



*Conditions at upstream side of TSV

Core Thermal Power	2419.0
Pump Heating	.74
Cleanup Losses	-3.3
Other System Losses	-0.6
Turbine Cycle Use	2422.5 MWt



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Reactor Heat Balance - Rated
Figure I-1-1
08/07/08





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Relationship Between Safety Action
 and Protective Action
 Figure I-2-1



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Relationship Between Protective
 Functions and Protective Actions
 Figure I-2-2



NOTES 1. ONLY TWO SYSTEMS OF EACH TYPE ARE SHOWN. THERE MAY BE MORE THAN THIS NUMBER OF SYSTEMS IN ANY CATEGORY.
 2. THERE MAY BE CASES WHERE THE SYSTEM LEVEL ACTION IS IDENTICAL TO THE ULTIMATE ACTION IN THE PLANT. IN SUCH A CASE THE INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM LEVEL ACTION NEED NOT BE IDENTIFIED.

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Relationship Between Different Types
 of Systems Actions and Objectives
 Figure I-2-3

Figure I-5-1

Engineered Safety Features	Protection Systems	Safety Functions and Systems	Design Basis Accidents (LOCA, RDA, MSLB, FHA)	Safety-Related Functions, Structures, Systems and Components
Nuclear Safety Systems			Abnormal Operational Transients	Safety-Related and Non-Safety-Related Functions, Structures, Systems and Components*
Special Safety Systems	Non Protection Systems		Special Events	Non-Safety Related Functions, Structures, Systems and Components
Process Safety Systems		Planned Operations		
Power Generation Systems			Power Generation Functions and Systems	

RELATIONSHIP OF VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF SYSTEMS

(The same horizontal level of one column relative to another column denotes equivalency)

* Non-safety-related functions and SSCs may be credited in mitigating Abnormal Operating Transients provided the event is enveloped by safety-related functions and SSCs. Assuming the non-safety-related equipment fails, safety-related equipment must ultimately assure: a) the integrity of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, b) the capability of shutting down the reactor and maintaining it in a safe shutdown condition, and c) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of 10CFR100 (or 10CFR50.67 for Fuel Handling Accident).