

**Regulatory Docket File**

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

May 20, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 041  
PO&M/ALH:jlf  
Docket No. 50-281  
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S2-76-04.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.


Very truly yours,

Original Signed By  
W. L. Proffitt  
for

G. M. Stallings  
Vice President-Power Supply  
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40)  
Operating Reactors Branch 4



# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

## Regulatory Docket File

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME: 01 V A S P S 2 | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 0 | EVENT TYPE: 0 3

CATEGORY: 01 CONT | REPORT TYPE: M I | REPORT SOURCE: L | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 - 0 2 8 1 | EVENT DATE: 0 4 2 2 7 6 | REPORT DATE: 0 5 1 7 7 6

### EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | With Unit 2 at intermediate shutdown prior to refueling shutdown, MOV-SW-202B, a valve  
03 | in the suction line to the service pumps from the circulating water canal, failed to  
04 | close when a GLS Hi-Hi, Train B signal was actuated during a routine functional test.  
05 | (PT.8.5A). This event is in violation of Technical Specification 3.4.A.5 and report-  
06 | able per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2). The immediate corrective action was (CONT'D)

SYSTEM CODE: W A | CAUSE CODE: E | COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X | PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER: A | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: P 3 4 0 | VIOLATION: Y

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | A maintenance order was initiated to repair the valve. The contacts of the torque  
09 | switch were corroded, causing an open circuit condition in the valve closing circuit.  
10 | A new torque switch was installed. After this maintenance the valve was demonstrated to  
 (CONT'D)

FACILITY STATUS: H | % POWER: 0 0 0 | OTHER STATUS: Z | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: N/A

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED: Z | CONTENT OF RELEASE: Z | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A

### PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 | TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: N/A

### PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER: 0 0 0 | DESCRIPTION: N/A

### OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | N/A

### LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: N/A

### PUBLICITY

17 | N/A

### ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | This valve could have been manually closed had this been required in an accident con-  
19 | dition; hence, its failure to close did not adversely affect the health or safety of  
 the public.

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONT'D)

to manually close the valve (USRE-S2-76-04).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION(CONT'D)

be operable.

The other valve in the same valve pit, MOV-SW-202A, did not experience a similar problem since it was proven operable during functional test PT8.5A. Because this similar valve was exposed to the same environmental conditions and did not fail, it is felt that this was an isolated occurrence and therefore no further corrective action is deemed necessary.