


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

May 27, 1976



Regulatory Docket File

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 054
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S2-76-06.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40)
Operating Reactors Branch 4



5566

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 V A S P S 2	00-000000-00	41110	03
7 8 9	14 15 25	26 30	31 32

CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T P O	L L	L L	050-0281	050476	052576
7 8	57 58	59 60	61 68	69 74	75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 While Unit Two was at refueling shutdown, two of the three pressurizer level transmit-
 03 ters were found to have out of specification high level trip setpoints. The high level
 04 trip setpoints were found as follows: LT-459-93% LT-460-91.56%, & LT461-92.08%; com-
 05 pared to the Technical Specification value of 92% (T.S.2.3.A.3[a]). Since the trip
 06 matrix is two out of three, a reactor trip on high pressurizer water level (CON'T'D)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07 IA	E	INSTRU	N	B080	Y
7 8 9 10	11	12 17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The cause of this event was normal electronic drift on LT-459 & LT-461 in excess of
 09 the conservative setting of the setpoint. The initial action was to recalibrate the
 10 transmitters. The long term corrective action will be to set the trip setpoint (CON'T)

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11 H	000	N/A	B	N/A
7 8 9	10 12 13	44	45 46	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12 Z	Z	N/A	N/A
7 8 9	10 11	44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13 000	Z	N/A
7 8 9	11 12	13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14 000	N/A
7 8 9	11 12 80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16 Z	N/A
7 8 9	10 80

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 The health and safety of the general public were not affected by this occurrence
 19 since a reactor trip would have been initiated .08% above the desired level. (CON'T)

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

would have been initiated at a level .08% higher than specified. This event is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2b(1). (USRE-S2-76-06).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

on pressurizer level on both units an additional 2% conservative to provide further allowance for electronic drift.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

Because of this slight difference in level (less than one half inch), and other methods of protection during an increasing pressurizer level transient (i.e., relief valves and high pressure trip), there would have been no adverse safety implications associated with this event.