

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

October 30, 1975



Regulatory Docket File

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 762
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S2-75-19.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,


C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

40 copies of AO-S2-75-19

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid



12701

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S2-75-19

CONTROL BLOCK

Regulatory Docket File

PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION

Control with Date 10-30-75

LICENSEE NAME														LICENSE NUMBER											LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE	
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1						
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32																					

CONT		CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE										
01	P	O	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1	1	0	1	5	7	5	1	0	2	8	7	5
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80													

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 (a) During normal operation of Unit No. 2 at 100 per cent power the "D" boric acid transfer pump motor failed resulting in loss of recirculation of the No. 2 boron injection tank. An immediate rampdown of 150 MWe/hour was initiated. (con't)

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION			
07	S	F	E	M	O	T	O	R	X	A	W	1	2	0	Y
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 (a) Examination of the defective motor revealed boric acid present in the stator windings although the present motors are the drip proof type. It is assumed that the boric acid worked its way into the windings during a recent failure (cont)

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS		METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
11	E	1	0	0	N/A	A	N/A				
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46			

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY		LOCATION OF RELEASE			
12	Z	Z	N/A			N/A			
7	8	9	10	11	44	45			

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A
7	8	9	11	12	13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION		
14	0	0	0	N/A
7	8	9	11	12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
16	Z	N/A	
7	8	9	10

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 The health and safety of the general public were in no way affected by this occurrence

19 in that the boron injection tank remained full and the capability of the safety (con't)

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr. PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

- (b) The "B" boric acid transfer pump was placed in service recirculating the No. 2 boron injection tank minimizing the loss of recirculation to 15 minutes. The tank was then sampled and determined to have the correct boric acid concentration and the unit was returned to 100 per cent power.
- (c) This is a similar occurrence to that reported on May 23, 1974 (AO-S1-74-07).
- (d) The defective motor has been replaced with one of the same type and the pump has been returned to service.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

of a mechanical joint in the boric acid system (See AO-S2-75-16).

- (b) Manufacturer's Nameplate Data
Model #TUDP Style #6904257
- (c) The licensee intends to replace existing motors with a totally enclosed fan cooled type which would eliminate any possibility of motor failure due to boric acid entering the windings. The orderly replacement of the existing motors will be dependent on the availability of the replacements.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (con't)

injection system was in no way impaired.