



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406-2713

May 14, 2019

Mr. Peter P. Sena, III
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
PSEG Nuclear, LLC
P. O. Box 236
Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000354/2019001

Dear Mr. Sena, III:

On March 31, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hope Creek Generating Station. On April 11, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Eric Carr, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented a finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC resident inspector at Hope Creek.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brice A. Bickett, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 05000354
License No.: NPF-57

Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000354/2019001

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SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000354/2019001 DATED MAY 14, 2019

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Number: 05000354

License Number: NPF-57

Report Number: 05000354/2019001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-001-0045

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC

Facility: Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1

Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2019 to March 31, 2019

Inspectors: J. DeBoer, Senior Project Engineer
L. Dumont, Reactor Inspector
J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist
S. Haney, Resident Inspector
J. Hawkins, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Johnson, Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist
J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector
A. Ziedonis, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Brice A. Bickett, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 3
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting a quarterly inspection at Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRC's assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedures			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green FIN 05000354/2019001-01 Open/Closed	[P.3] - Resolution	71111.12
The inspectors identified a Green finding (FIN) because PSEG did not adequately implement, in part, procedure LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, requirements to disposition corrective actions associated with an inadequate reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inservice testing (IST) procedure. Specifically, PSEG did not implement adequate actions to revise the RCIC IST procedure to monitor the turbine lube oil (LO) cooling flow pressure control valve (PCV) resulting in several missed opportunities to conduct the IST testing eliminated in October 2016.			

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

The Hope Creek Generating Station (Hope Creek) began the inspection period at full rated thermal power. On March 28, 2019, Hope Creek commenced a downpower and manual shutdown to conduct a planned maintenance outage (P191) to perform repairs on the 'D' and 'H' safety relief valves (SRVs). Following completion of the repairs, Hope Creek commenced a reactor startup on March 31, 2019.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, "Plant Status" and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures, heavy rains, snow and wind during the week of January 21, 2019.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown (IP Section 02.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) '4B' feedwater heater (FWH) after multiple FWH issues with drain and dump valve control and level transmitters during the week of January 7, 2019
- (2) 'A' control room chiller during 'B' control room chiller planned maintenance on March 18, 2019
- (3) Station service water (SSW) system while protected during increased shutdown risk condition (yellow) on March 29, 2019

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment

Complete Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the SSW system on February 25, 2019.

71111.05Q - Fire Protection

Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

- (1) Turbine building turbine area and reactor feed pump lube oil storage on January 3, 2019
- (2) Cable tray area and battery rooms on January 11, 2019
- (3) Service and radwaste area on January 25, 2019
- (4) Remote shutdown panel room on January 28, 2019
- (5) Reactor building south motor control center area on February 8 2019

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and 'A' core spray pump rooms after flood alarm circuitry failures during the week of January 28, 2019.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during power reduction and reactor shutdown for a planned maintenance outage on March 28, 2019
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during reactor and plant startup from a planned maintenance outage on March 31, 2019

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated a crew of licensed operators in the plant's simulator during licensed operator annual requalification exam. Simulated scenarios involved an earthquake, standby liquid control system initiation, a stator water cooling system trip, exciter ground and an anticipated transient without scram on January 16, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activities:

'A' and 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) voltage regulator (VR1) relay failures on January 8, 2019

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

- (1) Review of all condition monitoring events to ensure the effectiveness of pre-established maintenance rule criteria on February 19, 2019
- (2) Review of safety relief valve (SRV) solenoid valves on February 21, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

- (1) Emergent work associated with unplanned maintenance of a service air compressor (00-K-107) during the week of January 7, 2019
- (2) Risk assessment during planned testing of the EDG area CO2 system (Operability and Partial Discharge) during the week of January 22, 2019
- (3) Risk assessment during planned maintenance of the 'A' EDG on January 28, 2019
- (4) Risk assessment during planned maintenance on the 'B' reactor protection system normal electrical protection assembly on March 12, 2019
- (5) Risk assessment during planned maintenance on the 'B' control room chiller on March 18, 2019
- (6) Risk assessment during planned maintenance on the 'D' and 'H' SRV on March 30, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) 'B' SSW strainer non-conforming slot dimensions on January 23, 2019
- (2) 'H' SRV main seat leakage on January 25, 2019 and March 18, 2019
- (3) Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) outboard isolation valve packing leak on January 29, 2019

- (4) Technical evaluation of fuel in dry cask storage following the identification of operation with previous invalid measurement uncertainty recapture conditions on February 14, 2019
- (5) FLEX SRV air compressor (FLX-10-K-001) modification acceptance testing challenges on March 7, 2019

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary modification:

C SSW backwash valve (EA-HV-2197C) in manual configuration on March 6, 2019

71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing

Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

- (1) 'A' EDG voltage regulator troubleshooting and repair on January 2, 2019
- (2) '4B' feedwater heater drain failed level transmitter on January 7, 2019
- (3) 'A' EDG relay replacement on February 4, 2019
- (4) 'B' residual heat removal shutdown cooling suction valve (BC-HV-F006B) planned maintenance on February 14, 2019
- (5) 'A' safety auxiliaries cooling system heat exchanger inlet isolation valve planned preventive maintenance on February 28, 2019
- (6) 'B' control rod drive pump planned maintenance on March 17, 2019
- (7) Scram discharge volume dump valve solenoid replacement on March 28, 2019

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated planned maintenance outage (P191) activities from March 28, 2019 to March 31, 2019.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

In Service Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

HC.OP-IS.BH-0003, 'A' standby liquid control pump comprehensive IST on February 26, 2019

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

- (1) HC.OP.ST.KJ-0003, 'C' EDG monthly operability test on January 7, 2019
- (2) Review of surveillance test interval evaluations involving drywell leak detection (HC-18-022), 4kV emergency bus undervoltage (HC-18-023), and secondary containment integrity (HC-18-024) on January 14, 2019
- (3) HC.FP.ST.KC-0021, CO2 operability and partial discharge testing on January 18, 2019
- (4) HC.OP.ST.KJ-0002, 'B' EDG monthly operability test on February 15, 2019

71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated PSEG's maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system common to Salem and Hope Creek (June 2017 to January 2019) on February 11 through 15, 2019.

71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the readiness of PSEG's Emergency Preparedness Organization common to Salem and Hope Creek on February 11 through 14, 2019.

71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of PSEG's emergency preparedness program common to Salem and Hope Creek (June 2017 to January 2019) on February 11 through 14, 2019.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine PSEG emergency preparedness drill on February 26, 2019

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions and performed independent radiation measurements during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities. The inspectors examined the physical controls for selected HRAs, locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) and very high radiation areas (VHRAs) to verify conformance with the occupational PI.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (IP Section 02.02) (1 Partial)

The inspectors reviewed the current annual collective dose estimate; basis methodology; and measures to track, trend, and reduce occupational doses for ongoing work activities.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Engineering Controls (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated airborne controls and radioactive monitoring. The inspectors reviewed the following:

The inspectors reviewed operability and use of both permanent and temporary ventilation systems, and the adequacy of airborne radioactivity radiation monitoring in the plant based on location, sensitivity, and alarm set-points.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBAs) for Emergency Use (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated SCBA program implementation.

The inspectors reviewed the following: the status and surveillance records for three SCBAs staged in-plant for use during emergencies, procedures, maintenance and test records, the refilling and transporting of air bottles, mask size availability, and the qualifications of personnel performing service and repair of this equipment.

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated respiratory protection. The inspectors reviewed the following:

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of use of respiratory protection devices in the plant to include applicable as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) evaluations, respiratory protection device certification, respiratory equipment storage, air quality testing records, and individual qualification records.

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified PSEG's performance indicators submittals listed below:

Alert & Notification System Reliability (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)

January 2018 to December 2018 (common to Salem and Hope Creek)

Drill/Exercise Performance (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)

January 2018 to December 2018 (common to Salem and Hope Creek)

ERO Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)

January 2018 to December 2018 (common to Salem and Hope Creek)

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample – 4Q18)

January 1, 2018, to November 29, 2018 (completed in 4Q18)

Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample – 4Q18)

January 1, 2018, to November 29, 2018 (completed in 4Q18)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) RPS Cabinets Fire Barrier Separation on February 15, 2019

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedures			
Cornerstone	Significance	Cross-cutting Aspect	Report Section
Mitigating Systems	Green FIN 05000354/2019001-01 Open/Closed	[P.3] - Resolution	71111.12
The inspectors identified a Green finding (FIN) because PSEG did not adequately implement, in part, procedure LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, requirements to disposition corrective actions associated with an inadequate reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inservice testing (IST) procedure. Specifically, PSEG did not implement adequate actions to revise the RCIC IST procedure to monitor the turbine lube oil (LO) cooling flow pressure control valve (PCV) resulting in several missed opportunities to conduct the IST testing eliminated in October 2016.			
<u>Description:</u> RCIC is a safety-related system at Hope Creek consisting of a steam turbine-driven pump that will maintain adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated and/or after a loss of feed water. The operability of the system is confirmed through a quarterly IST that, in part, monitors system flow and pressure requirements. Per the design, the RCIC LO cooling flow should be 16 gpm to the cooler as long as the upstream pressure controlled by the PCV is at 89 psig.			
During an NRC inspection in June 2018, the inspectors identified an issue associated with a less than adequate procedure, HC.OP-IS.BD-0001, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump – OP203 – Inservice Test. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the basis behind PSEG's			

elimination of the RCIC cooling water PCV test in October 2016 under preventive maintenance (PM) change request (PCR) 80115269-2340. PSEG initiated multiple NOTFs (20799124 and 20799402) and CAs (70201434 and 70201667) because the inspectors determined that the elimination of this RCIC PCV PM had been performed without an adequate basis and had further credited the IST program with monitoring actions for potential PCV degradation that were not being performed. PSEG's NOTFs documented that their CAs would ensure the appropriate monitoring of the PCV during the next RCIC IST in August 2018. In October 2018, the inspectors documented in IR 2018003, that these CAs had not been completed or appropriately prioritized in PSEG's CAP.

In February 2019, the inspectors revisited PSEG's CAs, to determine if these CAs were adequately completed by PSEG, and found:

- The PCV PM activity had never been performed prior to its elimination and that no action had been taken by PSEG since June 2018, to ensure additional monitoring of the PCV was put into the IST procedure as indicated in previous notifications. Industry guidance for the PM of the PCV recommends a 12 year overhaul or condition-based maintenance (CBM). PSEG's procedure for CBM, ER-AA-210-1005, requires the use of all available direct diagnostic and performance data, process parameter trends, operator logs and visual inspections.
- PSEG's NOTFs 20799124 and 20799402 from June 2018, were prioritized as significance level (SL) 3 or conditions affecting regulatory compliance (CARCs) for a safety-related component, and were assigned CAs, designated as CRCAs, in orders 70201434 and 70201667. These CAs were closed as not required on July 26, 2018, with no additional justification contrary to LS-AA-125, Section 4.5.1.3, "*Closure documentation should 'STAND ALONE' and be clear enough to identify that the corrective action, as intended, was completed satisfactorily.*"
- After additional questions from the inspectors, PSEG documented NOTFs 20803119 and 20803120 on August 31, 2018, to address the inspector's original concerns. These NOTFs were incorrectly prioritized as SL 5 or non-corrective action program (NCAP) procedure revisions. As a result, PSEG's NOTFs were inappropriately assigned ACITs in orders 70202494 and 70202495, to revise the RCIC and HPCI IST procedures. If prioritized and identified correctly as CAs initially, then closure of the CAs to ACITs would not be allowed in accordance with LS-AA-125, Section 4.5.1, "*CAs cannot be closed to an ACIT.*" which would have likely influenced greater station awareness of actions.

Because of the above, the inspectors determined that PSEG did not promptly correct a deficiency with their RCIC IST procedure and inappropriately closed assigned CAs not in accordance with their CAP procedures.

Corrective Action(s): PSEG's corrective actions included revising the RCIC and HPCI IST procedures to ensure the PCV flow will be measured and trended as of March 12, 2019.

Corrective Action Reference(s): NOTFs 20803119 and 20803120

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: PSEG not adequately implementing CAP standards was a performance deficiency within their ability to foresee and correct, and which should have been prevented. Specifically, PSEG did not promptly correct a deficiency with their RCIC IST procedure and closed the assigned CAs inappropriately which resulted in procedure deficiencies being uncorrected since October 2016.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was also more than minor because if left uncorrected it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, not recording and trending the water pressure supplied from the RCIC PCV to the LO cooler during the IST could allow undetected degradation to occur within the valve causing RCIC inoperability because of either a low or high flow condition. As a result, low flow (caused by clogging, plugging, ring/seal damage, etc.), into the cooler could cause elevated turbine and governor LO temperatures and potentially lead to bearing failure in the worst case scenario (i.e., station blackout). High flow (caused by the valve failing full open or ring/seal damage) could result in the downstream relief valve lifting which would divert flow from the RCIC discharge to the reactor and send it directly into the RCIC room during transient conditions.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations". Using Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the qualification of mitigating structures, systems, or components (SSCs), however, the SSCs maintained their functionality.

Cross-cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, once the IST procedure issues associated with the PCV monitoring were identified, it took inspector engagement and over eight months to revise the procedures to ensure the original corrective actions were completed.

Enforcement: Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On January 11, 2019, the inspector presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. H. Trimble, Radiation Protection Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On February 14, 2019, the inspector presented the EP Program inspection results to Mr. Charles McFeaters, Salem Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On April 11, 2019, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Eric Carr, Hope Creek Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	20468516	2010 INPO AFI ER.3-3	June 30, 2010
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	20816874	Failure Analysis VR1 Relay	January 3, 2019
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	20817224	C-EDG Cannot Adjust KVARs While Synched	January 7, 2019
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	20817637	MRule Event Review in MRule Manager	January 14, 2019
71111.12	Corrective Action Documents	20817639	HC MRule Event Review in MRule Manager	January 14, 2019
71111.12	Procedures	EG-HC-034	Environmental qualification binder for target rock, safety relief valve electronic actuator (SOV)	Revision 1
71111.12	Procedures	ER-AA-310-1005	Maintenance rule positioning between (a) (1) and (a) (2)	Revision 10
71111.12	Procedures	ER-AA-310-1005	Maintenance rule performing monitoring	Revision 14
71111.12	Procedures	HC.MD-CM.AB-0006	Main Steam Safety/relief valve removal and installation	Revision 30
71111.12	Procedures	PSE-46864	Failure Analysis of Control Relays	February 26, 2019
71111.12	Work Orders	70159875	RF18 SRV-P SOV Failed As-Found Test	March 14, 2014
71111.12	Work Orders	70205310	C-EDG Cannot Adjust KVARs While Synched	April 8, 2019
71111.12	Work Orders	70205358	HC MRule Event Review in MRule Manager	March 21, 2019
71114.02	Procedures	Emergency Plan	PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan, Dated January 23, 2019	January 23, 2019
71114.03	Miscellaneous	Emergency Plan	PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan, Dated January 23, 2019	January 23, 2019
71114.05	Miscellaneous	Emergency Plan	PSEG Nuclear LLC Emergency Plan, Dated January 23, 2019	January 23, 2019
71152	Corrective Action Documents	20798788	EOC Review of Fire Barrier Separation	June 20, 2018
71152	Procedures	LS-AA-120	Issue identification and screening process	Revision 18

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71152	Procedures	LS-AA-120	Issue Identification & Screening Process	Revision 18
71152	Procedures	LS-AA-125	Corrective Action Program	Revision 24
71152	Procedures	LS-AA-125	Corrective Action Program	Revision 25
71152	Procedures	LS-AA-125-1005	Trending	Revision 8
71152	Procedures	WC-AA-106	Work Screening and Processing	Revision 21