

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

September 1, 1978

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 498
PO&M/DLB:das
Docket No. 50-281
License No. DFR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit No. 2.

Report No.	Applicable Technical Specification
LER 78-028/03L-0	TS 6.6.2.b.2.

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President - Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Mr. John G. Davis, Director (30 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies) ✓
Office of Management Information
and Program Control

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Surry Power Station, Unit 2
Docket No: 50-281
Report No: 78-028/03L-0
Event Date: 08-03-78

Title of Report: Containment Partial Pressure

1. Description of Event:

During normal operation the containment partial pressure exceeded the allowable limit as specified in the Surry Unit 1 and 2 Order for Modification of License dated June 29, 1978. At the time of the event, the service water temperature was 85°F and the Refueling Water Storage Tank temperature was less than 45°F. The partial pressure limit was exceeded by 0.05 psia before corrective action returned the pressure within the limits. This event is reportable as per Technical Specifications 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems

The containment pressure must be maintained below a specified limit in order to insure adequate conservatism in the ECCS performance as analyzed in the FSAR. A margin of partial pressure is permitted (not to exceed 0.25 psi) to sustain operation while action is taken to correct a problem. If the condition cannot be corrected, the reactor must be shutdown.

Containment pressure remained within the allowable limits at all times, and pressure instrumentation remained operable and capable of CLS initiation.

The health and safety of the general public were not affected.

3. Cause

This event was caused by a small leak in the containment radiation monitoring system and abnormally high ambient temperatures causing the containment to heat up and pressurize more rapidly than normal following unit startup.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

A second vacuum pump was started and a search for leaks initiated. When found, the leaking fittings on the containment radiation monitoring system were tightened. As the containment bulk average temperature reached equilibrium, the containment vacuum system brought the partial pressure within the limits and the second vacuum pump was returned to standby.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

No further corrective action was required.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

A modification to improve containment cooling systems has been initiated, approved, and is planned for installation during the Steam Generator Replacement Outage. During periods of high service water temperature (>87°), containment pressure, temperature and service water conditions are monitored

Surry Power Station, Unit 2

Docket No: 50-281

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Title of Report: Containment Partial Pressure (Continued)

6) on a more frequent interval.

7. Generic Implications

None