

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

July 15, 1975

Regulatory File Cy.

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 598
PO&M/JTB:clw
Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1,
the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies
of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S2-75-12.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear
Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the
next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,


C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

40 copies of AO-S2-75-12

cc: Mr. K. R. Goller ✓



7626

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S2-75-12

CONTROL BLOCK:

--	--	--	--	--	--

PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

LICENSEE NAME						LICENSE NUMBER						LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE								
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32															
CONT		CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE			REPORT DATE											
01	P	0	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1	0	7	0	6	7	5	0	7	1	4	7	5
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80													

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	During full power operation, the main steam trip valve in B steam line suddenly closed																							80
03	causing the closure of A and C trip valves and a reactor trip. While at hot shutdown																							80
04	testing revealed that the A and C main steam trip valves would not close following																							80
05	reopening. This event is considered an abnormal occurrence since the failure of the																							80
06	trip valves to close during testing is an engineered safeguard system malfunction (cont)																							80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION		
07	H	B	E	V	A	L	V	E	X	A	S	0	7	5	N
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	Investigation revealed a faulty piston O-ring in one of the operating cylinders on B																							80
09	trip valve and trash in the solenoid valve supplying air to the cylinder. Adequate																							80
10	air pressure was not maintained due to blockage in the solenoid valve and leakage (cont)																							80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
11	G	0	0	0	N/A	C	N/A						
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46					
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE					
12	Z	Z	N/A					N/A					
7	8	9	10	11	44	45							

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A
7	8	9	11	12	13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		
14	0	0	0	N/A
7	8	9	11	12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																							80
----	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
16	Z	N/A	
7	8	9	10

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																							80
----	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	N/A																							80
----	-----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----

19																								80
----	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	----

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION: (con't)

which could render the system incapable of performing its intended function (TS 1.I.6). AO-S2-75-12

CAUSE DESCRIPTION: (con't)

past the O-ring causing the valve to trip. The O-ring was replaced and the air lines cleared of all debris. A and C trip valves would not close due to binding between the back of the valve discs and valve body. Non-destructive testing revealed no component failures on any valves. The chamfer corner on the edge of the valve discs was rounded by grinding in the area where binding occurred. The corners were ground sufficiently on all valves to allow the disc to be opened approximately two degrees higher than the movement when connected to the operating cylinders. The load carrying capacity of the discs is not changed by this modification.