conditions in step 2.E.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	7. (Step 2.D)	<b>IF</b> time to boiling can <b>NOT</b> be calculated, <b>THEN RECORD</b> time to boil (t3) from Control Room logs in Step 2.E.	Examinee determined step is not applicable.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
(C)	8. (Step 2.E)	<b>CALCULATE</b> time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure as follows: $\frac{\{ t1 \} + [\{ t3 \} - 30 \text{ minutes}] = \{ time to start Step 5 \} $ $+[$	Examinee calculated to time to start CNTMT evacuation and closure to be between 0626 and 0627.1	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	END					

# **EXAMINER'S COPY**

# INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling was lost at 0605.

CET's and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 0605 when SDC was lost:

- RCS temperature = 172 <sup>o</sup>F
- RCS pressure is 240 psia
- PZR level is 41%
- RCS heatup rate is 4.33 <sup>o</sup>F per minute.

# **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to **START** CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Time to **START** evacuation and closure: \_\_\_\_\_\_0626 to 0627.1\_\_\_\_\_

# **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is in Mode 5 in preps for a refueling outage.

RCPs are secured and not available.

Shutdown Cooling was lost at 0605.

CET's and RVLMS ATS are operable.

RCS conditions @ 0605 when SDC was lost:

- RCS temperature = 172 °F
- RCS pressure is 240 psia
- PZR level is 41%
- RCS heatup rate is 4.33 <sup>o</sup>F per minute.

# **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to determine time to **START** CNTMT evacuation and closure using OP 2202.010, Standard Attachment 32, by performing step 2.

Time to **START** evacuation and closure:

N	A	N/	16	•
1.1		1 1	ᅳ	•

\_\_\_\_\_\_ START:\_\_\_\_\_\_ STOP: \_\_\_\_\_

UNIT: <u>2</u> REV #: <u>007</u> DATE:							
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations							
TASK: Determine limits for CEA positions using the COLR PDIL							
JTA#: ANO2-RO-OPRO	DC-NORM-62						
KA VALUE RO:	KA VALUE         RO:         3.1         SRO:         4.6         KA REFERENCE:         2.2.23						
	STRATION TO:	RO: X	SRO:	_			
TASK LOCATION:			DE CR:	вотн: х			
SUGGESTED TESTING E	NVIRONMENT ANI		ERFORM OR SIM	ULATE):			
PLANT SITE:	SIMULA	FOR:	CLA	SSROOM	x		
POSITION EVALUATED:	RO:	SRO:		_			
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIR	ONMENT: SIMU	LATOR:	PLANT SITE:	CLAS	SROOM:		
TESTING METHOD: S	IMULATE:		l:				
APPROXIMATE COMPLE	TION TIME IN MIN	UTES: 15 I	Minutes				
REFERENCE(S): OP-210	02.004, Unit 2 Tecł	n Specs, and L	Init 2 COLR				
EXAMINEE'S NAME:			Logon ID	):			
EVALUATOR'S NAME:							
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFO THIS JPM AND IS DETER		ALUATED AG	AINST THE STAN	IDARDS CON	TAINED IN		
SATISFACTORY:	UNSATIS	SFACTORY:					
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:							
					_		
Start Stor Time Tir	•	Total Time					
SIGNED:		DATE	:				
SIGNATURE INDICATES QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (							

## INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Group 6 CEAs were inserted between Long-Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit for a total of .5 EFPD from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 10<sup>th</sup>.
- The plant has been at 100% power since January 10<sup>th</sup> of this year with CEAs at the program insertion limit
- The following conditions were established on 4-15-19 at 0600 which was 250 EFPD:
  - Plant power was lowered to 70% power due to 'A' MFWP outage for bearing replacement
  - Group P CEAs are inserted to 140" withdrawn
  - Group 6 CEAs are being used for ASI control and are 80" withdrawn
  - o COLSS ASI is -.07
  - o #1 CEAC is inoperable for Surveillance testing
  - #2 CEAC is operable

## TASK STANDARD:

Determined that group 6 CEAs are inserted into the long term steady state insertion limits (LTSSIL) Determined that group P CEAs are not inserted into any limits.

Calculated group 6 CEAs were in LTSSIL for 2.2 to 2.3 EFPD in the last 30 EFPD. Calculated group 6 CEAs were in LTSSIL for 2.7 to 2.8 EFPD in the Calendar year.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP-2102.004, Unit 2 Tech Specs, and Unit 2 COLR

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

N/A

## **EXAMINER NOTES:**

None.

# Examiner Note: Give out <u>CUE #2</u> after Cue #1 is complete.

## **INITIATING CUE #1:**

SM/CRS directs determine applicable CEA insertion limits (if any) for Group 6 and Group P using Tech Specs and the COLR.

## **INITIATING CUE #2:**

On 4-18-19 at 1200 CEA were full withdrawn for power escalation. SM/CRS directs complete OP-2102.004A for the conditions stated above

## START TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

	PERFC	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)				
(C)	1.	Using cycle 27 COLR figure 3 determines if Group 6 CEA's are inserted limits of operation.	Examinee correctly derived from graph based on given values that Group 6 CEAs are inserted into the long term steady state insertion limits (LTSSIL).	N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	2.	Using cycle 27 COLR figure 3 determines if Group P CEA's are inserted limits of operation.	Examinee correctly derived from graph based on given values that Group P CEAs are not inserted into any insertion limits.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
EXA	EXAMINER'S CUE: If asked by the applicant when CEA group 6 was above the LTSSIL, THEN answer "All applicable CEAs went above their applicable insertion limits at 1200 on 4-18-19."							
(C)	3.	Using OP-2102.004 Calculates EFPD CEA were inserted into the LTSSIL	Examinee determines the LTSSIL have been entered for 78 hours (3.25 days) @ 70% power which equals 2.275 EFPD. Acceptable band 2.2 to 2.3 EFPD.	N/A SAT UNSAT				

	PERFO	RMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)				
	4. (Step 1)	<b>ENTER</b> time between Long-Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit:	Examinee logged the following for LTSSIL • Entered EFPD • Exit EFPD • Total EFPD • Previous Occurrences • Enter Time and date • Exit time and date. See Key for acceptable answers.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	5. (Step 2)	<b>CALCULATE</b> Total EFPD Last 30 EFPD as follows:	Examinee calculated total EFPD for last 30 EFPD to be 2.2 to 2.3.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	6. (Step 3)	<b>CALCULATE</b> Total EFPD Calendar Year as follows:	Examinee calculated total EFPD for last calendar year to be 2.7 to 2.8.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
	7. (Step 4)	<b>ENTER</b> time between Short Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit:	Examinee determined Step 4 is NA due to not being inserted into the STSSIL.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
	END							

STOP TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

## EXAMINER'S COPY

# Examiner Note: Give out <u>CUE #2</u> after Cue #1 is complete.

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Group 6 CEAs were inserted between Long-Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit for a total of .5 EFPD from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 10<sup>th</sup>.
- The plant has been at 100% power since January 10<sup>th</sup> of this year with CEAs at the program insertion limit
- The following conditions were established on 4-15-19 at 0600 which was 250 EFPD:
  - Plant power was lowered to 70% power due to 'A' MFWP outage for bearing replacement
  - Group P CEAs are inserted to 140" withdrawn
  - Group 6 CEAs are being used for ASI control and are 80" withdrawn
  - o COLSS ASI is -.07
  - #1 CEAC is inoperable for Surveillance testing
  - #2 CEAC is operable

# **INITIATING CUE #1:**

SM/CRS directs determine applicable CEA insertion limits (if any) for Group 6 and Group P using Tech Specs **AND** the COLR.

Group 6 CEA insertion limits applicable: (Circle One or More of the following)

LTSSIL/STSSIL / Transient Insertion limit / No limits

Group P CEA insertion limits applicable: (Circle One or More of the following)

LTSSIL / STSSIL / Transient Insertion limit / (No limits)

# **INITIATING CUE #2:**

On 4-18-19 at 1200 CEAs were fully withdrawn for power escalation. SM/CRS directs complete OP-2102.004A for the conditions stated above.

# **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Group 6 CEAs were inserted between Long-Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit for a total of .5 EFPD from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 10<sup>th</sup>.
- The plant has been at 100% power since January 10<sup>th</sup> of this year with CEAs at the program insertion limit
- The following conditions were established on 4-15-19 at 0600 which was 250 EFPD:
  - Plant power was lowered to 70% power due to 'A' MFWP outage for bearing replacement
  - Group P CEAs are inserted to 140" withdrawn
  - o Group 6 CEAs are being used for ASI control and are 80" withdrawn
  - o COLSS ASI is -.07
  - #1 CEAC is inoperable for Surveillance testing
  - #2 CEAC is operable

# **INITIATING CUE #1:**

SM/CRS directs determine applicable CEA insertion limits (if any) for Group 6 and Group P using Tech Specs **AND** the COLR.

Group 6 CEA insertion limits applicable: (Circle One or More of the following)

LTSSIL / STSSIL / Transient Insertion limit / No limits

Group P CEA insertion limits applicable: (Circle One or More of the following)

LTSSIL / STSSIL / Transient Insertion limit / No limits

# **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Group 6 CEAs were inserted between Long-Term Steady State Insertion Limit and Transient Insertion Limit for a total of .5 EFPD from January 1<sup>st</sup> to January 10<sup>th</sup>.
- The plant has been at 100% power since January 10<sup>th</sup> of this year with CEAs at the program insertion limit
- The following conditions were established on 4-15-19 at 0600 which was 250 EFPD:
  - Plant power was lowered to 70% power due to 'A' MFWP outage for bearing replacement
  - Group P CEAs are inserted to 140" withdrawn
  - Group 6 CEAs are being used for ASI control and are 80" withdrawn
  - o COLSS ASI is -.07
  - #1 CEAC is inoperable for Surveillance testing
  - o #2 CEAC is operable

# **INITIATING** <u>CUE #2</u>:

On 4-18-19 at 1200 CEAs were fully withdrawn for power escalation. SM/CRS directs complete OP-2102.004A for the conditions stated above. (A4)

UNIT: <u>2</u> REV #: <u>005</u> DATE:
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Radiation Control
TASK: _ Review RWP and apply RWP for evolution.
JTA#:
Alternate Path       Yes:       No:       X       Time Critical       Yes:       No:
KA VALUE         RO:         3.5         SRO:         3.6         KA REFERENCE:         2.3.7
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO:
TASK LOCATION:         INSIDE CR:         OUTSIDE CR:         BOTH:         X
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 25 Minutes
REFERENCE(S): EOP Standard Attachment 31 SDC Pump Venting; RWP 2019 2002 Operations Activities Unit 2; Survey Maps
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #
EVALUATOR'S NAME:
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN TH JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:
Start Time Stop Time Total Time
SIGNED: DATE:
QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Unit 2 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown have been competed for a refueling outage.
- Shutdown Cooling (SDC) is in service.
- RCPs have been secured.
- PZR bubble has been collapsed.
- Indications of LPSI pump cavitation is occurring.
- CRS entered Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP

## TASK STANDARD:

Using Operations Activities RWP:

- Identified appropriate RWP Task Number was Task 3
- Identified RWP Dose alarm is 20 mR
- Identified RWP Dose Rate alarm is 200 mR
- Identified Maximum Dose Rates encountered was 165 mr/hr
- Identified actions required if EAD dose rate alarm was received:
  - o Secure work
  - o Back out of immediate area until the alarm clears
  - o Notify others in your work crew
  - o Immediately notify RP for further instructions

**TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:** OP-2202.010, EOP Standard Attachment 31 SDC Pump Venting; RWP 20192002 Operations Activities Unit 2; EN-RP-106 Radiological Survey documentation and Survey maps for Auxiliary building.

SIMULATOR SETUP: NA

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform SDC venting using Standard Attachment 31 for 2P-60A, steam binding is <u>NOT</u> expected.

Using RWP 20192002, Operations Activities Unit 2, and EN-RP-106 Radiological Survey documentation, identify the following items associated with venting in 'A' ESF room and Upper South Piping Penetration Room:

RWP Task Number: Dose and Dose Rate alarm setpoints Actions required if EAD Dose Rate alarm is received Expected maximum Area Dose Rate (not contact) at venting locations

#### START TIME:

	PER	FORMANCECHECKLIST	<u>STANDARD</u>	CIRCLE ONE		
(C)	1.	Determine appropriate task for the evolution.	Determined that Task 3 was the appropriate RWP task for this evolution.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
(C)	2.	Determine Dose alarm setpoint.	Determined Dose alarm setpoint is 20 mR.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
(C)	3.	Determine Dose Rate alarm setpoint.	Determined Dose Rate alarm setpoint is 200 mR/hr.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
	4.	Determine actions required if EAD dose rate alarm is received.	Determined that the following actions should be performed if a dose rate alarm is received:	N/A SAT UNSAT		
(C)			<ul> <li>Secure work</li> <li>Back out of immediate area until the alarm clears</li> <li>Notify others in your work crew</li> <li>Immediately notify RP for further instructions</li> </ul>			
(C)	5.	Determine maximum area dose rate encountered.	Determined maximum area dose rate is 165 mR/hr.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
END						

#### STOP TIME:

#### EXAMINER'S COPY

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Unit 2 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown have been competed for a refueling outage.
- Shutdown Cooling (SDC) is in service.
- RCPs have been secured.
- PZR bubble has been collapsed.
- Indications of LPSI pump cavitation is occurring.
- CRS entered Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform SDC venting using Standard Attachment 31 for 2P-60A, steam binding is **NOT** expected.

Using RWP 20192002, Operations Activities Unit 2, and EN-RP-106 Radiological Survey documentation, identify the following items associated with venting in 'A' ESF room and Upper South Piping Penetration Room:

RWP Task Number Dose and Dose Rate alarm setpoints Actions required if EAD Dose Rate alarm is received Expected **MAXIMUM** Area Dose Rate **(NOT CONTACT)** at venting locations

RWP Task Number: \_\_\_\_\_3\_\_\_\_

Dose alarm setpoint: \_\_\_\_\_20 mR\_\_\_\_\_

Dose Rate alarm setpoint: \_\_\_\_\_\_200 mR/hr\_\_\_\_\_\_

Actions required if EAD Dose Rate alarm is received: \_\_\_\_Secure work\_\_\_\_\_\_

Back out of immediate area until the alarm clears

Notify others in your work crew

Immediately notify RP for further instructions

Expected MAXIMUM General Area Dose Rate for the evolution:\_\_\_\_\_165 mR/hr\_\_\_\_\_

## **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS**

- Unit 2 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown have been competed for a refueling outage.
- Shutdown Cooling (SDC) is in service.
- RCPs have been secured.
- PZR bubble has been collapsed.
- Indications of LPSI pump cavitation is occurring.
- CRS entered Loss of Shutdown Cooling AOP

## INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to perform SDC venting using Standard Attachment 31 for 2P-60A, steam binding is **NOT** expected.

Using RWP 20192002, Operations Activities Unit 2, and EN-RP-106 Radiological Survey documentation, identify the following items associated with venting in 'A' ESF room and Upper South Piping Penetration Room:

RWP Task Number: Dose and Dose Rate alarm setpoints Actions required if EAD Dose Rate alarm is received Expected MAXIMUM Area Dose Rate (NOT CONTACT) at venting locations

RWP Task Number:

Dose alarm setpoint: \_\_\_\_\_

Dose Rate alarm setpoint: \_\_\_\_\_

Actions required if EAD Dose Rate alarm is received: \_\_\_\_\_

Expected MAXIMUM General Area Dose Rate for the evolution:

(A5)

# ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

UNIT:         2         REV #:         002         DATE:							
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Conduct of Operations							
TASK: Determine which operators are available for call out.							
JTA#:							
Alternate Path       Yes:       No:       X       Time Critical       Yes:       No:       X							
KA VALUE         RO:         2.9         SRO:         3.9         KA REFERENCE:         2.1.5							
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO:							
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:       X							
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):							
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Classroom: Perform							
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO: X							
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: Classroom:							
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:							
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 20 Minutes							
REFERENCE(S): EN-OM-123, Fatigue Management Program.							
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Login ID #:							
EVALUATOR'S NAME:							
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:							
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:							
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:							
Start Time Stop Time Total Time							

#### THE EXAMINER SHALL VERIFY THE FOLLOWING WITH THE EXAMINEE:

Verify the examinee has reviewed and been briefed on NUREG 1021 APPENDIX E, Policies and Guidelines for Taking NRC Exams.

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is April 27<sup>th</sup>.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick and coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday April 28<sup>th</sup>.

eSOMS PQ&S and any other work hour calculators are not available due to a network outage. The Averaging period is set by the Watchbill coordinator to 6 weeks.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operator A is an off-shift operator and working in night shift (12 hours) for a work to complete maintenance outage on the week of April 21<sup>st</sup>.

Operators have averaged the following hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to April 21<sup>st</sup>:

- Operator A = 40.5
- Operator B = 53.2
- Operator C = 46
- Operator D = 51.5

N = Nights, 12 hours shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

# = number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

	Sun. April 21	Mon. April 22	Tue. April 23	Wed. April 24	Thu. April 25	Fri. April 26	Sat. April 27	Sun. April 28	Mon. April 29	Tue. April 30	Wed. May 1	Thu. May 2	Fri. May 3	Sat. May 4
Operator A		Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν			10	10	10	10		
Operator B	D		Т	Т	Т	Т			Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν		
Operator C		Ν	Ν	Ν					D	D	D	D		
Operator D	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν				D	D	D	D	D	

#### TASK STANDARD:

Determined that operator B and C are available and operator A is not available due to <34 hour break in any 9-day period and operator D is not available due > 54 hour rolling average limit.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

EN-OP-123 Fatigue Management program.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) can cover without violating working hours using EN-OM-123 section 5.2, Fatigue Management Program.

If an operator(s) would violate working hours, then state how they would violate the working hour limits.

Start Time:

	PERFO	STANDARDS	(Circle One)					
compli Work h	Procedure Note: Work hour tracking is accomplished using the eSOMS PQ&S software. Use of an alternate compliance tool, such as by contractors / vendors, requires approval of the site SME. Work hour limits for covered workers may only be exceeded during Exceptions (Section 5.3) or when evaluated and approved using the Waiver Process (Section 5.9).							
Procedure Step for Work hour limits: Work hour limits for individuals performing Covered Work consist of the following: (a) Maximum of 16 work hours in any 24-hour period. (b) Maximum of 26 work hours in any 48-hour period. (c) Maximum of 72 work hours in any 7-day period. (d) Minimum 10-hour break between successive work periods, except that an 8-hour break is allowed when necessary to accommodate a crew's scheduled transition between work schedules or shifts. (e) Minimum 34-hour break in any 9-day period. (f) 54-hour rolling average, as described in 5.2[3]. (g) Minimum Days Off (MDO), as described in 5.2[4] [2] Limits 5.2[1](a) through (e) apply for online and offline plant conditions. Limit 5.2[1](f) must be used when the plant is online and limit 5.2[1](g) is typically applied when the plant is offline, for individuals working on outage activities. However, limit 5.2[1](f) may also be used in lieu of limit 5.2[1](g) when the plant is offline. [3] The 54-hour rolling average limit (5.2[1](f)) is a maximum average of 54 work hours per week calculated using a rolling average period of up to 6 weeks. The requirements of the averaging calculation are modeled in the PQ&S software and include the following characteristics:								
	1. (Step 5.2	Review work hour limitations in EN-OM-123.	Examinee reviewed the limitation of section 5.2 of EN-OM-123.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	2. (Step 5.2)	Using EN-OM-123 requirements review operator A schedule to determine if he can provide coverage without violating working hour limits.	Reviewed the schedule for operator A to determine if any work hour limitations would be violated. Critical: Determined that Operator A cannot cover the watch on April 28 <sup>th</sup> without violating working hour limits due to not having a Minimum 34 hour break in any 9 day period.	N/A SAT UNSAT				

	PERFO	RMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	3. (Step 5.2)	Using EN-OM-123 requirements review operator B schedule to determine if he can provide coverage without violating working hour limits.	Reviewed the schedule for operator B to determine if any work hour limitations would be violated. Critical: Determined that Operator B can cover the watch on April 28 <sup>th</sup> without violating working hour limits.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	4. (Step 5.2)	Using EN-OM-123 requirements review operator C schedule to determine if he can provide coverage without violating working hour limits.	Reviewed the schedule for operator C to determine if any work hour limitations would be violated. Critical: Determined that Operator C can cover the watch on April 28 <sup>th</sup> without violating working hour limits.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	5. (Step 5.2)	Using EN-OM-123 requirements review operator D schedule to determine if he can provide coverage without violating working hour limits.	Reviewed the schedule for operator D to determine if any work hour limitations would be violated. Critical: Determined that Operator D cannot cover the watch on April 28 <sup>th</sup> without violating working hour limits due to exceeding the 54 hour average.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			END	

Stop Time:\_\_\_\_\_

#### (A5)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

# EXAMINER'S COPY

# INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is April 27<sup>th</sup>.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick **AND** coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday April 28<sup>th</sup>.

eSOMS PQ&S **AND** any other work hour calculators are **NOT** available due to a network outage. The **AVERAGING** period is set by the Watchbill coordinator to 6 weeks.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operator A is an off-shift operator **AND** working in night shift (12 hours) for a work to complete maintenance outage on the week of April 21<sup>st</sup>.

Operators have averaged the following hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to April 21<sup>st</sup>:

- Operator A = 40.5
- Operator B = 53.2
- Operator C = 46
- Operator D = 51.5

N = Nights, 12 hours shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

# = number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

	Sun. April	Mon. April	Tue. April	Wed. April	Thu. April	Fri. April	Sat. April	Sun. April	Mon. April	Tue. April	Wed. May 1	Thu. May 2	Fri. May 3	Sat. May 4
	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30				
Operator A		Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν			10	10	10	10		
Operator B	D		Т	Т	Т	Т			Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν		
Operator C		Ν	Ν	Ν					D	D	D	D		
Operator D	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν				D	D	D	D	D	

# **INITIATING CUE:**

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) **CAN** cover **WITHOUT** violating working hours using EN-OM-123 section 5.2, Fatigue Management Program.

Operator A: Can provide coverage without exceeding limits: Yes(No.) If **NO** what limit is exceeded:\_\_\_Minimum <u>34 hour break in a 9 day period\_\_\_\_\_</u>.

Operator B:	Can provide coverage without exceeding limits: Yes/No.
	VO what limit is exceeded:

Operator C:	Can provide coverage without exceeding limits: Yes/No.
	If NO what limit is exceeded:

Operator D: Can provide coverage without exceeding limits: Yes/No.) If **NO** what limit is exceeded: <u>Exceeding the 54 hour average</u> \_.

#### (A5)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

# EXAMINEE'S COPY

# INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Today is April 27<sup>th</sup>.

Unit 2 has been online for 300 days.

An operator for the next shift has called in sick **AND** coverage is required from 6 am to 6 pm on Sunday April 28<sup>th</sup>.

eSOMS PQ&S **AND** any other work hour calculators are **NOT** available due to a network outage. The **AVERAGING** period is set by the Watchbill coordinator to 6 weeks.

All scheduled hours are required to be worked.

Four Operators are available for the watch.

Operator A is an off-shift operator **AND** working in night shift (12 hours) for a work to complete maintenance outage on the week of April 21<sup>st</sup>.

Operators have averaged the following hours per week over previous 4 weeks prior to April 21<sup>st</sup>:

- Operator A = 40.5
- Operator B = 53.2
- Operator C = 46
- Operator D = 51.5

N = Nights, 12 hours shift, 6 pm to 6 am.

D = Days, 12 hours shift, 6 am to 6 pm.

T = Training, 8.5 hour shift 7:30 am to 4 pm.

# = number of hours for off-shift operator who starts work at 7 am.

	Sun. April 21	Mon. April 22	Tue. April 23	Wed. April 24	Thu. April 25	Fri. April 26	Sat. April 27	Sun. April 28	Mon. April 29	Tue. April 30	Wed. May 1	Thu. May 2	Fri. May 3	Sat. May 4
Operator A		Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν			10	10	10	10		
Operator B	D		Т	Т	Т	Т			Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν		
Operator C		Ν	Ν	Ν					D	D	D	D		
Operator D	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν	Ν				D	D	D	D	D	

# INITIATING CUE:

CRS/SM directs you to determine which operator(s) **CAN** cover **WITHOUT** violating working hours using EN-OM-123 section 5.2, Fatigue Management Program.

Operator A:	Can provide coverage without exceedi If <b>NO</b> what limit is exceeded:	0	
Operator B:	Can provide coverage without exceedi If <b>NO</b> what limit is exceeded:	•	
Operator C:	Can provide coverage without exceedi If <b>NO</b> what limit is exceeded:	0	
Operator D:	Can provide coverage without exceedi If <b>NO</b> what limit is exceeded:	5	
NAME		START:	STOP:

A2-JPM-SRC	D-MSSVINOP			(A6)				Page 1 of 6
		ADMINIS			ERFORM	IANCE N		
UNIT: <u>2</u>			REV #:	006			DATE:	
SYSTEM/DU	TY AREA:	Equipn	nent Cor	ntrol				
TASK: \	/erify RPS tri	p set poir	t detern	nination	for inop	erable MS	SSV	
JTA#: AN	IO-SRO-ADM	IN-NORM-	231					
KA VALUE	RO:	3.9	SRO:	4	.2	KA REF	ERENCE:	2.1.25
APPROVED	FOR ADMINI	STRATION	NTO:	RO:		SRO:	X	
TASK LOCA	TION:	INSIDE C	R:		OUTSIDI	ECR:	BOTH:	X
SUGGESTE	D TESTING EI	NVIRONM	ENT ANI	D METH	OD (PER	FORM OF	R SIMULATE):	
PLANT SITE	:		SIMULA	ATOR:	Per	form	CLASSROO	M: Perform
POSITION E	VALUATED:	RO:			SRO:			
ACTUAL TE	STING ENVIR	ONMENT	SIMU	LATOR:		PLANT	SITE:	CLASSROOM:
TESTING ME	THOD: S	IMULATE	:	PE	RFORM:			
APPROXIMA		TION TIME		UTES:	1	5 Minute	S	
REFERENCE	E(S): Unit 2	Tech Spe	ecs					
EXAMINEE'S	NAME:					Lo	ogin ID#:	
EVALUATOF	R'S NAME:							
	IEE'S PERFO DETERMINE		WAS EV	ALUAT	ED AGAI	NST THE	STANDARDS C	ONTAINED IN TH
SATISFACTO	ORY:		UNSAT	ISFACT	DRY:			
PERFORMA		LIST COM	MENTS:					

## (A6)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

# INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- The plant is at 90% power, 440 EFPD, Steady State.
- MSSV testing is in progress.
- The following are the MSSV as found lift pressure reported by maintenance:

MSSVs for 2E24A	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1002	1068 psig
2PSV-1003	1088 psig
2PSV-1004	1098 psig
2PSV-1005	1096 psig
2PSV-1006	1132 psig
MSSVs for 2E24B	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1052	1062 psig
2PSV-1053	1068 psig
2PSV-1054	1115 psig
2PSV-1055	1108 psig
2PSV-1056	1110 psig

## TASK STANDARD:

Determined that 2PSV-1005 and 2PSV-1053 are inoperable (1 MSSV per header) and determined the <u>maximum</u> High Linear Power Level and RPS trip set point to be 87.0% to comply with Technical Specification 3.7.1.1.

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: Unit 2 Tech Specs

Examiner Note: Give out <u>CUE #2</u> after Cue #1 is complete.

## INITIATING CUE #1 :

Determine operability of the MSSVs IAW with Tech Specs and OP-2306.006 Unit 2 Main Steam Safety valve test Attachment 1.

## **INITIATING CUE #2 :**

Determine the <u>Maximum</u> High Linear Power Level and RPS Trip Set point per Tech Specs allowed for this condition to remain at power.

Reactor Engineering reports MTC for 440 EFPD is  $-2.6E^{-4}\Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ .

Start Time:\_\_\_\_\_

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST			STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
(C)	1.	Using Tech Spec 3.7.1.1 Table 3.7-5 or OP- 2306.006 Att. 1 determines operability of MSSVs.	Examinee derived that one MSSV on each header is inoperable. (2PSV-1005 and 2PSV-1053)	N/A SAT UNSAT	
(C)	2.	Using Tech Spec 3.7.1.1 figure 3.7-1 determines new maximum power and RPS linear power trip set point.	Examinee derived from graph based on MTC of $-2.6E^{-4}\Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ and knowing that one MSSV is inoperable on each header determined that maximum power and RPS linear power trip set point should be 87.0%.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	•	·	END		

Stop Time:\_\_\_\_\_

#### (A6)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

# EXAMINER'S COPY

# INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- The plant is at 90% power, 440 EFPD, Steady State.
- MSSV testing is in progress.
- The following are the MSSV as found lift pressure reported by maintenance:

MSSVs for 2E24A	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1002	1068 psig
2PSV-1003	1088 psig
2PSV-1004	1098 psig
2PSV-1005	1096 psig
2PSV-1006	1132 psig
MSSVs for 2E24B	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1052	1062 psig
2PSV-1053	1068 psig
2PSV-1054	1115 psig
2PSV-1055	1108 psig

Examiner Note: Give out <u>CUE #2</u> after Cue #1 is complete.

# **INITIATING CUE #1:**

Determine operability of the MSSVs IAW with Tech Specs. **2PSV-1005 and 2PSV-1053** are inoperable.

**INITIAL CONDITIONS FOR CUE 2**: (same as previous initial conditions)

# **INITIATING CUE #2:**

Determine the **MAXIMUM** High Linear Power Level and RPS Trip **SET POINT** per Tech Specs allowed for this condition to remain at power.

Reactor Engineering reports MTC for 440 EFPD is  $-2.6E^{-4}\Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ .

# Maximum High Linear Power Level and RPS Trip Setpoint is 87% per Tech Spec figure 3.7-1

#### (A6)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

### **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- The plant is at 90% power, 440 EFPD, Steady State.
- MSSV testing is in progress.
- The following are the MSSV as found lift pressure reported by maintenance:

MSSVs for 2E24A	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1002	1068 psig
2PSV-1003	1088 psig
2PSV-1004	1098 psig
2PSV-1005	1096 psig
2PSV-1006	1132 psig
MSSVs for 2E24B	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1052	1062 psig
2PSV-1053	1068 psig
2PSV-1054	1115 psig
0001/ 4055	1100 00:0
2PSV-1055	1108 psig

## **INITIATING CUE #1:**

Determine operability of the MSSVs IAW with Tech Specs and OP-2306.006 Unit 2 Main Steam Safety valve test Attachment 1.

**INITIAL CONDITIONS:** (same as previous initial conditions)

- The plant is at 90% power, 440 EFPD, Steady State.
- MSSV testing is in progress.
- The following are the MSSV as found lift pressure reported by maintenance:

MSSVs for 2E24A	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1002	1068 psig
2PSV-1002	
	1088 psig
2PSV-1004	1098 psig
2PSV-1005	1096 psig
2PSV-1006	1132 psig
MSSVs for 2E24B	As found lift pressure
2PSV-1052	1062 psig
2PSV-1053	1068 psig
2PSV-1054	1115 psig
2PSV-1055	1108 psig
2PSV-1056	1110 psig

## **INITIATING CUE #2**:

Determine the **MAXIMUM** High Linear Power Level and RPS Trip **SET POINT** per Tech Specs allowed for this condition to remain at power.

Reactor Engineering reports MTC for 440 EFPD is  $-2.6E^{-4}\Delta k/k/^{\circ}F$ .

NAME:\_\_\_\_\_\_ STOP TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

ANO-2-JPM-NRC-AI <u>AD</u>	OMIN-EFWTS2 MINISTRATIVE JO	A7 <u>DB PERF(</u>		E MEASURE	Page 1 of 6
UNIT: <u>2</u>	REV #:	1		DATE:	
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA:	Equipment contro	ls			
TASK: Determine E	FW TS applicability.				
JTA#: ANO2-RO-EFV	V-SURV-51				
	3.6 SRO:				2.2.37
APPROVED FOR ADMIN	IISTRATION TO: R	:0:	SRO:	X	
TASK LOCATION:		OUTS	IDE CR:	BOTH:	X
SUGGESTED TESTING I	ENVIRONMENT AND M	/IETHOD (P	ERFORM O	R SIMULATE):	
PLANT SITE:	SIMULAT	OR: F	Perform	CLASSROOM	: Perform
POSITION EVALUATED:		SRO			
ACTUAL TESTING ENVI	RONMENT: SIMULA	TOR:	PLANT	SITE: C	LASSROOM:
TESTING METHOD:	SIMULATE:		M:		
	ETION TIME IN MINUT	ES:	15 Minute	es	
REFERENCE(S): 2106 Open	.006, Emergency Fee rations, Unit 2 Tech S	nooc	-	ion, 2104.036 Em	
EXAMINEE'S NAME:			L	ogin ID #:	
EVALUATOR'S NAME:					
THE EXAMINEE'S PERF JPM AND IS DETERMINI		LUATED AG	AINST THE	STANDARDS CC	ONTAINED IN THI
SATISFACTORY:	UNSATISI	ACTORY:			
PERFORMANCE CHECK	(LIST COMMENTS:				
Start Time S	Stop Time	_ Total Tim	e		

QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Plant is in Mode 3.
- Auxiliary Feedwater pump trips.
- EFAS actuates automatically to control SG level.
- All EFW valves cycle closed based on SG level.
- The Inside AO reports an oil leak on #2 EDG governor and the oil level is below indicating range.

## TASK STANDARD:

Determined that #2 EDG is NOT operable and that TS 3.8.1.1 action b is applicable.

Determined that all PZR heaters are NOT operable and that TS 3.4.4 action b is applicable.

Determined that both trains of EFW are operable.

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2106.006, Emergency Feedwater operations, OP-2104.036 Emergency Diesel operations, Unit 2 Tech Specs.

## ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-EFWTS2 A7 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

### **INITIATING CUE:**

Determine the operability of #2 EDG, Pressurizer Heaters, Red Train EFW and the Green Train of EFW for the given plant conditions using 2106.006 Emergency Feedwater operations, 2104.036 Emergency Diesel operations, and Unit 2 Tech Specs.

## START TIME:

	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARD	(Circle One)				
	<ol> <li>Review OP 2106.006, Emergency Feedwater System Operation, Attachment D, and Technical Specifications.</li> </ol>	Examinee reviewed the Emergency feedwater System Operation and Tech Specs.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	<ul> <li>2. Using 2104.036 Limit and Precaution 5.23 determines #2 EDG operability.</li> <li>(OP 2104.036 Step 5.23 3<sup>rd</sup></li> </ul>	Examinee determined that #2 EDG is inoperable.	N/A SAT UNSAT				
	bullet)		N/A SAT UNSAT				
(C)	<ol> <li>Using TS 3.4.4 determines PZR Heater availability.</li> </ol>	Examinee determined that All Pressurizer Heaters are not operable due to the emergency power supply being inoperable.					
Fxan	Examiner note: Due to the note on page one OP-2106.006 Attachment D (EFW summary						
of Op	perability) "Both EFW trains rema	in operable in Mode 1, 2, and 3	in the event of a				
	valid MSIS or EFAS closure of downstream valves, PPS matrix testing is not considered						
	a valid closure signal". Since the initial conditions state the unit is in mode 3 and there is a valid EFAS signal, both trains of EFW remain operable even though the downstream						
valve	es are closed. Therefore TS 3.7.1.2	2 and TS 3.0.5 are not applicable					
(C)	<ul> <li>4. Using Attachment D of 2106.006 determines Red Train EFW operability.</li> <li>(2106.006 Att. D)</li> </ul>	Examinee determined that the Red Train of EFW is operable because even though both downstream EFW valves are closed they were closed by a	N/A SAT UNSAT				
		valid EFAS.					

Page 4 of 6

## ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-EFWTS2 A7 ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARD	(Circle One)
(C)	<ol> <li>Using Attachment D of 2106.006 determines Green Train EFW operability.</li> <li>(2106.006 Att. D)</li> </ol>	Examinee determined that the Green Train of EFW is operable because even though both downstream EFW valves are closed they were closed by a valid EFAS.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	6. Determine applicable Technical Specifications.	Determined the following Technical Specifications must be entered: TS 3.8.1.1 action b is applicable. And TS 3.4.4 action b is applicable.	N/A SAT UNSAT

STOP TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

## EXAMINER'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Plant is in Mode 3.
- Auxiliary Feedwater pump trips.
- EFAS actuates automatically to control SG level.
- All EFW valves cycle closed based on SG level.
- The Inside AO reports an oil leak on #2 EDG governor **AND** the oil level is below indicating range.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

Determine the operability of #2 EDG, Pressurizer Heaters, Red Train EFW **AND** the Green Train of EFW for the given plant conditions using 2106.006 Emergency Feedwater operations, 2104.036 Emergency Diesel operations, **AND** Unit 2 Tech Specs.

#2 EDG Operable? YES(NO)(Circle One)
All Pressurizer Heaters Operable? YES(NO)(Circle One)
Red Train of EFW Operable? (ES)NO (Circle One)
Green Train of EFW Operable? YES/NO (Circle One)

# Applicable Tech Specs (**INCLUDE ACTIONS**): <u>TS 3.8.1.1 action b, TS 3.4.4 action b (TS 3.7.1.2 and TS 3.0.5 are not applicable)</u>

Examiner note: Due to the note on page one OP-2106.006 Attachment D (EFW summary of Operability) "Both EFW trains remain operable in Mode 1, 2, and 3 in the event of a valid MSIS or EFAS closure of downstream valves, PPS matrix testing is not considered a valid closure signal". Since the initial conditions state the unit is in mode 3 and there is a valid EFAS signal, both trains of EFW remain operable even though the downstream valves are closed. Therefore TS 3.7.1.2 and TS 3.0.5 are not applicable for this condition.

## EXAMINEE'S COPY

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Plant is in Mode 3.
- Auxiliary Feedwater pump trips.
- EFAS actuates automatically to control SG level.
- All EFW valves cycle closed based on SG level.
- The Inside AO reports an oil leak on #2 EDG governor **AND** the oil level is below indicating range.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

Determine the operability of #2 EDG, Pressurizer Heaters, Red Train EFW **AND** the Green Train of EFW for the given plant conditions using 2106.006 Emergency Feedwater operations, 2104.036 Emergency Diesel operations, **AND** Unit 2 Tech Specs.

#2 EDG Operable? YES/NO (Circle One)

All Pressurizer Heaters Operable? YES/NO (Circle One)

Red Train of EFW Operable? YES/NO (Circle One)

Green Train of EFW Operable? YES/NO (Circle One)

Applicable Tech Specs (INCLUDE ACTIONS):

NAME:START	Г: STOP:
------------	----------

UNIT: <u>2</u> REV #: <u>005</u> DATE:					
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: A.3: Radiation Control					
TASK: Review and approve Containment Purge Gaseous Release					
JTA#: ANO-SRO-ADMIN-NORM-189					
KA VALUE         RO:         2.0         SRO:         3.8         KA REFERENCE:         2.3.6					
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: SRO: X					
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:       X					
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):					
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: CLASSROOM: Perform PERF0PERF0PERF0PERF0PERF0PERF0PERF0PERF0					
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:					
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: CLR:					
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:					
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 Minutes					
REFERENCE(S): OP 2104.033 Containment Atmosphere Control					
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Login ID:					
EVALUATOR'S NAME:					
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:					
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:					
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:					
Start Time         Stop Time         Total Time					

#### INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS

- Plant is in Mode 5.
- Today's date is 9/24/2018.
- Chemistry has completed Containment atmosphere radioactivity analysis.
- Initial flow from 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 10.5 SCFM.
- Initial count rate on 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 50 cpm.
- Initial SPING 5 (2RX-9820) channel 5 activity in section 1 is 1<sup>e-7</sup> μci/cc.
- Initial CNTMT building average pressure in section 1 is 14 psia
- Initial CAM's Gaseous reading in section 2 is 68 CPM.
- Current four hour average CAM's Gaseous reading is 139 CPM.
- Last test reading run-time from engineering programs group is 7532.5 hrs.
- Current run-time reading from 2B85-C7 is 8284.9 hrs.
- Purge Exhaust Filter Unit doors have been verified closed and dogged.
- A reactor Operator has completed the request and containment purge verification section of OP 2104.033 Supplement 1.

#### TASK STANDARD:

ALL of the following errors must be identified:

- Step 1.4.4 was marked N/A incorrectly, the filter run-time should have been given to Engineering programs for evaluation.
- Step 4.3 calculated count rate limit is wrong.
- Step 4.4 since current CAMS radiation readings exceed the calculated limits, the permit should have been resubmitted to chemistry.
- Step 4.8 2RITS-8233 set point is recorded incorrectly.
- Step 4.8 Potentiometer dial set point circled is incorrect due to recording the set point incorrectly; this results in a non-conservative trip value for 2RITS-8233.

#### <u>AND</u>

Determined that the release permit must not be approved.

 TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:
 A marked-up copy of Supplement 1 Containment Purge Gaseous

 Release Permit through section 4 and chemistry release data.

SIMULATOR SETUP: NA

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The Shift Manager directs "Review and approve OP-2104.033 supplement 1, Containment Purge Gaseous Release Permit using the completed supplement and chemistry report. Identify all errors (if any) in the supplement."

## START TIME:

	PE	RFORMANCECHECKLIST	STANDARD	CIRCLE ONE
EXAM	INER	S NOTE: Provide a marked-up cop	y of OP 2104.033 Supplement 1.	
	1.	Perform supervisor review for approval of the Containment purge gaseous release permit and determine errors.	Reviews the containment purge gaseous release permit.	N/A
EXAM	INER	S NOTE: The following list the error ALL of the following error		
(C)	2.	<ul> <li>Step 1.4.4 was marked N/A incorrectly, the filter run-time should have been given to Engineering programs for evaluation.</li> <li>Step 4.3 calculated count rate limits are wrong.</li> <li>Step 4.4 since current CAMS radiation readings exceed the allowable limits, the permit should have been resubmitted to chemistry.</li> <li>Step 4.8 2RITS-8233 set point is recorded incorrectly.</li> <li>Step 4.8 Potentiometer dial set point circled is incorrect due to recording the set point incorrectly; this results in a nonconservative trip value for 2RITS-8233.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Filter run-time is beyond 720 hrs; this should be evaluated by engineering programs before proceeding with release.</li> <li>Calculated count rate limits was given to be gaseous 126 CPM but should have been gaseous 136 CPM.</li> <li>The Purge permit should be resubmitted to chemistry but the steps were marked as NA due current radiation readings exceeding calculated limits.</li> </ul>	N/A SAT UNSAT
EXAM	INER	S NOTE: The Examinee should disc	cuss that the release will be resubmitted build evaluate the runtime on the exhaus	
(C)	3.	The release should not be approved and should be resubmitted to chemistry.	begin.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			END	

STOP TIME:

#### ANO-2-JPM-NRC-ADMIN-PURGE

#### (A8)

#### ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

## **EXAMINER's COPY**

## **INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS**

- Plant is in Mode 5.
- Today's date is 9/24/2018.
- Chemistry has completed Containment atmosphere radioactivity analysis.
- Initial flow from 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 10.5 SCFM.
- Initial count rate on 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 50 cpm.
- Initial SPING 5 (2RX-9820) channel 5 activity in section 1 is 1<sup>e-7</sup> μci/cc.
- Initial CNTMT building average pressure in section 1 is 14 psia
- Initial CAM's Gaseous reading in section 2 is 68 CPM.
- Current four hour average CAM's Gaseous reading is 139 CPM.
- Last test reading run-time from engineering programs group is 7532.5 hrs.
- Current run-time reading from 2B85-C7 is 8284.9 hrs.
- Purge Exhaust Filter Unit doors have been verified closed and dogged.
- A reactor Operator has completed the request and containment purge verification section of OP 2104.033 Supplement 1.

## **Initiating CUE:**

The Shift Manager directs "Review and approve OP-2104.033 supplement 1, Containment Purge Gaseous Release Permit using the completed supplement and chemistry report. Identify all errors (if any) in the supplement."

List the errors identified below:

ALL of the following errors must be identified:

- Step 1.4.4 was marked N/A incorrectly, the filter run-time should have been given to Engineering programs for evaluation.
- Step 4.3 calculated count rate limit is wrong.
- Step 4.4 since current CAMS radiation readings exceed the calculated limits, the permit should have been resubmitted to chemistry.
- Step 4.8 2RITS-8233 set point is recorded incorrectly.
- Step 4.8 Potentiometer dial set point circled is incorrect due to recording the set point incorrectly; this results in a non-conservative trip value for 2RITS-8233.

Can this release permit be approved based review of OP-2104.033 Supplement 1? \_\_\_\_\_

Determined that the release permit must not be approved.

## **EXAMINEE's COPY**

## **INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS**

- Plant is in Mode 5.
- Today's date is 9/24/2018.
- Chemistry has completed Containment atmosphere radioactivity analysis.
- Initial flow from 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 10.5 SCFM.
- Initial count rate on 2RITS-8233 in section 1, Containment Purge, is 50 cpm.
- Initial SPING 5 (2RX-9820) channel 5 activity in section 1 is 1<sup>e-7</sup> μci/cc.
- Initial CNTMT building average pressure in section 1 is 14 psia
- Initial CAM's Gaseous reading in section 2 is 68 CPM.
- Current four hour average CAM's Gaseous reading is 139 CPM.
- Last test reading run-time from engineering programs group is 7532.5 hrs.
- Current run-time reading from 2B85-C7 is 8284.9 hrs.
- Purge Exhaust Filter Unit doors have been verified closed and dogged.
- A reactor Operator has completed the request and containment purge verification section of OP 2104.033 Supplement 1.

## Initiating CUE:

The Shift Manager directs "Review and approve OP-2104.033 Supplement 1, Containment Purge Gaseous Release Permit using the completed supplement and chemistry report. Identify all errors (if any) in the supplement."

List the errors (if any) identified below:

Can this release permit be approved based review of OP-2104.033 Supplement 1? \_\_\_\_\_

A9

## ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

UNIT: <u>2</u>	REV #: _005	5	DATE	E:
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA:	Emergency Plan			
TASK: Determine Eme	rgency Action Level/Pr	otective Ac	tion Recommen	dation (Time Critical JPM)
JTA#: ANO-SRO-EPL	AN-EMERG-278			
KA VALUE RO:	2.9 SRO:	4.6	KA REFERENC	E: 2.4.41
APPROVED FOR ADMINI	STRATION TO: RO:		SRO: X	_
TASK LOCATION:		OUTSID	E CR:	BOTH: X
SUGGESTED TESTING E	NVIRONMENT AND ME	ETHOD (PE	RFORM OR SIMU	JLATE):
PLANT SITE:	SIMULATOR:		Classroom:	Perform
POSITION EVALUATED:	RO:	SRO:		
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT:	SIMULATO	PR:	PLANT SITE:	CLASSROOM:
TESTING METHOD: S	SIMULATE: I	PERFORM:		
APPROXIMATE COMPLE	TION TIME IN MINUTES	S: <u>15 M</u>	inutes – EAL Cla	ssification
REFERENCE(S): 1903.	010 Emergency Action I	Level Class	ification	
EXAMINEE'S NAME:			Login ID:	
EVALUATOR'S NAME:				
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFO THIS JPM AND IS DETER		ATED AGA	INST THE STAN	DARDS CONTAINED IN
SATISFACTORY:		CTORY:		
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:				
	op T me	otal Time		

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS: (Time Critical JPM)

- Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident.
- Reactor was manually tripped
- SIAS, CCAS, CIAS, and CSAS have actuated.
- Currently all 3 charging pumps are running with normal flow.
- 2 HPSI pumps are running with 200 gpm per pump.
- Margin to Saturation is 31 degrees and stable.
- Containment High Range radiation monitors are reading 1200 R/hr

### TASK STANDARD: Determined the following (Time Critical - 15 minutes to classify event):

Determined SAE (FS-1) is the appropriate EAL. (Time Critical)

Determined two or the three fission product barriers are lost or potentially lost. (Not Time Critical)

- RCB1: RCS leakage > 44 GPM and/or RCB3: Containment Radiation Monitoring
- FCB4: containment Radiation Monitoring

Determined that containment boundary is not lost. (Not Time Critical)

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification

#### A9

## ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

### Examiner Note: Give out Cue #2 after cue #1 is complete.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

Determine the status of the fission product boundaries and the highest EAL classification from the given initial conditions (list EAL classification and event number).

#### Time Starts Now.

## START:\_\_\_\_\_

		PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARD	(Circle One)
(C)	1.	Determined "SAE" EAL classification.	Using OP 1903.010, determined "SAE" EAL classification FS1, Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			Stop Time:	
(C)	2.	EAL determination made in 15 minutes.	EAL determined within 15 minutes.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	3.	Determined RCS barrier status.	Determined RCS barrier Lost/Potentially Lost using given plant indications per OP 1903.010, Attachment 2, RCB1. RCS leak > 44 gpm with letdown isolated and/or RCB3: Containment Radiation Monitoring	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	4.	Determined Containment fission product barrier status.	Determined Containment barrier <b>NOT</b> Lost IAW per 1903.010, Attachment 2.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	5.	Determined Fuel Clad barrier status.	Determined Fuel Clad barrier lost/potentially lost using plant indications per 1903.010, Attachment 2 FCB4.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	1	1	END	

STOP:\_\_\_\_\_

### A9

## ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

Examiner Note: Give out Cue #2 after cue #1 is complete.

## Examiner's Copy

## This JPM (Cue #1) is time critical

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident.
- Reactor was manually tripped
- SIAS, CCAS, CIAS, and CSAS have actuated.
- Currently all 3 charging pumps are running with normal flow.
- 2 HPSI pumps are running with 200 gpm per pump.
- Margin to Saturation is 31 degrees and stable.
- Containment High Range radiation monitors are reading 1200 R/hr

### **INITIATING CUE #1:**

Determine the status of the EAL classification and Event number/code from the given initial conditions.

#### Time Starts Now.

EAL Class	Event number/code
SAE	FS-1

#### **INITIATING CUE #2:**

Determine the status of the fission product boundaries:

	Fission product boundary status: (Lost/Potentially Lost or Intact)	Barrier EAL number, code, etc. if applicable.
Containment	Intact	N/A
RCS	Lost/Potentially Lost	RCB1 and/or RCB3
Fuel	Lost/Potentially Lost	FCB4

## Examinee's Copy

## This JPM is time critical

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident.
- Reactor was manually tripped
- SIAS, CCAS, CIAS, and CSAS have actuated.
- Currently all 3 charging pumps are running with normal flow.
- 2 HPSI pumps are running with 200 gpm per pump.
- Margin to Saturation is 31 degrees and stable.
- Containment High Range radiation monitors are reading 1200 R/hr

## **INITIATING CUE #1:**

- Determine the status of the EAL classification from the given initial conditions.
- Time Starts Now.

EAL Classification	Event number/code

NAME:	STA

RT:\_\_\_\_\_ STOP: \_\_\_\_\_

### A9

## ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

## Examinee's Copy

## Not time critical

### INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident. •
- Reactor was manually tripped •
- SIAS, CCAS, CIAS, and CSAS have actuated. •
- Currently all 3 charging pumps are running with normal flow. •
- 2 HPSI pumps are running with 200 gpm per pump. •
- Margin to Saturation is 31 degrees and stable. •
- Containment High Range radiation monitors are reading 1200 R/hr •

### **INITIATING CUE #2:**

Determine the status of the fission product boundaries:

	Fission product boundary status: (Lost/Potentially Lost or Intact)	Barrier EAL number, code, etc. if applicable.
Containment		
RCS		
Fuel		

ES-301

## Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

Form ES-301-2

<u>AN()2019</u>					
Facility:ANO-2Date of Examination:4/22/2019Examination Level:ROSROOperating Test Number:2019-1					
Control Room Systems: $^{*}$ 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U					
System/JPM Title	Type Code*	Safety Function			
S1. A2JPM-RO-VCTMU2 004 A4.07, RO-3.9 / SRO 3.7. Perform Manual Makeup to the VCT	A, M, S	1 Reactivity control			
S2. A2JPM-RO-EOP08 002 A 2.01, RO-4.3 / SRO 4.4 Perform Standard Attachment 22 Isolating LOCA outside containment	A, EN, L, N, S	2 Inventory Control			
S3. A2JPM-RO-PZR09 010 A4.02; RO-3.6 / SRO-3.4 Perform 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations, Attachment B, Red Train Proportional Heater Test	N, S	3 Pressure Control			
S4. A2JPM-RO-RCP05 003 A2.02; RO-3.7 / SRO-3.9 Perform a normal RCP start (Alternate Path),	A, D, L, S	4 Heat Removal Primary			
S5. ANO-2-JPM-NRC-CNTCL 022 A4.03 RO-3.2/SRO-3.2 Verify Containment Coolers in Emergency Mode	A, D, EN,L, S	5 Containment			
S6. A2JPM-RO-AAC01 055 EA1.06; RO-4.1 / SRO-4.5 Perform an Emergency start of the AAC Diesel from 2C-14 and energize 2A3.	D, L, S	6 Electrical			
S7. A2JPM-RO-AOP06 015 A2.02; RO-3.1 / SRO-3.5 Disable B channel Excore nuclear instrumentation.	D, L, P, S	7 Instrumentation			
S8. A2JPM-RO-AOP7 A13 AA1.2; RO-3.1 / SRO-3.6 Shift Gland Seal Steam to Unit 1 during Natural Circ cool down.	N, S	8 Plant Service systems			
In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U					
P1. A2JPM-RO-WGDTR 071 A2.02: RO-3.3 / SRO-3.6 Perform Waste Gas Decay Tank Release	A, D, R	9 Radioactivity Release			
P2. A2JPM-RO-TLOF CE E06 EA2.2; RO-3.0 / SRO-4.2 Perform Local Actions to start 'A' Condensate pump during a Loss of Feedwater.	D, E, L, P	4 Heat Removal Secondary			
P3. A2JPM-RO- SURV01 062 A4.04; RO-2.6 / SRO-2.7 Perform 2305.016 Remote Feature Periodic test for EDG exhaust fans	EN, N, R	6 Electrical			

\*

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

* Type Codes	Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U		
(A)Iternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power/Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) (P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator	$\begin{array}{l} 4-6/4-6/2-3 \\ \leq 9/\leq 8/\leq 4 \\ \geq 1/\geq 1/\geq 1 \\ \geq 1/\geq 1/\geq 1 \ (\text{control room system}) \\ \geq 1/\geq 1/\geq 1 \\ \geq 2/\geq 2/\geq 1 \\ \leq 3/\leq 3/\leq 2 \ (\text{randomly selected}) \\ \geq 1/\geq 1/\geq 1 \end{array}$	5 / NA / 3 6 / NA / 2 1 / NA / 1 2 / NA / 1 6 / NA / 3 5 / NA / 3 2 / NA / 1 2 / NA / 1 8 / NA / 3	

ES-301

## Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

Form ES-301-2

AN				
Facility:ANO-2Date of Examination:4/22/2019Examination Level:ROSROOperating Test Number:2019-1				
Control Room Systems: * 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and	d 2 or 3 for SRO-U			
System/JPM Title		Type Code*	Safety Function	
S1. A2JPM-RO-VCTMU2 004 A4.07, RO-3.9 / SRO 3.7. Perform Manual Makeup to the VCT		A, M, S	1 Reactivity control	
S2. A2JPM-RO-EOP08 002 A 2.01, RO-4.3 / SRO 4.4 Perform Standard Attachment 22 Isolating LOCA outside cor	ntainment	A, EN, L, N, S	2 Inventory Control	
S3.				
S4. A2JPM-RO-RCP05 003 A2.02; RO-3.7 / SRO-3.9 Perform a normal RCP start (Alternate Path),		A, D, L, S	4 Heat Removal Primary	
S5.				
S6.				
S7.				
S8.				
In-Plant Systems: 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or	2 for SRO-U			
P1.				
P2. A2JPM-RO-TLOF CE E06 EA2.2; RO-3.0 / SRO-4.2 Perform Local Actions to start 'D' Condensate pump during a	Loss of Feedwater.	D, E, L, P	4 Heat Removal Secondary	
P3. A2JPM-RO-SURV01 062 A4.04; RO-2.6 / SRO-2.7 Perform 2305.016 Remote Feature Periodic test for EDG exh	naustfans	EN, N, R	6 Electrical	
* All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.				
* Type Codes Criteria for RO/SRO-I/SRO-U				

## ES-301

## Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

## Form ES-301-2

(A)Iternate path (C)ontrol room	4-6/4-6 /2-3	5 / NA / 3
(D)irect from bank	≤ 9/≤ 8/≤ 4	6 / NA / 2
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant	≥ 1/≥ 1/≥ 1	1 / NA / 1
(EN)gineered safety feature	≥ 1/≥ 1/≥ 1 (control room system)	2 / NA / 1
(L)ow-Power/Shutdown	≥ 1/≥ 1/≥ 1	6 / NA / 3
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)	≥ 2/≥ 2/≥ 1	5 / NA / 3
(P)revious 2 exams	$\leq 3/\leq 3/\leq 2$ (randomly selected)	2 / NA / 1
(R)CA	≥ 1/≥ 1/≥ 1	2 / NA / 1
(S)imulator		8 / NA / 3

A2JPM-RO-VCTMU2

## (S1)

UNIT: 2 REV #: 002 DATE:
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Chemical and Volume Control System
TASK: Perform Manual Makeup to the VCT
JTA#:ANO2-RO-CHADD-NORM-111
ALTERNATE PATH YES: X NO: TIME CRITICAL YES: NO: X
KA VALUE         RO:         3.6         SRO:         3.7         KA REFERENCE:         004 A4.15
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       X       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform LAB:
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 15 Minutes
REFERENCE(S): OP 2104.003 Chemical Addition Rev. 57
EXAMINEE'S NAME: LOGIN ID:
EVALUATOR'S NAME:
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:
Start     Stop     Total Time       Time

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

Plant is operating at 100%.

OP 2104.003 Attachment L is completed through step 2.2. Boron 2 PMS program has been completed.

'A' BAM Tank" boron concentration is 5964 ppm.

RCS boron Concentration is 746 ppm.

**TASK STANDARD:** Setup controller setpoints at the correct blend ratio, Commenced manual blend make-up to the VCT, recognized that the fluid transfer is not correct and secured the make-up alignment.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

Copy of OP 2104.003 Attachment L and Plant Monitoring System print out of required boric acid and water.

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

VCT level at 60%.

2CVC-68 is closed and 2CVC-83 is closed.

2CVC-64 open. (value = .5)

K11-J04 (Spent Fuel Pool level Hi) = On, Delay = 1 min. trigger by 2CV-4926 red light HF4R492A.

#### EXAMINER NOTES:

The applicant will line up to make up to the VCT and not change boron concentration. When the make-up is started the VCT level will not rise as expected, the Spent Fuel Pool high level alarm will annunciate and the applicant should secure the lineup.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs, "Raise VCT level to 75% using OP 2104.003 Attachment L beginning with step 2.3 using 'A' BAM Tank."

### START TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST			STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
		EXA	MINER'S NOTE:		
	The Boric Acid and DI water flow rates should be set up to be approximately 1 to 6.2 ratio based on current boron concentrations in the RCS and BAMT A with 1 part Boric Acid and 6 parts DI water.				
additio	The actual blend ratio to maintain RCS boron concentration is 1 to 7 but the last 50 gallons of addition should be DI water to flush the makeup line and this will equate to approximately 1 to 6.2 ratio make up rate.				
	1. Step 2.3	<b>ADJUST</b> blend ratio to achieve desired shutdown rate and make-up rate.	Determine that the blend ratio does not need to be adjusted for a shutdown or make-up rate.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		EXAMINER NOTE: The blend ratio does not need to be adjusted for a shutdown or make-up rate but the applicant may adjust the blend ratio as stated in the note above.			

## (S1)

	PERFORMANCE CHECK	ST	ANDARDS		(Circle One)	
		Pro	ocedure Note:			
Thes	The following chart and calculations are for operator aid only and are not required to be used or place kept. These tools may be modified as desired. (ie. periodic flow estimate can be used for any time interval desired)					
			EXAMPLE			
	Total v	olume <b>(V<sub>T</sub>)</b> = (	10%) * 33.8 ga	al/% = 338 gal		
	Acid v	rolume(V <sub>A</sub> ) = _	<u>338 gal_</u> = <b>52</b> g (5.5 + 1)	gal		
	Flush	/olume(V <sub>F</sub> ) = {	50 gal			
	Water	volume <b>(V<sub>w</sub>)</b> =	(338 gal – 52	gal) – 50 gal = <b>2</b>	<b>36</b> gal	
	Periodic Flow Estimate	1	2	3	4	FLUSH
	Water Volume(gal)	59	118	177	236 (V <sub>w</sub> )	286 (V <sub>w</sub> +V <sub>F</sub> )
	Acid Volume(gal)	13	26	39	52 (V <sub>A</sub> )	N/A
	Total volume( $V_T$ ) = (V	VCT level c	change) * 3	3.8 gal/%		
	$(\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{T}}) = (\_\_\_15\_$	) * 33.	8 gal/%	=	<u>507</u> (V <sub>T</sub> )	gal
	Acid volume( $V_A$ ) =	Total [Init:	<u>volume</u> ial blend r		(*1)	
	$(\mathbf{V}_{\mathbf{r}}) =$	(	507)		= 63	al al
	(*A/		7		<u>03</u>	3gal ( <b>V<sub>A</sub>)</b>
	Flush volume( $V_F$ ) = 50 gal $\underline{50}_{(V_F)}$ gal					
	Water volume( $V_w$ ) = (Total volume – Acid volume) – Flush volume					
	$(\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{W}}) = (\underline{\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{T}}}, 507)$	<u>64</u>	<u>.</u> ) – 5	0 gal =	<u>393</u>	gal
	Periodic Flow Estimate	<u> </u>	2	3	4	FLUSH
	Water (gal)	93	186	279	393 (V <sub>w</sub> )	443 (Vw+V₅)
	Acid (gal)	15	30	45	64 (V <sub>A</sub> )	N/A

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	2. Step 2.4	<ul> <li>IF making up to Volume Control Tank, THEN PERFORM the following to align to VCT:</li> <li>2.4.1 OPEN Manual Makeup to VCT (2CVC-68).</li> <li>2.4.2 CLOSE Manual Makeup to Charging Pump Suction (2CVC-83).</li> <li>EXAMINER CUE: WCO reports than 2CVC-68 is OPEN and 2CVC-83 is CLOSED.</li> </ul>	Contact WCO and direct OPENING of 2CVC-68 and CLOSING of 2CVC-83.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	3. Step 2.5	IF desired, THEN RECORD initial controller data: 2FIC-4926 Setpoint: Demand: 2FIC-4927 Setpoint: Demand:	Recorded data or N/A	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	4. Step 2.6	<ul> <li>ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) set as follows:</li> <li>2.6.1 Setpoint set to desired flow rate.</li> <li>2.6.2 <u>IF</u> in MANUAL, <u>THEN</u> demand set to desired value.</li> </ul>	On Panel 2C09, set Boric Acid Makeup Flow Controller (2FIC-4926) set point to desired flow rate. And adjusted output to desired value. Examiner note: It is critical to setup the controller setpoint at ~ 1 / 6.2 of water flow rate. Acceptable range is 1 / (5.7 to 6.7). It is not critical to have the output at the correct value due to the output being an estimate.	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	5. Step 2.7	ENSURE Reactor Makeup Water Flow controller (2FIC-4927) set as follows:	On Panel 2C09, set Reactor Makeup Water Flow Controller (2FIC-4927) setpoint to desired flow rate.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		2.7.1 Setpoint set to desired flow rate.	And adjusted output to desired value.	
		<ul> <li>2.7.2 IF in MANUAL, THEN demand set to desired value.</li> <li>2.7.3 IF aligned to Charging Pump Suction, THEN demand set less than Charging flow</li> </ul>	Examiner note: It is critical to setup the controller setpoint at ~ 6.2 times acid flow rate. Acceptable range is 5.7 to 6.7. It is not critical to have the output at the correct value due to the output being an estimate.	
	6. Step 2.8	<b>RESET</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow Totalizer (2FQI-4926) to zero.	On Panel 2C09, on (2FQI-4926) depressed the reset pushbutton. (Function pushbutton F3) Observed 2FQI-4926 indicating zero.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	7. Step 2.8	RESET Reactor Makeup Water Flow Totalizer (2FQI-4927) to zero.	On Panel 2C09, on (2FQI-4927) depressed the reset pushbutton. (Function pushbutton F3) Observed 2FQI-4927 indicating	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	8. Step 2.9	<b>OPEN</b> VCT Makeup Isolation (2CV-4941-2) (2HS-4941-2).	zero. On Panel 2C09, placed handswitch for VCT Makeup Isol Valve (2CV-4941-2) to OPEN. Observed red light ON, green light OFF above handswitch for 2CV-4941-2.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	9. Step 2.10	<b>ENSURE</b> EITHER Reactor Makeup pump running: 2P-109A (2HS-4965)	On Panel 2C09, verified handswitch for one Reactor Makeup Pump (either 2P109A or 2P109B) in START.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		2P-109B (2HS-4966)	Observed red light ON and green light OFF above handswitch for selected pump.	

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST			STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	10. Step 2.11	ENSURE at least ONE BAM pump running:	On Panel 2C09, placed handswitch for 2P-39A OR 2P- 39B BAM Pump to START.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		2P-39A (2HS-4919-2) 2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)	Observed red light ON and green light OFF above handswitch for selected pump	
	11. Step 2.12	ENSURE BAM Tank Recirc valve open for running pump: 2T-6A recirc (2HS-4903-2) 2T-6B recirc (2HS-4915-2)	On Panel 2C09, opened the BAM Pump recirc valve associated with the running BAM pump (2CV-4903-2) OR (2CV-4915). Observed red light ON and green light OFF for valve opened.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	12 Step 2.13	<b>ENSURE</b> running BAM pump selected for automatic operation using BAM Pump Select Switch (2HS-4911-2).	Verified BAM Pump Select Switch (2HS-4911-2) selected for automatic operation for the running BAM pump.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	13. Step 2.14	<b>PLACE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Mode Selector switch (2HS- 4928) to MANUAL.	On Panel 2C09, placed 2HS- 4928 to MANUAL.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	14. Step 2.15	<b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) indicates desired flow rate.	On Panel 2C09, verified 2CV-4926 opens to control flow at ~ 1 / 6.2 of water flow rate. Observed flow indicated on 2FIC-4926.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	15. Step 2.16	<b>ENSURE</b> Reactor Makeup Water Flow controller (2FIC-4927) indicates desired flow rate.	On Panel 2C09, verified 2CV-4927 opens to control flow at ~ 6.2 times acid flow rate. Observed flow indicated on 2FIC-4927.	N/A SAT UNSAT

Makeup (Blend) to the VCT is commence. VCT level will not respond due to a lineup error by NLOs and the Spent Fuel Pool level HI/LO alarm will annunciate. This will clue the operator that the lineup is incorrect and they need to secure the lineup using step 2.17.

<ul> <li>(C) 15. IF ANY of the following occur during RCS Makeup:</li> <li>2.17</li> <li>FUEL POOL LEVEL HIGH (2K11-J4) alarm</li> <li>Expected VCT level change NOT observed</li> <li>CRS/SM directs securing RCS Dilution,</li> <li>THEN PERFORM ANY of the following as necessary:</li> <li>PLACE Mode Select switch (2HS-4928) in DILUTE.</li> <li>ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow Control 2CV-4926 closed (2FIC-4926).</li> <li>ENSURE RMW Flow Control 2CV-4927 closed (2FIC-4927).</li> <li>ENSURE running BAM pumps secured: <ul> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul> </li> <li>ENSURE running Reactor Makeup pump secured: <ul> <li>2P-109A (2HS-4965)</li> <li>2P-109B (2HS-4966)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul> <li>on 2FIC-4926 and 2FIC-4927 by any of the following:</li> <li>PLACE Mode Select switch (2HS-4928) in DILUTE.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow Control 2CV 4926 closed (2FIC-4926).</li> <li>ENSURE RMW Flow Control 2CV 4927 closed (2FIC- 4927).</li> <li>OR</li> <li>ENSURE running BAM pumps secured: <ul> <li>2P-39A (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul> </li> <li>ENSURE running Reactor Makeup pump secured: <ul> <li>2P-109A (2HS-4965)</li> <li>2P-109B (2HS-4966)</li> </ul> </li> <li>when above step is complete.</li> </ul>			
END				

## EXAMINER'S COPY

### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

Plant is operating at 100%.

OP 2104.003 Attachment L is completed through step 2.2.

Boron2 program has been used to determine the correct amounts of Boric acid and water.

'A' BAM Tank" boron concentration is 5975 ppm.

RCS boron Concentration is 746 ppm.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs, "Raise VCT level to 75% using OP 2104.003 Attachment L beginning with step 2.3 using 'A' BAM Tank."

#### EXAMINEE'S COPY

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS:

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

Plant is operating at 100%.

OP 2104.003 Attachment L is completed through step 2.2.

Boron2 program has been used to determine the correct amounts of Boric acid and water.

'A' BAM Tank" boron concentration is 5975 ppm.

RCS boron Concentration is 746 ppm.

### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs, "Raise VCT level to 75% using OP 2104.003 Attachment L beginning with step 2.3 using 'A' BAM Tank."

(S2)

UNIT: <u>2</u>	REV #: DA	TE:			
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Invent	ory Control				
TASK: Perform Standard Attachment 22 Isolating LOCA outside containment					
JTA#: ANO-RO-EOPAOP-	EMERG-13				
Alternate Path Yes: X	No: Time Critical Y	(es: No:)			
KA VALUE RO: <u>4.3</u>	SRO: 4.4 KA REFEREN	CE: 002 A2.01			
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATI	ΟΝ ΤΟ: RO: <u>χ</u> SRO: <u>χ</u>				
TASK LOCATION: INSIDE		ВОТН:			
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRON	MENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SI	MULATE):			
PLANT SITE:	SIMULATOR: Perform LAI	B:			
POSITION EVALUATED: RO:	SRO:				
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMEN	IT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SI	TE: LAB:			
TESTING METHOD: SIMULAT	E: PERFORM:				
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: <u>15 Minutes</u> REFERENCE(S): OP-2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 22					
EVALUATOR'S NAME:					
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANC JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO B	CE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STA E:	NDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS			
SATISFACTORY:	UNSATISFACTORY:				
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST CO	MMENTS:				
Start Stop Time Time	Total Time				
	DATE:				

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Reactor trip due to a Loss of Offsite power.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- A RCS Leak is occurring outside CNTMT.
- 2203.003, Loss of Coolant Accident has been entered.
- Power restored to 2A-1 from AAC.

## TASK STANDARD:

Isolated the LOCA outside containment by determining the leak was into CCW and then, aligned surge tank vents to 2VEF-8A/B exhaust fan suction, isolated CCW to the RCPs, and isolated controlled bleed off.

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 22.

## SIMULATOR SETUP:

Unit 2 reactor tripped due to Loss of Offsite power. Loss Of Coolant Accident procedure complete up to the step to perform Standard Attachment 22. RCS sample valves open.

Intersystem LOCA in progress. Malfunction RCP2P32BSLK value = 10 gpm.

**Examiner Note:** This is an Alternate Path JPM. The applicant is tasked isolating a LOCA that is leaving containment. The applicant will determine that the leak is into component cooling water and they must transition to standard attachment 18. They will use attachment 18 to isolate the leak to the containment building.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform OP-2202.010 Attachment 22 to isolate the RCS leakage leaving containment.

START TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

	PERFO	RMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
	1 (Step 1)	CHECK Aux Building Radiation monitors to determine break location.	Monitored Aux Building radiation to determine leak location.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	2 (Step 2)	<b>IF</b> Charging pumps running, <b>AND</b> "HEADER FLOW LO" annunciator (2K12-B3) in alarm, <b>THEN</b> :	Determined that charging Header flow low annunciator not in alarm.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	1	Pro	cedure Note:		
	The following step addresses LPSI header check valve leakage which causes LPSI Header Relief valve (2PSV 5089) to lift.				
	3 (Step 3)	<b>IF</b> in service BMS Holdup Tank level rising, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following to isolate leaking check valve:	Monitored BMS holdup tank level and determined levels were not rising.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
(C)	4 (Step 4)	IF indications of RCS leakage into CCW exist, THEN perform Attachment 18, RCS to CCW Leak lsolation in conjunction with this attachment. Examiner Cue: If applicant tries to continue and do both	Monitored CCW surge tank level or CCW radiation and determined levels were rising and RCS leak was into CCW. Transitioned to Attachment 18.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	5	attachments then state another operator will continue with Att. 22 Isolate Letdown by closing	Observed 2CV-4820 green	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	(Step 1)	Letdown Isolation valve (2CV-4820-2).	light on and Red light off.		

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(	JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE				
	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
	6 (Step 2)	<b>Cycle</b> Charging pumps as needed to maintain PZR level within 5% of setpoint.	Observed PZR level is acceptable and charging pump operation was adequate.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
(C)	7 (Step 3)	<ul> <li>ALIGN CCW Surge Tank vents to 2VEF-8A/B suction:</li> <li>Loop 1 CCW Surge Tank Vent (2CV-5217)</li> <li>Loop 2 CCW Surge Tank Vent (2CV-5218)</li> </ul>	Placed Handswitches for 2CV-5217 and 2CV-5218 to 2VEF8A/B suction. Observed valves repositioned to red light on above 2VEF8A/B suction position and red light off above Atmosphere position.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	8 (Step 4)	<b>IF</b> CCW Surge Tank levels stop rising, <b>OR</b> RCS leak isolated, <b>THEN ISOLATE</b> CCW to Letdown Heat Exchanger as follows:	Determined CCW Surge Tank levels were still rising.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
	Procedure Note:				
	Maximu	Im CCW Surge tank drain rate	through 2CCW-5030 is approxin	nately 80 gpm.	
	9 (Step 5)	Locally <b>MAINTAIN</b> CCW Surge Tank levels 40% to 50% as follows:	Directed NLO to control surge tank levels.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		<ul> <li>A. ENSURE the following valves open:</li> <li>A SURGE TANK DRN (2CCW-1022)</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>B SURGE TANK DRN (2CCW 1023)</li> <li>B. <b>THROTTLE</b> "2T 37A/B</li> </ul>			
		DRN TO LRW" valve (2CCW 5030).			
		Examiner Cue: Respond as NLO and report that will maintain surge tank level 40 to 50%.			

	PERFO	RMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	10 (Step 6)	<b>ENSURE</b> ANY CCW feed and bleed/side stream filter operation for chemistry control secured.	Directed Chemistry/NLO to secure any feed and bleed and/or side stream filter.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		Examiner Cue: Respond as chemistry/NLO and report feed and bleed/side stream filter ops secured.		
	11 (Step 7)	IF RCS leak to CCW still exists, THEN ENSURE RCS Sample Isolation valves closed: A. 2SV-5833-1 B. 2SV-5843-2	Placed 2SV-5833-1 and 2SV-5843-2 handswitches in closed. Observed Green light on, Red light off.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	12 (Step 8A)	IF RCS leak to CCW from RCPs, THEN:	Observed RCP secured 2P- 32A, 2P-32B, 2P-32C, and 2P-32D.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		A. <b>ENSURE</b> ALL RCPs stopped.	Observed Green light on, Red light off.	
	13 (Step 8B)	B. <b>ENSURE</b> BOTH PZR Spray valves in MANUAL and closed.	Observed PZR spray valve (2CV-4651/2CV-4652) HS in Manual and PZR spray valves closed (2CV-4651/2CV-4652)	N/A SAT UNSAT
			Observed Green light on, Red light off.	
(C)	14 (Step 8C)	<b>Close</b> RCP CCW Supply valve (2CV-5236-1).	Placed HS for 2CV-5236-1 in close.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			Observed Green light on, Red light off.	

	PERFO	RMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	15 (Step 8D)	<b>Close</b> RCP CCW Return Isolation valves:	Placed HS for 2CV-5254-2 and 2CV-5255-1 in close.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		<ul><li> 2CV-5254-2</li><li> 2CV-5255-1</li></ul>	Observed Green light on, Red light off.	
		Examiner Note: 2CV-5255- 1 is a throttle valve and must be held in the close position.	Examiner Note: It is only critical to close one of the return isolation valves.	
	16 (Step 8E)	<b>Close</b> RCP Bleedoff to VCT Isolation valve (2CV-4847-2). Examiner Note: Step Not Critical because other containment isolation valve is closed.	Placed HS for 2CV-4847-2 in close. Observed Green light on, Red light off.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	17 (Step 8F)	<b>Close</b> RCP Bleedoff Relief to Quench Tank Isolation valve (2CV-4856).	Placed HS for 2CV-4856 in close. Observed Green light on, Red light off.	N/A SAT UNSAT
Exan	Examiner note: When the applicant has isolated Controlled Bleedoff this JPM is complete.			
END				

STOP TIME:

#### EXAMINER'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Reactor trip due to a Loss of Offsite power.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- A RCS Leak is occurring outside CNTMT.
- 2203.003, Loss of Coolant Accident has been entered.
- Power restored to 2A-1 from AAC.

#### INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to perform OP-2202.010 Attachment 22 to isolate the RCS leakage leaving containment.

#### **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Reactor trip due to a Loss of Offsite power.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- A RCS Leak is occurring outside CNTMT.
- 2203.003, Loss of Coolant Accident has been entered.
- Power restored to 2A-1 from AAC.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform OP-2202.010 Attachment 22 to isolate the RCS leakage leaving containment.

A2JPM-RO-PZF	209
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(S3)

UNIT:         2         REV #:         1         DATE:				
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Pressurizer Pressure Control				
TASK: Perform 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations, Attachment B, Red Train Heater Test	Proportional			
JTA#: ANO-RO-PZR-NORM-13				
Alternate Path Yes: No:X Time Critical Yes:	No: X			
KA VALUE RO: <u>3.6</u> SRO: <u>3.4</u> KA REFERENCE:	010 A4.02			
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: $\chi$ SRO: $\chi$				
TASK LOCATION:INSIDE CR: $\chi$ OUTSIDE CR:BOTH:				
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):				
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: <u>Perform</u> LAB:				
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:				
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE:	LAB:			
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:				
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: <u>10 Minutes</u>				
REFERENCE(S): OP-2103.005, Pressurizer Operations, Attachment B				
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Login ID:				
EVALUATOR'S NAME:				
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTA				
JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:				
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:				
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:				
Start Stop Total Time				
SIGNED: DATE:				

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Mode 3
- Reactivity Management Brief complete.
- Initial conditions of 2103.005 Pressurizer operations Att. B complete

#### TASK STANDARD:

Tested the Red train proportional heater test by de-energizing the green train proportional heaters, raised heater output to full fire, restored heater control to automatic and determined adjusted heater output is between 190 KW and 197 KW.

### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations, Att. B.

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

Mode 3

**Examiner Note:** The applicant will perform a red train proportional heater test. The applicant will place the green train proportional heaters in off, ensure they read 0KW on SPDS and then manually raise the output of the red train heater to maximum. They will then record the heater output then restore the system to normal.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to complete 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations Att. B starting with step 2.0 START TIME:

PE	RFORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
1 (Step 2.1)	IF Pressurizer pressure deviating/responding unexpectedly, THEN RESTORE BOTH banks of Proportional Heaters to AUTO.	Applicant read step and will continue to monitor for pressure response during test.	N/A SAT UNSAT
2 (Step 2.2)	<b>IF</b> plant in Mode 1, 2, or 3, <u>THEN</u> MAINTAIN Dedicated Operator to restore heater control as necessary.	Applicant determined that they were the dedicated operator and they would restore heater control if necessary	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C) 3 (Step 2.3)	<b>PLACE</b> PZR Prop Heater 2SCR-2 switch (2HS-4641) in OFF. (Spring return to AUTO)	Placed 2HS-4641 to off. Checked Green light on and Red light off	N/A SAT UNSAT
4 (Step 2.4)	<b>ENSURE</b> Proportional Heater Bank #2 approximately 0 KW on SPDS (J2C118).	Checked SPDS point J2C118 indicated ~ 0 KW.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C) 5 (Step 2.5) (Step 2.5.1)	<b>TAKE</b> manual control of ONLINE PZR Pressure controller (2PIC-4626A or 2PIC-4626B) as follows:Using the F2 button, <b>SELECT</b> Page 3 for Pressurizer Proportional Heaters.	Pressed the F2 button on the pressurizer proportional controller 2PIC-4626A until Prop HTR displayed at top of controller.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C) 6 (Step 2.5.2)	PLACE controller in MANUAL.	Depressed the A/M button until M was display on 2PIC-4626A faceplate.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C) 7 (Step 2.6)	ADJUST ONLINE PZR Pressure Controller output to zero (Full On).	Depressed the lower arrow near the bottom of the controller until output was less than or equal to zero	N/A SAT UNSAT
8 (Step 2.7)	RECORD Proportional Heater Bank #1 power (J2C117): KW Examiner Note: Bank #1 power is ~ 205 KW	Recorded J2C117 value	N/A SAT UNSAT

	PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	9 (Step 4.8)	<b>PLACE</b> ONLINE PZR Pressure Controller in AUTO.	Depressed the A/M button until A was display on 2PIC-4626A faceplate.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	10 (Step 2.9)	<b>PLACE</b> PZR Prop Heater 2SCR-2 switch (2HS-4641) in ON. (Spring return to AUTO)	Placed 2HS-4641 to on. Checked green light off and Red light on	N/A SAT UNSAT
	11 (Step 2.10)	ENSURE pressurizer heaters controlling pressure at setpoint. Examiner Note: The applicants may delay continuing to monitor pressure response if desired provide them with the following cue. Examiner Cue: Tell applicant that another operator will monitor RCS pressure and they can continue.	Monitored PZR pressure and determined that pressurizer heaters were in control.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	12 (Step 2.11)	RECORD 2B5 Bus Voltage from SPDS SFD Screen: volts Examiner Note: 2B5 Bus Voltage is ~ 489 KW	Recorded 2B5 bus voltage.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	13 (Step 2.12)	CALCULATE Proportional Heater Bank #1 Adjusted Power: Htr Power * (480 / 2B5 voltage) <sup>2</sup> * .964 = Adjusted Power 	Calculated Bank #1 adjusted power to be between the values of 188 KW and 193 KW	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERFO	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
14 (Step 3)	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	Determined that Proportional Heater Bank #1 Adjusted Power greater than 150 KW.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	3.1 Is Proportional Heater Bank #1 Adjusted Power greater than 150 KW? YES NO		
	3.2 IF NO answered in 3.1, THEN:		
	<ul> <li>NOTIFY Shift Manager.</li> </ul>		
	REFER TO Tech Spec 3.4.4.		
	<ul> <li>INITIATE Condition Report.</li> </ul>		
		END	

STOP TIME:

### **EXAMINER'S COPY**

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Mode 3
- Reactivity Management Brief complete.
- Initial conditions of 2103.005 Pressurizer operations Att. B complete

#### INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to complete 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations Att. B starting with step 2.0

#### EXAMINEE'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Mode 3
- Reactivity Management Brief complete.
- Initial conditions of 2103.005 Pressurizer operations Att. B complete

#### INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to complete 2103.005 Pressurizer Operations Att. B starting with step 2.0

#### (S4)

#### JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

Unit: _2 Rev #: _2	Date:			
System/Duty Area: Reactor Coolant Pum	ps			
Task: Perform a normal RCP start				
JTA# ANO2-RO-RCP-NORM-5				
Alternate Path Yes: X No:	Time Critical Yes: No: _X			
KA Value RO: <u>3.7</u> SRO: <u>3</u> .	9 KA Reference: 003 A2.02			
Approved For Administration To: RO: X	SRO: <u>X</u>			
Task Location: Inside CR: X	Outside CR: Both:			
Suggested Testing Environment And Method (Pe	erform Or Simulate):			
Plant Site: Simulate	or: Perform Lab:			
Position Evaluated: RO:	SRO:			
Actual Testing Environment: Simulator:	Plant Site: Lab:			
Testing Method: Simulate: Perform:				
Approximate Completion Time In Minutes:	10 minutes			
References(s): 2103.006 Reactor Coolant	Pump Operations			
Examinee's Name:	Login ID:			
Evaluator's Name:				
The Examinee's performance was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and is determined to be:				
Satisfactory: Unsatisfactory:				
Performance Checklist Comments:				
Start Time: Stop Tin	ne: Total Time:			
Signed:	Date:			

Signature indicates this JPM has been compared to its applicable procedure by a qualified individual (not the examinee) and is current with that revision.

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Reactor trip occurred then SU3 locked out due to a relay failure.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- Power has been restored to all Non-vital busses from Start-up 3 after relay replacement.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- The crew is on step 17 which directs the start of one RCP in each loop using 2103.006, RCP Operations.
- Steps 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of 2103.006 are complete.
- Unit 1 is aligned to SU2 and NOT SU1

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

Insert malfunction RCP-2P32BREV. Trigger it 10 seconds after event gh4r4620 (RCP A red light)

#### TASK STANDARD:

Applicant started 'A' RCP lift oil pump, started 'A' RCP, Determined reverse rotation valid for 'B' RCP and then secured 'A' RCP.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

EXAMINER'S NOTE: The applicant will monitor RCP oil level trends on PMS. Start the RCP lift pump for 'A' RCP. Next, they will monitor for oil leakage and proper lift pump discharge pressure. They will start the RCP. After the RCP is started, another RCP will show indications of reverse rotation. The applicant will then refer to the ACA and secure all RCPs.

#### INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to start RCP A using 2103.006, Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, using section 7.0 starting at step 7.4.

## START TIME:

		PERFORMANCE CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	<b>1</b> (Step 7.4)	MONITOR RCP oil level trends on PMS.	Monitored RCP oil level trends on PMS/PDS.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	2 (Step 7.5)	<b>IF</b> start is first start after pump or motor maintenance, <u>THEN</u> <b>STATION</b> operator locally to monitor pump start.	Determined not the first start after pump or motor maintenance	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	3 (Step 7.6)	<ul> <li>PLACE associated Lift Pump handswitch in START:</li> <li>2P-32A Lift pump 2P-63A (2HS-6084)</li> <li>2P-32B Lift pump 2P-63B (2HS-6094)</li> <li>2P-32C Lift pump 2P-63C (2HS-6104)</li> <li>2P-32D Lift pump 2P-63D (2HS-6114)</li> </ul>	Examinee placed 2P- 32A Lift Pump handswitch (2HS-6084) in START	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4 (Step 7.7)	<u>IF</u> oil leakage indicated on PMS, <u>THEN</u> STOP lift pump.	Monitored for oil leakage via PMS.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	5 (Step 7.8)	<b>IF</b> HP lift pump discharge pressure in alarm, THEN PERFORM Attachment C, Verification of HP Lift Pump Pressure.	Determined lift oil pump discharge pressure alarm clear.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	6 (Step 7.9)	IF required to install T-Mod for CCW Flow Interlock, THEN PERFORM Attachment D, T-Mod for CCW Flow Interlock.	Determined T-Mod for CCW flow interlock not required.	N/A SAT UNSAT

	PERFORMANCE CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
7 (Step 7.10)	<b>CHECK</b> Reverse Rotation alarm clear for ALL RCPs:	Verified Reverse Rotation alarm clear for all RCPs.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	• 2P-32A REVERSE ROTATION (2K11-C2)		
	• 2P-32B REVERSE ROTATION (2K11-C4)		
	• 2P-32C REVERSE ROTATION (2K11-C6)		
	• 2P-32D REVERSE ROTATION (2K11-C8)		
8 (Step 7.11)	WHEN oil lift system has been operating at least three minutes, THEN start Reactor Coolant pump as follows:	Determined 3 minutes have elapsed.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	<u>Examiner Cue:</u> Report 3 minutes has elapsed.		
	Procedure Note		
	al starting current duration is less than 10 seconds, ute to return to nominal.	however, bus voltage ma	y require up to
flow n	heatup and startup, VLPM will occasionally alarm bises associated with 1 and 2 RCP operations. In t dio monitoring is still warranted.		
9 (Step 7.11.1)	<b>IF</b> on SU3 Transformer, THEN MONITOR starting amps on SU3 Amp meter.	Ensured starting amps on SU3 Amp meter were being monitored.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	Examiner Cue:		
	Another operator will monitor amps.		
10 (Step 7.11.2)	IF Unit 1 on SU1 AND Unit 2 on SU3, THEN ENSURE Unit 1 480V Vital Bus voltage greater than 470V prior to RCP start (Millstone relay actuation concerns).	Determined Step is not applicable.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	<u>Examiner Cue:</u> If asked about Unit 1 tell them to refer to the initial conditions.		

		PERFORMANCE CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	11 (Step 7.11.3)	START desired RCPs using applicable handswitch: • 2P-32A (2HS-4620)	Examinee starts 2P- 32A RCPs using applicable handswitch (2HS-4620).	N/A SAT UNSAT
		PERFORM the following after start of each RCP: PERFORM OPS-B2, V&LPM Channel Check. Examiner Cue: Another operator will perform the channel check.	Checks to see if someone is performing V&LPM channel check (OPS-B2).	N/A SAT UNSAT
	13 (Step 7.11.4B)	<ul> <li>ENSURE Reverse Rotation alarm for IDLE RCPs clear:</li> <li>2P 32A REVERSE ROTATION (2K11 C2)</li> <li>2P 32B REVERSE ROTATION (2K11 C4)</li> <li>2P 32C REVERSE ROTATION (2K11 C6)</li> <li>2P 32D REVERSE ROTATION (2K11 C8)</li> </ul>	Determined Reverse rotation alarm is in for B RCP	N/A SAT UNSAT
	examine	E PATH STEP ee should notice the alarm is not clear for RCP B.	The Examinee should refe	er to the ARP for
cabin	net 2C-2	Procedure Note: ciated with 2FS-6081 (2P-32A) and 2FS-6091 (2P 1. Blown fuse is probable cause if both annunciat d CALC-85-E-0118-01)		

14 (ACA Step 2.2)	also in alarm, THEN check status of fuse F23 in cabinet 2C-21.	Determined 2K11-C2 clear.	N/A SAT UNSAT		
15 (ACA Step 2.3)	<ul> <li>IF EITHER of the following conditions exist:</li> <li>RCP (2P-32B) operating</li> <li>Fuse F23 in cabinet 2C-21 blown,</li> <li>THEN alarm is NOT valid.</li> </ul>	Determined Alarm is valid.	N/A SAT UNSAT		

		PERFORMANCE CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	ACA	IF 2P 32B Reverse Rotation alarm valid, THEN: Secure ALL operating RCPs: • 2P 32A (2HS 4620) • 2P 32C (2HS 4720) • 2P 32D (2HS 4721)	Secured RCP A (2P- 32A) by taking 2HS- 4620 to stop or PTL	N/A SAT UNSAT
	ACA		Ensured 2CV-4651 in manual with green light on Red light off.	N/A SAT UNSAT

STOP TIME:

# EXAMINER'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- A loss of offsite power has occurred.
- The plant is in mode 3
- Power has been restored to the 6.9 KV busses.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- The crew is on step 17 which directs the start of one RCP in each loop using 2103.006, RCP Operations.
- Steps 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of 2103.006 are complete.
- Unit 1 is aligned to SU2 and NOT SU1

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs you to start RCP A using 2103.006, Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, using section 7.0 starting at step 7.4.

# EXAMINEE'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- A loss of offsite power has occurred.
- The plant is in mode 3
- Power has been restored to the 6.9 KV busses.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- The crew is on step 17 which directs the start of one RCP in each loop using 2103.006, RCP Operations.
- Steps 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of 2103.006 are complete.
- Unit 1 is aligned to SU2 and NOT SU1

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs you to start RCP A using 2103.006, Reactor Coolant Pump Operations, using section 7.0 starting at step 7.4.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE           UNIT:         2           REV #:         8							
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Containment Cooling System							
TASK: Verify Containment Coolers in Emergency Mode							
JTA#: ANO2SROEOPAOPEMER12/ANO2ROEOPAOPEMERG13							
Alternate Path Yes: X No: Time Critical Yes: No: X							
KA VALUE         RO:         3.2         SRO:         3.2         KA REFERENCE:         022 A4.03							
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X							
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       X       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:							
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):							
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: LAB:							
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:							
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:							
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:							
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: <u>5 Minutes</u>							
REFERENCE(S): OP 2202.010 Standard Attachments, OP 2202.003 Loss of Coolant Accident.							
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Badge #							
EVALUATOR'S NAME:							
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:							
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:							
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:							
Start         Stop         Total Time           Time							
SIGNED: DATE:							

QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

#### INITIAL CONDITIONS

- Reactor has tripped due to a LOCA
- CCAS has failed to actuate automatically

### TASK STANDARD:

Containment Coolers were placed in Emergency Mode by manually actuating the Red Train using the actuation pushbuttons and then opened all green train Service Water valves, opened all green train bypass dampers and started the idle cooler.

#### OR

Containment Coolers were placed in Emergency Mode by opening all Service water valves, opening all bypass dampers and starting the idle cooler.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9.

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

Verify 2VSF-1C is the standby fan. 400 gpm LOCA. CCAS fails to actuate. Load the following malfunctions:

- ESFCCASA
- ESFCCAS2

### EXAMINER NOTES:

This is an alternate success path JPM.

#### INITIATING CUE:

Crew is performing OP 2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Section 1, Step 5. The SM/CRS directs you to actuate CCAS.

START TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

	PERFO	DRMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
the cor	Examiner's Note: The examinee may elect to start desired CCAS components manually rather than actuating the components from the PPS inserts. If step 1 is not completed, then steps 2, 3, and 4 become critical steps and step 1 is not critical.				
(C)	1.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.003 Step 5.	Examinee depressed CCAS push buttons on 2C03 or 2C14.	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		Verify CCAS actuated on PPS inserts.	Examinee observed CCAS actuated on PPS inserts on 2C03: Trip paths 1&2 if actuated from 2C03 OR trip paths 3&4 if actuated from 2C14.		
	2.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, first block.	On panel 2C17, examinee observed red light ON and green light OFF for CNTMT cooling fans:	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		Verify RED train CNTMT coolers in service.	<ul><li> 2VSF-1A</li><li> 2VSF-1B</li></ul>		
	3.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, second block.	On panel 2C17, examinee observed red light ON and green light OFF for Service Water to RED train CNTMT coolers:	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		Verify Service Water Aligned to RED train CNTMT coolers:	<ul><li> 2CV-1511-1 (Inlet)</li><li> 2CV-1519-1 (Outlet)</li></ul>		
	4.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, third block.	On panels 2C17, examinee observed red lights ON for dampers:	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		Verify RED train Bypass Dampers open.	<ul><li>2UCD-8209-1</li><li>2UCD-8203-1</li></ul>		
Exami	ner's No	te: The following steps have the fa	ulted components.		

	PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	5.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, fourth block.	On panel 2C16, examinee observed red light ON and green light OFF for CNTMT cooling fan:	N/A SAT UNSAT
		Verify GREEN train CNTMT coolers in service.	• 2VSF-1D	
			On panel 2C16, examinee observed red light Off and green light On for CNTMT cooling fan:	
			• 2VSF-1C	
			Critical portion: On panel 2C16, examinee manually started 2VSF-1C.	
(C)	6.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, fifth block. Verify Service Water aligned to GREEN train CNTMT Coolers:	On panel 2C16, examinee observed red light OFF and green light ON for Service Water to GREEN train CNTMT coolers: • 2CV-1510-2 (Inlet)	N/A SAT UNSAT
			<ul> <li>2CV-1513-2 (Outlet)</li> </ul>	
			Critical portion: On panel 2C16, examinee opened the following valves:	
			• 2CV-1510-2 (Inlet)	
			• 2CV-1513-2 (Outlet)	
(C)	7.	Procedure Step: OP-2202.010 Exhibit 9, Step 4, sixth block.	On panel 2C16, examinee observed red light OFF and green light ON for CNTMT cooling dampers:	N/A SAT UNSAT
		Verify GREEN train Bypass dampers open.	• 2UCD-8216-2	
			• 2UCD-8222-2	
			Critical portion: On panel 2C16, examinee opened the following dampers:	
			• 2UCD-8216-2	
			• 2UCD-8222-2	
			END	

STOP TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

#### EXAMINER'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

- Reactor has tripped due to a LOCA
- CCAS has failed to actuate automatically

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

Crew is performing OP 2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Section 1, Step 5. The SM/CRS directs you to actuate CCAS.

#### EXAMINEE'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

- Reactor has tripped due to a LOCA
- CCAS has failed to actuate automatically

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

Crew is performing OP 2202.003, Loss of Coolant Accident, Section 1, Step 5. The SM/CRS directs you to actuate CCAS.

(S6)

2 REV #: 06 DATE:						
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Alternate AC Diesel Generator System						
TASK: Perform an Emergency start of the AAC Diesel from 2C-14 and energize 2A3						
JTA#: ANO2-RO-AACDG-OFFNORM-14 Alternate						
Path: Yes: <u>No: X</u> Time Critical Yes: <u>No: X</u>						
KA VALUE         RO:         4.1         SRO:         4.5         KA REFERENCE:         055 EA1.06						
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X						
TASK LOCATION:       INSIDE CR:       X       OUTSIDE CR:       BOTH:						
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):						
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR: Perform LAB:						
POSITION EVALUATED: RO: SRO:						
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:						
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: PERFORM:						
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 12 Minutes						
REFERENCE(S): OP-2104.037, Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations						
EXAMINEE'S NAME: Login ID:						
EVALUATOR'S NAME:						
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:						
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:						
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:						
Start     Stop     Total Time       Time      Time						

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

A loss of Offsite Power has occurred.

2EDG-01 has a lockout due to a large lube oil leak. Unit 1 does not need the AACG to energize any bus.

**TASK STANDARD:** <u>AACG (2K-9) running with normal voltage and frequency and 2A3</u> <u>energized from the AACG.</u>

TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS: <u>OP 2104.037 Attachment E.</u>

**SIMULATOR SETUP:** <u>#1 EDG has a loss of lube oil malfunction. 2A3 deenergized. AACG not in service.</u>

### **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs, "Start AAC Generator and energize 2A-3 using OP 2104.037 Attachment E."

START	TIME:			
	PERFO	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	1. (Step 1.0)	<ul> <li>IF PLC-A available, <u>THEN</u> RESET PLC using EITHER of the following:</li> <li>AACG Annunciator Screen</li> <li>Handswitch on 2C435</li> </ul>	Touched PLC Reset on PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	1		Procedure:	
		e started and tied to buses from s (PLC-A and PLC-C) are funct	n either of the PCs (2C14 or 2C43 tional.	5) as long as both
	2. (Step 2.0)	IF EITHER AACG network PLC (PLC-A or PLC-C) failed, OR BOTH PCs failed, THEN PERFORM a local start using Exhibit 1, AAC Generator Local Start and Stop.	Determined step is NA	N/A SAT UNSAT
	3. (Step 3.0 and 3.1))	<b>PERFORM</b> the following to start AAC Generator: <b>TOUCH</b> ELECTRICAL BUS CONTROL.	Touched Electrical Bus Control on PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4. (Step 3.2)	<b>TOUCH</b> 4160 V BREAKERS.	Touched 4160V Breakers on PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT

	PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	5. (Step 3.3)	<ul> <li>ENSURE the following breakers open:</li> <li>2A-901, AAC to 4.16KV Switchgear A3</li> <li>2A-902, AAC to 4.16KV Switchgear 2A4</li> <li>2A-903, AAC to 4.16KV Switchgear A1</li> <li>2A-904, AAC to 4.16KV Switchgear 2A1</li> </ul>	Check breakers 2A-901, 2A- 902, 2A-903, and 2A-904 open by checking breakers on green button indication on the PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	6. (Step 3.4)	TOUCH ENGINE START/STOP.	Touched Engine Start/Stop button PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	7. (Step 3.5)	TOUCH START SCREEN.	Touched Start Screen button PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	8. (Step 3.6)	TOUCH START button.	Touched Start button PC.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	9. (Step 3.7)	<b>IF</b> engine does <b>NOT</b> start in 35 seconds due to pre-lube interlock, <b>THEN TOUCH</b> and <b>HOLD</b> EMERGENCY START until engine speed is 180 RPM.	Determined step is NA	N/A SAT UNSAT
	10. (Step 3.8)	<ul> <li>ENSURE the following generator parameters:</li> <li>Frequency approximately 60 Hz (900 RPM)</li> <li>Voltage approximately 4160 volts</li> </ul>	Checked frequency ~60 Hz and voltage ~4160 V. Adjusted frequency or voltage if necessary by: Touched [Electrical Bus Control], touched [Synchronize] may use the [Switch To Sync Window] if on different screen, used speed [♠] and/or [♥] to adjust frequency, used voltage [♠] and/or [♥] to adjust voltage.	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
11. (Step 4 and 4.1 and 4.2)	<ul> <li><b>PERFORM</b> the following to ensure proper AAC Electrical System alignment:</li> <li><b>TOUCH</b> ELECTRICAL BUS CONTROL.</li> <li><b>TOUCH</b> 4160V BREAKERS.</li> </ul>	Touched Electrical Bus Control button on PC. Touched 4160V Breakers.	N/A SAT UNSAT
12. (Step 4.3)	<b>ENSURE</b> AAC Generator Output breaker (2A-1001) closed.	Checked 2A-1001 output breaker closed by Red button indication on 2A-1001.	N/A SAT UNSAT
13. (Step 4.4 and 4.5)	TOUCH ELECTRICAL BUS CONTROL. TOUCH 480V BREAKERS.	Touched Electrical Bus Control button on PC. Touched 480V Breakers.	N/A SAT UNSAT
14. (Step 4.6)	<b>ENSURE</b> Offsite Main Breaker M1 (2B16-A1) open.	Checked 2B16-A1 open by green button indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT
15. (Step 4.7)	<b>ENSURE</b> Generator Main Breaker M2 (2B16-B1) closed.	Checked 2B16-B1 closed by red button indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT
16. (Step 4.8 and 4.9)	TOUCH MONITOR TOUCH ANNUNCIATOR SCREEN	Touched monitor button on PC. Touched annunciator screen Breakers.	N/A SAT UNSAT
17. (Step 4.10)	<ul> <li>ENSURE the following alarms clear:</li> <li>Loss of 480 VAC POWER</li> <li>120 VAC UPS TROUBLE</li> </ul>	Checked alarms clear by depressing alarm acknowledge button and checking annunciators not in.	N/A SAT UNSAT
18. (Step 5)	COORDINATE with Unit 1 to determine electrical power status. Examiner Cue: State Unit 1 does not require AAC diesel generator.	Contacted Unit 1 to check bus status.	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		STANDARDS	(Circle One)			
Procedure Note:						
2A3 and 2A4 are not supplied at the same time in Modes 1-4 except to satisfy a safety function.						
19. (Step 6 and 6.1)	<b>IF</b> desired to energize 2A3 from the AACG (Dead-bus transfer only), <b>THEN:</b>	Determined that Step 6.1 is NA.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
	IF powering Safety Related loads on BOTH Unit 1 and Unit 2, THEN ENSURE efforts are being pursued to restore normal offsite power or EDGs to minimize the vulnerability of total reliance upon the AACG by both units.					
20. (Step 6.2)	<b>ENSURE</b> 2A3 - 2A4 Tie breaker (2A-310) open.	Verified that 2A-310 open by green light indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
21. (Step 6.3)	ENSURE 2A3 Supply breaker (2A-309) in PULL- TO-LOCK.	Placed 2A-309 handswitches in PTL and check open by green light indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
22. (Step 6.4)	<b>ENSURE</b> 2DG1 Output breaker (2A-308) in PULL- TO-LOCK.	Placed 2A-308 handswitches in PTL and check open by green light indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
23. (Step 6.5 and	IF 2A4 NOT energized from AAC Generator, THEN:	Verified that 2A-410 open by green light indication.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
6.5.1)	<b>ENSURE</b> 2A3 - 2A4 Tie breaker (2A-410) open.					

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	24. (Step 6.5.2)	IF PLC available, THEN: TOUCH ELECTRICAL BUS CONTROL. TOUCH 4160 V BREAKERS. TOUCH 2A-902.	Touched electrical bus control button, 4160V button, and 2A- 902 button on PC	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	25. (Step 6.5.3)	<ul> <li>6.5.3 <b>PERFORM</b> the following as needed to close 2A-902:</li> <li><b>TOUCH</b> CLOSE on PLC.</li> <li><b>USE</b> 2A-902 Control switch (2HS-7101).</li> <li>Locally <b>OPERATE</b> 2A-902 using Exhibit 4, AAC Generator 4160 V Breaker Operation Without DC.</li> </ul>	Touched CLOSE on 2A-902 breaker control sub-screen, <u>or</u> Placed 2HS-7101 to close on 2C-14 (may have to hold in close for ~1-2 seconds) then, verified 2A-902 indicated red.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	26. (Step 6.6)	<b>CLOSE</b> and <b>HOLD</b> 2A3 - 2A4 Tie (2A-310) in CLOSE position for 3 seconds.	Placed 2A-310 handswitch to close and held for ~3 seconds.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	11.	<b>ENSURE</b> 2A3 voltage indicates approximately 4160 volts.	Checked 2A-3 voltage indicated ~4160 V.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	1	1	END	

STOP TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

### EXAMINER'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

A loss of Offsite Power has occurred.

2EDG-01 has a lockout due to a large lube oil leak. Unit 1 does not need the AACG to energize any bus.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs, "Start AAC Generator and energize 2A-3 using OP 2104.037 Attachment E."

#### EXAMINEE'S COPY

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

A loss of Offsite Power has occurred.

2EDG-01 has a lockout due to a large lube oil leak. Unit 1 does not need the AACG to energize any bus.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs, "Start AAC Generator and energize 2A-3 using OP 2104.037 Attachment E."

(S7)

Unit: 2 Rev #: Date:					
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Emergency & Abnormal Operations					
TASK: Disable B channel excore nuclear instrumentation.					
JTA# ANO2-RO-EOPAOP-OFFNORM-172					
ALTENATE PATH         YES:         NO:         X         TIME CRITICAL         YES:         NO:         X					
KA VALUE         RO:         3.1         SRO:         3.5         KA REFERENCE:         015 A2.02					
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO: RO: X SRO: X					
TASK LOCATION:         INSIDE CR: X         OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:					
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):					
PLANT SITE: SIMULATOR:perform LAB:					
POSITION EVALUATED:         RO:         SRO:					
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:					
Testing Method: Simulate: Perform:					
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN MINUTES: 8 minutes					
REFERENCES(S): OP 2203.026 Nuclear Instrument Malfunction Rev. 7					
EXAMINEE'S NAME: LOGON ID:					
EVALUATOR'S NAME:					
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BE:					
SATISFACTORY: UNSATISFACTORY:					
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMENTS:					
START TIME:         STOP TIME:         TOTAL TIME:					

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- The plant is in mode 3.
- CEAs are capable of withdrawal.
- Shutdown bank CEAs are withdrawn for cocked rod protection
- Channel "A" Nuclear Instrument had previously failed and associated RPS channels were placed in bypass.
- Channel "B" Nuclear Instrument has just failed.

#### SIMULATOR SETUP:

Mode 3, CEAs capable of withdrawal, and SD banks withdrawn for cocked rod protection. SDBCS in AL 1000# setpoint Insert malfunction: NIALINEPWR with a value = 0 Bypass bistables 1 thru 4 on RPS channel A. Insert malfunction: NIBLINEPWR with a value = 200

#### TASK STANDARD:

Channel B RPS bistables 2 thru 4 are tripped.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP-2203.026 Nuclear Instrument Malfunction Rev. 7

#### **EXAMINER NOTES:**

Disable B channel excore nuclear instrumentation. With a NI channel failed and already bypassed, a second NI channel failure will require the examinee to take contingency actions to place the second NI channel in the trip condition placing the RPS trip logic in a one out of two channels to trip the reactor.

(S7)

## JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs you to disable Nuclear Instrument B Log channel using Nuclear Instrument Malfunction OP-2203.026 step 6.

START TIME:

# Examiner Note: Ensure applicant avoids the other applicant during the administration of this JPM. The other applicant will be near the ATC area computer during their JPM.

		CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	1. (Step 6/6A)	Disable affected log channel as follows:	Examinee determined only two Channels are failed and marks step 6.A as N/A.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		If Three or more channels failed Then enter Tech Spec 3.0.3.		
	2. (Step 6.B)	Ensure affected Log Power channel NOT in Trip Channel Bypass at 2C23.	On the PPS 'B' Channel. Examinee verified Log Power channel NOT in Trip Channel Bypass at 2C23	N/A SAT UNSAT
	II. I	PROCE	DURE CAUTION	
		Removing "LOG CALIBRATE" switch fi	rom operate will initiate Power Trip Test Interlo	
(C)	3. (Step 6.C)	Place associated LOG CALIBRATE switch at 2C23 to position #1.	Examinee placed LOG CALIBRATE switch at 2C23 to position #1 for the 'B' Channel.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4. (Step 6.D)	Check associated High Log Power Operating Bypass OFF light at 2C03 is ON.	Examinee checked High Log Power Operating Bypass OFF light at 2C03 is ON for the 'B' Channel.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	5. (Step 6.E)	Place associated LOG CALIBRATE switch at 2C23 to position #6.	Examinee placed LOG CALIBRATE switch at 2C23 to position #6 for the 'B' Channel.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	6. (Step 6.F)	Ensure High Log Power Operating Bypass maintained in OFF.	On Panel 2C03, examinee verified High Log Power Operating Bypass maintained in OFF on the 'B' Channel by verifying High Log Power Operating Bypass OFF light at 2C03 is ON for the 'B' Channel.	N/A SAT UNSAT

(S7)

## JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

	CHECKLISTS	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
7. (Step 6.G)	Check following PPS Bistable Relay Indicating lamps at 2C23 are ON: • Log power {2} • LPD {3} • DNBR {4} Examiner Note: the Bistable Relay Indicating lamps are the small red lights located below the associated points.	Examinee checked following PPS Bistable Relay Indicating lamps at 2C23 are ON for the 'B' Channel: • Log power {2} • LPD {3} • DNBR {4}	N/A SAT UNSAT
8. (Step 6.H)	Install caution tag on High Log Power Operating Bypass switch at 2C03 to maintain switch in OFF. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Another operator will take care of this.	Examinee asked SM/CRS to install clearance on High Log Power Operating Bypass switch at 2C03 to maintain switch in OFF.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		END	

STOP TIME:

## EXAMINER'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

- The plant is in mode 3.
- CEAs are capable of withdrawal.
- Shutdown bank CEAs are withdrawn for cocked rod protection
- Channel "A" Nuclear Instrument had previously failed and associated RPS channels were placed in bypass.
- Channel "B" Nuclear Instrument has just failed.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs you to disable Nuclear Instrument B Log channel using Nuclear Instrument Malfunction OP-2203.026 step 6.

## EXAMINEE'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

You are responsible for any applicable annunciators during the performance of this task. All annunciators that are not applicable to this task will be performed by another operator.

- The plant is in mode 3.
- CEAs are capable of withdrawal.
- Shutdown bank CEAs are withdrawn for cocked rod protection
- Channel "A" Nuclear Instrument had previously failed and associated RPS channels were placed in bypass.
- Channel "B" Nuclear Instrument has just failed.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The CRS directs you to disable Nuclear Instrument B Log channel using Nuclear Instrument Malfunction OP-2203.026 step 6.

(S8)

JNIT: <u>2</u>		REV #: <u>1</u> DATE:
SYSTEM/DUTY A	REA: Natura	al Circulation Cooldown
ASK: Shift	Gland Seal Ste	eam to Unit 1 during a Natural Circ Cooldown.
TA#: ANO-	RO-EOPAOP-0	DFFNORM-123
Alternate Path	Yes:	No: X Time Critical Yes: No: X
KA VALUE R	0: 3.1	SRO: <u>3.6</u> KA REFERENCE: <u>013 AA 1.2</u>
APPROVED FOR	ADMINISTRATI	ΟΝ ΤΟ: RO: <u>X</u> SRO: <u>X</u>
	I: INSIDE	CR: <u>X</u> OUTSIDE CR: BOTH:
SUGGESTED TE	STING ENVIRON	IMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):
PLANT SITE:		SIMULATOR: Perform LAB:
		SRO:
		IT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE: LAB:
ESTING METHO	DD: SIMULAT	E: PERFORM:
	COMPLETION TI	ME IN MINUTES: 10 Minutes
REFERENCE(S):	OP-2202.01	0, Standard Attachments, Attachment 60
EXAMINEE'S NA	ME:	Login ID:
EVALUATOR'S N	IAME:	
	S PERFORMANC ERMINED TO BE	E WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONTAINED IN THIS
SATISFACTORY	:	UNSATISFACTORY:
PERFORMANCE	CHECKLIST CO	MMENTS:
Start Time	Stop Time	Total Time
SIGNED:		DATE:

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Reactor trip occurred then SU3 locked out due to a relay failure.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- Power has been restored to all Non-vital busses from Start-up 3 after relay replacement.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- Unit 1 Startup boiler is available and in operation.
- Aux Steam Pressure controller 2PC-2102 available set to 70 psig and aligned.
- Seal Steam Pressure Regulator 2PCV-0231 is in automatic.

## TASK STANDARD:

Gland Seal steam aligned from Unit 1 start-up boiler with Seal steam pressure 2.5 to 4.5 psig.

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 60.

## SIMULATOR SETUP:

Unit 2 reactor tripped SU3 lockout and then restored. Power has been restored to all Non-vital busses from Start-up 3.

Following Malfunctions on a trigger: CV0231 =.1, ramp = 1 min. DO\_CI\_0231\_G, value = off MS2GS1 = 0, ramp = 1 min.

**Examiner Note:** The applicant will use standard attachment 60 to shift gland seal steam from Unit 2 to Unit 1 main steam. They will direct NLO to align the control valves and manual valve in the field. Next, they will place the standby steam packing exhauster in PTL and open the steam seal aux feed valve. They will monitor seal steam pressure and direct a NLO to manually close the Unit 2 MS supply to gland seal.

## INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to transfer Gland Seal to Unit 1 Startup Boiler using op-2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 60 starting with step 3.C. Ensure Seal Steam pressure is between 2.5 and 4.5 psig.

START TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

	PERFC	DRMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	1 (Step 3.C)	<ul> <li>ENSURE the following valves open:</li> <li>Unit 2 Startup Boiler Isolation (SU-69)</li> <li>Unit 2 Startup Boiler Isolation (2AS-45)</li> <li>Examiner Cue: Report SU-69 and 2AS-45 are open</li> </ul>	Contacted NLO to open SU- 69 and 2AS-45.	N/A SAT UNSAT
Exam	niner Note	e: Step 4 is NA.		
	2 (Step 5)	<ul> <li>ENSURE STANDBY Steam Packing Exhauster in PULL TO LOCK:</li> <li>2C-1A (2HS-0996)</li> <li>2C-1B (2HS-0997)</li> </ul>	Placed non-running steam packing exhauster in PTL	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	3 (Step 6)	<b>OPEN</b> Steam Seal Aux Feed Valve (2CV-0230).	Placed handswitch for 2CV- 0230 to open.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			Checked Green light off and	
			Red light on	
		Pro	cedure Note:	
		2PCV-0231 Bypass (2CV-0233 be fully open to maintain adec	B) and Seal Steam Pressure Regulate seal steam pressure.	julator (2PCV-0231)

## (S8)

	PERFO	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	4 (Step 7 A, B, & C)	<b>PERFORM</b> the following concurrently to maintain Gland Seal Steam pressure 2.5 to 4.5 psig:	Monitored 2PI-220 and directed NLO to close 2GS-1.	N/A SAT UNSAT
			Examiner Note:	
		A. Closely <b>MONITOR</b> Gland Seal Steam	Closing 2GS-1 is critical.	
		pressure (2PI-0220).	Determined 2PCV-0231 is in automatic by initial conditions.	
		B. <b>CLOSE</b> MS Supply to Gland Seal System	conditions.	
		(2GS-1).	And	
		Examiner Cue: Report NLO is closing 2GS-1. After 1 min report 2GS-1 is fully closed.	Throttled 2CV-0233 to maintain gland seal pressure.	
		Examiner Note: Booth Operator will close 2GS-1 over 1 min when you report you are close 2GS- 1. Booth operator will trigger remote for 2GS-1 to close.		
		<ul> <li>C. <u>IF</u> required to maintain gland seal steam pressure, <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>1) ENSURE Seal Steam Pressure Regulator (2PCV-0231) in automatic.</li> <li>2) THROTTLE open</li> </ul>	Examiner Note: 2PCV-0231 is normally in automatic. It is critical to throttle open 2CV-0233 to restore gland seal pressure to 2.5 to 4.5 psig.	
		2) THROTTLE open 2PCV-0231 Bypass (2CV-0233).	It is acceptable for gland seal pressure to go out of the band but final pressure must be in the band.	

PERFC	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
5 (Step 8)	<b>IF</b> using Unit 1 Main Steam, <u>THEN</u> THROTTLE 2AS-95 as needed to maintain Auxiliary steam header pressure less than 115 psig (2PI-2165).	Determined step N/A.	N/A SAT UNSAT
6 (Step 9)	<b>ENSURE</b> 2C-1A or 2C-1B maintaining Steam Packing Exhauster vacuum 5 to 15" H <sub>2</sub> O (2PI-0998).	Monitored 2PI-0998 and determined pressure 5 to 15" vacuum.	N/A SAT UNSAT
7 (Step 10)	<b>IF</b> Steam Packing Exhauster pressure adjustment is needed, <u>THEN:</u>	Determined step NA	N/A SAT UNSAT
	e: When the applicant has de ot needed JPM is complete.	termined Steam Packing exha	uster pressure
		END	

STOP TIME:

## **EXAMINER'S COPY**

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- Reactor trip occurred then SU3 locked out due to a relay failure.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- Power has been restored to all Non-vital busses from Start-up 3 after relay replacement.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- Unit 1 Startup boiler is available and in operation.
- Aux Steam Pressure controller 2PC-2102 available set to 70 psig and aligned.
- Seal Steam Pressure Regulator 2PCV-0231 is in automatic.

## INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to transfer Gland Seal to Unit 1 Startup Boiler using op-2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 60 starting with step 3.C. Ensure Seal Steam pressure is between 2.5 and 4.5 psig.

## **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Reactor trip occurred then SU3 locked out due to a relay failure.
- The plant is in mode 3.
- Power has been restored to all Non-vital busses from Start-up 3 after relay replacement.
- 2203.013, Natural Circulation Operations has been entered.
- Unit 1 Startup boiler is available and in operation.
- Aux Steam Pressure controller 2PC-2102 available set to 70 psig and aligned.
- Seal Steam Pressure Regulator 2PCV-0231 is in automatic.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to transfer Gland Seal to Unit 1 Startup Boiler using op-2202.010 Standard Attachments, Attachment 60 starting with step 3.C. Ensure Seal Steam pressure is between 2.5 and 4.5 psig.

(P1)

	COB I EIG			
UNIT: <u>2</u>	REV #:	4	DATE:	
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA:	Gaseous Radwas	te System		
TASK: Perform Wa	ste Gas Decay Tan	k Release		
JTA#: ANO2-WCO	-GRW-NORM-9			
Alternate Path Yes:	X No:	Time Critical	Yes:	No: X
KA VALUE RO:	3.3 SRO:	3.6 KA RE	EFERENCE:	071 A2.02
APPROVED FOR ADMIN	ISTRATION TO: RO	: <u>χ</u> SRO:	X	
TASK LOCATION:		OUTSIDE CR:	Х ВОТ	ſH:
SUGGESTED TESTING	ENVIRONMENT AND N	IETHOD (PERFORM	I OR SIMULATE):	
PLANT SITE: Simula	ate SIMULATO	R:	LAB:	
POSITION EVALUATED	: RO:	SRO:		
ACTUAL TESTING ENVI	IRONMENT: SIMULA	TOR: PL	LANT SITE:	LAB:
TESTING METHOD:	SIMULATE:	PERFORM:		
APPROXIMATE COMPL	ETION TIME IN MINUT	ES: 20 Minute	S	
REFERENCE(S): OP-	2104.022, Gaseous eous Release Perm	-	em Operations,	Sup. 1, Unit 2
EXAMINEE'S NAME:		I	_ogon ID#:	
EVALUATOR'S NAME:				
THE EXAMINEE'S PERF JPM AND IS DETERMIN		UATED AGAINST T	HE STANDARDS	CONTAINED IN THIS
SATISFACTORY:	UNSATISF/	ACTORY:		
PERFORMANCE CHECK	(LIST COMMENTS:			
	Stop Fime	Total Time		
SIGNED:		DATE:		
SIGNATURE INDICATES				

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank pressure is 205 psig
- 2T-18A has been held for 200 days
- OP 2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Sup. 1, UNIT 2 GASEOUS RELEASE PERMIT, submitted and returned for tank release
- 2RITS-2429 Gas Decay Tank radiation monitor is OPERABLE
- CAMS 2RITS-8231-1 is in service
- Pre-release report indicates a maximum of 30 CFM

## TASK STANDARD:

Properly positioned the required valves to commence a Gaseous Rad Waste Tank release and when the pressure control valve did not function properly, aligned alternate flow control method at less than 30 SCFM.

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2104.022 Gaseous Rad Waste System.

SIMULATOR SETUP: N/A

#### A2JPM-RO-WGDTR

## (P1)

## JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank release using OP-2104.022 Sup. 1 starting with step 4.3.

START TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

	PERFO	DRMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	1 (Step 4.3)	<ul> <li>ENSURE following valves CLOSED:</li> <li>2RITS-2429 Outlet Loop Seal Drain (2GZ-37)</li> <li>2FIT-2430 Outlet Loop Seal Drain (2GZ-2473)</li> <li>WG Decay Tank Disch 2FIT-2430 Isol (2GZ-15)</li> <li>Examiner Cue: Indicate that the valves are closed after appropriate simulation.</li> <li>Examiner Note: 2GZ-37 is located on 354' elevation in the aux building.</li> <li>Examiner Note: 2GZ-15 is above 7' off the floor. The applicant would need to locate a ladder and contact RP to go above 7'.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Rotated valve HW clockwise until hard resistance was felt:</li> <li>2RITS-2429 Outlet Loop Seal Drain (2GZ-37) (normally open)</li> <li>2FIT-2430 Outlet Loop Seal Drain (2GZ-2473) (normally open)</li> <li>WG Decay Tank Disch 2FIT-2430 Isol (2GZ-15) (normally closed, not critical)</li> </ul>	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	2 (Step 4.4)	<ul> <li>ENSURE following valves OPEN:</li> <li>2CV-2428 Inlet Isol (2GZ-2428A)</li> <li>2CV-2428 Outlet Isol (2GZ-2428B)</li> <li>Examiner Cue: Indicate that the valves are open after appropriate simulation.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Aligned the valve handle inline with the piping:</li> <li>2CV-2428 Inlet Isol (2GZ-2428A) (normally closed)</li> <li>2CV-2428 Outlet Isol (2GZ-2428B) (normally closed)</li> </ul>	N/A SAT UNSAT

	PERFC	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	3 (Step 4.5) (Step 4.5.1)	IF releasing WG Decay tank (2T-18A), <u>THEN</u> proceed as follows: REMOVE Placard from 2T-18A Isol (2GZ-12A). <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that placard was installed but is removed after appropriate simulation.	Removed placard from 2GZ- 12A	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	4 (Step 4.5.2)	OPEN 2T-18A Isol (2GZ-12A). <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that 2GZ-12A is open after appropriate simulation.	Rotated 2GZ-12A by HW counter clockwise until hard resistance is felt.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	5 (Step 4.5.3)	REMOVE Placard from 2T-18A Isol (2GZ-74A). Examiner Cue: Indicate that placard was installed but is removed after appropriate simulation.	Removed placard from 2GZ- 74A	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	6 (Step 4.5.4)	OPEN 2T-18A Isol (2GZ-74A). <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that 2GZ-12A is open after appropriate simulation.	Positioned 2GZ-74A handle in line with the piping.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	7 (Step 4.6)	IF releasing WG Decay tank (2T-18B), THEN proceed as follows:	Determined step was N/A.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	8 (Step 4.7)	IF releasing WG Decay tank (2T-18C), THEN proceed as follows:	Determined step was N/A	N/A SAT UNSAT
	9 (Step 4.8)	<b>IF</b> GRW Gas Decay Tank Vent Line Rad Monitor 2RITS-2429 NOT operable, <u>THEN</u> independently verify the following:	Determined step was N/A	N/A SAT UNSAT
	10 (Step 4.9)	<b>ENSURE</b> GRW Release Header Pressure Isolation (2GZ-2430) OPEN.	Verified 2GZ-2430 handle in line with piping.	N/A SAT UNSAT

## (P1)

PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST			STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	11 (Step 4.10)	ENSURE GRW Release Hdr Pressure Control valve (2PCV-2417) set to 0 psig by rotating pressure adjustment handwheel counter clockwise until very little resistance felt. Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2PCV-2417 has very little resistance in the counter clockwise direction.	Rotated 2PCV-2417 handwheel counter clockwise until little resistance felt.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	12 (Step 4.11)	IF releasing WG Decay tank 2T-18A, THEN OPEN 2T-18A Release valve (2GZ-46A). Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2GZ-46A is open after appropriate simulation.	Rotated 2GZ-46A handle to align with piping to open the valve.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	13 (Step 4.12)	IF releasing WG Decay tank 2T-18B, THEN OPEN 2T-18B Release valve (2GZ-46B).	Determined step was N/A	N/A SAT UNSAT
	14 (Step 4.13)	<u>IF</u> releasing WG Decay tank 2T-18C, <u>THEN</u> OPEN 2T-18C Release valve (2GZ-46C).	Determined step was N/A	N/A SAT UNSAT
	15 (Step 4.14)	NOTIFY Control Room of intent to begin release. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> When contacted as Control Room, inform them to continue.	Contacted Control Room and informed them of intent to start the release.	N/A SAT UNSAT

PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
16 (Step 4.15.1)	Document release start as follows:         Enter the following information:         Release Permit Number         Release Start Time         Release Start Date         Tank being released	Documented the required items. Permit Number 2019-1 Start Time Start Date Tank being released 2T-18A.	N/A SAT UNSAT
17 (Step 4.15.2)	RECORD information from step 4.15.1 on the following: GRW Gas Radiation recorder (2FR/2RR 2431) on 2C14 Process Gas Radiation Recorder (2RR 0645) on 2C25 Examiner Cue: When contacted as Control Room, inform them that all data has been record IAW step 4.15.	Informed CR to record the required information on 2FR/2RR-2431. Examiner Note: Both chart recorders are located in the control room.	N/A SAT UNSAT
18 (Step 4.16)	OPEN WG Decay Tank Discharge to Vent Plenum 2CV-2428 (2HS-2428). <u>Examiner Cue:</u> When contacted as Control Room, inform them that 2CV- 2428 is open.	Contacted CR to open 2CV- 2428.	N/A SAT UNSAT
19 (Step 4.17) (Step 4.17.1)	IFGRW Gas Decay TanksVent (2PCV-2417) functional,THEN:Slowly OPEN 2PCV-2417 Inlet(2GZ-2417A)	Opened 2PCV-2417A inlet by aligning the handle with the piping.	N/A SAT UNSAT

The following step is the alternate path portion of this JPM. The failure mechanism is a failed bushing in 2PCV-2417.

	PERFO	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	20 (Step 4.17.2)	<b>INITIATE</b> release by concurrently performing the following:	Rotated 2PCV-2417 clockwise to raise pressure.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		Slowly <b>ADJUST</b> GRW     Release Hdr Pressure     Control valve (2PCV-2417)     clockwise to obtain a	Recognized that 2PI-2430 and 2FIT-2430 are reading zero indicating no flow.	
		maximum of 30 psig on 2PI-2430.	Rotated 2GZ-15 counter clockwise to commence flow.	
		• Slowly <b>THROTTLE OPEN</b> WG Decay Tank Disch 2FIT-2430 Isol (2GZ-15) while monitoring flow on 2FIT-2430.	Determined that 2PCV-2417 is not function properly and that step 4.17 is N/A.	
		Examiner Cue: When 2PCV-2417 is rotated clockwise report that the hand wheel spins freely and NO resistance is felt, 2PI- 2430 reads zero, and 2FIT- 2430 reads zero. If the applicant continues to rotate 2PCV-2417 clockwise report that the hand wheel spins freely and NO resistance is felt, 2PI-2430 is reading zero, and 2FIT-2430 reads zero.	<u>Examiner Note:</u> Applicant may elect to close 2PCV-2417 Inlet 2GZ-2417A (Not Critical)	
		Examiner Cue: If the applicant informs the Control Room that 2PCV- 2417 is not working, inform them to continue with the release.		
(C)	21 (Step 4.18) (Step	IF GRW Gas Decay Tanks Vent (2PCV-2417) <u>NOT</u> functional, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:	Opened 2PCV-2417C by aligning the handle with the piping to open the valve.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4.18.1)	<b>OPEN</b> 2PCV-2417 Bypass (2GZ-2417C).		
		Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2GZ-2417C is open.		

## (P1)

## JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

PEI	RFORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)			
(C) 22 (Step 4.18.2	Slowly <b>THROTTLE OPEN</b> 2FIT-2430 Isol (2GZ-15) to obtain release rate less than or equal to CFM (Listed on Pre-release Report). <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Report flow is 10 SCFM.	Rotated 2GZ-15 counter- clockwise to start flow. Observed flow on 2FIT-2430.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
Examiner note: When the applicant has commenced flow the JPM is complete.						

STOP TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

## **EXAMINER'S COPY**

## INITIAL CONDITIONS:

- 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank pressure is 205 psig
- 2T-18A has been held for 200 days
- OP 2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Sup. 1 UNIT 2 GASEOUS RELEASE PERMIT submitted and returned for tank release
- 2RITS-2429 Gas Decay Tank radiation monitor is OPERABLE
- CAMS 2RITS-8231-1 is in service
- Pre-release report indicates a maximum of 30 CFM
- Release Permit Number is 2019-1

## INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank release using OP-2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Sup. 1, Unit 2 Gaseous Release Permit, starting with step 4.3.

## EXAMINEE'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank pressure is 205 psig
- 2T-18A has been held for 200 days
- OP 2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Sup. 1 UNIT 2 GASEOUS RELEASE PERMIT submitted and returned for tank release
- 2RITS-2429 Gas Decay Tank radiation monitor is OPERABLE
- CAMS 2RITS-8231-1 is in service
- Pre-release report indicates a maximum of 30 CFM
- Release Permit Number is 2019-1

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2T-18A Waste Gas Decay Tank release using OP-2104.022, Gaseous Radwaste System, Sup. 1, Unit 2 Gaseous Release Permit, starting with step 4.3. (P2)

UNIT: <u>2</u> RE	/#: <u>005</u>	DATE:				
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA: Condensate	and Feedwater System					
TASK: Perform Local Actions to sta	TASK: Perform Local Actions to start 'A' Condensate pump during a Loss of Feedwater.					
JTA#: _ANO2-RO-EOPAOP-EMER-28						
Alternate Path Yes: No:	X Time Critical	Yes: <u> </u>				
KA VALUE RO: <u>3.0</u> SR	D: <u>4.2</u> KA REFERENCE:	CE E06 EA2.2				
APPROVED FOR ADMINISTRATION TO	D: RO: <u>X</u> SRO: <u>X</u>					
TASK LOCATION: INSIDE CR:		ВОТН:				
SUGGESTED TESTING ENVIRONMEN	AND METHOD (PERFORM OR	SIMULATE):				
PLANT SITE: Simulate SIN		_AB:				
POSITION EVALUATED: RO:	SRO:					
ACTUAL TESTING ENVIRONMENT:	SIMULATOR: PLANT	SITE: LAB:				
TESTING METHOD: SIMULATE: _	PERFORM:					
APPROXIMATE COMPLETION TIME IN	MINUTES: 20 Minutes					
REFERENCE(S): OP 2202.010, Stand	ard Attachments, Attachment 50	Condensate pump start.				
EXAMINEE'S NAME:	Badg	e #				
EVALUATOR'S NAME:						
THE EXAMINEE'S PERFORMANCE WA THIS JPM AND IS DETERMINED TO BI		TANDARDS CONTAINED IN				
SATISFACTORY: UN	SATISFACTORY:	_				
PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST COMMEN	NTS:					
Start Stop Time Time	Total Time	_				

#### **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2P-7A Outboard Pump Bearing Replacement in-progress.
- The plant has tripped from 100% power due to an inadvertent CSAS.
- Bus 2A3 is locked out and not available.

#### TASK STANDARD:

Established 'A' Condensate pump as a feedwater source to steam generators by performing the following actions:

- Opened DC control power breakers in 2A-106 and 2A-205 to defeat the trip signal.
- Isolated side stream flow path by closing valves 2CS-57 and 2CS-59.
- Opened 'A' condensate pump discharge valve.

#### TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2202.010, Standard Attachments, Attachment 50 Condensate pump start.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform local actions to start 2P-2A Condensate Pump using OP-2202.010 attachment 50 starting with step 3.

START TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST		STANDARDS	(Circle One)	
	TRANSITION NOTE:				
	G	o to elevation 370' Turbine Buildin	g, east of the elevator, to the 2A-1 /	2 Bus area.	
(C)	1. (Step 3)	IF MSIS AND CSAS NOT reset, THEN locally OPEN "DC control power" breaker in the following breaker cubicles:	The DC Control Power Breakers located in 2A106 AND 2A205 are positioned down (open).	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		<ul> <li>"CONDENSATE PUMP 2P-2C" 2A106</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>"CONDENSATE PUMP 2P-2B" 2A205</li> </ul>			
		Examiner Cue: When the applicant finds the correct breaker cubicle ask them the general location of the DC control power breaker once they describe it then Show Picture #1. If the applicant wants a closer picture to read the placard Show Picture #2.			
		TRA	NSITION NOTE:	<u> </u>	
	The app level lo	licant may go to elevation 330' Tu cally, use the level gauge above the	rbine Building, east of the Main Con he 'B' Condensate pump or contact	denser if checking the control room.	
	2. (Step 4)	ENSURE Hotwell level greater than 38%. Examiner Cue: Describe that Hotwell level indicates >38% by indicating	Hotwell is checked > 38% by contacting a Control Room Operator, checking the local level instrument east of the Main Condenser in the Turbine Building Basement, or the gauge above	N/A SAT UNSAT	
		the approximate reading. (Normal level at power is greater than 38%).	the 'B' Condensate pump (2A-205).		

PERF	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
3. (Step 5)	<b>ENSURE</b> the following Recirc valves closed AND Flow Indicating Controllers in MANUAL at 0% demand:	2CV-0662, 2CV-0663, 2CV-0741, and 2CV-0749 are checked closed by contacting a Control Room Operator to determine valve position and demand.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	Condensate Pump Recirc 2CV-0662 (2FIC-0662)		
	Condensate Pump Recirc 2CV-0663 (2FIC-0663)		
	<ul> <li>"A" MFP Recirc 2CV-0741 (2FIC-0735) (R/L then M/A and close)</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>"B" MFP Recirc 2CV-0749 (2FIC-0742) (R/L then M/A and close)</li> </ul>		
	Examiner Cue:		
	Report as a control room operator that all recirc valves listed in the above step are closed with flow indicating controllers in manual at 0% demand.		

## (P2)

		TRAN	NSITION NOTE:			
	Go to e	levation 330' Turbine Building, nea	ar southwest stairwell to check valve	e positio	n local	у.
	5. (Step 6 first bullet.)	<ul> <li>Locally ENSURE the following valves closed:</li> <li>"INLET TO 2PCV-4505 ISOL" (2CS-57)</li> </ul>	Examinee verified closed 2CS- 57 by turning handwheel clockwise and noting resistance to motion.	N/A	SAT	UNSAT
		Examiner Cue: Describe that 2CS-57 is closed. (stem inserted, resistance felt in the closed direction.)				
(C)	6. (Step 6 second bullet.)	Locally <b>ENSURE</b> the following valves closed: • "2PCV-4505 BYPASS" (2CS-59)	Examinee closed 2CS-59 by turning handwheel clockwise until resistance to motion occurs.	N/A	SAT	UNSAT
		Examiner Cue: Describe that 2CS-59 is closed. (stem inserted, resistance felt in the closed direction.)				
Conde	nsate pur		<b>cedure Note:</b> t due the location of its discharge va	alve (20	°S-2C)	
Conde	7. (Step 7)	Locally <b>OPEN</b> selected Condensate Pump Discharge valve 10 turns: • "2P-2A DISCHARGE" (2CS-2A)	Examinee closed 2CS-2A by turning the handwheel clockwise until resistance is felt and then reopened the valve 10 turns by turning the handwheel counter clockwise.		SAT	UNSAT
		Examiner Cue:				
		Describe that 2CS-2A is closed. (stem inserted, resistance felt in the closed direction.) Then describe that 2CS-2A is reopened 10 turns. (Normally open valve.)				
		Proc	edure Caution:			
	ining Cor n pump t		e greater than 753 psig for three min	utes or	greate	· will

	8. (Step 8)	Start selected Condensate pump. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Acknowledge communication from the applicant. Then report 2P-2A condensate pump is running and direct the applicant to perform step 9	Examinee contacted the control room to start 2P-2A condensate pump.	N/A	SAT	UNSAT
(C)	9. (Step 9)	Locally <b>OPEN</b> selected Condensate Pump Discharge valve: • "2P-2A DISCHARGE" (2CS-2A) • "2P-2B DISCHARGE" (2CS-2B) • "2P-2C DISCHARGE" (2CS-2C) • "2P-2D DISCHARGE" (2CS-2D) <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Describe that 2CS-2A is open. (stem extended, resistance felt in the open direction.)	Examinee opened 2CS-2A by turning handwheel counter clockwise	N/A	SAT	UNSAT
	END					

STOP TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

## Picture #1



## Picture #2



## EXAMINER'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2P-7A Outboard Pump Bearing Replacement in-progress.
- The plant has tripped from 100% power due to an inadvertent CSAS.
- Bus 2A3 is locked out and not available.

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform local actions to start 2P-2A Condensate Pump using OP-2202.010 attachment 50 starting with step 3.

## EXAMINEE'S COPY

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2P-7A Outboard Pump Bearing Replacement in-progress.
- The plant has tripped from 100% power due to an inadvertent CSAS.
- Bus 2A3 is locked out and not available.

#### **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to perform local actions to start 2P-2A Condensate Pump using OP-2202.010 attachment 50 starting with step 3.

(P3)

## JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

	JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE	
UNIT: <u>2</u>	REV #: <u>1</u> DATE:	
SYSTEM/DUTY AREA:	Electrical	
TASK: Perform 23	05.016 Remote Feature Periodic test for EDG exhaus	st fans
JTA#: ANO2-RO-C	DPROC SURV-106	
Alternate Path Yes:	No: X Time Critical Yes:	No: X
KA VALUE RO:	2.6 SRO: 2.7 KA REFERENCE:	062 A4.04
APPROVED FOR ADMI	NISTRATION TO: RO: $\chi$ SRO: $\chi$	
TASK LOCATION:		ł:
SUGGESTED TESTING	ENVIRONMENT AND METHOD (PERFORM OR SIMULATE):	
PLANT SITE: Simul	ate SIMULATOR: LAB:	
POSITION EVALUATED	D: RO: SRO:	
ACTUAL TESTING ENV	/IRONMENT: SIMULATOR: PLANT SITE:	LAB:
TESTING METHOD:	SIMULATE: PERFORM:	
APPROXIMATE COMPL	LETION TIME IN MINUTES: 20 Minutes	
REFERENCE(S): OP	-2305.016, Remote Features Periodic Testing Supple	ement 2.
EXAMINEE'S NAME:	Logon ID#:	
EVALUATOR'S NAME:		
THE EXAMINEE'S PERI JPM AND IS DETERMIN	FORMANCE WAS EVALUATED AGAINST THE STANDARDS CONED TO BE:	ONTAINED IN THIS
SATISFACTORY:	UNSATISFACTORY:	
PERFORMANCE CHEC	KLIST COMMENTS:	
	Stop Total Time	
SIGNED:	DATE:	_
	DATE: S THIS JPM HAS BEEN COMPARED TO ITS APPLICABLE PRO	- CEDURE BY A

QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL (NOT THE EXAMINEE) AND IS CURRENT WITH THAT REVISION.

## **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2DG2 Exhaust fan 2VEF-24C has had Maintenance performed.
- Emergency Diesel generator (2DG2) secured.
- 2DG2 Exhaust fans 2VEF-24C & 2VEF-24D secured with control room handswitches in AUTO.
- Communications have been established with Control Room.
- NLO is standing by in the #2 EDG room

## TASK STANDARD:

Applicant tested the remote functions of #2 EDG exhaust fan by:

- Testing the fan would NOT start from the breaker with the local HS in Remote.
- Testing the fan would start from the breaker with the local HS in Local.
- Testing the fan would NOT start from the control room with the local HS in Local.
- Restored the local HS to Remote.

## TASK PERFORMANCE AIDS:

OP 2305.016 Remote Features Periodic Testing.

SIMULATOR SETUP: N/A

## **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2DG2 Room exhaust fans 18 month test OP-2305.016 Supplement 2 for 2VEF-24C starting with step 2.1.

START TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

	PERFC	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
(C)	1 (Step 2.1)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Start switch (2HS-8638-2A) to ON. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that 2HS-8638-2A is in ON.	Rotated HS (2HS-8638-2A) clockwise to ON.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	2 (Step 2.2)	WHEN70 seconds have elapsed,THENCHECK2VEF-24C remains secured.ExaminerCue: 70 seconds have elapsed.Indicate2B62-C6Green Light On, Red light Off.	Observed Green Light on; Red light off	N/A SAT UNSAT
	3 (Step 2.3)	PLACE 2VEF-24C handswitch (2HS-8638-2) to START on 2C33. Examiner Cue: CR reports that 2HS-8638-2 on 2C33 in start.	Contacted CR to place 2VEF- 24C HS in start.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	4 (Step 2.4.1)	WHEN70 seconds have elapsed, THEN:CHECK 2VEF-24C starts.Examiner Cue: 70 seconds have elapsed.Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light Off, Red light On.	Observed Green Light off; Red light on.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	5 (Step 2.4.2)	IF 2VEF-24C fails to start, THEN: (CR-ANO-2-95-0051)	Determined Step is NA	N/A SAT UNSAT

	PERFO	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	6 (Step 2.4.3)	<b>CHECK</b> 2VEF-24C Suction dampers open. (determined by EITHER of the following:)	Contacted Local operator or Control Room to determine if 2VEF-24C suction dampers were open.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		<ul> <li>Locally:</li> <li>2TCD-8690-2</li> </ul>		
		- 2TCD-8692-2		
		<ul> <li>2DG2 RM INTAKE DAMPER FAIL TO OPEN (2K09-K2) annunciator clear. (3 minute 20 second time delay)</li> </ul>		
		Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2VEF-24C Suction dampers open by local indication or control alarm clear.		
(C)	7 (Step 2.5)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Start switch (2HS-8638-2A) to OFF.	Rotated HS (2HS-8638-2A) counter-clockwise to OFF.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	2.3)	<u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that 2HS-8638-2A is in OFF.		
	8 (Step 2.6)	<b>CHECK</b> 2VEF-24C continues to run.	Observed Green Light off; Red light on.	N/A SAT UNSAT
		<u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light Off, Red light On.		
	9 (Step	<b>PLACE</b> 2VEF-24C handswitch (2HS-8638-2) to AUTO.	Contacted CR to place 2VEF- 24C HS in auto.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	2.7)	Examiner Cue: CR reports that 2HS-8638-2 on 2C33 in auto.		
	10 (Step	CHECK 2VEF-24C stops. Examiner Cue:	Observed Green Light on; Red light off	N/A SAT UNSAT
	2.8)	Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light On, Red light Off.		

	PERFO	DRMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	11 (Step 2.9)	Locally CHECK Dampers close: - 2TCD-8690-2 - 2TCD-8692-2 Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2VEF-24C Suctions Dampers are closed by local observation.	Contacted Local operator to determine if 2VEF-24C suction dampers were closed.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	12 (Step 2.10)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Local/Remote switch (2HS-8638-2S) to LOCAL. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate that 2HS-8638-2S is in Local.	Rotated 2HS-8638-2S to local.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	13 (Step 2.11)	PLACE 2VEF-24C handswitch (2HS-8638-2) to START. Examiner Cue: CR reports that 2HS-8638-2 on 2C33 in start.	Contacted CR to place 2VEF- 24C HS in start.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	14 (Step 2.12)	WHEN70 seconds have elapsed,THENCHECK2VEF-24C remains secured.ExaminerCue: 70 seconds have elapsed.Indicate2B62-C6Green LightLightOn,RedlightOff.1000000000000000000000000000000000000	Observed Green Light on; Red light off	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	15 (Step 2.13)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Start switch (2HS-8638-2A) to ON. Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2HS-8638-2A is in ON.	Rotated HS (2HS-8638-2A) clockwise to ON.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	16 (Step 2.14.1)	WHEN70 seconds have elapsed, THEN:CHECK 2VEF-24C starts.Examiner Cue: 70 seconds have elapsed.Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light Off, Red light On.	Observed Green Light off; Red light on	N/A SAT UNSAT

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE							
	PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST         STANDARDS         (Circle One)						
	17         IF         2VEF-24C fails to start,           (Step 2.14.2)         THEN: (CR-ANO-2-95-0051)		Determined Step is NA	N/A SAT UNSAT			
	18 (Step 2.14.3)CHECK 2VEF-24C Suction dampers open. (determined by 		Contacted Local operator or Control Room to determine if 2VEF-24C suction dampers were open.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
		<ul> <li>Locally:         <ul> <li>2TCD-8690-2</li> <li>2TCD-8692-2</li> </ul> </li> <li>2DG2 RM INTAKE DAMPER FAIL TO OPEN (2K09-K2) annunciator clear. (3 minute 20 second time delay)</li> <li>Examiner Cue:</li> </ul>					
		Indicate that 2VEF-24C Suction dampers open by local indication or control alarm clear.					
	19 (Step 2.15)	PLACE 2VEF-24C handswitch (2HS-8638-2) to AUTO. Examiner Cue: CR reports that 2HS-8638-2 on 2C33 in auto.	Contacted CR to place 2VEF- 24C HS in auto.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
	20 (Step 2.16)	CHECK 2VEF-24C continues to run. Examiner Cue: Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light Off, Red light On.	Observed Green Light off; Red light on.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
(C)	21 (Step 2.17)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Start switch (2HS-8638-2A) to OFF. Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2HS-8638-2A is in OFF.	Rotated HS (2HS-8638-2A) clockwise to OFF.	N/A SAT UNSAT			
	22 (Step 2.18)	CHECK 2VEF-24C stops. <u>Examiner Cue:</u> Indicate 2B62-C6 Green Light On, Red light Off.	Observed Green Light on; Red light off	N/A SAT UNSAT			

	PERFC	ORMANCE CHECKLIST	STANDARDS	(Circle One)
	23 (Step 2.19) - 2TCD-8690-2 - 2TCD-8692-2 Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2VEF-24C Suctions Dampers are closed by local observation.		Contacted Local operator to determine if 2VEF-24C suction dampers were closed.	N/A SAT UNSAT
(C)	24 (Step 2.20)	PLACE 2B62-C6 Local/Remote switch (2HS-8638-2S) to REMOTE. Examiner Cue: Indicate that 2HS-8638-2S is in Remote.	Rotated 2HS-8638-2S to remote.	N/A SAT UNSAT
	25 (Step 2.21)	ENSURE 2VEF-24C handswitch (2HS-8638-2) in AUTO. Examiner Cue: CR reports that 2HS-8638-2 on 2C33 in auto.	Contacted CR to ensure 2VEF- 24C HS in auto.	N/A SAT UNSAT
Exam	iner note	: When the applicant has comple	eted with step 2.21 this JPM is co	mplete.
			END	

STOP TIME:\_\_\_\_\_

# **EXAMINER'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- 2DG2 Exhaust fan 2VEF-24C has had Maintenance performed.
- Emergency Diesel generator (2DG2) secured.
- 2DG2 Exhaust fans 2VEF-24C & 2VEF-24D secured with control room handswitches in AUTO.
- Communications have been established with Control Room.
- NLO is standing by in the #2 EDG room

# INITIATING CUE:

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2DG2 Room exhaust fans 18 month test OP-2305.016 Supplement 2 for 2VEF-24C starting with step 2.1.

## **EXAMINEE'S COPY**

# **INITIAL CONDITIONS:**

- Emergency Diesel generator (2DG2) secured.
- 2DG2 Exhaust fans 2VEF-24C & 2VEF-24D secured with control room handswitches in AUTO.
- Communications have been established with Control Room.
- NLO is standing by in the #2 EDG room

# **INITIATING CUE:**

The SM/CRS directs you to commence a 2DG2 Room exhaust fans 18 month test OP-2305.016 Supplement 2 for 2VEF-24C starting with step 2.1.

Appendix	Appendix D Scenario #1 Form ES-D-1						
	Facility:         ANO-2         Scenario No.:         1         Op-Test No.:         2019-1           Examiners:          Operators:						
Turnove	Initial Conditions: <u>~100%, MOL, RED Train Maintenance Week.</u> Turnover: <u>~100%. 260 EFPD. EOOS indicates 'Minimal Risk'. Red Train Maintenance Week.</u>						
and Volu	ume control section 8.	1 starting with					
			ation IAW 2202.010 Standard Attachment Exhibit 1 by the prior to both SG levels reaching 70" wide range.				
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description				
1		N (BOP) N (SRO)	Shift Lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36B. OP-2104.002, CVCS Operations.				
2	CV4651	C (ATC) C (SRO)	'A' RCP normal spray valve drifts partially open. OP-2203.028, Pressurizer System Malfunction AOP				
3	ESF2C40B73	C (BOP) C (SRO) TS (SRO)	Inadvertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). OP-2203.040, Inadvertent RAS AOP.				
4	CEA43DROP	C (ATC) C (BOP) C (SRO) TS (SRO)	CEA 43 fully inserts. OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction AOP				
5	DI_HS_4930_1 CVC2P39ANAS CVC2P39BNAS	C (ATC) C (SRO)	2CV-4930 boration valve fails to automatically open and 2P-39A and 2P-39B boric acid makeup pumps fail to start automatically. <b>OP-2104.003, Chemical Addition</b>				
6	MTGTRIPLOCKO	M (ALL)	Turbine trip causing a reactor trip. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP				
7	MFWPMPBTRP EFW2P7BFLT EFWROOMB CV0340	M (ALL)	2P-1B Main Feedwater (MFW) pump trip, 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not open. <b>CT-2</b> <b>OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP</b>				
8	CEA02STUCK CEA07STUCK CV4873	C (ATC) C (SRO)	Control Element Assemblies (CEA's) 2 and 7 will remain withdrawn requiring emergency boration. The Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valve will not close. <b>CT-1</b> <b>OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments.</b>				
9	AFW2P75LO	C (BOP) C (SRO)	2P-75 AFW pump trips due loss of lube oil. OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP				
End Poi	nt	Feedwater	is restored to at least one Steam Generator				
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor							

Target Quantitative Attributes (Section D.5.d)	Actual Attributes
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)	2
Abnormal Events (2-4)	3
Major Transients (1-2)	2
EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)	1
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (≥ 1per scenario set)	1
Critical Tasks (≥2)	2

Critical Task	Justification	
Commence Emergency Boration IAW 2202.010 Standard Attachment Exhibit 1 by the completion of SPTAs.	Meeting the SFSCs prevents core damage and minimizes radiological releases to the environment, ultimately protecting the health and safety of the public. The SFSCs assume that all but one CEA is fully inserted and that the reactor is subcritical by a certain amount (required shutdown margin or SDM).	<ul> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-01, Establish Reactivity Control (SPTA-01)</li> <li>TS 3.1.1.1 Shutdown margin.</li> </ul>
Restore Feedwater prior to both SG levels reaching 70" wide range.	Without feedwater, the SG being steamed will eventually boil dry, RCS heat removal will cease, and the reactor core will begin overheating (core melt potential). Thus, it is essential to steam and feed at least one SG to continue to remove RCS decay heat.	<ul> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-08, Establish RCS Heat Removal (LOAF-02)</li> <li>EOP 2202.006 Loss of Feedwater EOP</li> <li>EOP 2202.006 Loss of Feedwater EOP Tech Guide</li> </ul>
Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.	Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.	NUREG-1021 Appendix D

# Scenario #1 Objectives

- 1) Evaluate individual ability to shift lead Charging pumps
- 2) Evaluate individual response to a pressurizer spray valve failing partially open.
- 3) Evaluate individual response to an Inadvertent Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS).
- 4) Evaluate individual response to a drop Control Element Assembly (CEA)
- 5) Evaluate individual response to failure of interlocks for boration control.
- 6) Evaluate individual and crew's response to a turbine trip.
- 7) Evaluate individual and crew's ability to restore feedwater using Loss of Feedwater EOP.
- 8) Evaluate individual response to Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) failing to insert.
- 9) Evaluate individual response to 2P-75 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump trips.

# Scenario #1 NARRATIVE

Simulator session begins with the plant at ~100% power steady state.

When the crew has completed their control room walk down and brief, the BOP should shift lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36B.

After the Charging pumps have been shifted, and cued by lead examiner, 2CV-4652 RCP spray valve will open to ~40%. The ATC should recognize RCS pressure lowering and 2CV-4652 intermediate indication. The SRO will enter the Pressurizer Malfunctions AOP OP-2203.028 and direct actions to attempt to close 2CV-4652 Spray valve and then isolate 2CV-4652 using the PZR spray block valves. [Industry OE: SER 4-93 RCS pressure transients caused by failed open pressurizer spray valves.].

When the crew has isolated the failed Pressurizer Spray valve, an inadvertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) will occur. The SRO should enter and commence taking action of the Inadvertent RAS AOP. The BOP will override and close the inside CNTMT sump suction isolation valve. The crew will check that Service Water is still aligned to Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Auxiliary Cooling Water (ACW). The BOP will place green train ECCS pumps in PTL. The SRO should also enter Tech Spec 3.6.2.1 for CNTMT spray and 3.5.2 for ECCS components. The SRO may have to enter Tech Spec 3.5.4 and TRM 3.1.8 for RWT level. [Industry OE: SEN 268 Invalid Safety Injection with Failure to Reset, Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2013-005 Inadvertent SIAS, CCAS, And CIAS.]

# Scenario #1 NARRATIVE (continued)

When the crew has closed the CNTMT sump suction valve and entered the appropriate Tech Specs or at the lead examiner's cue, CEA 43 will drop into the core due to faulty timing card. The SRO will enter OP-2203.003, CEA malfunction AOP. The SRO should check that less than 2 CEAs are inserted and then commence a down power within 15 minutes. The BOP should complete attachment C DNBR/LPD log. The SRO will enter Tech Specs for CEA position (3.1.3.1 Action d) and Aztilt (3.2.3). When the ATC starts boration, 2CV-4930 boration valve will fail to automatically open and 2P-39A boric acid makeup (BAM) pump will fail to automatically start. The ATC will manually start the BAM pump and open 2CV-4930 boration valve. [Site and industry OE: CR-ANO-2-2007-0127 dropped CEA, and NRC Event # 49601 Palo Verde dropped CEA.]

When the crew has commenced a plant shutdown, entered the appropriate Tech Spec or cued by the lead examiner, the turbine will trip. The SRO will direct the reactor to be tripped, due to RCS pressure rising. The Reactor may trip automatically prior to the crew manually tripping the reactor. The SRO should enter and direct the actions of SPTAs. Two CEAs will remain withdrawn and the ATC will commence emergency boration to maintain Shutdown Margin. When the ATC attempt gravity feed boration the VCT outlet will fail to close requiring use of the Boric Acid Make-up pumps. When EFAS is actuated 2P-7B EFW pump flange will wet the motor and cause a motor fault. 2P-7A steam driven EFW pump steam admission valve 2CV-0340-2 will be bound and not open. 2P-1A MFW pump will trip due to being interlocked with the turbine trip. Also, 2P-1B MFW pump will trip causing a loss of feedwater. The SRO should diagnose and enter Loss of Feedwater EOP. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2002-2173, Reactor Trip due to turbine trip. Industry OE: SEN134 Failure of Control Rods to Fully insert.]

The SRO will complete the initial actions of the Loss of Feedwater EOP to conserve inventory, then determine that AFW is the highest prioritized source of feedwater. The BOP will start the AFW pump and it will trip based on a loss of Lube Oil. The crew will transition to the next highest prioritized source of feedwater Common Feedwater (CFW) and restore feedwater using a CFW pump. [Industry OE: SOER 86-01 Reliability of PWR Auxiliary Feedwater systems][ PSA Action of failure to establish flow from auxiliary feedwater pump and PRA action to align CFW to the SGs. PSA-ANO2-06-05, PRA-A2-05-004 Rev. 3]

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		Simulator Ins	tructions for Scenario 1		
Reset simulator to MOL ~100% power IC steady state.					
Ensure 2P-1A Main Feedwater pump select to trip on Turbine trip.					
CV0340	value = 0				
T5 = Rea	actor Trip				
T6 = OE	4R10A1.				
T7 = E14	4R0763				
Event	Malf. No. /	Value/	Event		
No.	Trigger Number	Ramp/Time	Description		
1			Shift Lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36B. OP-2104.002, CVCS Operations.		
2	CV4651	.4	'A' RCP normal spray valve drifts partially open.		
	Trigger = T1		OP-2203.028, Pressurizer System Malfunction AOP		
3	ESF2C40B73	active	Inadvertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal		
	Trigger T2		(RAS).		
			OP-2203.040, Inadvertent RAS AOP.		
4	CEA43DROP	0	CEA 43 fully inserts.		
	Trigger = T3		OP-2203.003, CEA Malfunction AOP		
5	DI_HS_4930_1	true	2CV-4930 boration valve fails to automatically open and		
	CVC2P39ANAS active		2P-39A and 2P-39B boric acid makeup pumps fail to		
	CVC2P39BNAS	active	start automatically.		
			OP-2104.003, Chemical Addition		
6	MTGTRIPLOCKO	active	Turbine trip causing a reactor trip.		
	Trigger T4		OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP		
7	MFWPMPBTRP	active /	2P-1B Main Feedwater (MFW) pump trip, 2P-7B		
	Trigger T5	delay = 1 min.	Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not open.		
		active	OP-2202.006. Loss of Feedwater.		
	EFWROOMB EFW2P7BFLT	active /	01 -2202.000, 2033 01 1 Geuwalet.		
	Trigger T6	delay = 1			
		min.			
8	CEA02STUCK	0%	CEA's 2 and 7 will remain withdrawn requiring emergency boration.		
	CEA07STUCK	0%	OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments.		
	CV4873	_			
	Trigger T5	1			
9	AFW2P75LO	active	2P-75 AFW pump trips due loss of lube oil.		
	Trigger T7	delay 20 sec.	OP-2202.006, Loss of Feedwater EOP		

	Si	mulator Instructions for Scenario 1			
At T=0	t T=0 Shift Lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36B.				
Cue: If reque	sted as the NLC	D, report that prestart checks are sat for 2P-36B.			
Cue: ~15 sec	after 2P-36B st	art, report that post start are sat.			
Cue: ~ 30 sec	after 2P-36C is	s stopped, report that post stop checks are sat for 2P-36C			
		D to place 2P-36C Seal water pump in auto after 1 min, report pump handswitch 2HS-4882 is in auto.			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger = T1	'A' RCP normal spray valve drifts partially open.			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger = T2	Inadvertent Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS).			
•		w to de-energize the RWT outlet valves, then respond as pen breaker and 5 min. to open the RWT outlet valves.			
	ontacted as the tuation.	e WWM, then report that I&C maintenance will investigate the			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger = T3	CEA 43 fully inserts.			
		work management or I&C to troubleshoot, wait 15 minutes or that you are going to commence troubleshooting.			
Cue: If reque	sted as Reactor	r Engineering, after 10 minutes report that SDM is met.			
Cue: If contac reques		try to sample the RCS, then state you will comply with the			
	cted as Plant May with the reque	anagement or Reactor Engineering, then state you will st.			
	cted as a NLO a onitor secondar	and/or chemistry, report that you will secure Zinc injection y chemistry.			
	cted as chemist e requested.	try, report that you will obtain an RCS sample for lodine at			
	sted as WWM, ( ications.	Communicator or Off shift operator, then perform Attachment			
Cue: If reque	sted as NLO to	monitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.			
		2CV-4930 boration valve fails to automatically open and 2P-39A and 2P-39B boric acid makeup pumps fail to start automatically.			

	Si	mulator Instructions for Scenario 1			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Lead				
Cue: If contact	cted as the STA	to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.			
	cted as a NLO t /ledge request.	o perform Attachment 47 Field Operator Post Trip Actions,			
	Reactor Trip and EFW pump start	2P-1B Main Feedwater (MFW) pump trip, 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A will overspeed trip causing a loss of Feedwater			
has a s black fl	mall leak that a ash mark near	O to investigate 2P-7B, report that 2P-7B discharge flange ppears to have sprayed on the motor and the motor has the motor vents. Breaker has overcurrent drop flags. If the leak report that it is a small trickle.			
2EFW-4	B and 2EFW-3	the leak after 5 min report the leak was isolated by closing. B, after an additional five min remove the malfunction 3 room level alarm.			
Cue: If contaction issues		o investigate 2P-7A report it is running at ~ 1100 rpm no			
report t		o investigate 2P-7A steam admission valve 2CV-0340 then he MOV is running but the valve indicates closed and is not r failure.			
Cue: If contac extreme		o investigate 2P-1B, report that the thrust bearing is			
	cted as a NLO t ormal indication	o investigate 2P-1A, report that 'A' Main Feedwater pump has ns.			
	oth operator clo	LO to close the LTOP relief isolation valves, after 2 min have ose the LTOP breakers, then report the 2B51-E4, and 2B51-K2			
	Reactor Trip CEA's 2 and 7 will remain withdrawn requiring emergency boration.				
	AFW pump start	2P-75 AFW pump trips due loss of lube oil.			
2P-75 is	Cue: If contacted as a NLO to investigate 2P-75, report that there is a lube oil leak and 2P-75 is no longer running. All the oil is being contained in the berm around the pump skid.				
Cue: If requested investigate CFW pumps, then report CFW pumps are normal no issues noted.					

Appendix D

Scenario #1

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1			Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 1
Event Desc	ription: Shift	Lead Ch	arging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36	6B.
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions or Be	ehavior
	BOP	8.1.4	IF shifting from 2P-36B to 2P-36C 2P-36C to 2P-36B, THEN Place 2P-36A handswitch (	°
Cue: If req	uested as the	e NLO, r	eport that prestart checks are sat	for 2P-36B.
	BOP R A P	8.1.5	Place selected CCP handswitch in <u>2P-36A handswitch (2HS-48</u> ) <u>2P-36B handswitch (2HS-48</u> ) 2P-36C handswitch (2HS-48)	32-1) 42-2
Cue: ~15 s	ec after 2P-3	6B start	, report that post start are sat.	
	BOP	8.1.6 Check Charging Flow goes up 43 to 45 gpm (2FIS-486		to 45 gpm (2FIS-4863).
	BOP	8.1.7 Place CCP Select switch (2HS-4868) to position corresponding to selected lead pump: • 2P-36A (PMP B&C) • 2P-36B (PMP C&A) • 2P-36C (PMP A&B)		
Cue: ~ 30 s	sec after 2P-3	36C is st	opped, report that post stop chec	cks are sat for 2P-36C
	BOP	8.1.8	Ensure previous lead pump stops:	
	BOP	8.1.9	Check Charging flow lowers 43 to	45 gpm (2FIS-4863).
	BOP	8.1.10	IF 2P-36A previously placed in ST THEN place 2P-36A handswitch (	
	BOP	8.1.11	Place selected lead pump handsw <u>2P-36A handswitch (2HS-48</u> ) <u>2P-36B handswitch (2HS-48</u> ) <u>2P-36C handswitch (2HS-48</u> )	<u>32-1)</u> 42-2)

Appendix D	Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 1
Event Description: Shift	Lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P-36B.	
BOP	<ul> <li>8.1.12 Perform the following for proper room of A. Stop off-going pump Room cooler:</li> <li>2P-36A Room cooler 2VUC-7</li> <li>2P-36B Room cooler 2VUC-7</li> <li>2P-36C Room cooler 2VUC-7</li> <li>(2HS-8463-1) OR (2HS-8464-</li> </ul>	A (2HS-8461-1) B (2HS-8462-2)
BOP	<ul> <li>B. Close off-going pump Room coole Inlet valve:</li> <li>2VUC-7A SW Inlet 2CV-1500</li> <li>2VUC-7B SW Inlet 2CV-1502</li> <li>2VUC-7C SW Inlet 2CV-1501</li> <li>(2HS-1501-1) OR (2HS-1501-1)</li> </ul>	-1 (2HS-1500-1) -2 (2HS-1502-2) -5
BOP	C. Ensure on-coming pump Room co Normal-After-Start: • 2P-36A Rm Cooler 2VUC-7A • 2P-36B Rm Cooler 2VUC-7B • 2P-36C Rm Cooler 2VUC-7C (2HS-8463-1) OR (2HS-8464-	<u>(2HS-8461-1)</u> (2HS-8462-2)>
BOP	D. Ensure on-coming pump Room co Inlet valve open: • 2VUC-7A SW Inlet 2CV-1500 • 2VUC-7B SW Inlet 2CV-1502 • 2VUC-7C SW Inlet 2CV-1501 (2HS-1501-1) OR (2HS-1501-1)	<u>-1 (2HS-1500-1)</u> -2 (2HS-1502-2)> -5
ANY	8.1.13 Record current RCS boron concentration Board for Charging pump that was sect	
The following steps do	Examiner Note: not have to be completed to move to the next	malfunction.

Appendix D	Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 1	Event No.: 1
Event Description: Sh	nift Lead Charging pumps from 2P-36C to 2P	-36B.
ANY	8.1.14 <u>WHEN</u> CCP secured > 10 minuted $\overline{\text{THEN}}$ perform the following:	tes,
	A. <u>IF</u> desired to secure Seal W applicable Seal Water Pum	
	<ul> <li>2P-36B Seal Water put</li> </ul>	mp 2P-64A (2HS-4862) <del>mp 2P-64B (2HS-48</del> 72) mp 2P-64C (2HS-4882)
	B. <u>IF</u> desired to keep associat service, <u>THEN</u> place applicable han	
	2P-36B Seal Water pu	mp 2P-64A (2HS-4862) mp 2P-64B (2HS-4872) mp 2P-64C (2HS-4882)
	C. <u>IF</u> Seal Water Pump for a s remains in HAND, <u>THEN</u> REFER TO EN-OP- Control.	
Cue: If requested as the NLO to place 2P-36C Seal water pump in auto after 1 min, report that 2P-36C seal water pump handswitch 2HS-4882 is in auto.		
Termination criteria:	When 2P-36B has been placed in service the lead examiner.	or at the discretion of

Op-Test N	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #1	Event No: 2				
Event Description: 'A' RCP normal spray valve drifts partially open.							
Time	Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior						
Cued by Lead Examiner	ANY	Recognize RCS pressure lowering and 2CV-4651 indicates intermediate.					
	Enter and	implement AOP 2203.028, PZR Systems Malfu	nction				
	ATC	1. Check the following criteria:					
		A. <u>IF</u> any PZR spray valve failed open, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 2.					
		Examiner Note: The CRS will transition to s	tep 2				
		NOTE					
		R Spray Valves may be indicated by abnormal tre on (T4607/T4608).	end on Spray Line				
	ATC	<ol> <li>IF ANY PZR Spray valve failed open.</li> <li>THEN PERFORM the following:</li> </ol>					
		A. <b>PLACE</b> affected PZR Spray valve in M	IANUAL and close:				
		• 2CV-4651					
		• 2CV-4652					
	ATC	B. <u>IF</u> affected PZR Spray valve did <u>NOT</u> on <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:	close,				
		<ol> <li>PLACE associated PZR Spray value OPEN for 1 second:</li> </ol>	ve handswitch to				
		• 2CV-4651					
		• 2CV-4652					
		<ol> <li><u>WHEN</u> 5 seconds have elapsed, <u>T</u> handswitch in CLOSE until green in flashes.</li> </ol>					

Appendix D		Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2			
Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #1	Event No: 2			
Event Des	cription: 'A'	RCP normal spray valve drifts partially open.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavio	or			
	ATC	<ul> <li>C. IF affected PZR Spray valve is 2CV-4651 <u>AND</u> it will <u>NOT</u> close, <u>THEN</u> CLOSE associated energized Blo</li> <li>2CV-4655</li> <li>2CV-4656</li> </ul>	ock valves:			
Termination criteria: After 2CV-4651 PZR spray valve has been isolated by 2CV-4656 block valve or at the discretion of the lead examiner.						

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Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario #1	Event No: 3				
Event Desc	Event Description: Inadvertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS).						
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior					
Cued by Lead Examiner	rm. K10-B7)						
	Enter	and implement AOP 2203.040, Ir	nadvertent RAS				
		NOTE					
		Steps marked with (*) are continue	ous steps.				
	ANY	*1. CHECK Reactor NOT trippe	ed.				
	ANY	2. CHECK SIAS NOT present.					
	ANY	3. CHECK CSAS NOT presen	t.				
	BOP	4.       CLOSE the following CNTW handswitch in RAS OVRD:         TRAIN A       TRAIN A         2CV-5647-1       2CV-5647-1					
	SRO	A. REFER TO the following	g:				
		• TS 3.5.2 or 3.5.3 for	HPSI/LPSI				
		• TS 3.6.2.1 or 3.0.3 f	or Containment Spray				
		• TS 3.5.4 for RWT					
		Examiner Note: SRO must enter and LPSI and TS 3.6.2.1 action					
		Examiner Note: SRO may enter below 91.7% and TS 3.4.6.1 for overflows the containment sum	RCS leak detection if water				
	BOP	5. <b>PERFORM</b> the following for <b>Examiner's Note: Step 'A' is N</b>					

Appendix D		Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2	
Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario #1 Event N	lo: 3	
Event Desc	ription: Inadv	vertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RA	S).	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	BOP	<ul> <li>B. <u>IF</u> suction sources isolated for Green Train E (RWT AND CNTMT Sump),</li> <li><u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following in PTL:</li> </ul>	ESF pumps	
		HPSI pump 2P89B		
		HPSI pump 2P89C (Green Train) (Alre	eady in PTL)	
		LPSI pump 2P60B		
		CNTMT Spray pump 2P35B		
	SRO	C. <b>REFER TO</b> the following Tech Specs:		
		• 3.5.2		
		• 3.5.3		
		• 3.6.2.1		
		• 3.0.3		
		Examiner Note: SRO must enter TS 3.5.2, action b and LPSI and TS 3.6.2.1 action a for Containment		
Examiner Note: TS 3.5.4 and TRM 3.1.8 are applicable if RWT level lowers below 91.7%.				
	ANY	6. <b>CHECK</b> the following:		
		A. SW aligned to CCW.		
		B. SW aligned to ACW.		

Appendix D

Scenario #1

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 3

Event Description: Inadvertent Green Train Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS).

	<u>NOTE</u>					
IF SW MOVs are overridden after an actuation, then the associated SW loop is considered inoperable. If MOVs are overridden on both SW loops, then both SW loops are considered inoperable.						
SRO	7. <b>IF</b> SW MOVs were overridden, <u>THEN</u> EVALUTE SW operability as follows:					
	A. <u>IF</u> SW MOVs on BOTH SW headers overridden, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:					
	B. <u>IF</u> SW MOVs on only ONE SW header overridden, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:					
	C. <b>REFER TO</b> Attachment B, Tech Spec and TRM Evaluation due to inoperable SW loop(s).					
	Examiner Note: No service water valves were overridden.					
ANY	8. CHECK SIAS or MSIS actuated.					
SRO	8. <b>IF</b> MSIS or SIAS <b>NOT</b> actuated, <u>THEN</u> <b>GO TO</b> Step 10.					
SRO	10. <b>ENSURE</b> TS/TRM reviewed for applicability per Attachment B, Tech Spec and TRM Evaluation.					
ANY	11. <b>NOTIFY</b> I&C to determine and correct problem.					
Cue: If requested by the crew to de-energize the RWT outlet valves, then respond as requested. 1 min to open breaker and 5 min. to open the RWT outlet valves.						
Cue: When contacted a the RAS actuation	is the WWM, then report that I&C maintenance will investigate					
Termination Criteria: When the sump valves are overridden and the SRO has entered the appropriate TS or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.						

Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #1	Event No: 4 & 5					
	Event Description: CEA 43 fully inserts. 2CV-4930 boration valve fails to automatically open and 2P-39A and 2P-39B boric acid makeup pumps fail to start automatically.							
Time	Position	Applicant's Act	ions or Behavior					
Cued by lead	ANY	Assess multiple alarms on panels 2K04 and 2K10						
examiner		Recognize CEA 43 has dropped	into the core. Time:					
	SRO	Enter OP-2203.003, CEA malfun	ction AOP.					
applicant aid the exa	Examiner Note: For Events 4 and 5 the ES-D-2 is broken down into steps for each applicant due to many procedure steps/sections being performed in parallel. This is to aid the examiners' ability to follow along. The section starts with SRO steps, then the ATC steps (page 21), and the BOP steps (page 26) are last.							
		Procedure Note:						
• /	Attachment D	provides trip and shutdown criteria	a.					
	<ul> <li>Attachment E provides a list of possible Tech Spec actions to be taken within two hours of procedure entry.</li> </ul>							
<ul> <li>Steps marked with (*) are continuous action steps.</li> </ul>								
<ul> <li>Steps marked with (■) are floating steps.</li> </ul>								
	SRO	1. Open Placekeeping page.						
	SRO	<ol> <li>Open Placekeeping page.</li> <li>Stop ALL CEA movement.</li> </ol>						
	SRO	-	tors to monitor floating steps.					
	0110	Procedure Note:						
		ent is defined as a CEA misaligned on more than 5 inches or inward de						
	<ul> <li>For the purpose of defining CEA operability to satisfy TS LCO requirements, a CEA is inoperable under the following conditions:</li> </ul>							
1.	<ol> <li>CEA is known to be untrippable or immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference (TS 3.1.3.1.a).</li> </ol>							
	<ol> <li>CEA is known to be immovable as a result of CEDMCS malfunction (TS 3.1.3.1.b and 3.1.3.1.c).</li> </ol>							
3.		ligned from ANY other CEA in its T be aligned (TS 3.1.3.1.d).	group by greater than 7 inches					
4.		DT be exercised within the maximus of TS 4.1.3.1.2.	um TS surveillance time					
5.		ank CEA withdrawn to less than it testing (TS 3.1.3.5).	s full out position except for					

SRO       4. Refer to the following:         • Tech Specs         • Attachment E, Tech Spec Two Hour Actions         Examiner Note: The SRO will inform the SM to Refer to Te Specs and Attachment E.         SRO       *5. IF ANY CEAs immovable AND aligned, THEN GO TO 37.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *6. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A. Trip Reactor.         B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
Attachment E, Tech Spec Two Hour Actions     Examiner Note: The SRO will inform the SM to Refer to Te     Specs and Attachment E.     SRO     *5. IF ANY CEAs immovable AND aligned, THEN GO TO     37.     Examiner Note: This step is N/A.     SRO     *6. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than     19 inches,     THEN perform the following:     A. Trip Reactor.     B. GO TO 2202.001,     Standard Post Trip Actions.     Examiner Note: This step is N/A.     SRO     *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
Examiner Note: The SRO will inform the SM to Refer to Ters         SRO       *5.       IF ANY CEAs immovable AND aligned, THEN GO TO 37.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.       Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *6.       IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A.       Trip Reactor.       B.         GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.       Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7.       IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
Specs and Attachment E.         SRO       *5.       IF ANY CEAs immovable AND aligned, THEN GO TO 37.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.       Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *6.       IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A.       Trip Reactor.       B.         GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.       Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7.       IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	ch
37.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *6.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A.       Trip Reactor.         B.       GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
37.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *6.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A.       Trip Reactor.         B.       GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
SRO       *6.       IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than 19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A.       Trip Reactor.         B.       GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	Step
19 inches,         THEN perform the following:         A. Trip Reactor.         B. GO TO 2202.001,         Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
19 inches, THEN perform the following:         A. Trip Reactor.         B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.         Examiner Note: This step is N/A.         SRO       *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
Examiner Note: This step is N/A.           SRO         *7.         IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
SRO *7. IF TWO or MORE CEAs misaligned by greater than	
7 inches	
7 inches, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:	
A. <b>Commence</b> Plant shutdown at greater than 14 % using EITHER of the following:	√hr
2102.004, Power Operation	
2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction	
B. Refer to TS 3.1.3.1.e., CEA Position.	
Examiner Note: This step is N/A.	
Procedure Note:	
TAVE computer point numbers that may be used include T-AVG and T4617-B.	
ANY 8. Record the following:	
Ctart time	
Start time     Pre-misalignment Rx power	
TAVE change	
SRO 9. Check Reactor startup in progress. (Not Met, perform	
contingency)	
SRO 9. <u>IF</u> Reactor startup NOT in progress, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 17.	

	ANY	17. Check inward CEA misalignment exists.
	SRO	Direct the following: ■18. Adjust Turbine load to match TAVE within 2°F of TREF.
	ANY	*19. Check RCS TC 542 to 554.7°F using CPC PID 5, 6, 160, or 161.
	ANY	*20. Check RCS pressure 2025 to 2275 psia.
		Procedure Note:
plant powe misalignme	er within the ac ent from 100%	y plan for a dropped CEA reduces power at a rate that will maintain cceptable region of Attachment A and is the preferred plan for CEA b power. ew should select the 70% reactivity plan which starts with
		total boration of 520 gallons.
	SRO	<ul> <li>Commence power reduction within 15 minutes of misalignment to maintain within ACCEPTABLE region of Attachment A, Required Power Reduction After CEA Deviation using EITHER of the following:</li> <li>2102.004, Power Operation</li> </ul>
		2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction
		RO may implement a floating step to log LPD and DNBR limits 27 of this guide.
		Enters 2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction
requir	ed.	Procedure Note: re may be terminated at any point if a complete shutdown is not
		l be based on plant conditions and safety considerations. Rate may d as plant conditions warrant.
	SRO	<ul> <li>*1. <u>IF</u> at any time, it is determined that significant manual actions are required to EITHER maintain the plant online,</li> <li><u>OR</u> maintain the desired maneuvering rate,</li> <li><u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:</li> <li>A. TRIP the Reactor.</li> </ul>

Procedure Note:					
If Emergency Boration in change boration rate.	progress, changing the number of running Charging pumps will				
SRO	Direct the following step.				
	<ol> <li>I<u>F</u> Letdown available, <u>THEN</u> COMMENCE Power reduction using appropriate reactivity plan in conjunction with EITHER of the following:</li> </ol>				
	<ul> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration At Power</li> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Attachment R, RCS Boration From The RWT Or BAMT</li> </ul>				
SRO	Direct the following step.				
	*6. <b>LOWER</b> Turbine load as necessary to hold Tave within ± 3°F of program Tref.				
SRO	*8 <u>IF</u> desired to transfer unit auxiliaries from Unit Aux transformer to SU #3, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM Attachment A, Transferring Loads to SU #3.				
	Examiner's Note: This step is not applicable.				
SRO	Direct the following step.				
	10. <b>PERFORM</b> notifications of power reduction using Attachment B, Notifications.				
	Cue: If requested as WWM, Communicator, or Off shift operator, then perform Attachment B Notifications.				
SRO	Direct the following step.				
	*11. <b>Monitor</b> Secondary chemistry and adjust chemical feed as needed using 2106.028, Secondary System Chemical Addition.				
Cue: If requested as NI	LO to monitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.				
SRO	Implement remaining OP-2203.003, CEA malfunction AOP.				

Appendix D			Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2
	SRO	*22.	Commence CEA troubleshooting as follows:	
			A. Notify I&C to commence CEA troubleshoo to TS 3.1.3.1.c, CEA Position.	ting. Refer
			<ul> <li>B. <u>IF</u> CEA withdrawal required during CEA troubleshooting, <u>THEN</u> CEA may be withd 5 inches using 2105.009, CEDM Control S Operation.</li> </ul>	
minu			vork management or I&C to troubleshoot, wait d report that you are going to commence	: 15
	SRO	23.	Perform SDM checks as follows:	
			A. Notify Reactor Engineering of CEA misalig inoperability and request assistance in det SDM.	
			B. Ensure SDM satisfied within 1 hour using 2 Reactivity Balance Calculation. Refer to TS Shutdown Margin, Tavg > 200°F and TS 3 CEA Position	S 3.1.1.1,
		Exam	iner Note: SRO must enter TS 3.1.3.1 Action d	-
Cue: If rec	Cue: If requested as Reactor Engineering, after 10 minutes report that SDM is met.			
	ANY	■26.	Check CEA pulse counter and CEAC position in agree within 5 inches for ALL CEAs.	dication
	SRO	■27.	<u>IF</u> CEA fully inserted, <u>THEN</u> declare COLSS Po Operating Limits for LPD and DNBR inoperable, TS 3.2.1.b, Linear Heat Rate and 3.2.4.c, DNBR	refer to
		is gre Actio	niner Note: SRO must enter TS 3.2.1. Action b eater than 13.7 KW/ft. The SRO must enter Sp n c if DNBR is not met for the COLR. This ma v-up question.	ec 3.2.4.
			re that at least the first set of data is taken on hment C is complete including ASI.	
Procedure Note:				
Consider ti	ripped or failed	d CPCs	inoperable for determining DNBR or LPD Limits.	
Examiner	Note: 'D' CP	C is tri	oped and should be considered inoperable.	
	SRO	*28.	Check CPC LPD less than TS 3.2.1 (Linear Heat Rate) limits using an average of AL CPC channels.	L operable

			Procedure Caution:
DNBR ope	erating limits w	vill shift	during ASI swings with COLSS out of service.
	•		
	SRO	*29.	Check CPC DNBR greater than TS 3.2.4 (DNBR Margin) limits using an average of ALL operable CPC channels.
	SRO	30.	Notify Chemistry to sample RCS for lodine within 2 to 6 hours following Reactor power change greater than 15% in 1 hour, refer to TS 3.4.8, Specific Activity.
Cue: If co	ntacted as CI	hemist	ry, then state you will comply with the request.
	ANY	31.	Notify appropriate Plant Management and Reactor Engineering to evaluate core power distribution.
	ntacted as PI ply with the r		nagement or Reactor Engineering, then state you will t.
Examiner	's Note: The f	ollowi	ng are the ATC steps for Events 4 and 5.
	ATC		ment OP 2104.003 Chemical Addition, Exhibit 3, Normal Boration at Power.
This sect Level.	ion has a Rea	ctivity /	CAUTION Addition Potential (RAP) and is classified as Normal Risk
	ATC	1.0	<b>IF</b> a Reactivity Management Brief has <b>NOT</b> been conducted, <b><u>THEN</u> PERFORM</b> a Reactivity Management Brief IAW EN-OP-115-14, Reactivity Management with an SRO.
		2.0	<u>IF</u> this is the first Boration of the shift, <u>THEN</u> ENSURE BAM Flow totalizer (2FQI-4926) reset.
2104.003, Exhibit 3		3.0	<u>IF</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> RECORD initial controller data:
			2FIC-4926 Setpoint: Demand:
		4.0	<b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) set as follows:
			Setpoint set to desired flow rate.
			<ul> <li><u>IF</u> in MANUAL,</li> <li><u>THEN</u> demand set to desired value.</li> </ul>

		Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2
ATC	5.0 6.0	selected for automatic operation using BAM pu switch (2HS-4911-2).	mp Select
ATC	7.0	(2CV-4930) opens (2HS-4930). (2CV-4930 will	not
	8.0		
		<ul> <li>2P-39A (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul>	
	*9.0		umps:
		• 2T-6B recirc (2HS-4915-2)	
	*10.0	<b>IF</b> additional boric acid flow required, <b>THEN START</b> additional BAM pump:	
		<ul> <li>2P-39A (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul>	
ATC		CRITICAL STEP	
	11.0	<b>OPERATE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch cont (2FQIS-4926) as follows:	roller
		11.1 <b>DEPRESS</b> AND <b>HOLD</b> red pushbutt	on.
		11.2 <b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow B controller (2FQIS-4926) set for desired quantity.	atch
		11.3 <b>RELEASE</b> Red pushbutton.	
	12.0	<b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2 indicates desired flow rate.	FIC-4926)
	ATC	ATC       7.0         ATC       8.0         *9.0       *10.0         ATC       11.0	ATC       5.0       ENSURE desired BAM pump (2P-39A OR 2P-3 selected for automatic operation using BAM purswitch (2HS-4911-2).         6.0       PLACE Mode Select switch (2HS-4928) to BOI (2CV-4930) opens (2HS-4930). (2CV-4930) will automatically open and the applicant should using the HS)         8.0       ENSURE Charging Pump Suction From Boric / (2CV-4930) opens (2HS-4930). (2CV-4930) will automatically open and the applicant should using the HS)         8.0       ENSURE selected BAM pump running: (The B pump(s) will not automatically start and the should start it using the HS)         9.0       ENSURE BAM Tank Recirc open for running provide the should start is using the HS)         9.1       2T-6A recirc (2HS-4910-2)         * 9.0       ENSURE BAM Tank Recirc open for running provide the should boric acid flow required, THEN START additional BAM pump:         10.1       If additional boric acid flow required, THEN START additional BAM pump:         11.2       2P-398 (2HS-4910-2)         * 11.0       OPERATE Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch cont (2FQIS-4926) as follows:         11.1       DEPRESS AND HOLD red pushbutt         11.2       ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch cont (2FQIS-4926) as tor desired quantity.         11.3       RELEASE Red pushbutton.         12.0       ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2

	ATC	*13.0	PERFOR	R <b>M</b> the f	following to Start/Stop additional Charging	
			13.1	<u>IF</u> des THEN	sired to raise flow, <u>I</u> :	
				A.	<b>START</b> additional charging pumps as necessary.	
2104.003, Exhibit 3				В.	<b>ADJUST</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) to desired flow rate.	
			13.2	<u>IF</u> des THEN	sired to lower flow, <u>I</u> :	
				A.	<b>ADJUST</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) to desired flow rate.	
				В.	<b>SECURE</b> additional Charging Pumps as necessary.	
		Exami	iner Note:	This s	tep should be NA.	
	ATC	*14.0 <b>MONITOR</b> the following parameters:				
		RCS T <sub>AVE</sub>				
		Axial Shape Index				
			Read	tor pow	/er	
2104.003, Exhibit 3				0	CRITICAL STEP	
		16.0			id Makeup Flow Batch controller t zero, <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following:	
			• Boric	Acid M	lakeup Flow Control (2CV-4926) closes.	
				ow indic 2-4926)	cated on Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller	
Enter 2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation (CEDMCs Operations, Exhibit 3)						

		NOTE			
• "CEA \$	"CEA SELECTED" indicates selected CEA position.				
• "GROL	JP SELECTE	D" indicates average position of selected group.			
	otion is inhibi in any regula	ted by PMS CEA sequencing program if a deviation of six inches ating group.			
		2 annunciators on 2K04 and CEDMCS annunciators on 2K10 for applicability prior to moving CEAs.			
R A P	A classified as Risk Level R2.				
	ATC 1.0 <b>IF</b> time allows <u>AND</u> Reactivity Management Brief has <u>NOT</u> been conducted, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM a Reactivity Management Brief per COPD-030 with an SRO.				
	ATC	2.0 CHECK CEAC CH1 and CH2 annunciators on 2K04 and CEDMCS annunciators on 2K10 for applicability prior to moving CEAs.			

	ATC	3.0 <u>IF</u>	<u>ד mo</u> י	ving CEAs in group, <u>THEN</u> :
		3	5.1	<b>ENSURE</b> Group Select switch to desired group position.
		3	5.2	IF moving Group P CEAs, THEN PLACE P Group Select switch to P.
		3	.3	<b>ENSURE</b> Individual CEA Selection switches aligned to CEA in group selected to move.
		3	5.4	<b>PLACE</b> Mode Select switch to MANUAL GROUP (MG) or MANUAL SEQUENTIAL (MS).
		* 3.	.5	<b>OBSERVE</b> CEAC and Pulse Counter CEA position indications to ensure CEA motion and alignment as CEAs are moved.
		R A P 3	6.6	<b>POSITION</b> groups as desired using Manual Control lever.
		3	5.7	PLACE Mode Select switch to OFF.
		3	5.8	<b>ENSURE Pulse</b> Counter and CEAC indications match.
	C	OP-2203.0	953, F	Rapid Power reduction AOP.
	<ul> <li>Procedure Note:</li> <li>ASI would tend to shift back to the top of the core if CEAs are inserted below 80 inches withdrawn when the Reactor is at power and the CPC Aux trip is active.</li> </ul>			
	<ul> <li>At higher power levels, larger (more aggressive) CEA insertions may be required (6 to 8 inches recommended initially). (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2)</li> </ul>			
<ul> <li>ASI response to power changes at the end of core life is more severe, at times significantly so. The effects of ASI may not be seen until well into the power change.</li> </ul>				
<ul> <li>Proactively driving ASI more positive than ESI (up to +0.05 deviation) will improve the ability to control ASI at lower power levels. (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2)</li> </ul>				

• Exceeding COLR ASI limit will challenge CPC QASI Aux Trip setpoint and may result in automatic trip. CPC QASI Aux Trip occurs at ±0.45 (PID 187).

opendix D		Scenario #1 Form ES-
	ATC	*7. <b>PERFORM</b> the following for ASI:
		<ul> <li>MAINTAIN ASI within Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) limits using CEA Group 6 or Group P.</li> </ul>
		USE ONE of the following to monitor ASI closely:
		- COLSS (CV9198)
		<ul> <li><u>IF</u> COLSS inoperable, <u>THEN</u> USE CPC channel ASI (PID 268) that most closely agreed with COLSS when it was operable.</li> </ul>
		• Periodically <b>MONITOR</b> QASI (PID 187).
		<ul> <li>INSERT Group 6 (preferred at higher power) OR Group P CEAS (preferred at lower power) using Exhibit 3 of 2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation, as necessary.</li> </ul>
		• MAINTAIN CEAs greater than 80 inches withdrawn.
		<ul> <li><u>IF</u> CEAs are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM 2102.004A, Unit 2 CEA Insertion Log</li> </ul>
Examiner'	s Note: The	ollowing are the BOP steps for Events 4 and 5.
BOP action	ns from Rap	d Power Reduction AOP
	BOP	*6. LOWER Turbine load as necessary to hold Tave within ± 3°

		of program Tref.	
	BOP	*9 <b>THROTTLE</b> Condensate recircs as necessary to maintain 650-750 psig Condensate Pump Discharge pressure:	
		<ul> <li>2CV-0662 (2FIC-0662)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>2CV-0663 (2FIC-0663)</li> </ul>	
BOP action	ns from CEA	Malfunctions AOP	
	BOP	From CEA Malfunctions AOP.	
		■18. Adjust Turbine load to match TAVE within 2°F of TREF.	
	BOP	A. Perform ATTACHMENT C, DNBR/LPD TECH SPEC	

 

 BOP
 A.
 Perform ATTACHMENT C, DNBR/LPD TECH SPEC LOG every 15 minutes until COLSS Power Operating Limits for LPD and DNBR are operable.

 OP-2203.003, CEA malfunction AOP, Attachment C DNBR/LPD TECH SPEC LOG.

Consider ti	Procedure Note:					
Consider tripped or failed CPCs inoperable for determining DNBR or LPD Limits.						
LAdminer	Examiner Note: 'D' CPC is tripped and should be considered inoperable.         BOP       1.       Determine DNBR Limit as follows.					
	BOF	<ul> <li>A. Add operable CPC channel values (PID 169 or 406) and divide by number of channels.</li> </ul>				
		Ch A+ Ch B+ Ch C + Ch D = Total				
Attach. C		Total ÷ operable channels = DNBR average				
		DNBR average				
		B. Subtract 0.12 from DNBR average to determine DNBR Limit.				
		DNBR average 0.12 = DNBR Limit				
		Calculated DNBR Limit				
		2. Determine LPD Limit as follows.				
		A. Add operable CPC channel values (PID 179) and divide by number of channels.				
		Ch A + Ch B + Ch C + Ch D = Total				
Attach. C	BOP	Total ÷ operable channels = LPD average				
		LPD average				
		B. Add 0.16 to LPD average to determine LPD Limit.				
		LPD average + 0.16 = LPD Limit				
		Calculated LPD Limit				
		3. Perform the following every 15 minutes until COLSS calculated DNBR and LPD POLs are returned to service:				
Attach. C	BOP	A. Record DNBR and LPD values from ALL operable CPCs.				
		B. Determine DNBR and LPD average.				

	Procedure Note:											
	If the below listed step becomes applicable, power reduction to less than 20% is required even if the dropped CEA is recovered prior to going below 20% power.											
Atta	ach. C	*4.       IF ANY DNBR 15 minute average less than calculated DNBR limit OR ANY LPD 15 minute average greater than calculated LPD Limit, THEN immediately commence power reduction to less than 20 using EITHER of the following:         BOP       2102.004, Power Operation         •       2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction				d						
Atta	ach. C	BOP 5. <u>IF plant power being changed,</u> <u>THEN perform recalculation of DNBR and LPD limits using</u> steps 1 and 2 of this attachment when steady-state power level achieved.										
			DN	BR (PIC	0 406)		LPD (PID 179)					
	TIME	CPC A	CPC B	CPC C	CPC D	DNBR AVE	CPC A	CPC B	CPC C	CPC D	LPD AVE	-
												-
								-				
Ex	Examiner Note: Ensure that at least one set of data is taken on attachment C prior to the next malfunction.											
Ter	Termination criteria: When the required reactivity manipulation is complete or at lead examiner's discretion.											

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Event Description: (6) Main Turbine trip causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip / 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not open. (8) 2 CEAs remain withdrawn (9) AFW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
Cued by Lead	ANY	Numerous alarms indicating a Main Turbine trip.		
Examiner		Examiner Note: Reactor will trip in seconds on High Pressurizer pressure if the crew does not manually trip the reactor.		
	SRO	Direct tripping the reactor due to the loss of the Main Turbine.		
	Enter and i	mplement EOP 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.		
	SRO	<ol> <li>Notify Control Board Operators to perform the following:         <ul> <li>A. Monitor safety functions using Exhibit 7, CBO Reactor Trip Checklist.</li> <li>B. Perform post trip contingencies as required.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Open Safety Function Tracking page.</li> </ol>		
Reactivity Control Safety Function	ATC	<ul> <li>3. Check Reactivity Control established as follows:</li> <li>A. Reactor power lowering.</li> <li>B. Check startup rate is negative.</li> <li>C. ALL CEAs fully inserted by observing ANY of the following: (CEAs 2 &amp; 7 do not insert - perform contingency)</li> <li>1) CEA Rod bottom lights illuminated.</li> <li>2) CEAC 1 indicates ALL CEAs fully inserted.</li> <li>3) CEAC 2 indicates ALL CEAs fully inserted.</li> <li>C. Ensure emergency boration in progress using Exhibit 1, Emergency Boration</li> </ul>		

Appendix D		Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2			
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #1	Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9			
/ 2P-7B Em	ergency Feed	ain Turbine trip causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip dwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not withdrawn (9) AFW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.				
Time	Position	Applicar	t's Actions or Behavior			
Perf	orms 2202.0	10, Standard Attachments	(Exhibit 1) Emergency Boration			
	ATC	1. Select ONE of the follo	wing Emergency Boration flowpaths:			
		FLOWPATH	ACTIONS REQUIRED			
		A. Gravity Feed	<ul> <li>A. Ensure at least ONE BAM Tank Gravity Feed valve open:</li> </ul>			
Exhibit 1			<ul><li> 2CV-4920-1</li><li> 2CV-4921-1</li></ul>			
Boration		B. BAM pumps	B. 1) Start at least ONE BAM pump.			
			<ol> <li>Open Emergency Borate valve (2CV-4916-2).</li> </ol>			
			<ol> <li>Ensure Boric Acid Makeup Flow Control valve (2CV-4926) closed.</li> </ol>			
	I		<u>N</u>			
	Aligning Charging pump suction to RWT during RWT purification with ALL Charging pumps running may cause Charging pumps to trip due to low suction pressure.					
		C. RWT to Charging pumps	C. Open Charging Pump Suction Source from RWT valve (2CV-4950-2).			
		2. Close VCT Outlet va	lve (2CV-4873-1).			
		Examiner Note: VCT Out flowpath B (BAM pumps	let valve (2CV-4873-1) does not close, ) must be selected.			
		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> VCT Outlet valve does <u>NOT</u> close, <u>THEN</u> Ensure BAM Pumps Emergency Boration flowpath selected.</li> </ol>				

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Event Description: (6) Main Turbine trip causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip / 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not open. (8) 2 CEAs remain withdrawn (9) AFW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ATC	<ol> <li>Ensure Reactor Makeup Water Flow Control valve (2CV-4927) closed.</li> </ol>	
		5. Ensure at least ONE Charging pump running.	
		6. Ensure charging header flow greater than 40 gpm by either of the following:	
Exhibit 1		• 2FIS-4863 Disch Flow (2C09)	
Boration		Computer Point F4863 (PDS, PMS or SPDS)	
Critical Task: Commence Emergency boration IAW 2202.010 Standard Attachment Exhibit 1 by the completion of SPTAs.			

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP	4. Check Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries satisfied:
		<ul><li>A. Check Main Turbine tripped by BOTH of the following:</li><li>ALL Main Stop Valves closed.</li></ul>
		Generator megawatts indicate zero.
		B. Generator Output breakers open.
		C. Exciter Field Breaker open.
		D. Perform EITHER of the following as required:
		1) Check the following valves closed:
Vital Auxiliaries Safety Function		<ul> <li>MSR 2E-12A Steam Supply From SG A (2CV-0400)</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>MSR 2E-12B Steam Supply From SG B (2CV-0460)</li> </ul>
		<ol> <li>No flow indicated on the following MSR second stage flow instruments:</li> </ol>
		<ul><li>2FI-0402</li><li>2FI-0462</li></ul>
		E. At least ONE 6900v AC bus energized.
		F. At least ONE 4160v Non-vital AC bus energized.
		G. BOTH 4160v Vital AC buses energized
		H. BOTH DGs secured.
		I. At least ONE 125v Vital DC bus energized:
		<ul> <li>2D01 - SPDS point E2D01</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>2D02 - SPDS point E2D02</li> </ul>

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
RCS Inventory Control Safety Function	ATC	<ul> <li>5. Check RCS Inventory Control established as follows:</li> <li>A. PZR level: <ul> <li>10 to 80%.</li> <li>Trending to setpoint.</li> </ul> </li> <li>B. RCS MTS 30°F or greater.</li> </ul>
RCS Pressure Control Safety Function	ATC	<ul> <li>6. Check RCS Pressure Control:</li> <li>1800 to 2250 psia.</li> <li>Trending to setpoint.</li> <li>Normal PZR Spray and heaters controlling pressure.</li> <li>Valid CNTMT Spray <u>NOT</u> in progress.</li> </ul>
Core Heat Removal safety Function.	ATC	<ul> <li>7. Check Core Heat Removal by forced circulation:</li> <li>A. At least ONE RCP running.</li> <li>B. CCW flow aligned to RCPs.</li> <li>C. Loop delta T less than 10°F.</li> <li>D. RCS MTS 30°F or greater.</li> <li>E. Check SW aligned to CCW.</li> <li>F. <u>IF</u> SIAS or MSIS actuated, <u>THEN</u> maintain SW header pressure greater than 85 psig.</li> </ul>

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ANY	8. Check RCS Heat Removal:
RCS Heat Removal Safety Function	ANY	<ul> <li>8. Check RCS Heat Removal: <ul> <li>A. Check SG available by BOTH of the following: <ul> <li>At least ONE SG level 10 to 90%.</li> <li>FW maintaining SG level. (NOT met)</li> </ul> </li> <li>A. Contingency Actions <ul> <li>1) IF SG level lowering THEN Ensure EFAS actuated.</li> <li>2) IF SG level less than 10% THEN Ensure total flow greater than 485 gpm</li> <li>4) IF FW NOT maintaining SG level, THEN manually control FW flow rate.</li> <li>5) IF FW NOT available THEN perform the following: <ul> <li>a) Ensure maximum of ONE RCP running in each loop.</li> <li>b) IF RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, THEN Ensure associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.</li> </ul> </li> </ul></li></ul></li></ul>
		<ul> <li>RCP A Spray Valve (2CV-4651)</li> <li>RCP B Spray Valve (2CV-4652)</li> </ul>
		c) Close SG Blowdown Isolation valves
		• 2CV-1016-1
		• 2CV-1066-1
		d) GO TO Step 8.C
		Examiner Note: 2K12-H9 "EFWP ROOM(S) LEVEL HI alarms due to the flange leak on 2P-7B EFW pump resulting in the motor fault.

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
RCS Heat Removal Safety Function	ANY	<ul> <li>C. Check Feedwater line intact by the following: <ul> <li>SG level stable or rising.</li> <li>NO unexplained step changes or erratic FW flow.</li> <li>NO unexplained step changes or erratic Condensate flow.</li> </ul> </li> <li>D. Check RCS TC 540°F to 555°F <ul> <li>Check SG pressure 950 psia to 1050 psia.</li> </ul> </li> <li>F. IF MSIVs open, <u>AND</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> place SDBCS Master Controller in Auto/Local with setpoint of 960 psia using 2105.008 Exhibit 3, SDBCS Emergency Operation.</li> </ul> <li>Examiner Note: EFAS is actuated but NO EFW pumps are available. SRO may discuss TS 3.7.1.2 for no EFW trains.</li>
<ul> <li>Cue: If contacted as the WCO to investigate 2P-7B, report that 2P-7B discharge flange has a small leak that appears to have sprayed on the motor and the motor has black flash mark near the motor vents. Breaker has overcurrent drop flags. If requested, to quantify the leak report that it is a small trickle.</li> <li>Cue: If requested to isolate the leak after 5 min report the leak was isolated by closing. 2EFW-4B and 2EFW-3B, after an additional five min remove the malfunction EFWROOMB for 2P-7B room level alarm.</li> </ul>		
Cue: If contacted as a NLO to investigate 2P-7A report it is running at ~ 1100 rpm no issues noted.		
Cue: If contacted as a NLO to investigate 2P-7A steam admission valve 2CV-0340 then report the motor for the MOV is running but the valve indicates closed and is not moving. Suspect gear failure.		
Cue: If contacted as a NLO to investigate 2P-1B, report that the thrust bearing is extremely hot.		
Cue: If contacted as a NLO to investigate 2P-1A, report that 'A' Main Feedwater pump has no abnormal indications.		

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Time	Position ANY	Applicant's Actions or Behavior         9. Check CNTMT parameters:         A. Temperature and Pressure:         • Temperature less than 140°F.         • Pressure less than 16 psia.         B. Check CNTMT Spray pumps secured.         C. NO CNTMT radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity.         1) CAMS alarms         • "CNTMT PART/GAS RAD HI/LO annunciator (2K10-B6) clear.         2) RCS leakage alarms:         • "AREA RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-B10) clear.         2) RCS leakage alarms:         • "AREA RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-C10) clear.         3) Check the following radiation monitors trend stable:         • CNTNT Area         • CAMS         • Process Liquid         D. NO secondary system radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity         1) "SEC SYS RADIATION HI" annunciator (2K11-A10) clear.         2) Secondary Systems Radiation monitors trend stable:         • Main Steam lines         • SG Sample         • Condenser Off Gas

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Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

SR0       10. Notify STA to report to control room.         SR0       11. Direct NLOs to perform Attachment 47, Field Operator Post Trip Actions.         Cue: If contacted as the STA to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.         Cue: If contacted as a NLO to perform Attachment 47 Field Operator Post Trip Actions, acknowledge request.         SR0       12. Ensure Reactor trip announced on Plant page.         SR0       13. Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.         SR0       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SR0       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         IF Contingency actions       IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.       B. GO TO Exhibit 8, Diagnostic Actions.	Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Actions.         Cue: If contacted as the STA to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.         Cue: If contacted as a NLO to perform Attachment 47 Field Operator Post Trip Actions, acknowledge request.         SRO       12. Ensure Reactor trip announced on Plant page.         SRO       13. Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.         SRO       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:       A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	10. Notify STA to report to control room.
SRO       12. Ensure Reactor trip announced on Plant page.         SRO       13. Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.         SRO       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:       A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	
acknowledge request.         SRO       12. Ensure Reactor trip announced on Plant page.         SRO       13. Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.         SRO       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         If Contingency actions       IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.	Cue: If con	tacted as the	e STA to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.
SRO       13. Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.         SRO       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         If Contingency actions       IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.			• • •
Emergency Action Level Classification.         SRO       14. Direct control board operators to acknowledge ALL annunciators and announce ALL critical alarms.         SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.         If Contingency actions       IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	12. Ensure Reactor trip announced on Plant page.
SRO       15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied. <b>15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied. 15. Contingency actions</b> IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	
15 Contingency actions         IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	
IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, THEN perform the following:         A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.		SRO	15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied.
perform the following:A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.			15 Contingency actions
B. GO TO Exhibit 8, Diagnostic Actions.			A. Notify control room staff of safety functions NOT satisfied.
			B. GO TO Exhibit 8, Diagnostic Actions.
SRO Diagnose Loss of Feedwater EOP 2202.006.		SRO	Diagnose Loss of Feedwater EOP 2202.006.

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9 causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip otor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not FW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.
causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip otor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not FW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.
otor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not FW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.
Applicant's Actions or Bohavior
Applicants Actions of Denavior
oss of Feedwater EOP 2202.006.
CAUTION
r MTS with ALL RCPs stopped may result in s
rform the following:
iagnosis of Loss Of Feedwater by checking SFSC ce criteria satisfied every 15 minutes.
to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, cy Action Level Classification.
cekeeping page.
cekeeping page. htrol Board Operators to monitor floating steps.
ntrol Board Operators to monitor floating steps.
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Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Desition	Anglisentle Astigne on Debouisn
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP	6. Conserve SG inventory as follows:
		A. Ensure SG Blowdown Isolation valves closed:
		• 2CV-1016-1
		• 2CV-1066-1
		B. Ensure SG Sample valves closed.
		• 2CV-5850
		• 2CV-5858
		• 2CV-5852-2
		• 2CV-5859-2
		Examiner Note: SRO may bring forward step 12 to establish a feed source. Step 12 is on page 42.
	BOP	■ 7. Check ALL AC and Vital DC buses energized.
	ATC	*8. Maintain RCS pressure 1800 psia to 2250 psia using 2202.010 Attachment 48, RCS Pressure Control.
	Crew	performs Attachment 48, RCS Pressure Control
		<u>NOTE</u>
	method of pre tinuous use.	essure control is established, this attachment is not required in hand
	•	thod of pressure control will require in hand or continuous use until ontrol method is established.
Attach 48	ATC	<ol> <li>IF loss of power or failed indication prevents automatic operation of heaters and spray,</li> <li>THEN PLACE the following handswitches to the unaffected channel as necessary:</li> </ol>
Attach 48		<ul> <li>PZR Low Level Cutoff Select (2HS-4642)</li> <li>PZR Pressure Channel Select (2HS-4626)</li> <li>PZR Level Channel Select (2HS-4628)</li> </ul>

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Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
Attach 48	ATC	<ul> <li>*2. Maintain RCS pressure with heaters and spray using one or more of the following: <ul> <li>A. IF desired to use PZR Pressure controller (2PIC-4626A/B), <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> <li>* 1) Ensure RCS MTS greater than 30 degrees.</li> <li>2) Adjust PZR Pressure controller (2PIC-4626A/B) setpoint to desired pressure.</li> <li>* 3) RESET Low PZR Pressure setpoints during depressurization.</li> </ul> </li> <li>B. IF desired to use PZR Heaters, <u>THEN</u> perform the following: <ul> <li>1) Cycle available PZR Backup heaters as necessary.</li> <li>2) Cycle available PZR Proportional heaters as necessary.</li> <li>2) LF desired to use AUXILIARY Spray, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> <li>* 1) Ensure RCS MTS greater than 30 degrees.</li> <li>2) Ensure at least ONE Charging pump running.</li> <li>3) Close Regen HX to RCP B/C valves: <ul> <li>2CV-4827-2</li> <li>2CV-4831-2</li> </ul> </li> </ul></li></ul>	
<u>NOTE</u> PZR Spray Block valves 2CV-4653 and 2CV-4655 are de-energized due to degraded power supply cables.			
Attach 48ATC4)Ensure PZR Spray (2CV-4651/2CV-4652) or PZR Spray Isolation valves (2HS-4655/2HS-4653) closed.			
<ul> <li><u>Caution</u></li> <li>Securing Charging pumps will secure/change Aux Spray flow.</li> <li>Securing all Charging pumps will terminate emergency Boration, if in progress.</li> </ul>			

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ATC	<ol> <li>5) Perform EITHER of the following to control RCS pressure:</li> </ol>
		<ul> <li>Throttle Aux Spray valve (2CV-4824-2) as necessary.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Start and stop Charging pump(s) as necessary.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Reset Low PZR Pressure setpoints during depressurization.</li> </ul>
Attach 48		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> Regen HX to RCS temperature (2TI-4825) can <u>NOT</u> be reduced to less than 275°F, <u>THEN</u> perform ONE of the following:</li> </ol>
		a) Isolate Letdown to reduce temperature.
		b) Complete Table 1 of this attachment.
		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> Regen HX to RCS (2TI-4825) <u>AND</u> PZR water phase (2TI-4627) differential temperature greater than 200°F AND PMS is unavailable, <u>THEN</u> complete Table 1 of this attachment.</li> </ol>
Attach 48	ATC	8) <b>IF</b> desired to COMPLETELY secure Aux Spray, THEN:
		a) <b>ENSURE</b> Aux Spray valve (2CV-4824-2) closed.
		<ul> <li>b) ENSURE open at least ONE Regen HX to RCP B/C valves:</li> </ul>
		• 2CV-4827-2
		• 2CV-4831-2

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Return to LOAF	SRO	<ul> <li>The SRO should direct the following action to be completed.</li> <li>9. Locally remove danger tags and close the following breakers:</li> <li>2B51-E4 "LTOP RELIEF ISOL 2CV-4730-1"</li> <li>2B51-K2 "LTOP RELIEF ISOL 2CV-4741-1"</li> </ul>
have		as a NLO to close the LTOP relief isolation valves, after 2 min perator close the LTOP breakers, then report the 2B51-E4, and ed.
LOAF	ANY	■10. Check IA pressure greater than 65 psig.
LOAF	SRO	<ol> <li><u>IF</u> FW established to at least ONE SG, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 15.</li> <li>Examiner note: FW will not be established.</li> </ol>
LOAF	SRO	<ul> <li>I2. Establish a SG feed source from at least one of the following (listed in preferred order):</li> <li>A. EFW Pump 2P7B using 2202.010 Attachment 53, Recovery From Loss of Feed With 2P7B.</li> <li>B. EFW Pump 2P7A using 2202.010 Attachment 54, Recovery From Loss of Feed With 2P7A.</li> <li>C. AFW Pump 2P75 using 2202.010 Attachment 55, Recovery From Loss of Feed With 2P75.</li> <li>D. Common Feedwater using 1106.007, Common Feedwater System.</li> <li>E. MFW Pumps using 2202.010 Attachment 56, Recovery From Loss of Feed With Main Feed Pumps.</li> <li>F. Condensate Pumps using 2202.010 Attachment 57, Recovery From Loss of Feed With Condensate Pumps.</li> </ul>
		Examiner note: AFW pump 2P75 is the first option available.

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Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
Transition to Attachment 55, Recovery From Loss of Feed With 2P75.					
	SRO	1. <u>IF</u> 2P7A or 2P7B EFW pumps running, <u>THEN</u> Ensure 2P75 suction aligned to an alternate source using 2106.006, Emergency Feedwater System Operations.			
		Examiner Note: This step is NA, no EFW pumps are running.			
	ANY	<ol> <li><u>IF</u> 4160VAC Bus 2A1 is energized from SU XFMR #2, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> </ol>			
Attach 55		Examiner Note: This step is NA.			
Allacii 55		<ol> <li>IF MSIS or CSAS actuated, <u>THEN</u> locally open "DC CONTROL POWER" breaker in the following breaker cubicles:</li> </ol>			
		Examiner Note: This step is NA.			
	ANY	<ul> <li>5. Perform the following to start AFW Lube Oil pump (2P225):</li> <li>A. Place 2HS-0766 in ON.</li> <li>B. Check 2P225 amber light OFF.</li> <li>C. <u>IF</u> 2P225 <u>NOT</u> available, <u>THEN</u> RETURN TO procedure in effect.</li> </ul>			
Attach 55		<ul> <li>6. Ensure following valves closed:</li> <li>AFW to 2P7A DISCH (2CV-0761)</li> <li>AFW to 2P7B DISCH (2CV-0760)</li> </ul>			
		7. Start 2P75. Examiner Note: AFW pump 2P75 will trip on low Lube Oil pressure approximately 20 seconds after start, SRO will return to step 12 and choose Common Feedwater.			
		<ul><li>8. Perform the following to secure 2P225:</li><li>A. Place 2HS-0766 in OFF.</li><li>B. Place 2HS-0766 in AUTO.</li></ul>			

Appendix D		Scenario #1	Form ES-D-2		
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #1 Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9			
/ 2P-7B Em	Event Description: (6) Main Turbine trip causing a Reactor trip (7) Main Feedwater pump trip / 2P-7B Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motor fault, and 2P-7A steam admission valve will not open. (8) 2 CEAs remain withdrawn (9) AFW pump 2P-75 trips on loss of lube oil.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Action	ns or Behavior		
2P-7		NLO to investigate 2P-75, report the running. All the oil is being cont			
Transitio	on to 1106.00	7, Common Feedwater Operations.	Attachment F		
		1.0 <b>ENSURE</b> CFW power availa	ble by performing the following:		
	BOP	1.1 SELECT 4160V Elec	trical Screen.		
	BOP	1.2 <u>IF</u> P-805A to be used <u>THEN</u> : 1.2.1 <b>CHECK</b> ON breakers cle	E of the following supply		
		• A1512	, London Line Feed to A15 , A1 Feed to A15		
		1.3 <u>IF</u> P-805B to be used <u>THEN</u> :	,		
	ANY	1.3.1 CHECK ON breakers clo	E of the following supply osed:		
			, London Line Feed to A19		
		• A1932	, A1 Feed to A19		
	BOP	2.0 Starting CFW:			
		2.1 SELECT Injection Screer	n Display on HMI 2QC-7100.		
	Procedure Note If CFW powered from A1 and EFW Pump P-7B receives an automatic start signal or its supply breaker (A-311) is closed, the CFW Pump will not run due to load shed.				
	BOP	2.2 IF starting CFW Pump A (P-805A), THEN:			

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
Procedure Note P-805A pump icon will be a gray hue if load shed is enabled.				
	BOP	2.2.1 SELECT P-805A by pressing P-805A symbol.		
	BOP	2.2.3 <b>SELECT</b> START button in pop-up box.		
	BOP	<ul> <li>2.3 <u>IF</u> starting CFW Pump B (P-805B), <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>2.3.1 SELECT P-805B by pressing P-805B symbol.</li> <li>2.3.3 SELECT START button in pop-up box.</li> </ul>		
	BOP	<ul><li>2.4 CHECK selected pump icon changes from green to red.</li><li>2.5 CHECK selected pump discharge pressure greater than or equal to 1350 psig.</li></ul>		
	BOP	<ul> <li>3.0 <u>IF</u> feedwater will be aligned to SG A, <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>3.1 <b>REFER TO</b> Tech Spec 3.6.3.1, Containment Isolation Valves.</li> <li>3.2 <b>UNLOCK</b> and <b>CLOSE</b> Disconnect Switch for 2CV-1070A (2S-1070A2).</li> <li>3.3 At HMI, ENSURE 2CV-1070A operation selected to manual.</li> </ul>		
	Procedure Note Time for 2CV-1070A from full closed to full open is 26 seconds.			
	BOP	<ul> <li>3.4 IF SG A level is less than 49% [60%], <u>THEN</u> THROTTLE OPEN 2CV-1070A to achieve less than 150 gpm until ONE of the following conditions is met:</li> <li>SG level rises</li> <li>Flow has been maintained for greater than 5 minutes</li> </ul>		

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Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #1

Event No: 6, 7, 8 & 9

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		4.0 <b>IF</b> feedwater will be aligned to SG B, THEN:			
	505	4.1 <b>REFER TO</b> Tech Spec 3.6.3.1, Containment Isolation Valves.			
	BOP	4.2 <b>UNLOCK</b> and <b>CLOSE</b> Disconnect Switch for 2CV-1070B (2S-1070B2).			
		4.3 At HMI, ENSURE 2CV-1070B operation selected to manual.			
	Procedure Note				
	Time for	2CV-1070B from full closed to full open is 26 seconds.			
		4.4 <b>IF</b> SG B level is less than 49% [60%], <u>THEN</u> THROTTLE OPEN 2CV-1070B to achieve less than 150 gpm until ONE of the following conditions is met:			
	BOP	SG level rises			
		<ul> <li>Flow has been maintained for greater than 5 minutes</li> </ul>			
Critical Tas	Critical Task: Restore Feedwater prior to both SG levels reaching 70" wide range.				
Terminatio	Termination criteria: When feedwater restored or at Lead Examiner's discretion.				

Scenario 2

Facility:	ANO-2	Scenario	No.: <u>2</u> Op-Test No <u>.: 2019-1</u>
Examine	ers:		Operators:
Initial Co	onditions: <u>~100%,</u>	MOL, RED TI	rain Maintenance Week.
Turnove	r: <u>~100%. 260 EFPD</u>	. EOOS indic	ates 'Minimal Risk'. Red Train Maintenance Week.
Schedule	ed evolution: None		
Critical T	asks: Manually trin t	he reactor wi	thin 1 minute of 'A' RCP trip. All RCPs must be secured
			remaining below minimum NPSH for RCPs (<30 degrees
	-		restored prior to RVLMS level 4.
Event	Malf. No.	Event	Event
No.	Maii. NO.	Type*	Description
1	NIBUPPER	C (BOP)	'B' channel Excore upper chamber fails high.
		C (SRO) TS (SRO)	OP-2203.026, NI malfunction AOP.
2	XCVLDNHXOU	I (ATC)	The temperature input to the letdown HX temperature
2	XOVEDITIXOO	I (SRO)	controller (2TIC-4815) fails low.
		· · ·	OP-2203.012L, Annunciator 2K-12 Corrective Action (ACA)
3	SGBTUBE	C (ATC)	'B' SG tube leak.
		C (BOP) C (SRO)	OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary leakage AOP.
		TS (SRO)	
4	IAINSTAIR	C (BOP)	Loss of Instrument Air.
	K12-B08	C (SRO)	OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air AOP
5	RCP2P32AGRN	C (ATC)	'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor. <b>CT-2</b>
	RPSRXAUTO	C (SRO)	OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP
	RPSRXMAN		
6	RCSLOCATCA	M (All)	Loss of Coolant accident. CT-3 OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP.
7	HPI2P89AFAL	C (BOP)	2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS.
	ESFK409BAF	C (SRO)	2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2
			Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open. CT-1 OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments EOP.
End Poir	nt		ew has completed the entry section of Functional Recovery d Safety injection flow
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor			

Target Quantitative Attributes (Section D.5.d)	Actual Attributes
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)	1
Abnormal Events (2-4)	4
Major Transients (1-2)	1
EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)	1
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (≥ 1per	1
scenario set)	
Critical Tasks (≥2)	3

Critical Task	Justification	References
<ul> <li>Perform one or more of the following to establish minimum design safety injection flow.</li> <li>Start 'A' or 'C' HPSI pump.</li> <li>Open Green train HPSI valve 2CV-5076-2.</li> <li>Safety injection flow must be restored prior to RVLMS level 4.</li> </ul>	During a loss of inventory, SI flow keeps the core covered, cooled, and borated. The inability to maintain minimum required SI flow could result in a net loss of RCS inventory, pressure control, and sub-cooling. Once sub- cooling is lost, pressurizer level is no longer a valid indication of RCS mass inventory, and a reactor head void can form, both of which complicate the event recovery. RVLMS level 3 or higher has to be maintained to ensure Natural	CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-16, Establish required SI flow (IC-03)
Manually trip the reactor within 1 minute of 'A' RCP trip.	Circulation. Following a reactor trip, safety systems are designed to keep the plant in a safe state by meeting specified critical safety function criteria (SFSC). If the heat being generated by the reactor is greater than normal decay heat levels, then the heat removal capacity of the safety systems may be inadequate resulting in core damage.	<ul> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-01, Establish reactivity control (SPTA-01)</li> <li>CR-ANO-2-2010-948, Critical task criteria</li> </ul>
All RCPs must be secured within 10 min of RCS margin to saturation remaining below minimum NPSH for RCPs (<30 degrees MTS).	The out-of-limits condition could result in shaft seal damage, and then shaft seal failure could result in increased RCS leakage out the seal to the containment atmosphere, which would worsen the event severity.	<ul> <li>EN-OP-123 Time Critical Action/Time sensitive action program Attachment 4.</li> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-23, Trip any RCP exceeding operating limits. (FRG-04)</li> <li>CR-ANO-2-2010-948, Critical task criteria</li> </ul>
Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.	Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.	NUREG-1021 Appendix D

## Scenario #2 Objectives

- 1) Evaluate individual response to a failure of a Nuclear Instrument.
- 2) Evaluate individual response to the Letdown temperature controller.
- 3) Evaluate individual response to a Steam Generator Tube leak.
- 4) Evaluate individual response to a Loss of Instrument air.
- 5) Evaluate individual and crew's response to Reactor Coolant Pump trip without a reactor trip.
- 6) Evaluate crew's ability to mitigate a Loss of Coolant Accident.
- 7) Evaluate individual response to ECCS component failures.

## Scenario #2 NARRATIVE

When the crew has completed their control room walk down and brief, B Excore upper chamber will fail high. The SRO will enter the OP-2203.026, NI Malfunction AOP and the crew should determine that B channel linear power is failed but log power is still functional by monitoring output for the three chambers. The SRO will also enter Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Action 2 for Reactor Protection System. The BOP will bypass points 1, 3, and 4 on channel 'B' channel PPS. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2002-693, D Excore failure.]

After the 'B' channel PPS points are placed in bypass or cued by lead examiner, the Letdown heat exchanger temperature input will fail low. The ATC will report that 2K12-C1 LETDOWN HX 2E29 OUTLET TEMP HI alarm is in and the letdown heat exchanger temperature is reading low on the hand indicating controller but the computer point and control board indication are reading higher than normal. The SRO will direct the ATC to take manual control of the Letdown heat exchanger temperature control valve and manually control temperature. The SRO will also refer to the ACA for letdown radiation monitor flow low 2K12 J1 RADMONITOR FLOW LO and restore letdown radiation monitor flow. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2018-0812, 2TIC-4815 letdown temperature controller failed to 50 degrees.]

After the ATC has taken manual control of the letdown temperature control valve, or at the lead examiner's cue, a Steam Generator (SG) Tube Leak will occur on 'A' Steam Generator. The SRO will enter OP 2203.038, Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP. The SRO will direct the ATC to perform power reduction to take the unit offline. He will also direct the BOP to isolate steam to 'A' EFW pump from the 'A' steam generator. The SRO will enter TS 3.4.6.2 Action a, RCS leakage, 3.4.5 SG tube integrity, and TS 3.7.1.2 for EFW action a when steam is isolated to 2P-7A EFW pump. [Industry OE: SOER 83-2, Steam Generator Tube Ruptures.]

After the crew has started the down power, or cued by the lead examiner, an Instrument Air (IA) dryer will malfunction. This will cause a lowering of IA header pressure. The SRO should enter the OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air AOP. The BOP will check IA crosstie with Unit 1 2CV-3015 open and will open IA crosstie with Unit 1 2CV-3004. The crew should dispatch the NLO to the IA compressors, air dryers, and to look for a leak. After the NLO report the crew should bypass the air dryer. . [Industry OE: Loss of IA, SOER 88-1 Instrument Air system failures, Braidwood Unit1 poor solder joint INPO OE# 287448. Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2014-02501 Instrument air dryer malfunction.]

Appendix D	Scenario 2	Form ES-D-1

After the crew has cross tied IA with Unit 1, 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) will trip which should cause an automatic reactor trip. RPS will not function requiring a manual reactor trip from the Diverse Scram System (DSS). The crew will trip the reactor. After the reactor is tripped, a Large Break LOCA will occur. The SRO will enter OP 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs). The crew should recognize the signs of LOCA and ensure Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) actuated. The SRO should diagnose and enter OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP due to the Steam Generator Tube leak and the Large Break LOCA. The BOP should recognize that two Safety Injection valves failed to open and open them. The 'A' High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump will fail to start and the BOP should start the 'A' or 'C' HPSI pump. After the crew has entered the Functional Recovery EOP, the crew will commence mitigating actions. [Industry OE: SEN-220, SEN-216, & SEN-182, RCS leakage events.]

## Simulator Instructions for Scenario 2

Reset simulator to MOL 100% power IC steady state.

Place MINIMAL RISK and RED Train Maintenance Week signs on 2C11.

RPSRXAUTO, Value = active

RPSRXMAN, Value = active

T6 set to reactor trip.

		1	
Event No.	Malf. No.	Value/ Ramp Time	Event Description
1	NIBUPPER Trigger 1	200	'B' channel Excore upper chamber fails high. TS for SRO. <b>OP-2203.026, NI malfunction AOP.</b>
2	XCVLDNHXOU Trigger 2	50	The temperature input to the letdown HX temperature controller (2TIC-4815) fails low. OP-2203.012L, Annunciator 2K-12 Corrective Action (ACA)
3	SGBTUBE Trigger 3	5	'B' SG tube leak. OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary leakage AOP.
4	IAINSTAIR K12-B08 Trigger 4	8 on	Loss of Instrument Air. OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Air AOP
5	RCP2P32AGRN Trigger 5	active	<ul> <li>'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor.</li> <li>OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP</li> </ul>
6	RCSLOCATCA Trigger 6	2200 10 min.	Loss of Coolant accident. OP-2202.009, Functional Recovery EOP.
7	HPI2P89AFAL ESFK409BAF	Active Active	2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS. 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV- 5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open. <b>OP-2202.010 Standard Attachments EOP.</b>

		Simulator Operator CUEs		
At T=0	Trigger 1 'B' channel Excore upper chamber fails high.			
		WWM, then report that I&C will start planning a work uclear instrument.		
Cued by lead examiner	Trigger 2	The temperature input to the letdown HX temperature controller (2TIC-4815) fails low.		
of 2TIC-4815 less than 20 2TIC-4815 th	i then WCO repor 0 gpm but not on hen report there is	WCO and requested then, If crew has taken manual control its that CCW flow on 2FIS-5261 is indicating normal which is the low peg. If the crew has not taken manual control of s no flow indicated on 2FIS-5261. nagement, state that you will contact I&C to investigate the		
failure.		nagement, state that you will contact ido to investigate the		
Cued by lead examiner	Trigger 3	'B' SG tube leak.		
Cue: When to Secondar		emistry, respond that you will implement 2602.001 Primary		
power reduc		e people, acknowledge the information concerning the d as Communicator state you will inform groups listed in e.		
	acted as a NLO ar secondary chem	nd/or chemistry, report that you will secure Zinc injection istry.		
Cue: If conta the time requ		y, report that you will obtain an RCS sample for lodine at		
	ested as WWM, C B Notifications.	ommunicator, or Off shift operator, then perform		
		commences Att. 19, then report you will commence condary Contamination.		
Cue: If reque	ested as NLO to r	nonitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.		
Cued by lead	Trigger 4	Loss of Instrument Air.		

			t 1, report that IA pressure is lowering on Unit 1 and er than what is currently displayed in the Unit 2 simulator.				
Cue:	If asked about EC-28743 being installed, report that it is not installed.						
Cue:	If requested as Unit 1 for assistance looking for IA leak report that the Unit 1 NLO will assist looking for leaks.						
Cue:	If requested as NLO to assess the IA system, the wait 2 min. and report the following: 'A' IA compressors are running normally, receiver pressure is ~ 98 psi, Coalescing filter DP ~ 0, IA header flow is ~ 100 scfm, After filter DP ~ 0 zero, IA header pressure is ~ the same pressure as indicated in simulator.						
Cue:		ested as NLO to a re Malfunction al	assess the INSTR AIR SYSTEM TROUBLE alarm, report 2M- arm is in.				
Cue:	If conta	acted to open 21A	A-8, then after 1 min delete the IA malfunction (IAINSTAIR).				
Cue:	lf conta normal		andby IA dryer in service after 10 min return K12-B08 to				
Cue:	lf conta Pool.	acted as NLO, re	port that SFP purification pump is aligned to the Spent Fuel				
Cued lead exam		Trigger 5	'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor.				
over	current	lags are dropped	o check A RCP breaker then after ~ 1 min., then report that d. to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.				
Cue:	If conta		perform Attachment 47 Field Operator Post Trip Actions,				
			en report HPS, after 3 min. use the remotes (HPI252A and en report HPS is secured.				
Cued lead exam		Reactor Trip	Loss of Coolant accident.				
			nvestigate 2P-89A HPSI pump, then after 2 min. report the al and 2P-89A HPSI pump has no issues locally.				
-			s on LTOPS, after 3 min. use the remotes (RCSB51E4 and Ps and then report LTOPs energized.				
	lby	SIAS actuation	2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS.				

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event Description: 'B' channel Excore upper chamber fails high. TS for SRO. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Cued by ANY Announce annunciators: lead 2K04-A5 CH B RPS/ESF/PRETRIP/TRIP examiner 2K04-B3 PPS CHANNEL TRIP 2K04 H4 CPC CHANNEL SENSOR FAILURE 2K09 J5 Protect Cabinet Trouble. ANY Crew will recognize that 'B' excore upper chamber has failed High. Enter OP-2203.026, NI Malfunction AOP. ANY 1. **CHECK** at least TWO Linear Safety channels operable. ANY 2. CHECK ALL Linear Safety channels operable. (Channel 'B' and will not be operable) SRO 2. IF ALL Linear Safety channels NOT operable, **THEN** perform the following: A. Refer to TS 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protective Instrumentation. Examiner Note: SRO must enter Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Action 2 Procedure Caution: With one Linear Safety channel in trip, anything that initiates Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI) in second channel will cause Reactor trip. B. IF ONE Linear Safety channel previously bypassed, SRO THEN GO TO Step 3 AND DISABLE affected channel. Examiner Note: Step is NA BOP C. IF ONLY ONE channel failed, **THEN ENSURE** the following trip functions bypassed within ONE hour: Hi Linear Power {1} High LPD {3} • Low DNBR {4} Examiner Note: BOP will use 2105.001 to bypass points 1, 3, & 4. Transition to procedure OP-2105.001 CPC/CEAC Operations, section 11.

Appendix D	S	cenario 2	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-		Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 1
Event Description: "	3' channel Excore	upper chamber fails high. TS f	or SRO.
Time Positio	n	Applicant's Actions or Be	havior
BOP	Bypass the p	points 1, 3 and 4 on Channel B:	
	11.1	<b>REFER TO</b> Tech Spec 3.3. <sup>-</sup> 3.3.3.6 and TRM 3.3.1.	1.1, 3.3.2.1, 3.3.3.5,
	11.2	<b>CIRCLE</b> channel and function bypassed below:	$\bigcap_{i=1}^{n}$
		Channel to be bypassed: A Points to be bypassed: $1^{2}$ $3^{4}$ 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	$\bigcirc$
	11.3	ENTER appropriate Tech S	pec/TRM actions.
	11.4	<b>ENSURE</b> points to be bypase ANY other channel.	ssed <u>NOT</u> bypassed in
	11.5	PLACE desired points in BY channel on 2C23.	PASS for selected
	Examiner No	ote: SRO must enter LCO 3.3.	1.1 action 2.
Transition back to	procedure OP-220	03.026, NI Malfunction AOP.	

	SRO		D. GO TO Step 4.		
	SRO	4.	CHECK ALL Log Power channels operable.		
		Exa	miner Note: All Log channels are operable.		
	SRO	5.	GO TO Step 8.		
	SRO	8.	<b>NOTIFY</b> I&C of Nuclear Instrument malfunctions.		
	Cue: When contacted as the WWM, then report that I&C will start planning a work package to repair the failed nuclear instrument.				
Terminatio	Termination criteria: Affected channel points placed in bypass or at lead examiner's discretion.				

Scenario 2

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Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario No.: 2 Event No	.: 2	
Event Desc	ription: The t	temperature input to the letdown HX temperature controller fails	low.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
Cued by Lead Examiner	ATC	Announce alarm 2K12-C1, LETDOWN HX 2E29 OUTLET TEMP HI.		
	ANY	Implement Annunciator Corrective Action 2203.012L.		
	ANY	2.1 <b>CHECK</b> the following indications:		
		LD Temp CNTRL (2TIC-4815)		
		<ul> <li>Computer Point C&amp;VCS HIGH LETDOWN TEMP (T4</li> </ul>	805)	
		Examiners Note: Temperature is reading accurately on 2C and the computer point but the temperature instrument in to 2TIC-4815 is failed.		
	ATC	2.2 <b>ENSURE</b> letdown flow (2FIS-4801) within 10 gpm of cha flow (2FIS-4863) per 2104.002, Chemical and Volume Co		
	ANY	Direct WCO to locally perform the following:		
		<ol> <li>Locally ENSURE CCW flow through Letdown Heat Exchanges (2FIS-526I).</li> </ol>	anger	
cont norr take	trol of 2TIC-4 nal which is	as the WCO and requested then, If crew has taken manual I815 then WCO reports that CCW flow on 2FIS-5261 is indic less than 200 gpm but not on the low peg. If the crew has n ontrol of 2TIC-4815 then report there is no flow indicated on		
	ATC	2.4 IF Loop 2 CCW temperature high, <u>THEN</u> REDUCE temperature using 2104.028, Componen Cooling Water System Operation.	nt	
		Examiners Note: Loop 2 CCW temperature is not expected be high.	d to	
	ATC	2.5 <b>IF</b> Letdown HX Temperature controller (2TIC-48I5) <b>NOT</b> controlling in AUTOMATIC, <b>THEN</b> :		
		2.5.1 <b>Place</b> Letdown HX Temperature controller (2TIC-4815) MANUAL.	in	
		2.5.2 Raise CCW flow.		
	SRO	Establish a control band for letdown heat exchanger outlet.		

Appendix D		Sc	enar	io 2	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1		Sc	enario No.: 2	Event No.: 2
Event Desc	ription: The	temperature in	put t	o the letdown HX tempera	ture controller fails low.
Time	Position			Applicant's Actions or Be	havior
	ANY	Report 2K1	2 J1	RADMONITOR FLOW LO	1
	ATC			ted due to Letdown tempe nger (2TC-4805) greater th	
		2.2.1	lov LE	<b>ISURE</b> letdown temperatu vered to less than 140°F IA TDOWN HX 2E29 OUTLE this procedure.	AW response to
		2.2.2	28	<b>ISURE</b> letdown flow (2FIS gpm per 2104.002, Chem ontrol.	
	ATC	2.2.3		<b>RFORM</b> the following to o CV-4804):	pen L/D to Rad monitor
			A.	PLACE handswitch for I 2CV-4804 (2HS-4804) to	
			В.	PLACE handswitch for I 2CV-4804 (2HS-4804) to following:	
				<ul><li>AUTO (preferred)</li><li>OPEN</li></ul>	
Cue: If con the failure.		ork managem	ent,	state that you will contac	ct I&C to investigate
Terminatio	1	When the letd manual and te of lead examin	empe	temperature controller h erature is in the directed	has been placed in band or at discretion

Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Cued by ANY Announce alarm 2K11-A10 SEC SYS RADIATION HI. lead examiner SRO Enter OP-2203.038, Primary to Secondary leakage AOP. SRO 1. **OPEN** Placekeeping page. 2. **NOTIFY** Control Board Operators to monitor floating steps. Procedure Note: N-16 monitors only calculate SG leak rates with plant power (CV-9000) greater than 20%. \*3. Determine Primary to Secondary leakrate by ANY of the following: Computer RCS LKRT programs. • • CHECK PZR level stable and USE Charging and Letdown mismatch minus Controlled Bleed Off. • **CHECK** Letdown isolated and **PERFORM** of estimate RCS leak rate by total Charging flow minus Controlled ANY Bleed Off. Chemistry leakrate calculation using 1604.013, Measurement of Primary to Secondary Leakage. SG Tube Leak N-16 monitors. Manual leakrate calculation.

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		4. <b>DETERMINE</b> leaking SG by ANY of the following:
		A. Secondary Systems Radiation Trend recorder:
		• 2RR-1057
		B. SG Sample Radiation monitors:
	ANY	<ul><li>2RITS-5854</li><li>2RITS-5864</li></ul>
		C. Main Steam Line Radiation monitors:
		<ul><li>2RI-1007</li><li>2RI-1057</li></ul>
		D. SG water sample results.
		E. SG Tube Leak N-16 monitors.
	ATC	*5. <b>CONTROL</b> Charging and Letdown to maintain PZR level wit 5% of setpoint.
		■6. CHECK BOTH of the following are true:
		<ul> <li>RCS leakage LESS than 44 gpm</li> </ul>
	ANY	<ul> <li>PZR level maintained within 10% of setpoint</li> </ul>
	ANY	<ol> <li>NOTIFY Chemistry to implement 2602.001, Primary to Secondary Leakage.</li> </ol>
	en contacted econdary lea	as Chemistry, respond that you will implement 2602.001 Prima Akage.
		Procedure Note:
	ige (including ng upward.	leakage spike) is confirmed if TWO independent radiation monitors
The n	robability of l	ocating a tube leak after plant shutdown with leakrates less than 50

Scenario 2

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position		Applicant's Actio	ns or Behavior
	SRO			econdary leakrate determined, ble action per the table below:
		Parameter	Value	Action
		ANY SG OR TOTAL (BOTH SGs)	≥ 44 gpm	RETURN TO Step 6.
		ANY-SG	> 100 gpd (> 0.069 gpm)	PERFORM ACTION LEVEL THREE section of Attachment A while continuing with this procedure.
		ANY SG	≥ 75 gpd (0.052 gpm)	PERFORM ACTION LEVEL TWO section of Attachment A while continuing with this procedure.
		ANY SG	≥ 30 gpd (.021 gpm)	PERFORM ACTION LEVEL ONE section of Attachment A while continuing with this procedure.
		TOTAL (both SGs)	≥ 5 gpd (.0035 gpm)	<b>PERFORM</b> RAISED MONITORING section of Attachment A while continuing with this procedure.
		TOTAL (both SGs)	< 5 gpd (.0035 gpm)	<b>PERFORM</b> ACTION PLAN of Attachment A while continuing with this procedure.
				rm step 9 which is a floating on to Attachment A.

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 3
Event Desc	ription: 'B' S	G tube leak.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behav	ior
	ANY	■9. <u>IF</u> plant shutdown required, <u>THEN</u> ISOLATE EFW pump 2P7A Steam	ו supply as follows:
		A. <b>CLOSE</b> Main Steam Supply valve to 2 SG:	2P7A from leaking
		<ul> <li>SG "A" TO EMER FW PUMP TUR</li> <li>SG "B" TO EMER FW PUMP TUR</li> </ul>	· · · /
		B. <b>REFER TO</b> TS 3.7.1.2, Emergency Feedwater System.	
		Examiner Note: The SRO must enter TS 3.7	.1.2 action a.
Examiner N		procedures may be performed in parallel the foll n the exam.	lowing are the
	Attachmer	nt A of the Primary to Secondary AOP is on this p	bage.
		Power Reduction AOP starts on page 16 and the steps on page 20.	ien continues after
		r Operations procedure starts on page 22.	
	•	for boration are on pages 17 -20.	
	The contir	nuation of the primary secondary AOP is on page	; 29.
	SRO	The SRO will transition to Action Level Three of	Attachment A.
		1. ACTION LEVEL THREE (> 100 gpd)	
	SRO	A. RECORD current time:	_
Action Level Three		*B. <b>IF</b> ANY SG leakrate rises to ≥44 gpm THEN GO TO Step 6 in the body of th	is procedure.
		C. <u>IF</u> at power, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:	
	ATC/SRO	1) <b>REFER TO</b> applicable reactivity pl	an.

Scenario 2

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Event Description:	'B' SG tube leak.
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Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		<ul> <li>2) INITIATE the following using 2102.004, Power Operations <u>OR</u> 2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction as necessary to be &lt; 50% power within one hour of time recorded above,</li> <li><u>AND</u> in Mode 3 in the following two hours:</li> </ul>	
		*a) <u>IF</u> RCS leakage greater than or equal to 10 gpm <u>THEN</u> PERFORM RCS boration using2104.003 Chemical Addition, Attachment R, RCS Boration From the RWT OR BAMT.	
	SRO	b) <u>IF</u> leakage less than 10 gpm, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM EITHER of the following:	
		<ul> <li>RCS boration using 2104.003, Chemical Addition, Attachment R, RCS Boration from the RWT or BAMT.</li> </ul>	
		RCS boration using 2104.003, Chemical Addition, Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration a Power.	
		Examiner Note: The SRO will direct a power reduction using either power operations procedure or Rapid Power Reduction AOP.	
	SRO	The SRO will transition to OP-2203.053 Rapid Power Reduction AOP or OP-2102.004 Power Operations emergent power reductio section.	
		Examiner Note: Power operations procedure steps start on page 21.	
		OP-2203.053 Rapid Power Reduction AOP	
		Procedure Note:	
<ul> <li>Use of this procedure may be terminated at any point if a complete shutdown is not required.</li> </ul>			

• Shutdown rate shall be based on plant conditions and safety considerations. Rate may be raised or lowered as plant conditions warrant.

Appendix D
Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Scenario 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	ANY	<ul> <li>*1. IF at any time, it is determined that significant manual actions are required to EITHER maintain the plant online,</li> <li>OR maintain the desired maneuvering rate,</li> <li>THEN PERFORM the following:</li> <li>A. TRIP the Reactor.</li> <li>B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.</li> </ul>		
Rapid Power	Procedure I	Note: If Emergency Boration in progress, changing the number of running Charging pumps will change boration rate.		
Reduction AOP	ATC	<ul> <li>3. IF Letdown available, <u>THEN COMMENCE</u> Power reduction using appropriate reactivity plan in conjunction with EITHER of the following:</li> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration At Power</li> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Attachment R, RCS Boration From The RWT Or BAMT</li> <li>Examiner Note: The crew can select either 2104.003, Normal boration or 2104.003 Att. R boration. It is anticipated that the crew will select The steps for Att. R with suction from RWT to lower power to less than 50% in 1 hour.</li> </ul>		
	ATC	The ATC will transition to OP-2104.003, Chemical Addition, Attachment R to commence boration.		
<ul> <li>Procedure Caution:</li> <li>Do NOT use BAMT and RWT as boration sources at same time.</li> <li>Additional CCP starts while aligned to RWT or BAMT suction will result in more boration.</li> <li>With VCT isolated (Outlet closed and divert flow aligned to BMS), CBO flow will result in VCT level rise with no control process in place to limit level rise. (CR-ANO-2-2009-01786)</li> </ul>				
		Procedure Caution:		
This sectior	n has a Reac	tivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is classified as Low Risk Level.		

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	ANY	<ul> <li>1.0 <u>IF</u> a Reactivity Management Brief has <b>NOT</b> been conducted, <u>AND</u> this a planned reactivity_manipulation (not, EOP, AOP, or ACA) <u>THEN</u> <b>PERFORM</b> a Reactivity Management Brief IAW EN- OP-115-14, Reactivity Management with an SRO.</li> <li>Examiner Note: This step in N/A when an AOP has been entered.</li> </ul>		
2104.003 Att. R boration steps.	ATC	<ul> <li>2.0 DETERMINE desired boration rate, dilution flow, and number of required charging pumps from Reactivity Plans located in Plant Data Book or by manual calculation.</li> <li>Examiner Note: The crew will run 2 charging pumps with suction from the RWT. They will dilute at ~22 gpm and insert group 6 CEA's 13" for ASI control during the first 15 min.</li> </ul>		
	ATC	3.0 <b>ENSURE</b> the following:		
		<ul> <li>Blending Tee aligned to CCP Suction</li> <li>"CVCS - Secure Attachment R lineup" added to Standard Attachments Exhibit 7, CBO Reactor Trip Checklist as a contingency.</li> </ul>		
		Procedure Note:		
Placing VC indications.	T Inlet/Divert	valve 2CV-4826 in BMS position will change RCS leakage		
	ATC	4.0 <u>IF</u> VCT level greater than 62 percent, <u>THEN</u> PLACE 2HS-4826 (VCT Inlet/Divert valve 2CV-4826) to BMS position.		
2104.003 Att. R boration		5.0 <u>IF</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> RECORD initial controller data:		
steps.		2FIC-4926 Setpoint: Demand:		
		2FIC-4927 Setpoint: Demand:		

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
2104.003 Att. R boration steps.	ATC	<ul> <li>6.0 PERFORM the following to align for dilution:</li> <li>6.1 ENSURE the following on Boric Acid MU Flow controller (2FIC-4926): <ul> <li>In MANUAL</li> <li>Demand set to MINIMUM</li> </ul> </li> <li>6.2 ENSURE EITHER Reactor Makeup pump running: <ul> <li>2P-109A (2HS-4965)</li> <li>2P-109B (2HS-4966)</li> </ul> </li> <li>6.3 ENSURE Reactor Makeup Water Flow controller (2FIC-4927) set as follows: <ul> <li>6.3.1 Setpoint set to desired flow rate.</li> <li>6.3.2 IF in MANUAL, THEN demand set to desired value.</li> <li>6.4 OPEN VCT Makeup Isolation (2CV-4941-2) (2HS-4941-2).</li> </ul> </li> <li>7.0 OPEN one of the following valves from a boric acid source: <ul> <li>Charging Pump Suction from RWT (2CV-4950-2) (2HS-4950-2)</li> <li>(2HS-4950-2)</li> <li>BAMT (2T-6A) Gravity Feed (2CV-4920-1) (2HS-4921-1)</li> <li>BAMT (2T-6B) Gravity Feed (2CV-4921-1) (2HS-4921-1)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	ATC	8.0 CLOSE VCT Outlet (2CV-4873-1) (2HS-4873-1). Examiner Note: Step 8 starts the down power.

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Robavier
TIME		Applicant's Actions or Behavior
2104.003 Att. R boration steps.	ATC	<ul> <li>9.0 ENSURE VCT Inlet/ Divert valve 2CV-4826 (2HS-4826) in BMS position.</li> <li>*10.0 PERFORM the following to Start/Stop additional Charging pumps:</li> <li>10.1 IF desired to raise flow, THEN perform the following: <ul> <li>A. START additional charging pumps as necessary.</li> <li>B. ADJUST Reactor Makeup Water flow as necessary to maintain desired shutdown rate (2FIC-4927).</li> </ul> </li> <li>10.2 IF desired to lower flow, THEN perform the following: <ul> <li>A. ADJUST Reactor Makeup Water flow as necessary to maintain desired shutdown rate (2FIC-4927).</li> <li>B. SECURE additional Charging Pumps as necessary.</li> </ul> </li> <li>11.0 PERFORM the following to initiate dilution flow: <ul> <li>11.1 PLACE Mode Select switch (2HS-4928) in MANUAL.</li> <li>11.2 ENSURE Boric Acid MU Flow controller (2FIC-4926) indicates zero.</li> <li>*11.3 ENSURE Reactor Makeup Water Flow controller (2FIC-4927) indicates desired flow rate.</li> <li>11.4 ENSURE BAM Tank Recirc valve open for running pump: <ul> <li>2T-6A recirc (2HS-4903-2)</li> <li>2T-6B recirc (2HS-4915-2)</li> </ul> </li> </ul></li></ul>
Continue with OP-2203.053, Rapid Power reduction AOP.		
<ul> <li>Procedure Note:</li> <li>The CBOT is the preferred RO to lower turbine load so that the ATC can focus on primary plant control. However, either individual can operate the turbine as plant conditions dictate.</li> </ul>		
PMS/PDS point CV0223 displays Unit 2 net generation in MWe.		
	BOP	*6. <b>LOWER</b> Turbine load as necessary to hold Tave within ± 3°F of program Tref.

Appendix D Scenario 2 Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: ASI would tend to shift back to the top of the core if CEAs are inserted below 80 inches • withdrawn when the Reactor is at power and the CPC Aux trip is active. At higher power levels, larger (more aggressive) CEA insertions may be • required (6 to 8 inches recommended initially). (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2) ASI response to power changes at the end of core life is more severe, at times significantly so. The effects of ASI may not be seen until well into the power change. Proactively driving ASI more positive than ESI (up to +0.05 deviation) will improve the • ability to control ASI at lower power levels. (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2) Exceeding COLR ASI limit will challenge CPC QASI Aux Trip setpoint and may result in automatic trip. CPC QASI Aux Trip occurs at ±0.45 (PID 187). ATC \*7. **PERFORM** the following for ASI: MAINTAIN ASI within Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) limits using CEA Group 6 or Group P. **USE** ONE of the following to monitor ASI closely: - COLSS (CV9198) **IF** COLSS inoperable, THEN USE CPC channel ASI (PID 268) that most closely agreed with COLSS when it was operable. Periodically MONITOR QASI (PID 187). • **INSERT** Group 6 (preferred at higher power) OR Group P CEAS (preferred at lower power) using Exhibit 3 of 2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation, as necessary. MAINTAIN CEAs greater than 80 inches withdrawn. • **IF** CEAs are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit. THEN PERFORM 2102.004A, Unit 2 CEA Insertion Log. Enter 2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation (CEDMCs Operations, Exhibit 3)

Appendix D		Sce	enario 2	Form ES-D-2	
Op-Test No	Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3				
Event Desci	Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak.				
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions or	Behavior	
			NOTE ted CEA position. verage position of selected	aroup	
Rod m		ited by PMS C	EA sequencing program if a		
R A P	classifi For an planne ACA re	ed as Risk Lev Unplanned Re d reactivity evo	eactivity Manipulation, the re olutions are not applicable d OP conditions IAW COPD-03	quired controls for uring AOP (including	
	ATC	2.0 <u>IF</u> mo	ving CEAs in group, <u>THEN</u> :		
		2.1	<b>ENSURE</b> Group Select sv position.	vitch to desired group	
		2.2	<u>IF</u> moving Group P CEAs, <u>THEN</u> PLACE P Group Se		
		2.3	<b>ENSURE</b> Individual CEA statistical centric aligned to CEA in group set		
		2.4	PLACE Mode Select swite (MG) or MANUAL SEQUE		
		* 2.5	<b>OBSERVE</b> CEAC and Pul indications to ensure CEA CEAs are moved.	•	
		<b>R</b> <b>A</b> <b>P</b> 2.6	<b>POSITION</b> groups as desi lever.	red using Manual Control	
		2.7	PLACE Mode Select swite	ch to OFF.	
		2.8	ENSURE Pulse Counter a match.	nd CEAC indications	
Continue with OP-2203.053, Rapid Power reduction AOP.					

Appendix D

Scenario 2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP	*8 <b>IF</b> desired to transfer unit auxiliaries from Unit Aux transformer to SU #3, <b>THEN PERFORM</b> Attachment A, Transferring Loads to SU #3.	
	BOP	<ul> <li>*9 THROTTLE Condensate recircs as necessary to maintain 650-750 psig Condensate Pump Discharge pressure:</li> <li>2CV-0662 (2FIC-0662)</li> <li>2CV-0663 (2FIC-0663)</li> </ul>	
	ANY	10. <b>PERFORM</b> notifications of power reduction using Attachment B, Notifications.	
	uested as W hment B Not	WM, Communicator, or Off shift operator, then perform tifications.	
	ANY	*11. <b>MONITOR</b> Secondary chemistry and adjust chemical feed as needed using 2106.028, Secondary System Chemical Addition.	
Cue: If requ	uested as NL	O to monitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.	
	ANY	<ul> <li>12. <u>WHEN</u> at ~ 80% power, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:</li> <li>A. INITIATE action to perform channel calibration within 24 hours of last successful channel check (OPS-B6).</li> <li>B. <u>IF</u> MSR Stage 2 Hi Load valves (2CV-0404/0464) have NOT closed automatically, <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following valves closed (2HS-0404):</li> <li>2CV-0404</li> <li>2CV-0464</li> </ul>	
Examiner	Examiner Note: OP-22013.038 Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP steps are continued on Page 28.		
OP-2102.004 Power Operations emergent power reduction section.			

Appendix D
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Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 3	
Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or I	Behavior	
Procedure Caution: This section has a Reactivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is classified High Risk. For an Unplanned Reactivity Manipulation, the required controls for planned reactivity evolutions are not applicable during AOP (including ACA response) or EOP conditions.				
Power Operation power reduction.	SRO	12.2 <u>IF</u> time allows <u>AND</u> Reactivity Management Brief h <u>THEN</u> PERFORM a Reactivity Mana EN-OP-115-14, Reactivity Managem Examiner Note: Formal Reactivity Brief to AOP implementation.	agement Brief per nent with an SRO.	
		Procedure Note: parameters may be monitored using Exhibit actor Power.	it 2, Various Parameters	
	<ul> <li>Boron adjustment data for power change may be obtained from Reactivity curves located in Plant Data book.</li> </ul>			
Power Operation power reduction.	SRO	12.3 <u>IF</u> plant must be off-line within one h <u>THEN</u> REFER TO Attachment H, Ra		
	few pe causir reduct • If one	Procedure Note: y, only enough boric acid should be added ercent (less than 5%). As power lowers, Xe ng power to drop faster. Dilution may be re tion rate. BAM Tank is out of service for Acid Reduc line BAMT during power reduction may res	enon will start to peak quired to slow power ing Chemistry, depletion	

Appendix D

Scenario 2

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.: 3

Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ATC	<ul> <li>12.4 COMMENCE Power reduction by performing the following as necessary:</li> <li>Boration using Normal Borate Mode to Charging pump suction (unless directed otherwise by Abnormal Operating Procedure). Refer to Chemical Addition (2104.003), Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration at Power.</li> <li>Boration from RWT or BAMT using Chemical Addition (2104.003), Attachment R, RCS Boration From The RWT or BAMT.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>CEA insertion using CEDMCS Control System Operation (2105.009), Exhibit 3 CEDMCS Operations (normally for ASI control).</li> </ul>	
	ATC	The ATC will transition to OP-2104.003, Chemical Addition, Attachment R to commence boration. See page 17	
	SRO	The SRO will continue to OP-2102.004, Power Operations emergent power reduction.	
2102.004 Power Operation	BOP	12.5 <b>LOWER</b> Turbine load as necessary to hold Tave within ± 2°F of program Tref using Exhibit 1, TAVE VS TREF.	
	SRO	<ul> <li>12.8 <u>IF</u> plant shutdown/power reduction directed by Tech Specs, <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>12.8.1 <b>INITIATE</b> Attachment L, Tech Spec Required Shutdown Time Limitations to determine mode specific time limits.</li> <li>12.8.2 <b>CONTINUE</b> with shutdown.</li> <li>Examiner Note: The SRO should give attachment L to the Shift Manager to perform.</li> </ul>	

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2		
Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 3		
Event Desc	Event Description: 'B' SG tube leak.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Beha	vior		
powe	<ul> <li>Procedure Note:</li> <li>CEAs should not be inserted below 80 inches withdrawn when the Reactor is at power and the CPC Aux trip is active. ASI would tend to shift back to the top of the core if CEAs are inserted more than halfway.</li> </ul>				
		ower changes at the end of core life is more sev he effects of ASI may not be seen until well into			
• QASI	(PID 187) pr	ovides the CPC Aux Trip function (trip setpoint	± 0.45).		
	Reactivity Pla sired ASI res	n provides information on CEA positioning to m ponse.	inimize the		
	ATC	<ul> <li>*12.9 PERFORM the following for ASI:</li> <li>MAINTAIN ASI (CV9198 with COLSS with COLSS out of service) within Co Report (COLR) limits using CEA Groit Periodically MONITOR QASI (PID 18 0.45).</li> <li>MAINTAIN CEAs above 80 inches w Aux trip is active.</li> </ul>	ore Operating Limits up 6 or Group P. 37, trip setpoint ±		
	SRO	<ul> <li>12.11 <u>IF</u> unit auxiliaries powered from Unit A <u>AND</u> desired to transfer electrical load <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>12.11.1 ENSURE SU #3 available.</li> <li>12.11.2 <u>WHEN</u> desired to transfer ele <u>THEN</u> TRANSFER to SU #3 2107.001, Electrical System Operations.</li> </ul>	ds to SU #3, ctrical loads, Transformer using		
	BOP	<ul> <li>12.12 THROTTLE Condensate recircs as nece 650-750 psig Condensate Pump Dischart</li> <li>2CV-0662 (2FIC-0662)</li> <li>2CV-0663 (2FIC-0663)</li> </ul>			

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2	
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 3	
Event Desc	ription: 'B' S	G tube leak.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Beha	vior	
status	<ul> <li>Procedure Note:</li> <li>The Woodlands (SPO/EMO) (Power Marketing Corp) is only informed of the current status of the unit (e.g. we are going off-line). (EN-FAP-WM-015, Unit Generation Forecasting for EMO/MISO (Woodlands) section 3.2)</li> </ul>			
for m monit	onitoring the toring tool. T	C are the Entergy Transmission Organization ar Grid System; this includes ensuring the adequa herefore, they can be given more specific inforr tdown. (ENS-DC-201, ENS Transmission Grid	acy of the ONLINE mation regarding the	
	ANY	<ul> <li>12.13 Notify the following of power reduction:</li> <li>Chemistry</li> <li>Reactor Engineering</li> <li>Radiation Protection</li> <li>Little Rock Dispatcher (TOC)</li> <li>Woodlands Dispatcher (SPO/EMO)</li> </ul>		
powe		e above people, acknowledge the information If requested as Communicator state you wi		
	SRO	<ul> <li>12.14 PERFORM the following for Chemistry C</li> <li>MONITOR Secondary chemistry and feed as needed using Secondary Sy Addition (2106.028).</li> <li>IF reducing power less than 90%, THEN ENSURE Primary Zinc Injection of the following:         <ul> <li>REQUEST Chemistry secure Z 2 Reactor Coolant System (RC (1052.037))</li> <li>PERFORM 2104.003, Chemica Zinc Injection section.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	d <b>ADJUST</b> chemical vstem Chemical ion secured per ONE inc Injection per Unit S) Zinc Control	
Cue: If contacted as a NLO and/or chemistry, report that you will secure Zinc injection and monitor secondary chemistry.			ecure Zinc injection	
	ANY	12.15 <b>ENSURE</b> FWBSCAL selected for COLS Calorimetric at ~ 95% (PID 177).	S Secondary	
	SRO	12.14 <u>IF</u> power change exceeds 15% within a <u>THEN</u> NOTIFY Chemistry to obtain an R between2 and 6 hours following power c	RCS sample for lodine	

Appendix D		Scenario 2 Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3
Event Desc	ription: 'B' S	G tube leak.
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	itacted as ch	emistry, report that you will obtain an RCS sample for lodine at d.
	OP-2	2203.038 Primary to Secondary Leakage AOP.
	ANY	<ol> <li>INITIATE secondary contamination control using 2202.010 Attachment 19, Control of Secondary Contamination.</li> </ol>
		NLO to commences Att. 19, then report you will commence ontrol of Secondary Contamination.
	ANY	*11. CHECK VCT level 60 to 75%.
	SRO	*12. <b>NOTIFY</b> SM to refer to the following:
		Tech Specs:
		<ul> <li>3.4.5, SG Tube Integrity</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>3.7.1.4, Secondary Activity</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification</li> </ul>
		Examiner Note: SRO must enter 3.4.6.2 action a, and must enter TS 3.4.5. TS 3.4.5 may require a follow up question because the basis needs to be reviewed to determine if it is applicable based on the size of the leak.
Termination criteria: When the required reactivity manipulation is complete and the appropriate TS have been entered or at lead examiner's discretion.		

Op-Test No	D-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4				
Event Desc	Event Description: Loss of Instrument Air.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or	Behavior		
Cued by lead examiner	ANY	Announce annunciators: 2K12-A8 INSTR AIR PRESS HI/LO 2K12-B8 INSTR AIR SYSTEM TROUBI	_E		
	Ent	er OP-2203.021, Loss of Instrument Ai	r AOP.		
	SRO	1. <b>OPEN</b> Placekeeping Page.			
	SRO	2. <b>NOTIFY</b> Control Board operators	to monitor Floating Steps.		
	ATC/BOP	<ul> <li>3. ENSURE IA cross-connected with</li> <li>A. ENSURE IA Cross-connect v</li> <li>2CV-3004</li> <li>2CV-3015</li> <li>B. INFORM Unit 1 of IA cross-c</li> <li>C. <u>IF</u> EC-28743 installed on Bre Main Turbine, <u>THEN</u> REQUE OUTLET ISOL" (ISOL-1) close</li> </ul>	valves open: onnect status. eathing Air System for Unit 1 EST Unit 1 locally verify "BA		
<ul> <li>Cue: When contacted as Unit 1, report that IA pressure is lowering on Unit 1 and pressure is ~ 5 psi higher than what is currently displayed in the Unit 2 simulator.</li> <li>Cue: If asked about EC-28743 being installed, report that it is not installed.</li> <li>Cue: If requested as Unit 1 for assistance looking for IA leak report that the Unit 1 NLO will assist looking for leaks.</li> </ul>					
	SRO	*4. <u>IF</u> event on Unit 1, AND Unit 2 IA header pressure du <u>THEN</u> SECURE cross connect as Examiner Note: This step is not appl	s follows:		
<ul> <li>Cue: If requested as NLO to assess the IA system, the wait 2 min. and report the following: 'A' IA compressors are running normally, receiver pressure is ~ 98 psi, Coalescing filter DP ~ 0, IA header flow is ~ 100 scfm, After filter DP ~ 0 zero, IA header pressure is ~ the same pressure as indicated in simulator.</li> <li>Cue: If requested as NLO to assess the INSTR AIR SYSTEM TROUBLE alarm, report 2M-76 Valve Malfunction alarm is in.</li> </ul>					

ppendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-I
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 4
Event Desc	ription: Loss	of Instrument Air.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions of	r Behavior
		*5. <b>IF</b> event on Unit 2, <b>AND</b> Unit 1 IA header pressure d <u>THEN</u> <b>SECURE</b> cross-connect w	
		<ul> <li>A. CLOSE IA Cross-connect va</li> <li>2CV-3004</li> </ul>	lves:
		• 2CV-3015	
	BOP	<ul> <li>B. Locally <b>ENSURE</b> the followin</li> <li>MANUAL X-CONNECT TO</li> </ul>	
		MANUAL X-CONNECT TO	D UNIT 1 (2IA-48)
		<ul> <li>2F-37 INLET FROM DRY (2IA-192)</li> </ul>	HDR
	ANY	■6. CHECK IA header pressure great	ter than 35 psig.
		Procedure Note:	
		ne following two steps may be masked wi s-connect valves.	ith IA cross-connected.
		7. <b>PERFORM</b> the following:	
	ANY	DISPATCH local operator to ir	nvestigate.

<ul> <li>INFORM local operator to refer to local Exhibit 1, Loss of Instrument Air Local Checks.</li> </ul>
Procedure Note:

Symptoms checked by the following TWO steps may be masked with IA cross-connected. Consider closing IA cross-connect valves.

ANY	<ol> <li>Locally CHECK BOTH IA receivers pressure greater than 85 psig.</li> </ol>
ANY	<ul> <li>"2T88A PRESS IND" 2PI-3033</li> <li>"2T88B PRESS IND" 2PI-3019</li> </ul>

4

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 2

Event No.:

Event Description: Loss of Instrument Air.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ANY	<ul> <li>9. Locally CHECK IA header pressure and air receivers pressure within 10 psid.</li> <li>"IA MAIN SUPPLY HEADER" (2PIT-3013)</li> <li>"2T88A PRESS IND" 2PI-3033</li> <li>"2T88B PRESS IND" 2PI-3019</li> </ul> Examiner Note: Using the report from NLO the crew should determine that IA header pressure and receiver pressure is greater than 10 psid.	
	ANY	<ul> <li>9. IF IA header and receivers pressure greater than 10 psid, <u>THEN</u> locally PERFORM the following as necessary:</li> <li>A. OPEN "COALESCING PREFILTER BYPASS" valve (2IA-186C). (will not correct condition, dryer issue)</li> <li>B. OPEN "AIR DRYER BYPASS" valve (2IA-8). (action crew should take)</li> <li>C. WHEN time allows, <u>THEN</u> PLACE standby IA Dryer in service (refer to 2104.024, Instrument Air System). (action crew should take as time allows)</li> <li>D. PLACE standby IA Filter in service, refer to 2104.024, Instrument Air System. (will not correct condition, dryer issue)</li> <li>E. Locally CHECK IA header pressure and air receivers pressure within 10 psid.</li> <li>"IA MAIN SUPPLY HEADER" (2PIT-3013)</li> <li>"2T88A PRESS IND" 2PI-3033</li> <li>"2T88B PRESS IND" 2PI-3019</li> </ul>	
Cue: If co normal.	Cue: If contacted to open 2IA-8, then after 1 min delete the IA malfunction (IAINSTAIR) Cue: If contacted to place standby IA dryer in service after 10 min return K12-B08 to normal. Cue: If contacted to check IA header pressure and air receivers' pressure are		

Appendix D Scenario 2			Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-1		Scenario No.: 2	Event No.: 4
Event Desc	ription: Loss	of Instrument Air.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions of	or Behavior
Attachment repositioning	B aligns critio g as IA press	Procedure Note: al components to their "fail safe" position ure restores.	n to prevent inadvertent
	ANY	ID. <u>IF</u> AOVs have repositioned or are degraded IA pressure, <u>THEN</u> PE Valve Switch Safe Positions, as inadvertent repositioning.	<b>RFORM</b> Attachment B,
		Procedure Note:	
A loss of ins	strument air c	an cause a trip of normal Control Room	chillers (2VCH-2A/2B).
	ANY	<ul> <li>11. <u>IF</u> desired to start Emergency Control Room chiller(s) (2VE-1A/1B), <u>THEN START</u> desired Emergency Control Room chiller(s) (2VE-1A/1B) using appropriate section of 2104.007, Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning and Ventilation.</li> </ul>	
	I	Procedure Note:	
		air demand indicated by 2FI-3001 is app d and approximately 275 to 375 scfm wi	
	ANY	12. <b>Check</b> indication of IA header ru locally checking "IA HEADER FL than 400 SCFM.	pture does NOT exist by OW IND" (2FI-3001) less
	ANY 13. CHECK SDC secured.		
	ANY	12. <b>CHECK</b> SFP Purification pump ( purification.	2P66) NOT aligned for RWT
Cue: If con Fuel	tacted as NI Pool.	O, report that SFP purification pump	is aligned to the Spent
Terminatio		hen the crew has bypass the IA dryer scretion.	r or at lead examiner's

Appendix D	dix D Scenario 2 Form ES-D-2		
Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #2	Event No.: 5, 6, & 7
<ul><li>Loss</li><li>2P8</li></ul>	CP Trip and of Coolant a 9A HPSI pun	RPS will not auto or manually trip the ccident op fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-507 ow pressure safety injection valves f	6-2 High pressure safety injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Act	tions or Behavior
		Recognize 'A' RCP trip and/or need following indications:	d to trip the reactor any of the
	ANY	RCP trip alarm, Green light on for 'A' RCP breaker.	
		RPS trip alarm. RPS LPD or DNBR trip lights on 20	C-03.
Examiner No	ote: The follo	wing steps are immediate actions of S	SPTAs.
	k: Manually time:	trip the reactor within 1 minute of	'A' RCP trip.
	ATC	Depress BOTH Reactor Trip pushb	outtons on 2C03.
	ATC	ATC Depress DSS Emergency Reactor Trip pushbutton on 2C03. Reactor trip time:	
	E	nter EOP 2202.001, Standard Post	Trip Actions.
		1. Notify Control Board Opera	tors to perform the following:
	SRO	A. Monitor safety functions u Exhibit 7, CBO Reactor T	
	360	B. Perform post trip continge	encies as required
		2. Open Safety Function Track	king page.
		3. Check Reactivity Control es	stablished as follows:
Reactivity control		A. Reactor power lowe	ering.
safety function	ATC	Examiner Note: Step A is currently RCP tripped. The ATC will have all contingency column. The SRO ma placekeep the actions taken.	

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

## Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Step 'A' contingency actions	SRO	<ul> <li>A. Perform the following: <ol> <li>Perform the following as needed to manually trip CEAs:</li> <li>Depress BOTH Reactor Trip pushbuttons on 2C03.</li> <li>Depress DSS Emergency Reactor Trip pushbutton on 2C03.</li> <li>Depress BOTH Manual Reactor Trip pushbuttons on 2C14.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2) IF ANY CEDMCS bus remains <ul> <li>ENERGIZED</li> <li>THEN perform the following:</li> <li>a) Open the following breakers on 2C10 to de-energize MG sets: <ul> <li>2B712</li> <li>2B812</li> </ul> </li> <li>b) WHEN breakers have been open 10 seconds, THEN close 2B712 and 2B812.</li> </ul> </li> <li>3) Check reactor power lowering.</li> </ul>
Reactivity control safety function	ATC	<ul> <li>B. Check startup rate is negative.</li> <li>C. ALL CEAs fully inserted by observing ANY of the following: <ol> <li>CEA Rod bottom lights illuminated.</li> <li>CEAC 1 indicates ALL CEAs fully inserted.</li> <li>CEAC 2 indicates ALL CEAs fully inserted.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>

Appendix D	dix D Scenario 2 Form ES		
<ul> <li>Loss</li> <li>2P89</li> </ul>	ription: CP Trip and of Coolant a 9A HPSI pun	Scenario #2 RPS will not auto or manually trip the reacted ccident np fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 His ow pressure safety injection valves fail to o	igh pressure safety injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions of	or Behavior
Vital Auxiliaries safety function	BOP	<ul> <li>4. Check Maintenance of Vital Auxil A. Check Main Turbine tripped by</li> <li>ALL Main Stop Valves close</li> <li>Generator megawatts indica</li> <li>B. Generator Output breakers operator</li> </ul>	BOTH of the following: ed. ate zero.
Vital Auxiliaries safety function	BOP	<ul> <li>C. Exciter Field Breaker open.</li> <li>D. Perform EITHER of the followin</li> <li>1) Check the following valves of MSR 2E-12A Steam Sup SG A (2CV-0400)</li> <li>MSR 2E-12B Steam Sup SG B (2CV-0460)</li> <li>2) No flow indicated on the foll instruments: <ul> <li>2FI-0402</li> <li>2FI-0402</li> <li>2FI-0462</li> </ul> </li> <li>E. At least ONE 6900v AC bus en F. At least ONE 4160v Non-vital A G. BOTH 4160v Vital AC buses er H. BOTH DGs secured.</li> <li>I. At least ONE 125v Vital DC bus</li> <li>2D01 - SPDS point E2D01</li> <li>2D02 - SPDS point E2D02</li> </ul>	closed: oply From oply From lowing MSR second stage flow hergized. AC bus energized. hergized

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
<ul> <li>Loss</li> <li>2P89</li> </ul>	cription: CP Trip and of Coolant a 9A HPSI pun	Scenario #2 RPS will not auto or manually trip the re- ccident op fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 ow pressure safety injection valves fail	2 High pressure safety injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Actior	ns or Behavior
RCS Inventory Control Safety function	ATC	<ul> <li>5. Check RCS Inventory Control</li> <li>A. PZR level:</li> <li>— • 10 to 80%.</li> <li>— • Trending to setpoint. (Wi #6, perform contingenc</li> <li>B. RCS MTS 30°F or greater.</li> </ul>	I not be met due to LOCA Event
RCS Inventory Control Safety function	SRO	·	inserts, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 6. system restoring level to setpoint.
RCS Pressure Control Safety function	BOP	<ul> <li>6. Check RCS Pressure Control:</li> <li>1800 to 2250 psia.</li> <li>Trending to setpoint. (Will no perform contingency)</li> <li>Normal PZR Spray and heate</li> <li>Valid CNTMT Spray NOT in</li> </ul>	

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

#### Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Time	Position	<ul> <li>Direct the following actions as necessary:</li> <li>6. Perform as necessary: <ul> <li>A. IF RCS pressure lowers to less than 1400 psia, <u>THEN</u> trip ONE RCP in EACH loop.</li> <li>B. IF NPSH requirements violated <u>OR</u> RCS MTS less than 30°F, <u>THEN</u> verify ALL RCPs tripped.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
RCS Pressure Control Safety function	SRO	<ul> <li>D. IF RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, THEN verify associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.</li> <li>RCP A Spray Valve (2CV-4651)</li> <li>RCP B Spray Valve (2CV-4652)</li> <li>E. IF ALL RCPs stopped AND RCS pressure control required, THEN initiate Aux spray using Attachment 48, RCS Pressure Control.</li> <li>F. IF RCS pressure lowers to 1650 psia or less, THEN perform the following: <ol> <li>Verify SIAS actuated on PPS inserts.</li> <li>GO TO Step 7.</li> </ol> </li> <li>G. Verify PZR Pressure Control system restoring pressure to setpoint.</li> </ul>
		must be secured within 10 min of RCS margin to saturation num NPSH for RCPs (<30 degrees MTS).
Core Heat Removal safety function.	ATC	<ul> <li>7. Check Core Heat Removal by forced circulation:</li> <li>A. At least ONE RCP running. (Not Met, Secure due to low MTS)</li> </ul>

<ul> <li>Loss of Coolant accident</li> <li>2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.</li> </ul>				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		Direct the contingency for step 7. A		
		A. <u>IF</u> ALL RCPs stopped, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:		
	SRO	1) Verify BOTH PZR Spray valves in MANUAL and closed.		
		• 2CV-4651		
		• 2CV-4652		
		2) GO TO Step 8.		
		8. Check RCS Heat Removal:		
		A. Check SG available by BOTH of the following:		
	BOP/ATC	At least ONE SG level 10 to 90%.		
		FW maintaining SG level		
		B. Check MFW in RTO		
		C. Check Feedwater line intact by the following:		
RCS Heat Removal Safety Function		<ul> <li>SG level stable or rising.</li> <li>NO unexplained step changes or erratic FW flow.</li> <li>NO unexplained step changes or erratic Condensate flow.</li> </ul>		
Function		D. Check RCS T <sub>C</sub> 540°F to 555°F		
		E. Check SG pressure 950 to 1050 psia.		
		F. <u>IF MSIVs open,</u> <u>AND</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> place SDBCS Master Controller in Auto/Local with setpoint of 960 psia using 2105.008 Exhibit 3, SDBCS Emergency Operation.		
		Examiner Note: Due to the RCS mass loss the crew may lower the SDBCS setpoint to gain additional margin to saturation.		
Perform 2105.008, Exhibit 3 (SDBCS Emergency Operation)				

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolent accident

Appendix D

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Event Description:

Scenario #2

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Op-Test No.: 2019-1

## Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP/ATC	1.0 IF BOTH MSIV's closed, THEN GO TO step 5.0.	
		Examiner Note: This step is NA.	
		2.0 <b>PERFORM</b> the following to determine availability of SDBCS valves:	
		2.1 <b>IF</b> the following conditions satisfied, <b>THEN</b> SDBCS Master controller (2PIC-0300) available:	
		SDBCS controlling S/G pressure at setpoint in automatic	
		EMERGENCY OFF (2K02-A14) annunciator clear	
Exhibit 3		Instrument air available	
	BOP/ATC	<ul> <li><u>IF</u> using Turbine Bypass valves, <u>THEN</u> CONDENSER INTERLOCK (2K02-B14) clear</li> </ul>	
		2.2 <b>IF</b> the following conditions satisfied, <b>THEN</b> SDBCS Downstream ADV/Turbine Bypass valves available:	
		Instrument air available	
		EMERGENCY OFF (2K02-A14) annunciator clear	
		Power available to selected controllers/valves	
		<ul> <li><u>IF</u> using Turbine Bypass valves, <u>THEN</u> CONDENSER INTERLOCK (2K02-B14) clear</li> </ul>	
		<u>NOTE</u>	

- The SDBCS Master controller cannot be set less than 650 psi.
- Computer points FR1030 and FR1130 can be useful to monitor steam flow.

Scenario #2

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
<ul> <li>Loss</li> <li>2P89</li> </ul>	ription: CP Trip and I of Coolant ao 9A HPSI pum	RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Be	ehavior
Exhibit 3	BOP/ATC	<ul> <li>3.0 IF SDBCS Master controller (2PIC-0300 <u>AND</u> use desired, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> <li>3.1 PLACE permissive handswitch for desire ADV/Turbine Bypass valves in MANUAL</li> <li>2CV-0301 Permissive (2HS-0301)</li> <li>2CV-0302 Permissive (2HS-0302)</li> <li>2CV-0303 Permissive (2HS-0303)</li> <li>2CV-0306 Permissive (2HS-0306)</li> <li>2CV-0305 Permissive (2HS-0305)</li> <li>3.2 ENSURE SDBCS Master controller (2PI R/L button.</li> <li>3.3 ADJUST SDBCS Master controller (2PI setpoint</li> </ul>	ed SDBCS Downstream .: C-0300) in LOCAL using
		EOP 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.	
Containment Safety Function	ANY	<ul> <li>9. Check CNTMT parameters:</li> <li>A. Temperature and Pressure:</li> <li>Temperature less than 140°F.</li> <li>Pressure less than 16 psia. (Not #6)</li> </ul>	met due to LOCA Event

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

## Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
Containment Safety Function	ANY	<ul> <li>9.A Contingency Actions</li> <li>A. Perform the following: <ol> <li>IF CNTMT pressure less than <ol> <li>a psia,</li> <li>THEN verify ALL available CNTMT Cooling fans running with cooling water aligned.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2) IF CNTMT pressure 18.3 psia or greater, <ol> <li>THEN verify the following:</li> <li>CIAS, CCAS, and SIAS actuated on PPS inserts.</li> </ol> </li> <li>At least ONE Emergency Penetration Room Vent Fan running.</li> <li>CNTMT Cooling fans running in Emergency Mode.</li> </ol></li></ul>	

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

#### Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
Containment Safety Function	ANY	<ul> <li>B. Check CNTMT Spray pumps secured.</li> <li>C. NO CNTMT radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity: <ol> <li>CAMS alarms: <ul> <li>"CNTMT PART/GAS RAD HI/LO" annunciator (2K10-B6) clear.</li> </ul> </li> <li>RCS leakage alarms: <ul> <li>"AREA RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-B10) clear. (Not met due to LOCA Event #6)</li> <li>"PROC LIQUID RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-C10) clear.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Check the following radiation monitors trend stable: (Not met due to LOCA Event #6) <ul> <li>CNTMT Area</li> <li>CAMS</li> <li>Process Liquid</li> </ul> </li> <li>NO secondary system radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity: <ul> <li>"SEC SYS RADIATION HI" annunciator (2K11-A10) clear. (Not Met)</li> <li>Secondary Systems Radiation monitors trend stable: (Not Met)</li> <li>Main Steam lines</li> <li>SG Sample</li> <li>Condenser Off Gas</li> </ul> </li> </ol></li></ul>	
	SRO	<ol> <li>Notify STA to report to control room.</li> <li>Direct NLOs to perform 2202.010 Attachment 47, Field Operator Post Trip Actions.</li> <li>Verify Reactor trip announced on Plant page.</li> <li>Notify SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.</li> </ol>	

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2	
Op-Test No.: 2019-1       Scenario #2       Event No.: 5, 6, & 7         Event Description:       • 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,       • Loss of Coolant accident         • 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Beh	avior	
Cue: If cont	acted as the	STA to report to the control room, acknowled	ge the request.	
Cue: If cont acknowledg		LO to perform Attachment 47 Field Operator P	ost Trip Actions,	
		LO to secure HPS, after 3 min. use the remote nd then report HPS is secured.	s (HPI252A and	
	SRO	14. Direct control board operators to acknowle and announce ALL critical alarms.	dge ALL annunciators	
	SRO	<ol> <li>Check ALL safety function acceptance crite functions are not satisfied, perform con</li> <li><u>IF</u> ANY safety function acceptance criteria <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> <li>A. Notify control room staff of safety functions <u>NOT</u> satisfied.</li> <li>B. GO TO Exhibit 8, Diagnostic Actions.</li> </ol>	tingency)	
	Enter	and implement Functional Recovery EOP 2202	2.009	
	SRO	<ul> <li>*1. NOTIFY Shift Technical Advisor to perform Checks for appropriate success paths at th</li> <li>Initially after appropriate success paths</li> <li>Every 15 minutes thereafter.</li> </ul>	ne following times:	
Cue: When	Cue: When contacted as Chemistry, then report you will sample both S/G for activity.			
	SRO	<ul> <li>2. RECORD present time:</li> <li>• Time</li> </ul>		
	SRO	*3. <b>NOTIFY</b> SM to refer to Technical Specifications and 1903.010, Emergency Action Level Classification.		
	SRO	*4. <b>CHECK</b> RCS pressure greater than 1400 psia.		

Appendix	D

Event Description:

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

• 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,

Scenario 2

Scenario #2

- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		Step 4. Contingency Actions (RCPs should have been secured in SPTAs)	
		*4. <b>PERFORM</b> the following:	
		A. IF RCS pressure less than 1400 psia, THEN:	
		1) <b>ENSURE</b> maximum of ONE RCP running in EACH loop.	
	ANY	<ol> <li>IF RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, THEN ENSURE associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.</li> </ol>	
		<ul> <li>B. <u>IF</u> NPSH requirements violated <u>OR</u> RCS MTS less than 30°F, <u>THEN</u>:</li> </ul>	
		1) <b>STOP</b> ALL RCPs.	
		2) <b>ENSURE</b> BOTH PZR Spray valves in MANUAL and closed.	
		3) <b>GO TO</b> Step 6.	
		*5. <b>ENSURE</b> the following for any operating RCP:	
	ANY	Examiner Note: No RCP are operating due to CNTMT spray.	
		*6. <b>IF</b> SIAS or MSIS actuated, <u>THEN</u> :	
		A. <b>ENSURE</b> at least ONE SW pump running on EACH loop.	
		B. CHECK EITHER DG running.	
		CAUTION	

## CAUTION

Operation of loaded DG without SW flow for greater than 3 minutes may cause engine damage.

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

<b>T</b> :	Dealting	Applicantle Actions on Debesier
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		C. <b>ENSURE</b> running DG SW Outlet valve open:
		• 2CV-1503-1
		• 2CV-1504-2
		D. <b>ENSURE</b> SW pump suction aligned to Lake.
	BOP	E. CHECK 4160v Non-vital bus 2A1 or 2A2 energized from offsite power.
		<ul> <li>F. CHECK 4160v Vital buses</li> <li>2A3 and 2A4 energized from offsite power.</li> </ul>
		G. START SW pumps as needed to maintain SW header pressure.
	ANY	H. CHECK SW to CCW restored. (May not be Met)
		Step H. Contingency Actions
	BOP	H. <u>IF</u> CCW available, <u>THEN</u> RESTORE SW to CCW, refer to 2202.010 Exhibit 5, CCW/ACW/SW Alignment.
	BOP	I. CHECK ACW restored.
	BOP	Step I. Contingency Actions
		<ol> <li>RESTORE SW to ACW, refer to 2202.010 Exhibit 5, CCW/ACW/SW Alignment.</li> </ol>
	Perfo	orm 2202.010, Exhibit 5 (CCW/ACW/SW Alignment)
	BOP	<ol> <li>IF SW suction <u>NOT</u> aligned to lake, <u>THEN</u> RETURN TO procedure in effect.</li> </ol>
		2. IF SW NOT aligned to CCW AND CCW available, THEN:
		A. <u>IF</u> RCP seal temperatures less than 180°F, <u>THEN</u> RESTORE SW to CCW by performing the following:
	BOP	<ol> <li>OVERRIDE and OPEN at least ONE SW to CCW/ACW Return valve:</li> </ol>
		• 2CV-1543-1
		• 2CV-1542-2

Scenario 2

Scenario #2

Appendix D	Dendix D Scenario 2 Form ES-D-2		
Op-Test No.: 2019-1Scenario #2Event No.: 5, 6, & 7Event Description:• 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,• Loss of Coolant accident• 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions	or Behavior
Supplying A0 pressure.	CW flow and	<u>CAUTION</u> CCW cooling from a single SW pump may	result in low SW header
	BOP	<ul> <li>2). OVERRIDE and THROTTL CCW /Main Chillers Supply value</li> <li>2CV-1530-1</li> <li>2CV-1531-2</li> <li>3). Maintain SW header press</li> </ul>	ve:
	BOP	<ul> <li>4. IF SW NOT aligned to ACW, THE</li> <li>A. ENSURE at least ONE SW to C</li> <li>2CV-1543-1</li> <li>2CV-1542-2</li> <li>B. OVERRIDE and THROTTLE of</li> <li>2CV-1425-1</li> <li>2CV-1427-2</li> <li>C. MAINTAIN SW header pressure</li> </ul>	CCW/ACW Return valve open:
Implement Functional Recovery EOP 2202.009			

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Event Description:		Scenario #2	Event No.: 5, 6, & 7
<ul> <li>'A' RC</li> <li>Loss c</li> <li>2P89</li> </ul>	P Trip and I of Coolant a A HPSI purr	RPS will not auto or manually trip the rea ccident op fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 ow pressure safety injection valves fail t	High pressure safety injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
		7. <u>IF</u> CCW in service to provide SG <u>THEN</u> :	Sample Cooler cooling,
		A. <u>IF</u> SG "A" has indicated water <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following	
		• 2CV-5850	
	BOP	• 2CV-5852-2	
		B. <u>IF</u> SG "B" has indicated water <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following	-
		• 2CV-5858	
		• 2CV-5859-2	
		C. NOTIFY Chemistry to sample	available SGs for activity.
	ANY	8. <b>CHECK</b> ALL available Hydrogen in service using 2104.044, Conta Operations.	
		Step 8. Contingency Actions	
		8. <b>ENSURE</b> ALL available Hydrogen minutes from start of event.	n Analyzers in service within 70
	ANY	<ul> <li>Record time from Entry Section step 2:</li> </ul>	
		Time	
		Examiners Note: SRO may elect to Hydrogen Analyzer	
	SRO	9. <b>OPEN</b> Functional Recovery Su	ccess Path Tracking page.

Appendix D

Scenario 2

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

#### Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		10. <b>NOTIFY</b> Control Board Operators to perform the following:	
	SRO	A. <b>MONITOR</b> floating steps.	
		<ul> <li>B. ENSURE actuated ESFAS components using 2202.010, Exhibit 9, ESFAS Actuation.</li> </ul>	

## 2202.010, Exhibit 9, ESFAS Actuation

#### Critical Task:

Perform one or more of the following to establish minimum design safety injection flow degrees F.

- Start 'A' or 'C' HPSI pump.
- Open Green train HPSI valve 2CV-5077-2.

Safety injection flow must be restored prior to RVLMS level 4.

Revision 2

		Red Train HPSI Injection MOVs open.
		Red Train Service Water Pump in service with proper discharge pressure.
		Red Train LPSI Pump (2P60A) in service with proper discharge pressure and flow.
		Red Train LPSI Injection MOVs open.
		Green Train RWT Outlet (2CV-5631-2) open.
Exhibit 9		Green Train HPSI Pump in service with proper discharge pressure and flow.
ESFAS actuation.	BOP/ATC	Green Train HPSI Injection MOVs open. (2CV-5076-2 will not be open and should be opened.)
		Green Train Service Water Pump in service with proper discharge pressure.
		Green Train LPSI Pump (2P60B) in service with proper discharge pressure and flow.
		Green Train LPSI Injection MOVs open. (2CV-5077-2 will not be open and should be opened.)
		Available Charging Pumps in service with proper discharge pressure and flow.
		Service Water Outlet Valves open for #1 and #2 EDGs.
		3.0 IF CCAS, THEN verify the following:
		Red Train CNTMT Coolers in service.
		Service Water aligned to Red Train CNTMT Coolers.
		Red Train Bypass Dampers open.
		Green Train CNTMT Coolers in service.
		Service Water aligned to Green Train CNTMT Coolers.
		Green Train Bypass Dampers open.

- Event Description:
  - 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor, •

notify CRS.

the pump)

Loss of Coolant accident •

Position

2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection • and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

2.0 IF SIAS, THEN verify the following:

□ Red Train RWT Outlet (2CV-5630-1) open.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

\*1.0 IF any abnormalities noted for affected ESFAS actuation, THEN

Red Train HPSI Pump in service with proper discharge pressure and flow. (2P-89A will fail to auto start the crew may elect to start 2P-89C or direct NLO to investigate 2P-89A then start

Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario #2

Time

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Form ES-D-2

Appendix D	Scenario 2 Form ES-D-2			
Op-Test No.: 2019-1       Scenario #2       Event No.: 5, 6, & 7         Event Description:       • 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,       • Loss of Coolant accident         • 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Action	ons or Behavior	
		O to investigate 2P-89A HPSI pump s are normal and 2P-89A HPSI pump	-	
Exhibit 9 ESFAS actuation	вор	<ul> <li>pressure and flow.</li> <li>Red Train CSS Header Isolatio</li> <li>Green Train CSS Pump (2P35E pressure and flow.</li> <li>Green Train CSS Header Isolation</li> <li>Main Feedwater Block valves of MSIVs closed.</li> <li>Main Feed pumps tripped.</li> <li>Condensate pumps secured.</li> <li>Heater Drain pumps secured.</li> <li>5.0 IF MSIS, THEN verify the follow</li> <li>MSIVs closed.</li> <li>Main Feedwater Block valves of MSIVs closed.</li> <li>Green Train Service Water Pump pressure.</li> <li>Green Train Service Water Pump pressure.</li> <li>Main Feed pumps tripped.</li> <li>Condensate pumps secured.</li> </ul>	in service with proper discharge n (2CV-5612-1) open. 3) in service with proper discharge tion (2CV-5613-2) open. losed. ving: losed. in service with proper discharge np in service with proper discharge	
	h	mplement Functional Recovery EOF	P 2202.009	

Appendix D	

Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1 Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ANY	<ul> <li>11. DETERMINE safety function status as follows:</li> <li>A. CHECK Reactivity Control satisfied by EITHER of the following: (Will be Sat.) <ul> <li>Maximum of ONE CEA <u>NOT</u> fully inserted and Reactor power lowering.</li> <li>Reactor power less than 10<sup>-1</sup>% and stable or lowering.</li> </ul> </li> <li>B. CHECK Vital DC Auxiliaries satisfied: (Will be Sat.) <ul> <li>1) At least ONE 125v Vital DC bus energized: <ul> <li>2D01-SPDS point E2D01</li> <li>2D02-SPDS point E2D02</li> </ul> </li> <li>2) At least ONE 120v Vital AC bus energized: <ul> <li>2RS1 - SPDS point E2RS1 or E2RS1RS3</li> <li>2RS2 - SPDS point E2RS3 or E2RS1RS3</li> <li>2RS4 - SPDS point E2RS4 or E2RS2RS4</li> </ul> </li> <li>CHECK Vital AC Auxiliaries satisfied: (Will be Sat.) <ul> <li>At least ONE 4160v Vital AC bus (2A3/2A4) energized.</li> </ul> </li> </ul></li></ul>
	ANY	<ul> <li>D. CHECK RCS Inventory Control satisfied: (Will NOT be Sat.)</li> <li>1) CVCS maintaining PZR level 10% to 80% [40% to 70%] and level stable or trending to setpoint.</li> <li>2) RCS MTS 30°F or greater.</li> <li>3) RVLMS LVL 03 or higher elevation indicates WET.</li> </ul>

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
<ul> <li>Loss of Coolant acci</li> <li>2P89A HPSI pump</li> </ul>		Scenario #2 RPS will not auto or manually trip the reaccident up fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 ow pressure safety injection valves fail	2 High pressure safety injection
Time	Position	Applicant's Actior	ns or Behavior
	ANY	<ul> <li>E. CHECK RCS Pressure Control</li> <li>1) RCS pressure maintained P-T limits, refer to 2202.0 Attachment 1, P-T Limits.</li> </ul>	d within 010
	ANY	<ol> <li>At least ONE intact SG at EITHER of the following:</li> <li>Level 10% to 90% [20 and FW available.</li> </ol>	AND total FW flow of 485 gpm or surization <b>NOT</b> in progress. 10°F <u>AND</u> 50°F <u>AND</u> and

Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2	
Op-Test No.: 2019-1       Scenario #2       Event No.: 5, 6, & 7         Event Description:       • 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,       • Loss of Coolant accident         • 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	ANY	<ul> <li>G. CHECK CNTMT Isolation sa</li> <li>1) CNTMT parameters normalized and the control of /li></ul>	mal: N HI" annunciator (2K10-A6) clear. in CNTMT radiation.	
	ANY	<ul><li>2202.010 Attachmer</li><li>ONE Emergency Pe</li></ul>	oonents are properly aligned, using at 5, CIAS Verification. netration Room Vent fan running. <u>OT</u> required to be open has at valve closed.	
<u>NOTE</u>				
During a loss of 120v Instrument AC Bus 2Y1, Secondary System Radiation recorder 2RR 1057 and annunciator 2K11 A10, "SEC SYS RADIATION HI" will NOT be available.				
	ANY	2) "SEC SYS RADIATION	HI" annunciator (2K11-A10) clear. Secondary Systems Radiation	

Annondix D		Secondria 2	
Appendix D		Scenario 2	Form ES-D-2
Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #2	Event No.: 5, 6, & 7
<ul> <li>Event Description:</li> <li>'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,</li> <li>Loss of Coolant accident</li> <li>2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.</li> </ul>			
Time Position Applicant's Act		Applicant's Action	ons or Behavior
	ANY	<ul> <li>H. CHECK CNTMT Temperate</li> <li>(Will <u>NOT</u> be Sat.)</li> <li>1) CNTMT pressure less the second /li></ul>	
	ANY	<ul> <li>12. Locally <b>REMOVE</b> danger tags a</li> <li>2B51-E4, "LTOP RELIEF IS 2CV-4730-1"</li> <li>2B51-K2, "LTOP RELIEF IS 2CV-4741-1"</li> </ul>	
Cue: If contacted to clear tags on LTOPS, after 3 min. use the remotes (RCSB51E4 and RCSB51K2) to energize LTOPs and then report LTOPs energized.			
SRO <b>*13. CHECK</b> ALL Safety Function acceptance criteria satisfied.			cceptance criteria satisfied.

		Diagnose and implement IC-2
		E. <u>WHEN</u> success path implemented for EACH Safety Function, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 14.
		<ul> <li>D. IF it is determined that a de-energized electrical bus is needed to satisfy a SAFETY FUNCTION,</li> <li>THEN RESTORE power to affected bus using 2202.010 Attachment 11, Degraded Power</li> </ul>
	RO	<ul> <li>C. <u>IF</u> higher priority Safety Function jeopardized <u>AND</u> lower priority safety function success path in progress, <u>THEN</u> GO TO appropriate success path for highest priority safety function in jeopardy.</li> </ul>
		<ol> <li>Challenged.</li> <li>Satisfied.</li> </ol>
		1) Jeopardized.
		B. INITIATE success paths for ALL Safety Functions in the following order:
		Decision Trees.

PPS inserts.

1.

ANY

**ENSURE** SIAS and CCAS actuated on

# Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Event Description:

Appendix D

Time

• 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,

Step G.1 Contingency Action. \*13. **PERFORM** the following:

Loss of Coolant accident •

Position

2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection • and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Scenario #2

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

A. **DETERMINE** appropriate success paths using Success Path

## Op-Test No.: 2019-1

#### Scenario #2

Event No.: 5, 6, & 7

Event Description:

- 'A' RCP Trip and RPS will not auto or manually trip the reactor,
- Loss of Coolant accident
- 2P89A HPSI pump fails to start on SIAS and 2CV-5076-2 High pressure safety injection and 2CV-5077-2 Low pressure safety injection valves fail to open.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		*2. <b>ENSURE</b> Safety Injection flow to RCS as follows:	
		A. ENSURE at least ONE HPSI pump running.	
		B. ENSURE running HPSI Injection MOVs open.	
		C. ENSURE ALL available Charging pumps running.	
	ANY	<ul> <li>D. CHECK RCS pressure less than 1390 psia.</li> </ul>	
		E. CHECK total HPSI flow acceptable using 2202.010 Exhibit 2, HPSI Flow Curve.	
		F. <b>CHECK</b> total LPSI flow acceptable using 2202.010 Exhibit 3, LPSI Flow Curve.	
Examiner Note: The SRO may elect to implement the floating steps to isolate the leaking SG however it is not critical due to the RCS depressurization lower the leakrate and will cause backflow from the SG to the RCS. Therefore the steps to isolate the SG are not in the guide.			
Termination criteria: When the crew has completed functional entry section and transitioned to IC-2 and restored one full train of HPSI or at the			

discretion of the lead examiner.

Scenario # 3

Facility:	ANO-2	Scenario	No.: <u>3</u> Op-Test No <u>.: 2019-1</u>	
Examiners: Operators:				
Initial Co	nditions <u>: ~50%, N</u>	IOL, Green Ti	rain Maintenance Week.	
	Turnover: <u>49 to 51% due 500KV line maintenance (Pleasant Hills). 260 EFPD. EOOS indicates</u> 'Minimal Risk'. Red Train Maintenance Week.			
Schedule	Scheduled evolution: Perform Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for			
2CV-22	01-2 section 2.8.3.			
Critical T	asks: <u>RCS CETs m</u>	ust be limited	to less than 80 degree F heatup. EFW must be isolated to	
<u>'A' SG to</u>	prevent MTS excee	ding 200 °F.	Restore CCW to RCPs within 10 min of the loss of CCW	
cooling o	or secure the RCPs v	vithin the next	<u>t 10 min.</u>	
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description	
1	CV22012	N (BOP) N (SRO) TS (SRO)	Complete Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for 2CV-2201-2. OP-2305.005, Valve Stroke and position verification.	
2	XCV2LT4861	I (ATC) I (SRO)	Volume Control Tank level instrument fails low resulting in Refueling Water Tank being aligned to Coolant Charging Pump suction. <b>OP-2203.012L Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action.</b>	
3	CT2VSF1B	C (BOP) C (SRO) TS (SRO)	Containment Cooler 2VSF-1B trips. OP-2203.012F Annunciator 2K06 Corrective Action OP-2104.033 Containment Atmosphere control	
4	XRRPZRLSP	I (ATC) I (SRO)	Reactor Reg. output to PZR level control program fails to 41%. OP-2203.028, Pressurizer System Malfunction AOP	
5	CNDAIRLEAKHI CND2C5	C (ATC) C (BOP) C (SRO)	Condenser Air in leakage and backup vacuum pump fails to auto start. OP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum AOP	
6	CNDAIRLEAKHI	M (ALL)	Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip. OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP	
7	FW2FW5AAFT	M (ALL)	Excess Steam Demand (ESD) on 'A' SG inside containment due to Feedwater line break. <b>CT-1, CT-3 OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand.</b>	
8	CV10251	C (BOP)	Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to close.	
C C	CV10382	C (SRO)	CT-2	
			OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP or OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand.	
End Point Post blow down RCS conditions have be stabilized.				
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor				

Target Quantitative Attributes (Section D.5.d)	Actual Attributes
Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)	1
Abnormal Events (2-4)	3
Major Transients (1-2)	2
EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)	1
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (≥ 1per scenario set)	0
Critical Tasks (≥2)	3

Critical Task	Justification	
Stabilize and control RCS temperature after the ESD blowdown terminates. RCS CETs must be limited to less than 80 degree F heatup.	Rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified heatup and cooldown rates do not exceed the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operation. Also, If RCS heatup is allowed after SG blowdown, the RCS could over pressurize and result in lifting PZR and SG safeties. These pressure stresses added to thermal stresses of rapid cooldown could present PTS concerns.	<ul> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-07, Establish RCS temperature Control (SPTA-07, ESDE-05)</li> <li>TS 3.4.9.1 RCS Pressure/Temperature Limits</li> </ul>
Maintain RCS pressure within the Pressure-Temperature limits of 200°F and 30°F Margin to Saturation (MTS) throughout implementation of SPTAs and Excess Steam Demand EOP. EFW must be isolated to 'A' SG to prevent MTS exceeding 200 °F	RCS pressure must be maintained in these limits to allow natural circulation of the RCS and prevent over pressurizing the RCS boundary.	<ul> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-06, Establish RCS Pressure Control (SPTA-05, ESDE-07)</li> <li>EOP 2202.005 Excess Steam Demand EOP.</li> </ul>
Restore CCW to RCPs within 10 min of the loss of CCW cooling or secure the RCPs within the next 10 min.	Exceeding operating limits has the potential to degrade the RCS pressure boundary. RCPs should be maintained in an available condition for last-resort use if needed.	<ul> <li>EN-OP-123 Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program.</li> <li>CE EPGB Simulator CTs: CT-23, Trip any RCP exceeding operating limits (ESDE-03)</li> </ul>
Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure.	Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.	NUREG-1021 Appendix D

## Scenario #3 Objectives

- 1) Evaluate individual ability to perform quarterly valve stroke surveillance.
- 2) Evaluate individual response to a failure of Reactor Regulating system input to PZR level setpoint failing low.
- 3) Evaluate individual response to a trip of the Containment Cooler.
- 4) Evaluate individual response to failure of a VCT level transmitter.
- 5) Evaluate individual response to Condenser Air in-leakage.
- 6) Evaluate individual ability to perform a power reduction.
- 7) Evaluate crew's and individual ability to perform standard post trip actions.
- 8) Evaluate crew's ability to respond to an Excess Steam Demand.
- 9) Evaluate individual response to a failure of EFW.

## Scenario #3 NARRATIVE

Simulator session begins with the plant at 49-51% power steady state due to 500KV line maintenance.

When the crew has completed their control room walk down and brief, the BOP will commence the stroke test of 2CV-2201-2. The valve will fall outside of the required stroke time and this will require the SRO to enter TS 3.6.3.1 Containment isolation valves.

When the crew has performed the completed the valve stroke and enter TS 3.6.3.1 or at the lead examiner's cue, one of the Volume Control Tank level transmitters, 2LT-4861, will fail low. The crew will respond to VCT low low level alarm, 2K12 G5. This will result in the VCT outlet valve to the charging pump suction closing and the Refueling Water tank (RWT) suction to the charging pumps opening. RCS temperature and pressure will lower due to boration until the ATC opens VCT outlet valve manually and closes the RWT valve manually. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2000-0199, VCT level transmitter spiking]

After the Crew has realigned Charging pump suction to the VCT or at the lead examiner's cue, 2VSF-1B containment cooler will trip. The BOP will determine that 2VSF-1B containment cooler has tripped and refer to OP-2203.012F/G, 2K06 and 2K07 Annunciator Corrective Actions. The BOP will start the idle containment cooler to maintain containment temperature and pressure in the acceptable region of operation. The SRO will enter Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 Action a. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2006-2444, 2VSF-1A motor failure and breaker trip.]

## SCENARIO #3 NARRATIVE (continued)

When the crew has placed the idle Containment cooler in service or at the lead examiner's cue, the Reactor Regulating system pressurizer level program output will fail to minimum (41%). The SRO will enter the OP-2203.028, PZR System Malfunctions AOP. The ATC will take manual control of letdown to control pressurizer level. The ATC must take control of PZR heaters to control RCS pressure (All heaters will be energized) The ATC should place the PZR level controller to Auto and Local then adjust the setpoint to programmed setpoint. Then Letdown should be placed back in automatic. This failure will also prevent manual start of back up charging pumps if needed to control PZR level.

When the ATC has placed letdown in automatic or at the lead examiner's cue, a condenser air leak will start. The crew will recognize the degrading condenser vacuum and enter the Loss of Condenser Vacuum AOP. The BOP will ensure both vacuum pumps are running. The crew will direct a NLO to locally investigate both Vacuum pumps and place the Vacuum pumps in the hogging mode (raising vacuum pump air removal capacity). The crew will investigate for the source of leakage into the condenser. When it is determined that condenser pressure is continuing to slowly degrade the crew will commence a power reduction. [Site OE: CR-ANO-2-2008-1350, Loss of Condenser Vacuum due to manway leak, CR-ANO-2-2003-1916 Loss of Condenser Vacuum due to dog bone seal leak.]

After the crew has commenced a power reduction, or at the lead examiner's discretion, the condenser air leakage will degrade causing the crew to manual trip the reactor. The crew will commence SPTAs. After the Reactor trips, an Excess Steam Demand (ESD) will occur due to an 'A' Main Feedwater line break inside containment. The Crew will recognize the ESD and manually actuate Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) or verify that a Main Steam Isolation signal automatically actuates. The ATC will secure all RCPs when Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) actuates. This will cause the crew to respond to a natural circulation ESD. The SRO will diagnose Excess Steam Demand (ESD) EOP 2202.005. The SRO will direct the BOP to maintain post blowdown temperature and the ATC to maintain post blowdown RCS pressure. The crew will restore Service Water to Component Cooling Water. [PRA item # 9 restore Service Water to CCW] [Industry OE for Excess Steam Demand, SOER 82-7, Reactor Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock.][PSA action to restore SW to CCW. PSA-ANO2-06-05]

When EFAS actuates to the 'A' SG the EFW block valves will fail to close. This will make the overcooling event more severe and could lead to the crew exceeding the PT limits of 200 degrees Margin to Saturation (MTS). The crew should recognize that EFW is feeding the faulted SG and secure feeding 2P-7B EFW pump.

## Simulator Instructions for Scenario 3

Reset simulator to MOL 50% power IC steady state.

Ensure Pleasant Hills line out of service BKR5122 and BKR5148 open.

Place MINIMAL RISK and RED Train Maintenance Week signs on 2C11.

T9 = NE4R2012 & !NE3O2012

T5 = CE4R0696

T7 = Reactor Trip

T8 = OE4R0251

Event	Malf. No. /	Value/	Event
No.	Trigger Number	Ramp/Time	Description
1	CV22012 Trigger = T9	0 / 6 sec.	Complete Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for 2CV-2201-2.
	119901 10		OP-2305.005, Valve Stroke and position verification.
2	XCV2LT4861	0	Volume Control Tank level instrument fails low resulting
	Trigger = T1		in Refueling Water Tank being aligned to Coolant Charging Pump suction.
			OP-2203.012L Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action.
3	CT2VSF1B	active	Containment Cooler 2VSF-1B trips.
	Trigger = T2		OP-2203.012F Annunciator 2K06 Corrective Action
			OP-2104.033 Containment Atmosphere control
4	XRRPZRLSP	41%	Reactor Reg. output to PZR level control program fails
	Trigger = T3		to 41%.
			OP-2203.028, Pressurizer System Malfunction AOP
5	CNDAIRLEAKHI	800/ 3 min.	Condenser Air in leakage and backup vacuum pump fails to auto start.
	CND2C5	Active	OP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum AOP
	Trigger = T4		OF-2203.019, LOSS OF CONDENSEL VACUUM AOF
	CNDAIRLEAKHI	1510/ 3 min.	
	Trigger = T5		
6	CNDAIRLEAKHI	5000 / 10	Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.
	Trigger = T6	min.	OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP
7	FW2FW5AAFT	10000 / 10	Excess Steam Demand (ESD) on 'A' SG inside
	Trigger = T7	min.	containment due to Feedwater line break.
			OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand.
8	CV10251	1 / Ramp =	Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.
	Trigger = T8	25 sec.	
	CV10382	1	OP-2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions (SPTAs) EOP or OP-2202.005, Excess Steam Demand.

	Si	imulator Instructions for Scenario 3			
Triggered by valve closure.	Trigger 9	Complete Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for 2CV-2201-2.			
drain va	alve) and lock t es DO_HS_2202	Work Management to open breaker for 2CV-2202-1 (RDT he valve respond as requested. Use Malfunction CV2202 and 2_G and DO_HS_2202_R to simulator removing power and to			
	and lock 2CV22	Work Management to fail 2CV-2201-2 (RDT drain valve) 201-2 respond as request and after 10 minutes report that it is			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger 1	Volume Control Tank level instrument fails low resulting in Refueling Water Tank being aligned to Coolant Charging Pump suction.			
Cue: When co transmi		WWM, then report that I&C will troubleshoot the level			
Cue: If contac		investigate the transmitter locally, report nothing is			
Cue: If asked	to investigate	VCT level at 2C-80 then report VCT level instrument is 2LI- he ~ VCT level in the simulator.			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger 2	Containment Cooler 2VSF-1B trips.			
Cue: If reques	sted the AO nee	eds to report that 2B-53 L2 is tripped.			
Cue: Report t	hat electrical p	lanner will begin planning work on failed containment cooler.			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger 3	Reactor Reg. output to PZR level control program fails to 41%.			
Examiner Not cue.	Examiner Note: If applicant goes to EWS to check the alarm, give them the following cue.				
Cue: EWS ala	arm is Internal	Card Failure.			
		VM/engineering, then report that a planner will begin planning eg and/or engineering will investigate Reactor Reg.			
CUED by Lead Examiner	Trigger 4	Condenser Air in leakage and backup vacuum pump fails to auto start.			

	Si	mulator Instructions for Scenario 3
		look for condenser air leaks wait approximately 5 min. and air leak into the condenser but you cannot locate it.
		perform pre-start or post-start checks, then after eport the checks are complete and sat.
water p		check the Vacuum pumps, then report the following: Seal sat., Seal Water Cooler outlet temperature ~ 85 degrees, and ormal.
approxi	mately 1 min. u in Hogging and	place the vacuum pump AUTO-HOG switch to HOG then after use the remote (CONDENSER to on) to place the Vacuum I report that both vacuum pumps are in Hogging mode of
	sted as WWM, ( nent B Notificat	Communicator, or Off shift operator, then perform tions.
Cue: If reques	sted as NLO to	monitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.
steam ir	nlet expansion	perform step 25 locally, then after 5 min. report that the joint sight glasses indicate flow, 2GS-2001 is closed and you of in-leakage yet but you will continue walk down.
		ions Management as to direction for a plant shutdown or ask for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion.
Maintain Cued by Lead Examiner power should be > 40 when cued. Cue: If contact	n plant stable, a	ask for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion.
Maintain Cued by Lead Examiner power should be > 40 when cued. Cue: If contact is loude	Trigger 6	ask for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion. Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades causing a trip.
Maintain Cued by Lead Examiner power should be > 40 when cued. Cue: If contact Cue: If contact Cue: If contact	Trigger 6 Trigger 6 Cted as NLO to er than before.	Ask for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion. Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades causing a trip. investigate air in leakage, then report that the air leak sound
Maintain Cued by Lead Examiner power should be > 40 when cued. Cue: If contact Cue: If contact Cue: If contact	Trigger 6 Trigger 6 Cted as NLO to er than before. Cted as the STA	Ask for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion. Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades causing a trip. investigate air in leakage, then report that the air leak sound to report to the control room, acknowledge the request.

Appendix D

Scenario # 3

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 1

Event Description: Complete Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for 2CV-2201-2.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	BOP	<ul> <li>2.8.3 MEASURING closed stroke time for Reactor Drain Tank Outlet (2CV-2201-2):</li> <li>A. ENSURE 2CV-2201-2 (2HS-2201-2) open.</li> </ul>		
	BOP	B. <b>MEASURE</b> stroke time and CLOSE 2CV-2201-2 (2HS-2201-2).		
	BOP	C. <b>RECORD</b> 2CV-2201-2 closed stroke time in Table 1.		
	BOP	3.1       COMPARE measured stroke time with "Limiting Value" and "Acceptable Normal Range" to determine operability.         2CV-2201-2       RDT Outlet       CLOSED       (1,2)       0.9-2.7       3.6       YES NO         NOTES:       1.       Stroke testing this valve also tests its Fail Safe Function.       2.       TS 3.6.3.1 is applicable to these Containment Isolation valves.       3.       Closing 2CV-4827-2 demonstrates a partial open stroke of 2CVC-28C.         4.       Closing 2CV-4831-2 demonstrates a partial open stroke of 2CVC-28B.       Examiner note: The stroke will fall outside of the limiting value.		
	BOP/SRO	<ul> <li>3.7 <u>IF</u> stroke time was greater than Limiting value, <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>NOTIFY Shift Manager.</li> <li>DECLARE valve inoperable.</li> <li>ENSURE Condition Report initiated.</li> <li><u>IF</u> Containment Isolation valve in Table 1 (NOTE 2), <u>THEN</u> REFER TO Tech Spec 3.6.3.1.</li> <li>Examiner Note: SRO must enter Tech Spec 3.6.3.1</li> </ul>		

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 1

Event Description: Complete Quarterly Red Train Containment isolation valve stroke test for 2CV-2201-2.

Time Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Cue: If contacted as NLO or Work Management to open breaker for 2CV-2202-1 (RDT drain valve) and lock the valve respond as requested. Use Malfunction CV2202 and overrides DO\_HS\_2202\_G and DO\_HS\_2202\_R to simulate removing power and to 2CV-2202-1.

Cue: If contacted as NLO or Work Management to fail 2CV-2201-2 (RDT drain valve) closed and lock 2CV2201-2 respond as request and after 10 minutes report that it is failed closed.

Termination criteria: When the stroke time test of 2CV-2201-2 is complete and SRO has entered TS 3.6.3.1 or at lead examiner's discretion.

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1 Scenario #3 Event No.:		Event No.: 2		
	Event Description: Volume Control Tank level instrument fails low resulting in Refueling Water Tank being aligned to Coolant Charging Pump suction.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Beha	avior		
Cued by Lead Examiner	ANY	Announce alarm: • 2K12-G5, VCT 2T4 level LO LO			
	Enter 2	203.012L, Annunciator 2K12 Corrective Action	ons.		
	ATC	<ul> <li>1.0 CAUSES</li> <li>1.1 VCT level (2LS-486IB) ≤ 9.6%</li> </ul>			
	ATC	<ul> <li>2.1 CHECK the following indications:</li> <li>VCT level (2LIS-4857)</li> <li>Computer Point C&amp;VCS VOLUME C (L4857) ~ 72%</li> <li>Computer Point C&amp;VCS VOLUME C (L4861) - 0%</li> </ul>			
	ATC	<ul> <li>2.2 <u>IF</u> VCT level lowers to 5%, <u>THEN</u> ENSURE Charging Pump suction</li> <li>CCPs Suction From RWT (2CV-4950)</li> <li>VCT Outlet (2CV-4873-1) closed</li> <li>Examiner Note: This step is NA.</li> </ul>			
	Cue: If asked to investigate VCT level at 2C-80 then report VCT level instrument is 2LI- 4857A and is reading the ~ VCT level in the simulator.				
Cue: If contacted as NLO to investigate the transmitter locally, report nothing is abnormal locally.					

Cue: When contacted as the WWM, then report that I&C will troubleshoot the level transmitter. Termination criteria: When Charging pump suction has been aligned to the VCT or at lead examiner's discretion.			
		Examiner Note: It will take approximately 4 minutes to see a change in RCS temperature. The BOP/ATC should lower main turbine load to maintain Tave constant.	
		2.3.4 <b>SUBMIT</b> CR/WR as necessary.	
	AIC	2.3.3 <b>MATCH</b> Tave within 2°F of Tref per Power Operation (2102.004).	
	ATC	2.3.2 <b>CLOSE</b> CCPs Suction From RWT (2CV-4950-2) (2HS- 4950-2).	
		2.3.1 <b>OPEN</b> VCT Outlet (2CV-4873-1) (2HS-4873-1).	
		2.3 <u>IF</u> diverse indications reveal LO LO Level is false (e.g. instrument failure) <u>AND</u> Charging pump suction has shifted to RWT, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following as necessary:	

Op-Test	No.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: Scenario # 3 Event No.: 3				
Event De	Event Description: 2VSF-1B Containment Cooler trips.					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior				
	ANY	Announce annunciator 2K07-B2 CCAS inop.				
		Announce annunciator 2K06-J7 CTMT BLDG CLG FANS A/B TROUBLE.				
	ANY	Implement Annunciator Corrective Action 2203.012G AND 2203.012F.				
		Annunciator Corrective Action 2203.012G				
	ANY	2.1 <u>IF NOT out of service for maintenance,</u> <u>THEN</u> verify ALL the following breakers closed:				
		<ul> <li>CNTMT Clg fan 2VSF-1A Byp Dmpr, 2UCD 8203-1 (2B53-G1)</li> </ul>				
		• Series Bkr for 2B53-G1, 2UCD-8203-1 (2B53-A5)				
		<ul> <li>CNTMT Clg fan 2VSF-1B Byp Dmpr, 2UCD-8209-1 (2B53-G2)</li> </ul>				
		<ul> <li>Series Bkr for 2B53-G2, 2UCD-8209-1 (2B53-A6)</li> </ul>				
		<ul> <li>CNTMT Cooling fan, 2VSF-1A (2B53-L1)</li> </ul>				
	<ul> <li>Series Bkr for 2B53-L1, 2VSF-1A (2B53-K5)</li> </ul>					
		CNTMT Cooling fan 2VSF-1B (2B53-L2)				
		• Series Bkr for 2B53-L2, 2VSF-1B (2B53-K6)				
Cue: If r	equested the A	D needs to report that 2B-53 L2 is tripped.				
	SRO	2.2 IF any equipment must remain out of service, THEN refer to Tech Spec 3.6.2.3.				
		Examiner note: SRO must enter Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 action a.				
	Annunciator Corrective Action 2203.012F					
	BOP	2.1 Determine affected CNTMT Cooling Fan:				
		• 2VSF-1A				
		• 2VSF-1B				

Appendix D

Op-Test	No.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: Scenario # 3 Event No.: 3		
Event Description: 2VSF-1B Containment Cooler trips.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	BOP	2.2 <u>IF</u> CCAS NOT actuated, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:		
		2.2.1 Stop affected CNTMT Cooling Fan:		
		<ul> <li>2VSF-1A (2HS-8201-1)</li> </ul>		
		• 2VSF-1B (2HS-8207-1)		
		2.2.2 <u>IF</u> Containment Building accessible, <u>THEN</u> check affected Cooler for dirty filters or blocked intake.		
		Examiner Note: The applicant may place 2VSF-1B HS in PTL.		
	BOP	2.3 <u>IF</u> CCAS actuated, <u>THEN</u> continue running Cooler AND verify associated Bypass Damper open:		
		Examiner Note: CCAS is not actuated and this step is NA.		
	ANY	2.4 Monitor Containment temperature and pressure using 2104.033 Containment Atmosphere Control.		
		Examiner Note: Containment temperature and pressure will be slowly rising and the crew should start the standby Containment cooler using 2104.033.		
	SRO	2.5 Refer to Tech Spec 3.6.2.3.		
		Examiner note: SRO must enter Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 action a.		
	210	4.033 Containment Atmosphere Control L&P		
	BOP	Verify three containment cooler in service. IAW the following L&P. 5.7 Both cooling units in Containment Cooling Group must be operable (service water flow > 1250 gpm with two operable fans) for that group to be operable. During normal operations it is expected that three of four units will be required to maintain building pressure and temperature within region of acceptable operations as specified by Technical Specifications. (TS 4.6.2.3)		
2104.033 Containment Atmosphere Control				

Op-Test No.:	2019-1	Scenario No.: Scenario # 3	Event No.: 3
Event Description: 2VSF-1B Containment Cooler trips.			
Time F	Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		NOTE	
		chilled water inlet valves are normally opened a system and remain open until the next schedule	
	BOP	18.1 <b>ENSURE</b> selected CNTMT Cooler Chill Open:	ed Water Inlet valve
		Chilled WTR to 2VCC-1A 2CV-3846	6 (2HS-3846)
		Chilled WTR to 2VCC-1B 2CV-3858	3 (2HS-3858)
		Chilled WTR to 2VCC-1C 2CV-3862	2 (2HS-3862)
		Chilled WTR to 2VCC-1D 2CV-3863	3 (2HS-3863)
	BOP	18.2 START selected on-coming Containme	nt Cooling fan(s):
		• 2VSF-1A (2HS-8201-1)	
		• 2VSF-1B (2HS-8207-1)	
		• 2VSF-1C (2HS-8214-2)	
		• 2VSF-1D (2HS-8220-2)	
	BOP	18.3 SECURE selected off-going Containme	ent Cooling fan(s):
		• 2VSF-1A (2HS-8201-1)	
		• 2VSF-1B (2HS-8207-1)	
		• 2VSF-1C (2HS-8214-2)	
		• 2VSF-1D (2HS-8220-2)	
	BOP	18.4 <b>CHECK</b> CNTMT Building Cooling Fan clear:	Frouble alarms
		CNTMT BLDG CLG FANS C/D TRO	OUBLE (2K05-J7)
		CNTMT BLDG CLG FANS A/B TRO	DUBLE (2K06-J7)
	SRO	18.5 <b>ENSURE</b> EOOS updated as necessary Cooling fans.	for Containment
	Examiner Note: The SRO may request the Admin SRO at work management update EOOS.		
Cue: Report that electrical planner will begin planning work on failed containment cooler.			
Termination criteria: When SRO has entered the appropriate TS, three containment coolers are running or at lead examiner's discretion.			

Op-Test	No.: 2019-1	Scenario No.: 3	Event No.: 4			
Event De	Event Description: Reactor Reg output to PZR level control program fails to 41%.					
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavi	or			
Cued by Lead Examin er	ANY	Report the following alarms: 2K-10 H2 RRS TROUBLE 2K-10 H6 CNTRL CH 1 LEVEL HI HI 2K-10 H7 CNTRL CH 2 LEVEL HI HI				
	Ente	r OP-2203.028, PZR System Malfunctions AOP				
	SRO	<ol> <li>CHECK the following criteria satisfied:</li> <li>A. <u>IF</u> any PZR spray valve failed open,</li> </ol>				
		THEN GO TO Step 2.				
		B. <u>IF</u> any PZR spray valve failed closed, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 4.				
		C. CHECK "RRS TROUBLE" annunciator (Not met perform contingency)	(2K10-H2) clear.			
	SRO	Perform Step 1.C Contingency Actions. C. <b>GO TO</b> Step 5.				
	SRO	5. CHECK "RRS TROUBLE" annunciator (2K met)	10-H2) clear. <b>(Not</b>			
	SRO	Perform Step 5 Contingency Actions.				
		5. <b>IF</b> malfunction caused PZR level setpoint to <b><u>THEN</u> PERFORM</b> the following:	o change,			
	ATC	A. <b>PERFORM</b> the following for Letdown (2HIC-4817):	Flow controller			
		1) <b>PLACE</b> controller in MANUAL.				
		<ol> <li>ADJUST output to control PZR level setpoint.</li> </ol>	el within 5% of			

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario No.: 3

Event No.: 4

Event Description: Reactor Reg output to PZR level control program fails to 41%.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ATC	B. Manually CONTROL Charging pumps.
		Examiner note: Charging pumps cannot be started due to the interlocks with PZR level HI HI alarms.
		C. Manually <b>OPERATE</b> PZR heaters.
		Examiner note: All PZR heaters will be energized and some should be secured as needed to control pressure.
	ATC	D. <u>IF</u> Remote Auto PZR Level setpoint incorrect, <u>THEN</u> PLACE PZR Level controller in LOCAL AUTO and adjust setpoint based on TAVE refer to 2102.004 Attachment E, Pressurizer Level Program.
		cant goes to EWS to check the alarm, give them the following cue. rnal Card Failure.
	ATC	E. <u>WHEN</u> Letdown Flow controller (2HIC-4817) Automatic and Manual signals matched, <u>THEN</u> RESTORE controller to AUTO using 2104.002, Chemical and Volume Control.
	SRO	F. <u>IF</u> failure prevents backup Charging pump operation, <u>AND</u> backup Charging pump required, <u>THEN</u> DEFEAT stop interlock using 2103.005, Pressurizer Operations.
		Examiner note: This failure does prevent starting backup charging pumps but no backup charging pumps are required.
	OP-2103.005	Pressurizer Operations, step for defeating stop interlock.
	ANY	11.1 <u>IF</u> desired to defeat ALL Backup Charging Pumps Stop Interlock, <u>THEN</u> :
		11.1.1 <b>PLACE</b> ALL Backup Charging Pump handswitches in STOP:
l		• 2P-36A (2HS-4832-1)
		• 2P-36B (2HS-4842-2)

Appendix D

Scenario # 3

Form ES-D-2

Op-Test No.: 2019-1			Scenario No.: 3	Event No.: 4
Event Description: Read		ctor Reg outp	out to PZR level control pr	ogram fails to 41%.
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions o	r Behavior
	ANY	11.1.2	SHIFT Pressurizer Level MANUAL and LOCAL.	controller (2LIC-4627) to
	ANY	11.1.3	On 2LIC-4627, DEPRES	<b>S</b> F3.
	ANY	11.1.4	ENSURE 2LIC-4627 disp	lays the following:
			<ul> <li>ALARM flashes at top</li> </ul>	o of controller screen
			CCP CONTROL BYF     setpoint indication	PASSED appears just below
	ANY	11.1.5	IF desired to restore ANY THEN PLACE selected B START or AUTO:	Backup Charging pump, ackup Charging pump HS in
			• 2P-36A (2HS-4832-1	)
			• 2P-36B (2HS-4842-2	)
			• 2P-36C (2HS-4852-1	or 2HS-4853-2)
	ANY	11.1.6	IF Backup Charging pump THEN CHECK Charging f (2FIS-4863).	o started, flow goes up 43 to 45 gpm
	ANY	11.1.7	IF desired to restore 2LIC THEN PLACE 2LIC-4627	
		11.1.8	IF desired to restore 2LIC THEN PLACE 2LIC-4627	
		Examiner No but not remo		restore 2LIC-4627 to auto
	C	DP-2203.028, I	PZR System Malfunctions	AOP
Examine	Examiner Note: The next malfunction will take a couple minutes to be visible and should not be delayed.			

Appendix	D

Op-Test No.: 2019-1Scenario No.: 3Event No.: 4

Event Description: Reactor Reg output to PZR level control program fails to 41%.

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ANY	<ul> <li>G. IF Letdown Radiation monitor isolated due to high temperature</li> <li><u>AND</u> Letdown HX Outlet temperature lowered to less than 140°F,</li> <li><u>THEN</u> RESTORE Letdown Radiation Monitor flow by opening Letdown Rad Monitor Isolation, 2CV-4804 (2HS-4804).</li> </ul>	
Cue: If contacted as the WWM/engineering, then report that a planner will begin planning work on the Reactor Reg and/or engineering will investigate Reactor Reg.			
Termination Criteria: When letdown has been restored to Automatic or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner.			

Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #3	Event No: 5		
Event Dese start.	Event Description: Condenser Air in leakage and backup vacuum pump fails to auto start.				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Be	havior		
Cued by Lead Examiner	ANY	Determine that condenser pressure is degra condenser pressure hi alarms.	ding or announce		
	AC	P, OP-2203.019 Loss of Condenser Vacuu	m		
		NOTE			
Steps mark	(*) axed with	re continuous action steps.			
Steps mark	ted with (■)	are floating steps.			
	000	Enter and direct the actions of:			
	SRO	1. <b>OPEN</b> Placekeeping page.			
	SRO	2. <b>NOTIFY</b> Control Board Operators to m	onitor floating steps.		
	ANY	3. <b>CHECK</b> procedure entered due to loss or reduced Circulating Water flow. <b>(No</b>			
	SRO	3. <b>GO TO</b> Step 15.			
		Note			
Main Fe	edwater pum	ps trip at Condenser vacuum of 13.4 inches H	IG Abs.		
Turbine	Generator tri	os at Condenser vacuum of 7.8 inches HG Ab	S.		
SDBCS Condenser interlock automatically resets at 5.15 inches HG Abs with controllers in automatic.					
	ANY	*15. <b>CHECK</b> Condenser vacuum less than 7 inches HG Abs.			
		.O to look for condenser air leaks wait app ar an air leak into the condenser but you c			
	BOP	16. <b>CHECK</b> BOTH Condenser Vacuum pum Vacuum pumps will not be running.)	ps running. (Both		

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	BOP	<ul> <li>16. PERFORM the following:</li> <li>A. START standby Vacuum pump (2C5A/B).</li> <li>B. <u>IF</u> NEITHER Vacuum pump can be started, <u>THEN</u> locally CLOSE "N<sub>2</sub> TO 2E-11A ISOL" valve</li> </ul>
		(2GS-2001). (Valve located SW corner of Condenser approximately 15 feet North of Condensate pump 2P-2D).
		O to perform pre-start or post-start checks, then after nin report the checks are complete and sat.
		*17. <b>IF</b> desired to align for Manual Hogging operation, THEN PERFORM the following:
	ANY	<ul> <li>Locally PLACE "2C-5A AUTO-HOG" switch (2HS-0687) to HOG.</li> <li>Locally PLACE "2C-5B AUTO-HOG" switch (2HS-0688) to HOG.</li> </ul>
		<b>Examiner Note:</b> The crew should align for manual hogging operation. The Vacuum pumps will auto transition between hogging and holding mode if left in auto.
Cue: If requested as NLO to place the vacuum pump AUTO-HOG switch to HOG then after approximately 1 min. use the remote (CONDENSER to on) to place the Vacuum pumps in Hogging and report that both vacuum pumps are in Hogging mode of operation.		
		18. ENSURE BOTH Condenser Vacuum breakers closed:
	BOP	<ul><li> 2CV-0637</li><li> 2CV-0600</li></ul>
	BOP	19. CHECK Seal Header pressure (2PI-0220) greater than 1.5 psig.
	BOP	20. <u>IF</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> ISOLATE SG Blowdown:
	201	<ul> <li>CLOSE S/G A Flow Control 2CV-1017 (2HIC-1017).</li> <li>CLOSE S/G B Flow Control 2CV-1067 (2HIC-1067).</li> </ul>

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		21. <u>IF</u> Vacuum Pump 2C5A running, <u>THEN</u> locally CHECK 2C5A as follows:
		A. Seal Water pump running.
	ANY	<ul> <li>B. Seal Water Cooler Outlet temperature less than 120°F.</li> </ul>
		C. Separator Tank level normal.
		D. REFER TO 2106.010, Condenser Vacuum System.
		22. <u>IF</u> Vacuum Pump 2C5B running, <u>THEN</u> locally CHECK 2C5B as follows:
		A. Seal Water pump running.
	ANY	<ul> <li>B. Seal Water Cooler Outlet temperature less than 120°F.</li> </ul>
		C. Separator Tank level normal.
		D. REFER TO 2106.010, Condenser Vacuum System.
Cue: If contacted as NLO to check the Vacuum pumps, then report the following: Seal water pumps running sat., Seal Water Cooler outlet temperature ~ 85 degrees, and Separator tank level normal.		
	ANY	■23. CHECK MFWP Seal Drn Tank (2T-79) Level HI/LO annunciator (2K03-E10) clear.
		24. <b>CHECK</b> BOTH of the following are satisfied:
	ANY	Condenser vacuum stable or improving.
		<ul> <li>Condenser vacuum in acceptable region of Attachment A, Backpressure and Temperature Limits.</li> </ul>
		Examiner Note: these conditions will not be met.

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Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	ATC	24. <b>COMMENCE</b> power reduction using EITHER of the following to maintain vacuum in acceptable region of Attachment A, Backpressure and Temperature Limits:
		• 2102.004, Power Operations
		<ul> <li>2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction</li> </ul>
		Enters 2203.053, Rapid Power Reduction
<ul> <li>Use of this procedure may be terminated at any point if a complete shutdown is not required.</li> <li>Shutdown rate shall be based on plant conditions and safety considerations. Rate may be raised or lowered as plant conditions warrant.</li> </ul>		
	SRO	<ul> <li>*1. IF at any time, it is determined that significant manual actions are required to EITHER maintain the plant online, OR maintain the desired maneuvering rate, THEN PERFORM the following:</li> <li>A. TRIP the Reactor.</li> <li>B. GO TO 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.</li> </ul>
Procedure Note: If Emergency Boration in progress, changing the number of running Charging pumps will change boration rate.		

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
	SRO	<ul> <li>3. IF Letdown available, <u>THEN</u> COMMENCE Power reduction using appropriate reactivity plan in conjunction with EITHER of the following:</li> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration At Power</li> <li>Chemical Addition, 2104.003, Attachment R, RCS Boration From The RWT Or BAMT</li> </ul>
Implemen	t OP 2104.00	03 Chemical Addition, Exhibit 3, Normal RCS Boration at Power.
		CAUTION
This section	n has a Reac	tivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is classified as Normal Risk Level.
2104.003, Exhibit 3	ATC	<ul> <li>1.0 IF a Reactivity Management Brief has NOT been conducted, THEN PERFORM a Reactivity Management Brief IAW EN-OP-115-14, Reactivity Management with an SRO.</li> <li>2.0 IF this is the first Boration of the shift, THEN ENSURE BAM Flow totalizer (2FQI-4926) reset.</li> <li>3.0 IF desired, THEN RECORD initial controller data: 2FIC-4926 Setpoint: Demand:</li> <li>4.0 ENSURE Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) set as follows:</li> <li>Setpoint set to desired flow rate.</li> <li>IF in MANUAL, THEN demand set to desired value.</li> </ul>

Op-Test No.: 2019-1

Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		5.0 <b>ENSURE</b> desired BAM pump (2P-39A OR 2P-39B) selected for automatic operation using BAM pump Select switch (2HS-4911-2).	
		6.0 <b>PLACE</b> Mode Select switch (2HS-4928) to BORATE.	
		<ul><li>7.0 Ensure Charging Pump Suction From Boric Acid (2CV-4930) opens (2HS-4930).</li></ul>	
		8.0 <b>ENSURE</b> selected BAM pump running:	
	ATC	<ul> <li>2P-39A (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul>	
	///0	*9.0 <b>ENSURE</b> BAM Tank Recirc open for running pumps:	
		<ul> <li>2T-6A recirc (2HS-4903-2)</li> <li>2T-6B recirc (2HS-4915-2)</li> </ul>	
2104.003, Exhibit 3		*10.0 <b>IF</b> additional boric acid flow required, <u>THEN</u> <b>START</b> additional BAM pump:	
		<ul> <li>2P-39A (2HS-4919-2)</li> <li>2P-39B (2HS-4910-2)</li> </ul>	
		CRITICAL STEP	
		11.0 <b>OPERATE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch controller (2FQIS-4926) as follows:	
		11.1 <b>DEPRESS</b> AND <b>HOLD</b> red pushbutton.	
	ATC	11.2 <b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch controller (2FQIS-4926) set for desired quantity.	
		11.3 <b>RELEASE</b> Red pushbutton.	
		12.0 <b>ENSURE</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) indicates desired flow rate.	

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Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		<ul> <li>*13.0 PERFORM the following to Start/Stop additional Charging pumps:</li> <li>13.1 <u>IF</u> desired to raise flow, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:</li> </ul>	
		A. <b>START</b> additional charging pumps as necessary.	
	ATC	B. <b>ADJUST</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) to desired flow rate.	
		13.2 <b>IF</b> desired to lower flow, <b>THEN</b> perform the following:	
		A. <b>ADJUST</b> Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926) to desired flow rate.	
		B. <b>SECURE</b> additional Charging Pumps as necessary.	
	ATC	<ul> <li>*14.0 MONITOR the following parameters:</li> <li>RCS T<sub>AVE</sub></li> <li>Axial Shape Index</li> <li>Reactor power</li> </ul> CRITICAL STEP 16.0 WHEN Boric Acid Makeup Flow Batch controller	
		<ul> <li>(2FQIS-4926) at zero, <u>THEN</u> ENSURE the following:</li> <li>Boric Acid Makeup Flow Control (2CV-4926) closes.</li> <li>No flow indicated on Boric Acid Makeup Flow controller (2FIC-4926).</li> </ul>	

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Appendix D

Scenario #3 Event No: 5 Event Description: Condenser Air in leakage and backup vacuum pump fails to auto start. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2203.053 Rapid Power Reduction. NOTE The CBOT is the preferred RO to lower turbine load so that the ATC can focus on primary plant control. However, either individual can operate the turbine as plant conditions dictate. PMS/PDS point CV0223 displays Unit 2 net generation in MWe. \* 6. LOWER Turbine load as necessary to hold Tave within ± 3°F BOP of program Tref. NOTE ASI would tend to shift back to the top of the core if CEAs are inserted below 80 inches withdrawn when the Reactor is at power and the CPC Aux trip is active. At higher power levels, larger (more aggressive) CEA insertions may be required (6 to 8 inches recommended initially). (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2) ASI response to power changes at the end of core life is more severe, at times significantly so. The effects of ASI may not be seen until well into the power change. Proactively driving ASI more positive than ESI (up to +0.05 deviation) will improve the ability to control ASI at lower power levels. (CR-ANO-C-2015-1383 CA 2)

• Exceeding COLR ASI limit will challenge CPC QASI Aux Trip setpoint and may result in automatic trip. CPC QASI Aux Trip occurs at ±0.45 (PID 187).

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Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		<ul> <li>*7. PERFORM the following for ASI and CEAs:</li> <li>MAINTAIN ASI within Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) limits using CEA Group 6 or Group P.</li> <li>USE ONE of the following to monitor ASI closely:</li> <li>COLSS (CV9198)</li> </ul>	
	ATC	<ul> <li>IF COLSS inoperable, <u>THEN</u> USE CPC channel ASI (PID 268) that most closely agreed with COLSS when it was operable.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Periodically MONITOR QASI (PID 187).</li> <li>INSERT Group 6 (preferred at higher power) OR Group P CEAS (preferred at lower power) using Exhibit 3 of 2105.009, CEDM Control System Operation, as necessary.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>MAINTAIN CEAs greater than 80 inches withdrawn.</li> <li><u>IF</u> CEAs are inserted beyond the Long Term Steady State Insertion Limit, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM 2102.004A, Unit 2 CEA Insertion Log.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	* 8. <u>IF</u> desired to transfer unit auxiliaries from Unit Aux transformer to SU #3, <u>THEN</u> PERFORM Attachment A, Transferring Loads to SU #3.	
	BOP	<ul> <li>*9 THROTTLE Condensate recircs as necessary to maintain 650-750 psig Condensate Pump Discharge pressure:</li> <li>2CV-0662 (2FIC-0662)</li> <li>2CV-0663 (2FIC-0663)</li> </ul>	
	ANY	10. <b>PERFORM</b> notifications of power reduction using Attachment B, Notifications.	
	Cue: If requested as WWM, Communicator, or Off shift operator, then perform Attachment B Notifications.		

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Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	ANY	*11. <b>MONITOR</b> Secondary chemistry and adjust chemical feed as needed using 2106.028, Secondary System Chemical Addition.	
Cue: If req	uested as NL	O to monitor and adjust chemical feed respond as requested.	
Enter 2 <sup>-</sup>	105.009, CED	M Control System Operation (CEDMCs Operations, Exhibit 3)	
<ul> <li>"GRO</li> <li>Rod m occurs</li> <li>CEAC</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>NOTE</li> <li>"CEA SELECTED" indicates selected CEA position.</li> <li>"GROUP SELECTED" indicates average position of selected group.</li> <li>Rod motion is inhibited by PMS CEA sequencing program if a deviation of six inches occurs in any regulating group.</li> <li>CEAC CH1 and CH2 annunciators on 2K04 and CEDMCS annunciators on 2K10</li> </ul>		
should	be checked	for applicability prior to moving CEAs.	
RCAUTIONPThe following section has a Reactivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is classified as Risk Level R2.PFor an Unplanned Reactivity Manipulation, the required controls for planned reactivity evolutions are not applicable during AOP (including ACA response) or EOP conditions IAW COPD-030, Reactivity 			
	classifi For an planne ACA re	lowing section has a Reactivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is ed as Risk Level R2. Unplanned Reactivity Manipulation, the required controls for d reactivity evolutions are not applicable during AOP (including sponse) or EOP conditions IAW COPD-030, Reactivity	
	classifi For an planne ACA re	lowing section has a Reactivity Addition Potential (RAP) and is ed as Risk Level R2. Unplanned Reactivity Manipulation, the required controls for d reactivity evolutions are not applicable during AOP (including sponse) or EOP conditions IAW COPD-030, Reactivity	

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Scenario #3

	0			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		3.0 <b>IF</b> moving CEAs in group, <b>THEN</b> :		
		3.1	<b>ENSURE</b> Group Select switch to desired group position.	
		3.2	<u>IF</u> moving Group P CEAs, <u>THEN</u> PLACE P Group Select switch to P.	
		3.3	<b>ENSURE</b> Individual CEA Selection switches aligned to CEA in group selected to move.	
	ATC	3.4	<b>PLACE</b> Mode Select switch to MANUAL GROUP (MG) or MANUAL SEQUENTIAL (MS).	
		<b>*</b> 3.5	<b>OBSERVE</b> CEAC and Pulse Counter CEA position indications to ensure CEA motion and alignment as CEAs are moved.	
		R A P	<b>POSITION</b> groups as desired using Manual Control lever.	
		3.7	PLACE Mode Select switch to OFF.	
		3.8	<b>ENSURE</b> Pulse Counter and CEAC indications match.	
In	nplement rer	remaining OP-2203.019, Loss of Condenser Vacuum AOP.		
			Note	
Condenser	air intrusion	event will caus	se hotwell level indication to show false lowering trend.	
	ANY	■25. CHECK cause of loss of vacuum identified. (Not Met)		

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Scenario #3

Event No: 5

Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		■25. <b>PERFORM</b> walk down of Condenser as follows:	
		<ul> <li>A. Locally ENSURE Steam Inlet Expansion Joint sight glasses indicate flow.</li> </ul>	
	ANY	<ul> <li>B. Locally CLOSE "N<sub>2</sub> TO 2E-11A ISOL" valve (2GS-2001). (Valve located SW corner of Condenser approximately 15 feet North of Condensate pump 2P-2D.)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>PERFORM walkdown of connected piping to locate and isolate air inleakage (refer to 2106.018, Unit 2 Condenser Air In-leakage Testing).</li> </ul>	
steam inle	t expansion	LO to perform step 25 locally, then after 5 min. report that the joint sight glasses indicate flow, 2GS-2001 is closed and you of in-leakage yet but you will continue walk down.	
		26. <b>Perform</b> EITHER of the following as directed by Operations Management:	
		A. <b>MAINTAIN</b> Plant conditions using 2102.004, Power Operation.	
	ANY	B. <u>IF</u> plant shutdown to be performed, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:	
		1) <b>REFER TO</b> applicable reactivity plan.	
		2) <b>PERFORM</b> Plant Shutdown using 2102.004, Power Operation.	
		perations Management as to direction for a plant shutdown or sk for the SRO's opinion and agree with their opinion.	
Terminatio	Termination Criteria: When the required reactivity manipulation or at the discretion of the lead examiner.		

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8		
Event Desc	ription:			
. ,		-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.		
		Ginside containment.		
• (8) E	mergency Fe	eedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
Cued by Lead Examiner power should be > 40 when cued.	ANY	Recognize Condenser Vacuum is leak is degrading.		
	AC	OP, OP-2203.019 Loss of Condenser Vacuum		
	ANY	*15. CHECK Condenser vacuum less than 7 inches HG Abs.		
		*15. <b>PERFORM</b> the following:		
		<ul> <li>A. <u>IF</u> Reactor power less than available Downstream ADV capacity,</li> <li><u>THEN</u> PERFORM the following:</li> </ul>		
	ATC	<b>Examiner Note:</b> Reactor Power is not less than Downstream ADV capacity (~23%)		
		B. <b>TRIP</b> Reactor.		
		C. <b>GO TO</b> 2202.001,		
		Standard Post Trip Actions.		
	tacted as NL d is louder th	O to investigate air in leakage, then report that the air leak nan before.		
	Ent	er EOP 2202.001, Standard Post Trip Actions.		
		1. Notify Control Board Operators to perform the following:		
		A. Monitor safety functions using		
	SRO	Exhibit 7, CBO Reactor Trip Checklist.		
		<ul> <li>B. Perform post trip contingencies as required.</li> </ul>		
		2. Open Safety Function Tracking page.		
Examiner Note: Crew may actuate MSIS during SPTAs due to the ESD inside containment.				

Op-Test No	No.: 2019-1 Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8			Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
Event Desc	Event Description:				
• (6) C	ondenser Air	-in-leakage degrad	es requiring a	trip.	
• (7) E	SD on 'A' SG	G inside containmer	nt.		
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) val	ves to A SG fa	ail to auto close.	
Time	Position		Applicant's A	ctions or Behavior	
		3. Check Re	activity Cont	rol established as follows:	
	ATC	A. Reactor power lowering.			
		B. Check startup rate is negative.			
Reactivity Control		C. ALL CEAs fully inserted by observing ANY of the			
Safety		followi	ng:		
Function		1)	CEA Rod bo	ttom lights illuminated.	
		2)	CEAC 1 indi	cates ALL CEAs fully inserted.	
		3)	CEAC 2 indi	cates ALL CEAs fully inserted.	
Examiner	Note: Docu	ment time of CIAS	for critical ta	ask tracking.	
Time of C	IAS:				

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8			
	vent Description:				
	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> </ul>				
. ,	<ul> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>				
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		4. Check Maintenance of Vital Auxiliaries satisfied:			
		A. Check Main Turbine tripped by BOTH of the following:			
		<ul><li>ALL Main Stop Valves closed.</li><li>Generator megawatts indicate zero.</li></ul>			
		B. Generator Output breakers open.			
		C. Exciter Field Breaker open.			
		D. Perform EITHER of the following as required:			
	вор	<ol> <li>Check the following valves closed:</li> <li>MSR 2E-12A Steam Supply From SG A (2CV-0400)</li> </ol>			
Vital		<ul> <li>MSR 2E-12B Steam Supply From SG B (2CV-0460)</li> </ul>			
Auxiliaries Safety Function		<ol> <li>No flow indicated on the following MSR second stage flow instruments:</li> </ol>			
FUNCTION		<ul><li>2FI-0402</li><li>2FI-0462</li></ul>			
		E. At least ONE 6900v AC bus energized.			
		F. At least ONE 4160v Non-vital AC bus energized.			
		G. BOTH 4160v Vital AC buses energized			
		<ul> <li>BOTH DGs secured. (DGs running unloaded, contingency satisfied)</li> </ul>			
		I. At least ONE 125v Vital DC bus energized:			
		<ul> <li>2D01 - SPDS point E2D01</li> </ul>			
		2D02 - SPDS point E2D02			

Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1	Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8
Event Desc	ription:	
<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior
		5. Check RCS Inventory Control established as follows:
		A. PZR level:
		• 10 to 80%.
	ATC	<ul> <li>Trending to setpoint. (Not Met due to the ESD, contingency actions may have to be performed.)</li> </ul>
RCS Inventory		B. RCS MTS 30°F or greater.
Control Safety		5.A Contingency actions
Function		A. Perform as necessary:
		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> SIAS actuated on PPS inserts, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 6.</li> </ol>
		<ol> <li>Verify PZR Level Control system restoring level to setpoint.</li> </ol>
		6. Check RCS Pressure Control:
RCS Pressure Control Safety Function	ATC	<ul> <li>1800 to 2250 psia. (Not Met due to the ESD, contingency actions may have to be performed.)</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Trending to setpoint. (Not Met due to the ESD, contingency actions may have to be performed.)</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Normal PZR Spray and heaters controlling pressure.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>Valid CNTMT Spray NOT in progress. (Will not be Met due to the ESD, contingency actions may have to be performed.)</li> </ul>

Event Desc • (6) C • (7) E			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
RCS Pressure Control Safety Function	ATC	<ul> <li>Examiners Note: Contingency actions may have to be performed depending on the PZR pressure trend at the time this safety function is assessed.</li> <li>6. Perform as necessary: <ul> <li>C. IF valid CNTMT Spray in progress, THEN verify ALL RCPs tripped.</li> <li>D. IF RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, THEN verify associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.</li> <li>RCP A Spray Valve (2CV-4651)</li> <li>RCP B Spray Valve (2CV-4652)</li> </ul> </li> <li>F. IF RCS pressure lowers to 1650 psia or less, THEN perform the following: <ul> <li>Verify SIAS actuated on PPS inserts.</li> <li>GO TO Step 7.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
		CCW to RCPs within 10 min of the loss of CCW cooling or n the next 10 min.	
Examiner Note: The crew will also be directed to secure the RCPs due to the CNTMT spray.			

Op-Test No	o.: 2019-1 Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8			
Event Desc	Description:			
• (6) C	ondenser Air	-in-leakage degrades requiring a	trip.	
( )		inside containment.		
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fa	hil to auto close.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Ac	ctions or Behavior	
		7. Check Core Heat Remove	al by forced circulation:	
		A. At least ONE RCP runr securing RCPs for CN	ning. <b>(May not be met due to</b> ITMT spray)	
		If RCPs secured, then Direct	the contingency for step 7. E	
Core Heat	ATC	A. <u>IF</u> ALL RCPs stopped, <u>THEN</u> perform the follo		
Removal Safety Function.		1) Verify BOTH PZR S closed.	Spray valves in MANUAL and	
		• 2CV-4651		
		• 2CV-4652		
		2) <b>GO TO</b> Step 8.		

	. 2010 1	Connoria #2			
Op-Test No		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8			
Event Desc	•				
	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>				
. ,	<ul> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>				
	<u> </u>				
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior			
		8. Check RCS Heat Removal:			
		A. Check SG available by BOTH of the following:			
		* At least ONE SG level 10 to 90%.			
		<ul> <li>* FW maintaining SG level. (Not met due to MSIS, perform contingency as necessary)</li> </ul>			
		B. Check MFW in RTO. (Not met due to MSIS, perform contingency as necessary)			
		C. Check Feedwater line intact by the following:			
		* SG level stable or rising.			
	BOP	* NO unexplained step changes or erratic FW flow.			
		<ul> <li>NO unexplained step changes or erratic Condensate flow.</li> </ul>			
RCS Heat Removal Safety Function		D. Check RCS T <sub>C</sub> 540°F to 555°F <b>(NOT met)</b>			
		E. Check SG pressure 950 to 1050 psia. (NOT met)			
		F. <u>IF</u> MSIVs open, <u>AND</u> desired, <u>THEN</u> place SDBCS Master Controller in Auto/Local with setpoint of 960 psia using 2105.008 Exhibit 3, SDBCS Emergency Operation.			
	BOP	Perform step 8 contingency actions that are applicable:			
		A. Perform the following:			
		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> SG level lowering, <u>THEN</u> verify EFAS actuated.</li> </ol>			
		B. Verify EITHER of the following:			
	BOP	<ul> <li>BOTH MFW pumps tripped.</li> </ul>			
		SG levels controlling at setpoint			

Op-Test No		Scena	ario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
	Event Description:				
	(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.				
( )	<ul> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>			fail to quite close	
Time	Position		Applicant's	Actions or Behavior	
		D. Perfor	m as necessa	ry:	
			T <sub>C</sub> less than I <u>EN</u> perform tl		
RCS Heat				·	
Removal Safety Function	BOP	a)	(MFW OR E	vater flow rate FW) <u>NOT</u> causing T <sub>C</sub> to lower. o A SG will be aligned, crew should B)	
		b)		S restoring T <sub>C</sub> 540°F to 555°F using hibit 3, SDBCS Emergency Operation.	
		E. Perfor	n as necessa	ry:	
		·	SG pressure 7 owing:	751 psia or less, <u>THEN</u> perform the	
		a)	Verify MSIS a	actuated on PPS inserts.	
		b)	Verify feed se	ecured to the affected SG.	
		c)	Maintain SG	to RCS $\Delta p$ less than 1600 psid.	
RCS Heat	BOP	d)	Maintain RC	S post-cooldown conditions as follows:	
Removal Safety Function			PZR hea	RCS pressure within P-T limits with ters and spray using ent 48, RCS Pressure Control.	
			SG using Isolation	RCS temperature by steaming intact Upstream ADV or Upstream ADV MOV using 2105.008 Exhibit 3, Emergency Operation.	
		e)	GO TO Step	9.	
Critical Task:					
Stabilize and control RCS temperature after the ESD blowdown terminates. RCS CETs must be limited to less than 80 degree F heatup.					
must be innited to less than ob degree i neatup.					

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8
Event Desc	Event Description:		
• (6) C	ondenser Air	-in-leakage degrades requiring a t	rip.
. ,		inside containment.	
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fai	il to auto close.
Time	Position	Applicant's Ac	tions or Behavior
		Critical Task:	
		within the Pressure-Temperatu roughout implementation of SP	re limits of 200°F and 30°F TAs and Excess Steam Demand
	Ре	rform Attachment 48, RCS Pres	sure Control
		NOTE	
Once me continuo		sure control is established, this att	achment is not required in hand or
•		od of pressure control will require I is established.	in hand or continuous use until the
		operation of heaters and sp	dication prevents automatic oray, g handswitches to the unaffected
	ATC	<ul> <li>PZR Low Level Cutoff</li> <li>PZR Pressure Channe</li> <li>PZR Level Channel Se</li> </ul>	el Select (2HS-4626)
		Examiner Note: Step is NA.	
Attach. 48		D. <u>IF</u> desired to use AUXI <u>THEN</u> :	ILIARY Spray,
	ATC	* 1) ENSURE RCS M	TS greater than 30 degrees.
		2) ENSURE at least	ONE Charging pump running.
		3) CLOSE Regen HX	X to RCP B/C valves:
		• 2CV-4827-2	
		• 2CV-4831-2	

Op-Test No		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
Event Description:			
		-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.	
		edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
		<u>NOTE</u>	
•	ray Block valv upply cables.	ves 2CV-4653 and 2CV-4655 are de-energized due to degraded	
	ATC	<ol> <li>ENSURE PZR Spray (2CV-4651/2CV-4652) or PZR Spray Isolation valves (2HS-4655/2HS-4653) closed.</li> </ol>	
		NOTE	
Seci	uring Chargin	g pumps will secure/change Aux Spray flow.	
Seci	uring all Char	ging pumps will terminate emergency boration if in progress.	
	ATC	<ol> <li>PERFORM EITHER of the following to control RCS pressure:</li> </ol>	
		<ul> <li>THROTTLE Aux Spray valve (2CV-4824-2) as necessary.</li> </ul>	
Attach. 48		<ul> <li>START and STOP Charging pumps as necessary</li> </ul>	
		* • <b>RESET</b> Low PZR Pressure setpoints during depressurization.	
	Perform	2105.008, Exhibit 3, SDBCS Emergency Operation	
	BOP	1.0 IF BOTH MSIV's closed, THEN GO TO step 5.0.	
	BOP	5.0 <b>PERFORM</b> the following to determine availability of Upstream SDBCS valves:	
Exhibit 3		5.1 <b>IF</b> the following conditions satisfied: <u><b>THEN</b></u> Upstream ADVs are available.	
		Instrument air available	
		<ul> <li>EMERGENCY OFF (2K02-A14) annunciator clear</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Power available to selected controllers/valves</li> </ul>	

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
	vent Description:		
	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>		
( )	<ul> <li>(7) ESD of A SC inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior	
	BOP	5.2 <b>IF</b> the following conditions satisfied: <u><b>THEN</b></u> ADV Upstream Isolation valve(s) are available.	
		<ul> <li>EMERGENCY OFF (2K02-A14) clear or Upstream ADV locally failed open</li> </ul>	
		Power available	
	BOP	6.0 <b>IF</b> operation of Upstream Atmospheric Dump valve from the Control Room desired, <b>THEN</b> :	
		6.1 <b>ENSURE</b> selected HIC in MANUAL with ZERO output demand:	
		<ul> <li>Hdr #1 UPSTM ADV 2CV-1001 (2HIC-1001)</li> </ul>	
		• Hdr #2 UPSTM ADV 2CV-1051 (2HIC-1051)	
Exhibit 3			
	BOP	6.2 <b>PLACE</b> selected valve(s) permissive handswitch in MANUAL:	
		<ul> <li>2CV-1001 Permissive (2HS-1001)</li> </ul>	
		• 2CV-1051 Permissive (2HS-1051)	
	BOP	6.3 <u>IF</u> MSIS actuated, <u>THEN</u> override "MSIS CLOSE" actuation for selected MOV isolation:	
		<ul> <li>ADV Upstream Isolation valve (2CV-1002)</li> </ul>	
Exhibit 3		ADV Upstream Isolation valve (2CV-1002)     ADV Upstream Isolation valve (2CV-1052)	
	BOP	6.4 <u>IF</u> in Modes 1-4, <u>THEN</u> ENTER TS 3.6.3.1 as applicable.	

	Op-Test No.: 2019-1         Scenario #3         Event No.: 6, 7, & 8				
Event Desc	ription:				
• (6) C	ondenser Air	-in-leakage degrades requiring a	trip.		
• (7) E	SD on 'A' SG	Ginside containment.			
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fa	il to auto close.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Ac	ctions or Behavior		
	BOP	*6.5 THROTTLE OPEN	selected MOV as desired:		
		ADV Upstream Is	solation valve (2CV-1002)		
			solation valve (2CV-1052)		
	BOP	*6.6 PLACE selected HICs to desired demand:			
		<ul> <li>Hdr #1 UPSTM ADV 2CV-1001 (2HIC-1001)</li> </ul>			
		<ul> <li>Hdr #2 UPSTM ADV 2CV-1051 (2HIC-1051)</li> </ul>			
		Continue with SPTAs	3		
		9. Check CNTMT parameters	5:		
CNITNAT		A. Temperature and Pres	sure:		
CNTMT Safety	ANY	<ul> <li>Temperature less the</li> </ul>			
Function		•			
		<ul> <li>Pressure less than Event #7)</li> </ul>	16 psia. <b>(Not met due to ESD</b>		

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8
Event Desc	escription:		
		-in-leakage degrades requiring	a trip.
,		inside containment.	
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG	i fail to auto close.
Time	Position	Applicant's	Actions or Behavior
		9.A Contingency Actions	
		A. Perform the following	g:
			ure less than . available CNTMT Cooling fans ling water aligned.
		2) <u>IF</u> CNTMT press <u>THEN</u> verify the	ure 18.3 psia or greater, following:
		CIAS, CCAS	, and SIAS actuated on PPS inserts.
	ANY	<ul> <li>At least ONE Fan running.</li> </ul>	Emergency Penetration Room Vent
		CNTMT Cool	ling fans running in Emergency Mode.
		3) <u>IF</u> CNTMT press <u>THEN</u> verify the	sure 23.3 psia or greater, following:
		CSAS actuat	ed on PPS inserts.
		<ul> <li>Spray flow gr 1875 gpm pe</li> </ul>	
		ALL RCPs st in MANUAL a	opped AND BOTH PZR Spray valves and closed.

Op-Test No.: 2019-1	Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8		
Event Description:	vent Description:		
	in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.		
( )	inside containment.		
(8) Emergency F	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.		
Time Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	<ul> <li>B. Check CNTMT Spray pumps secured. (Not met, Contingency NA)</li> </ul>		
	C. NO CNTMT radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity:		
	1) CAMS alarms:		
	<ul> <li>"CNTMT PART/GAS RAD HI/LO" annunciator (2K10-B6) clear.</li> </ul>		
	2) RCS leakage alarms:		
	<ul> <li>"AREA RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-B10) clear.</li> </ul>		
	<ul> <li>"PROC LIQUID RADIATION HI/LO" annunciator (2K11-C10) clear.</li> </ul>		
	3) Check the following radiation monitors trend stable:		
	CNTMT Area		
	• CAMS		
	Process Liquid		
	<ul> <li>D. NO secondary system radiation alarms or unexplained rise in activity:</li> </ul>		
	1) "SEC SYS RADIATION HI" annunciator (2K11-A10) clear.		
	2) Secondary Systems Radiation monitors trend stable:		
	Main Steam lines		
	SG Sample		
	Condenser Off Gas		

Op-Test No	.: 2019-1	Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
•	Event Description:			
• (7) E	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>			
Time	Position	Applicant's Act	tions or Behavior	
	SRO	10. Notify STA to report to control room.		
		11. Direct NLOs to perform Atta Trip Actions	achment 47, Field Operator Post	
		12. Verify Reactor trip announc	ed on Plant page.	
		13. Notify SM to refer to Techni Emergency Action Level CI	ical Specifications and 1903.010, assification.	
Cue: If con	Cue: If contacted as the STA to report to the control room, acknowledge the request. Cue: If contacted as a NLO to perform Attachment 47 Field Operator Post Trip Actions, acknowledge request.			
	SRO	14. Direct control board operate annunciators and announce	•	
	SRO	15. Check ALL safety function acceptance criteria satisfied. (All safety functions are not satisfied, perform contingency)		
		<ul> <li>15. IF ANY safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied, <u>THEN perform the following:</u></li> <li>A. Notify control room staff of safety functions <u>NOT</u> satisfied.</li> <li>B. GO TO Exhibit 8,</li> </ul>		
		Diagnostic Actions.		
	SRO	Diagnose Excess Steam Dema	nd, EOP 2202.005.	
	Enter and implement Excess Steam Demand EOP 2202.005.			
	CAUTION			
	Failure to use average CETs to monitor MTS with ALL RCPs stopped may result in misleading evaluation of core conditions.			

Op-Test No.: 2		Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
· · ·	<ul> <li>vent Description:</li> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>			
• (8) Emer	• (8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.			
Time Po	osition	Applicant's	Actions or Behavior	
		NOTE		
	t with CN	ts [] reflect normal values cor TMT temperature greater than	rected for harsh CNTMT 200°F or CNTMT radiation greater	
	SRO	*1. Confirm diagnosis of	Excess Steam Demand as follows:	
		A. Check SFSC acce minutes.	eptance criteria satisfied every 15	
		B. <u>IF</u> CCW in service <u>THEN</u> perform the	e to provide SG Sample Cooler cooling, e following:	
		,	indicated water level, <u>THEN</u> verify the A' Sample Valves open:	
		• 2CV-5850		
		• 2CV-5852-2		
		<ol> <li><u>IF</u> SG "B" has indicated water level, <u>THEN</u> verify the following SG 'B' Sample Valves open:</li> </ol>		
		• 2CV-5858	8	
		• 2CV-5859	9-2	
		C. Notify Chemistry to	sample available SGs for activity.	
	SRO	2. Notify SM to refer to Te Emergency Action Leve	echnical Specifications and 1903.010, el Classification.	
	SRO	3. Open Placekeeping pa	ge.	
	SRO	4. Notify Control Board Operators to monitor floating steps.		
	Examiner Note: The SRO may implement the floating step to Maintain RCS post- cooldown conditions if not direct from SPTAs.			

Op-Test No Event Desc		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8		
• (7) E	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>			
• (8) E	mergency Fe	eedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.		
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		■21. Maintain RCS post-cooldown conditions as follows:		
		<ul> <li>A. Maintain RCS temperature by steaming intact SG using EITHER of the following:</li> </ul>		
		<ul><li>Upstream ADV</li><li>Upstream ADV Isolation MOV</li></ul>		
		<ul> <li>B. Control feedwater flow to intact SG using 2202.010 Attachment 46, Establishing EFW Flow.</li> </ul>		
		C. Maintain RCS pressure within P-T limits using 2202.010 Attachment 48, RCS Pressure Control.		
	ANY	5. Verify the following:		
		MSIS actuated on PPS inserts		
		MSIVs closed		
	ANY	*6. IF SIAS setpoints exceeded by EITHER of the following:		
		RCS pressure 1650 psia or less		
		CNTMT pressure 18.3 psia or greater		
		THEN verify SIAS and CCAS actuated on PPS inserts.		
	ANY	<ul> <li>*7. Verify actuated ESFAS components using 2202.010, Exhibit</li> <li>9, ESFAS Actuation.</li> </ul>		
		<b>Examiner Note:</b> Exhibit 9 is a checklist of actuated components w be in the expected alignment.		
	ANY	8. Restore ESF/Non-ESF systems post-MSIS using 2202.010 Attachment 51, Post ESFAS Actuation System Restoration.		
	Attachment 51, Post ESFAS Actuation System Restoration			

Op-Test No Event Desc		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8		
• (6) C • (7) E	<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul>			
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
	BOP	<ol> <li>ENSURE at least ONE SW pump running on EACH loop.</li> <li><u>IF</u> ANY EDG in operation, <u>THEN</u>:.</li> </ol>		
		CAUTION		
•	ation of loade engine dama	d DG without Service Water for greater than three minutes may age.		
	BOP	A. Check running EDG SW Outlet valve open:		
		<ul> <li>2DG-1 SW Outlet (2CV-1503-1)</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>2DG-2 SW Outlet (2CV-1504-2)</li> </ul>		
Attach. 51	BOP	<ol> <li>IF Lake available, THEN ENSURE SW pump suction aligned to Lake.</li> </ol>		
	Examiner Note: Steps 4 and 5 are NA.			
	BOP	*6. IF BOTH 4160v Vital buses 2A3 AND 2A4 energized from offsite power, THEN START SW pumps as needed to maintain SW header pressure.		
	BOP	Examiner Note: Steps 7, 8 and 9 are NA.		
	BOP	*10. <b>MAINTAIN</b> Service Water header pressure greater than 85 psig while performing the following using 2202.010 Exhibit 5, CCW/ACW/SW Alignment:		
Attach. 51		<ul> <li>A. <u>IF</u> Loop 2 CCW available, <u>THEN</u> restore Service Water to Component Cooling Water.</li> </ul>		
		B. Restore Service Water to Auxiliary Cooling Water.		
	Perform 2202.010, Exhibit 5 (CCW/ACW/SW Alignment)			
Examiner I	Examiner Note: Steps 1 and 3 are NA.			

Op-Test No		Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8	
• (6) C • (7) E	<ul> <li>Event Description:</li> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> </ul>			
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fa	ail to auto close.	
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior		
		2. IF SW NOT aligned to CC	W <u>AND</u> CCW available, <u>THEN</u> :	
		A. <u>IF</u> RCP seal temperatu <u>THEN</u> RESTORE SW	ures less than 180°F, to CCW by performing the following:	
Exhibit 5	BOP	1). OVERRIDE and O CCW/ACW Return va	<b>PEN</b> at least ONE SW to alve:	
		• 2CV-1543-1		
		• 2CV-1542-2		
Supplying A pressure.	<u>CAUTION</u> Supplying ACW flow and CCW cooling from a single SW pump may result in low SW header pressure.			
		2). OVERRIDE and T CCW /Main Chillers S	<b>HROTTLE</b> open at least ONE SW to upply valve:	
	BOP	• 2CV-1530-1		
		• 2CV-1531-2		
		3). Maintain SW head	der pressure greater than 85 psig.	
		4. IF SW NOT aligned to A	CW, <u>THEN</u> :	
		A. <b>ENSURE</b> at least ONE open:	SW to CCW/ACW Return valve	
		• 2CV-1543-1		
	ANY	• 2CV-1542-2		
		B. OVERRIDE and THRO	DTTLE open ACW Supply valves:	
		• 2CV-1425-1		
		• 2CV-1427-2		
			r pressure greater than 85 psig.	
	Return to Excess Steam Demand			

Op-Test No		Scenario #3	Event No.: 6, 7, & 8									
Event Desc	•											
		-in-leakage degrades requiring a t	rıp.									
( )		inside containment. edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fai	il to auto close									
	<u> </u>											
Time	Position	Applicant's Ac	tions or Behavior									
	ANY	*9. IF SIAS actuated, <u>THEN</u> to RCS as follows:	verify Safety Injection flow									
		A. Check total HPSI flow	acceptable using Exhibit 2,									
		HPSI Flow Curve.										
		B. Check total LPSI flow a	acceptable using Exhibit 3,									
		LPSI Flow Curve.										
	ANY	*10. Verify the following for	erify the following for any operating RCP:									
		A. CSAS NOT actuated	l.									
		B. Proper seal staging.										
	ANY	■11. Check CCW flow aligne	ed to RCPs. (Not Met)									
	ANY	■ 11. Perform the following:	(Contingency Actions)									
		<ul> <li>A. <u>IF</u> CCW system availab <u>THEN</u> restore CCW to F 21, Restoration of CCW</li> </ul>	RCPs using 2202.010 Attachment									
		2202.010 Standard Attachm	nent 21									
	BOP	2. ALIGN Controlled Bleedoff	as follows:									
		A. IF SIAS OR CIAS NOT	actuated.									
			Bleedoff to VCT valves open:									
		• 2CV-4846-1										
		• 2CV-4847-2										
		<b>_</b>										
		B. ENSURE RCP Bleedoff valve (2CV-4856) open.	f Relief Isolation to Quench Tank									

Op-Test No Event Desc		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8										
• (6) (	Condenser Ai	-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.										
		B inside containment.										
. ,		edwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.										
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior										
	BOP	<ol> <li><u>IF</u> RCP seal temperatures less than 180°F,</li> <li><u>THEN</u> RESTORE CCW to RCPs by performing the following:</li> </ol>										
		A. ENSURE ANY CCW pump in service.										
		B. ENSURE open RCP CCW Supply valve (2CV-5236-1).										
		C. ENSURE open RCP CCW Return valve (2CV-5254-2).										
	D. ENSURE open RCP CCW Return valve (2CV-5255-											
	<ul> <li>E. <u>IF</u> unexplained CCW Surge Tank level changes observe <u>THEN</u>:</li> <li>1) ENSURE ALL RCPs stopped.</li> <li>2) ISOLATE CCW to RCPs.</li> </ul>											
		<ul><li>a) ENSURE RCP Bleedoff to VCT valves closed:</li></ul>										
		• 2CV-4846-1										
		• 2CV-4847-2										
		4) <b>ENSURE</b> RCP Bleedoff Relief Isolation to Quench										
		Tank valve (2CV-4856) closed.										
		Return to Excess Steam Demand										
	ANY	■12. IF Circ Water flow lost to the Main condenser, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:										
		Examiner Note: This step should be NA										
	ANY	■13. Check RCS pressure greater than 1400 psia.										
	ANY	■13. Perform the following: (Contingency Actions)										
		A. <u>IF</u> RCS pressure less than 1400 psia, <u>THEN</u> perform the following:										
		1) Verify maximum of ONE RCP running in EACH loop.										
		2) IF RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, <u>THEN</u> verify										
		associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.										
	L											

Op-Test No Event Desc		Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8								
• (6) C • (7) E	Condenser Air	-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip. 6 inside containment. eedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.								
Time	Position	Applicant's Actions or Behavior								
	ANY	■14. <u>WHEN</u> RCS T <sub>C</sub> less than 510°F, <u>THEN</u> reduce number of running RCPs as follows:								
		A. Verify maximum of ONE RCP running in EACH loop.								
		B. <u>IF</u> RCP 2P32A or 2P32B stopped, <u>THEN</u> verify associated PZR Spray valve in MANUAL and closed.								
	ANY	15. Determine most affected SG by comparing the following:								
		SG steam flows								
		SG pressures								
		SG levels								
		• RCS T <sub>C</sub>								
	ANY	16. Check MSIS stopped Excess Steam Demand event.								
	ANY	16. Perform the following: (Contingency Actions)								
		<ul> <li>A. Commence MSIS verification using 2202.010 Attachment</li> <li>4, MSIS Verification.</li> </ul>								
		B. GO TO Step 18.								
		Examiner Note: Attachment 4, MSIS Verification, is a checklist of actuated components which will all be in the expected condition.								
	ANY	■18. <u>IF</u> BOTH SGs equally affected, <u>THEN</u> close Main Steam to EFW Pump Turbine valves:								
		• 2CV-1000-1								
		• 2CV-1050-2								
		Examiner Note: This step is NA.								
	ANY	■19. Isolate most affected SG using 2202.010 Attachment 10, SG Isolation.								
		<ul> <li>IF affected SG still pressurized, <u>THEN</u> check MSSVs for affected SG closed by locally checking individual valve tail pipes for leakage.</li> </ul>								

Op-Test No	p-Test No.: 2019-1 Scenario #3 Event No.: 6, 7, & 8										
Event Description:											
<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> </ul>											
(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.											
• (8) E	mergency Fe	edwater (EFW) valves to A SG	fail to auto close.								
Time         Position         Applicant's Actions or Behavior											
2202.010 - Attachment 10, SG Isolation											
STEAM GENERATOR A											
		<u>NOTE</u>									
Goal i	s to isolate th	e SG within 30 minutes of proce	edure entry to limit off-site release.								
	BOP	1. IF SG B to be isolated,	THEN GO TO Step 4.								
		Examiner Note: This step is	NA.								
NOTE											
	<ul> <li>Steps two</li> </ul>	and three may be performed in	any order.								
	Valves in	Table 1 and Table 2 may be po	sitioned in any order.								

<ul> <li>(6) Condenser Air-in-leakage degrades requiring a trip.</li> <li>(7) ESD on 'A' SG inside containment.</li> <li>(8) Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valves to A SG fail to auto close.</li> </ul> Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior           BOP         2. Verify each component in the following table in the indicate position:	Op-Test No Event Desc		Scenario #3	3	Event No	.: 6, 7, & 8									
Time         Position         Applicant's Actions or Behavior           BOP         2. Verify each component in the following table in the indicate position:           TABLE 1           COMPONENT DESCRIPTION           ADV UPSTRM ISOL         2CV-1002*         2C02         CLOSED (1)           2CV-1001 PERMISSIVE         2CV-1001         2C02         CLOSED (1)           ADV UPSTRM ISOL         2CV-1001         2C02         CLOSED (1)           2CV-1001 PERMISSIVE         2CV-1001         2C02         CLOSED (1)           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED (1)           MAIN STEAM TO EFWP         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           TRB 2K03         FEEDWATER BLOCK         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1024-1         2C16         CLOSED (1)           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1016-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           PTD DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSE	<ul><li>(6) C</li><li>(7) E</li></ul>	ondenser Air SD on 'A' SC	G inside containment.												
BOP       2. Verify each component in the following table in the indicate position:         TABLE 1         COMPONENT DESCRIPTION       NUMBER       LOCATION       POSITION       Image: colspan="2">POSITION         ADV UPSTRM ISOL       2CV-1002*       2C02       CLOSED (1)         2CV-1001 PERMISSIVE       2CV-1001       2C02       OFF (1)         MSIV HEADER #1       2SV-1010-1A       2C17       CLOSED         MSIV HEADER #1       2SV-1010-2A       2C16       CLOSED         MSIV HEADER #1       2SV-1010-1       2C17       CLOSED         MSIV HEADER #1       2SV-1010-1       2C17       CLOSED         MSIV HEADER #1 BYP       2CV-1024-1       2C17       CLOSED         MAIN STEAM TO EFWP       2CV-1024-1       2C17       CLOSED         TURB 2K03       FEEDWATER BLOCK       2CV-1024-1       2C17       CLOSED         SG BLOWDOWN       3COLTION       2CV-1016-1       2C17       CLOSED (1)         SG BLOWDOWN       3COLTION       2CV-1025-1*       2C17       CLOSED (1)         SAMPLE ISOLATION       2CV-1026-2*       2C16       CLOSED (1)         VALVE SG-A       2CV-1026-2*       2C16       CLOSED (1)         SG-A       2CV-1026-2*	. ,					vior									
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION         NUMBER         LOCATION         POSITION         1           ADV UPSTRM ISOL         2CV-1002*         2C02         CLOSED (1)         2 CV-1001         2C02         OFF         (1)           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MAIN STEAM TO EFWP         2CV-1040-1         2C17         CLOSED         1           VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED         1           FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED         1           SG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1           2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1			2. Verify each component in the following table in the indicated position:												
DESCRIPTION         CLOSED (1)           ADV UPSTRM ISOL         2CV-1002*         2C02         CLOSED (1)           2CV-1001 PERMISSIVE         2CV-1001         2C02         OFF (1)           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED (1)           MAIN STEAM TO EFWP         2CV-1020-1         2C17         CLOSED           TURB 2K03         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED           FEEDWATER BLOCK         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED           VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED (1)           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1016-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           2P7B DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SAMPLE ISOLATION         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           2P7A DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)           SG-A         2CV-1026-2*<			COMPONENT		1	POSITION									
Attach. 10         2CV-1001 PERMISSIVE         2CV-1001         2C02         OFF         (1)           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1 BYP         2CV-1040-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           MAIN STEAM TO EFWP         2CV-1000-1         2C17         CLOSED         1           FEEDWATER BLOCK         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1023-2*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           PTB DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SAMPLE ISOLATION         2CV-5850         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SAMPLE ISOLATION         2CV-5850         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1           2P7A DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1026-2*         2C16			DESCRIPTION	NOWBER	LOOATION		v								
MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-1A         2C17         CLOSED           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1         2SV-1010-2A         2C16         CLOSED         1           MSIV HEADER #1 BYP         2CV-1040-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           MSIV HEADER #1 BYP         2CV-1000-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           MIN STEAM TO EFWP         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED         1           FEEDWATER BLOCK         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1016-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1016-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SG BLOWDOWN         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           PTB DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           SAMPLE ISOLATION         2CV-5850         2C17         CLOSED (1)         1           2P7A DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1           2P7A DISCHARGE TO         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)         1				-		. ,									
Attach. 10         Ison ison ison ison ison ison ison ison i						( )	<b> </b>								
MSIV HEADER #1 BYP         2CV-1040-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           MAIN STEAM TO EFWP TURB 2K03         2CV-1000-1         2C17         CLOSED           FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1024-1         2C17         CLOSED           SG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION         2CV-1023-2         2C16         CLOSED (1)           2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A         2CV-1016-1         2C17         CLOSED (1)           FELOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A         2CV-1026-2*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A         2CV-1025-1*         2C17         CLOSED (1)           SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)           SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A         2CV-1026-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)           2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A         2CV-1037-1*         2C16         CLOSED (1)           2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A         2CV-1037-1*         2C16         CLOSED (1)           SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A         2CV-5852-2*         2C16         CLOSED (1)															
MAIN STEAM TO EFWP TURB 2K032CV-1000-12C17CLOSEDFEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1024-12C17CLOSEDFEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1023-22C16CLOSEDSG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION2CV-1016-12C17CLOSED (1)2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1038-2*2C17CLOSED (1)FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)						-									
TURB 2K03TURB 2K03FEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1024-12C17CLOSEDFEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1023-22C16CLOSEDSG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION2CV-1016-12C17CLOSED (1)2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1038-2*2C17CLOSED (1)FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-58502C17CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)						. ,									
Attach. 10VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1023-22C16CLOSEDFEEDWATER BLOCK VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1016-12C17CLOSED (1)SG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION2CV-1038-2*2C17CLOSED (1)2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)FLOW CONTROL VALVE 				2CV-1000-1	2C17	CLOSED									
Attach. 10VALVE TO SG-ACLOSED (1)SG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION2CV-1016-12C17CLOSED (1)2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1038-2*2C17CLOSED (1)FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-58502C17CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-1024-1	2C17	CLOSED									
SG BLOW DOWN ISOLATION2CV-1016-12C17CLOSED (1)2P7B DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1038-2*2C17CLOSED (1)FLOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-58502C17CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)	Attach 10			2CV-1023-2	2C16	CLOSED									
SG-ASG-AFLOW CONTROL VALVE TO SG-A2CV-1025-1* 2CV-1025-1*2C17CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-58502C17CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-1016-1	2C17	CLOSED (1)									
TO SG-ACLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE SG-A2CV-58502C17CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-1038-2*	2C17	CLOSED (1)									
VALVE SG-A2CV-1026-2*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-1025-1*	2C17	CLOSED (1)									
SG-A2P7A DISCHARGE TO SG-A2CV-1037-1* 2CV-1037-1*2C16CLOSED (1)SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2* 2C162C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-5850	2C17	CLOSED (1)									
SG-ASAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE STEAM GEN A2CV-5852-2*2C16CLOSED (1)				2CV-1026-2*	2C16	CLOSED (1)									
VALVE STEAM GEN A				2CV-1037-1*	2C16	CLOSED (1)									
* Denotes override capability.				2CV-5852-2*	2C16	CLOSED (1)									
			* Denotes override cap	ability.		•	I								
NOTE #1: Valves may be open at SM/CRS discretion.			NOTE #1: Valves may	/ be open at	SM/CRS disc	cretion.									
Termination criteria: When post-cooldown conditions have been stabilized or at	Terminatio	on criteria: V	When post-cooldown c	onditions ha	ave been sta	bilized or at									
examiner's discretion.															

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## **Transient and Event Checklist**

## Form ES-301-5

Facility:	A	NO-2	O-2 Date of Exam: 4/22/2019 Operating Test No.: 2019-1														
A	E		Scenarios														
P V P E L N I T	Е	1			2 (spare not 3 counted in total)						T O	ſ	M				
		CREW DSITIO	N	CREW POSITION			CREW POSITION			CREV	V POS	ITION	T A		N I M		
A N T	T Y P F	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	L	ι	J J M(*)	U
RO	RX													0*	1		0
Х	NOR			1										1	1	1	1
SRO-I	I/C			3,4, 9		2,3, 5			2,4,5					6	4	4	2
SRO-U	MAJ			6,7		6			6,7					4	2	2	1
	TS													0	0	2	2
RO	RX													0*	1	1	0
X	NOR									1				1	1	1	1
SRO-I	I/C		2,4,5, 8				1,3,4,7			3,5,8				7	4	4	2
SRO-U	MAJ		6,7				6			6,7				4	2	2	1
	TS													0	0	2	2
RO	RX													0	1	1	0
SRO-I	NOR	1						1						2	1	1	1
SRO-U	I/C	2,3,4, 5,8,9			1,2,3, 4,5,7			2,3,4, 5,8						11	4	4	2
X	MAJ	6,7			6			6,7						4	2	2	1
	TS	3,4			1,3			1,3						4	0	2	2
RO	RX														1	1	0
SRO-I	NOR														1	1	1
	I/C														4	4	2
SRO-U	MAJ														2	2	1
	TS														0	2	2
a F G	Check the are not app positions. component position, or	blicable f Instant S t (I/C) m ne I/C m	for RO a SROs (S alfunctionalfunction	applica SRO-I) ons ar on car	ants. R( ) must s nd one n n be cree	Ös mu erve ir najor ti dited te	st serve i both the ransient, oward the	n both t SRO a in the A e two I/(	he at-th ind the TC pos C malfui	ne-contro ATC position. If nctions i	ols (ATC sitions, i an SRC required	C) and b includin D-I <i>addi</i> I for the	alance g at lea <i>tionally</i> ATC po	of-pla st two serve: osition	ant (B ) instr s in th ).	OP) umer ne BC	nt or )P
	Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or <i>controlled</i> abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with											Jui					

must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (\*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional I/C malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For new reactor facility licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

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## **Competencies Checklist**

Form ES-301-6

Facility: ANO-2 Date of Examination: 4/22/19 Operating Test No.: 2019-1																		
							PLIC	ICANTS										
	RO SRO-I SRO-U		<b>X</b> □ □			RO SRO-I SRO-U		<b>X</b> □ □		D-I □ D-U <b>X</b>			RO SRO-I SRO-U					
Competencies	5	SCEN	ARIO		Ś	SCEN/	ARIO		S	SCEN/	ARIO			SCEN	IARIO	)		
	1 BOP	2 ATC	3 ATC	4	1 ATC	2 BOP	3 BOP	4	1 SRO	2 SRO	3 SRO	4	1	2	3	4		
Interpret/Diagnose Events and Conditions	3,4,6 ,7,9	1,2,3 ,5,6	2,4,5 ,6,7		2,3,4 ,5,6, 7,8	1,3,4 ,6,7	3,5,6 ,7,8		2,3,4 ,5,6, 7,8,9	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7	2,3,4 ,5,6, 7,8							
Comply with and Use Procedures (1)	1,3,4 ,6,7, 9	2,3,5 ,6	2,4,5 ,6,7		4,5,6 ,7,8	1,3,4 ,6,7	1,3,5 ,6,7, 8		2,3,4 ,6,7, 8,9	1,3,4 ,5,6	2,4,5 ,6,7, 8							
Operate Control Boards (2)	1,3,4 ,7,9	2,3,5 ,6	2,4,5 ,6,7		2,4,5 ,6,7, 8	1,3,4 ,6,7	1,3,5 ,6,7, 8		NA	NA	NA							
Communicate and Interact	1,3,4 ,6,7, 9	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7	2,3,4 ,5,6, 7,8		1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7,8	1,3,4 ,5,6, 7,	1,3,4 ,5,6, 7,8		1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7,8 ,9	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7,8							
Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)	NA	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA		1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7,8 ,9	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7	1,2,3 ,4,5, 6,7,8							
Comply with and Use TS (3)	NA	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA		3,4	1,3	1,3							
Ose is (3)       Notes:         (1)       Includes TS compliance for an RO.         (2)       Optional for an SRO-U.         (3)       Only applicable to SROs.																		

## Instructions:

Check the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Forms ES 303 1 and ES 303 3 describe the competency rating factors.)