

Regulatory

File Cy.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

September 4, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 679
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S2-75-16.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,


C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

40 copies of AO-S2-75-16

cc: Mr. K. R. Goller ✓



9509

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S2-75-16

CONTROL BLOCK:

1	2	3	4	5	6
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[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME						LICENSE NUMBER						LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE						
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32													

CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE													
01	CONT	P	0	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1	0	8	2	3	7	5	0	9	0	2	7	5
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80														

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During normal operation of Unit No. 2 at 60 per cent power the low level alarm on "C" boric acid tank was received at 0859 hours. At this time the level was observed to be steadily decreasing and had fallen to 58 per cent. An immediate rampdown of 150 MWe/hr was initiated since the level in the tank was below the minimum (62%) listed in section 3.2.B.3 of the Technical Specifications. Investigation for the source (con't)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION					
07	S	F	B	P	I	P	E	X	X	A	Z	9	9	9	N
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Examination of the failed mechanical joint leading to flow transmitter 2110 has revealed the flanges and pipe of the spool piece to be of carbon steel rather than stainless steel 304 as specified in NUS-20 Class 152. An examination of all (con't)

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					
11	E	0	6	0	N/A	A	L.L. ALARM "C" BORIC ACID TANK		
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE				
12	Z	N/A	N/A				
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION				
13	Z	Z	Z	N/A		
7	8	9	11	12	13	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION				
14	Z	Z	Z	N/A	
7	8	9	11	12	80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION			
16	Z	N/A		
7	8	9	10	80

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 The health and safety of the general public was not in any way affected.

19

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

of the boric acid loss revealed that the inlet flange to flow transmitter 2110 was leaking. Boric acid transfer pump "D" was secured in order to stop the leak. This also stopped recirculation of the No. 2 boron injection tank. A blank flange was installed on the piping immediately upstream of flow transmitter 2110 and boric acid transfer pump "D" was placed back in service restoring the recirculation to the No. 2 boron injection tank. The level in the "C" boric acid tank was restored within technical specification limits by transferring boric acid from the "A" boric acid tank. At 1011 hours the rampdown in power was secured and an increase of 150 MWe/hr was initiated. The lowest reading observed in the "C" boric acid tank during this event was 46 per cent. A sample of the No. 2 boron injection tank was taken at 1030 hours indicated a satisfactory boric acid concentration of 12.6 per cent by weight.

Although blanking off the line leading to flow transmitter 2110 eliminates the normal mode of emergency boration, a backup path is available through flow transmitter 2113 and manually operated valve CH 228. One other method of emergency boration is available by shifting the charging pump suction to the refueling water storage tank.

The discrepant portion of the system will be repaired/replaced as soon as practical. (A0-S2-75-16)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

similar installations (flow transmitters 2113, 1110 and 1113) will be made and replacement of all improper installations will be made with the correct material according to present piping specifications.

This incorrect installation is assumed to be from initial construction since no modifications have been made on this portion of the boric acid system.