


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

May 12, 1976

Mr. Norman G. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



Serial No. 021
PO&M/ALH:jlf
Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S2-76-03.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.


Very truly yours,

G. M. Stallings

G. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40) ✓
Operating Reactors Branch 4



Regulatory Docket File

14

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	V A S P S	00-000000-00	41110	03
7 8 9	14	15 25	26 30	31 32

01	CONT	M I	L	L	050-0281	041276	050676
7 8	57 58	59	60	61	68 69	74	75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | During normal operations, it was found that condenser outlet valve MOV-CW-200A would
7 8 9 80

03 | not operate. This is in violation of Technical Specification 3.7.
7 8 9 80

04 |
7 8 9 80

05 |
7 8 9 80

06 |
7 8 9 80

07	H F	F	V A L V E X	A	P 3 4 0	Y
7 8 9 10	11	12	17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | Condenser outlet valve MOV-CW-200A was throttled when it was found that it would not
7 8 9 80

09 | open or close. The condenser inlet valve, MOV-CW-206A, provides additional assurance
7 8 9 80

10 | that the proper intake canal level will be maintained. This valve operated (continued)
7 8 9 80

11	E	098	N/A	A	N/A
7 8 9	10	12 13	44	45	46 80

12	Z	Z	N/A	N/A
7 8 9	10	11	44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13	000	Z	N/A
7 8 9	11	12	13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

14	000	N/A
7 8 9	11	12 80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | N/A
7 8 9 80

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16	Z	N/A
7 8 9	10	80

PUBLICITY

17 | N/A
7 8 9 80

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | The health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence because
7 8 9 80

19 | the redundant valve would have closed as required.
7 8 9 80

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

satisfactorily.

An investigation revealed that the limit switch compartment and the motor contained water. The origin of the water could not be found. The motor and limit switch were repaired and the limit switch compartment was water-proofed. The valve was then tested satisfactorily. The remaining condenser outlet valves on both units will be similarly water-proofed to prevent recurrence of this event.

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

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Very truly yours,



G. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40)
Operating Reactors Branch 4

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME			LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE							
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	3
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32															

CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE												
01	CONT	M	I	L	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1	0	4	1	2	7	6	0	5	0	6	7	6
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80														

EVENT DESCRIPTION

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7 8 9 | 80

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7 8 9 | 80

04 |
7 8 9 | 80

05 |
7 8 9 | 80

06 |
7 8 9 | 80

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION				
07	H	F	F	V	A	L	V	E	X	A	P	3	4	0	Y
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

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09 | open or close. The condenser inlet valve, MOV-CW-206A, provides additional assurance
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10 | that the proper intake canal level will be maintained. This valve operated (continued)
7 8 9 | 80

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
11	E	0	9	8	N/A	A	N/A		
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE			
12	Z	Z	N/A			N/A		
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80	

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION				
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A	
7	8	9	11	12	13	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION				
14	0	0	0	N/A	
7	8	9	11	12	80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | N/A
7 8 9 | 80

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION			
16	Z	N/A		
7	8	9	10	80

PUBLICITY

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