

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

June 16, 1976



Mr. Norman G. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 090
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. AO-S2-76-04.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stallings

G. M. Stallings
Vice President - Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40 copies)
Operating Reactors Branch 4

6927

SENSEE EVENT REPORT

A0-S2-76-04

CONTROL BLOCK:

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[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME						LICENSEE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE											
01	V	A	S	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1							
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32	CATEGORY						REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE			
01	CONT	M	I	T	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1	0	6	0	6	7	6	0	6	1	4	7	6						
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80																				

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	Prior to the startup of Unit 2 from refueling, both of the heat tracing systems on the																								80
03	recirculation line to 'C' Boric Acid Tank were tagged out for maintenance on valve																								80
04	1-CH-125. The unit was then made critical for Low Power Physics Testing without the																								80
05	heat tracing circuits being placed back in operation. This is contrary to Technical																								80
06	Specification 3.2.C.5 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.2 (Con't.)																								80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION			
07	P	C	D	C	K	T	B	R	T	A	X	9	9	9	Y	
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	43	44	45	46	47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	The circuits were tagged out after the Pre-Startup checkoff list (OP-1A) had verified																								80
09	them operable. The Start-up form (OP-1D) did not include a review of the tag-out																								80
10	records. To prevent a future recurrence of this event, OP-1D has been modified (Con't.)																								80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER		OTHER STATUS				METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION																																																															
11	C	0	0	4	N/A				A	Found by low temperature alarm																																																															
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE																																																																	
12	Z	Z	N/A																																																																						
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION																																																																					
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A																																																																				
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION																																																																							
14	0	0	0	N/A																																																																					
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																								80
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION																																																																							
16	Z	N/A																																																																							
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																								80
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18																									80
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19																									80
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NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

The unit was returned to hot shutdown for maintenance, at which time a low temperature alarm in the line occurred. The immediate action was to check the heat tracing circuits, which revealed the subject circuits were tagged out. The circuits were energized and the heat tracing returned to normal. (A0-S2-76-04).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

to include the tag-out review prior to criticality.

While critical, the temperatures in the lines were always above the alarm point. Flow through the lines was normal at all times and no Engineered Safeguards features were affected. Therefore, there were no safety implications and the health and safety of the general public was not affected.