


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

August 8, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 632
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S2-75-14.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.


Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

40 copies of AO-S2-75-14

cc: Mr. K. R. Goller ✓



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S2-75-14

CONTROL BLOCK: [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME [01][V][A][S][P][S][2] LICENSE NUMBER [0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0][0] LICENSE TYPE [4][1][1][1][0] EVENT TYPE [0][1]

CONT [01] CATEGORY [P][O] REPORT TYPE [T] REPORT SOURCE [L] DOCKET NUMBER [0][5][0][0][2][8][1] EVENT DATE [0][7][2][9][7][5] REPORT DATE [0][8][0][5][7][5]

EVENT DESCRIPTION

[02] During normal operation of Unit No. 2 at 100 per cent power, regularly scheduled
 [03] sampling of the No. 2 boron injection tank revealed the boron concentration to be
 [04] 11.4 per cent by weight in violation of Technical Specification 3.3.A.3. A reduction
 [05] in power of 150 MWe per hour was initiated at 1515 hours and the recirculation rate
 [06] of the No. 2 boron injection tank with the "C" boric acid storage tank was (con't)

SYSTEM CODE [S][F] CAUSE CODE [E] COMPONENT CODE [V][A][L][V][E][S] PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER [A] COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [V][O][8][5] VIOLATION [Y]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

[08] The dilution of the No. 2 boron injection tank was apparently caused by leakage through
 [09] one or both of the inlet valves MOV 2867A and B. These valves are normally closed
 [10] and isolate the boron injection tank from charging pump discharge. In-leakage (con't)

[11] FACILITY STATUS [E] % POWER [1][0][0] OTHER STATUS [N/A] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [B] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [N/A]
 [12] FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED [Z] CONTENT OF RELEASE [N/A] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [N/A] LOCATION OF RELEASE [N/A]

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

[13] NUMBER [0][0][0] TYPE [Z] DESCRIPTION [N/A]

PERSONNEL INJURIES

[14] NUMBER [0][0][0] DESCRIPTION [N/A]

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

[15] [N/A]

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

[16] TYPE [Z] DESCRIPTION [N/A]

PUBLICITY

[17] [N/A]

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

[18] [N/A]

[19] []

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

increased. At 1550 hours the No. 2 boron injection tank showed a concentration of 11.5 per cent and the ramp-down in power was terminated. At 0045 hours on July 30, 1975 a new batch of boric acid solution was added to "C" boric acid storage tank increasing the boric acid concentration in No. 2 boron injection tank to 12.3 per cent.

The effect of this boric acid dilution would not have affected shutdown capability at this point in core life. A safety injection would have placed the station in the cold shutdown condition even with the reduced boron concentration in the injection tank.

This is a similar occurrence of an event reported on June 19, 1974.

The leaking valves (MOV 2867A and B) will be reworked as soon as practicable. An increased surveillance program has been instituted which will prevent undetected dilution below the Technical Specification limit.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

is primary coolant with a lower concentration of boric acid. The valves will be inspected for seat-tightness and proper motor operator performance during the next refueling outage.