VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

June 16, 1976

Regulatory Docket File



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 090
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. AO-S2-76-04.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations



Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40 copies)
Operating Reactors Branch 4

517

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 VASPS2 (7–14)	00–00000–00 (15–25)	4110 (26–30)	01 (31–32)

CON'T	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 (7–8)	MI (57–58)	T (59)	L (60)	050–0281 (61–68)	060676 (69–74)	061476 (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 Prior to the startup of Unit 2 from refueling, both of the heat tracing systems on the (7–80)
03 recirculation line to 'C' Boric Acid Tank were tagged out for maintenance on valve (7–80)
04 1-CH-125. The unit was then made critical for Low Power Physics Testing without the (7–80)
05 heat tracing circuits being placed back in operation. This is contrary to Technical (7–80)
06 Specification 3.2.C.5 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.2 (Con't.) (7–80)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07 PC (9–10)	D (11)	CKTBRT (12–17)	A (43)	X999 (44–47)	Y (48)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The circuits were tagged out after the Pre-Startup checkoff list (OP-1A) had verified (7–80)
09 them operable. The Start-up form (OP-1D) did not include a review of the tag-out (7–80)
10 records. To prevent a future recurrence of this event, OP-1D has been modified (Con't). (7–80)

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11 C (9)	004 (10–12)	N/A (13–44)	A (45)	Found by low temperature alarm (46–80)

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12 Z (9)	Z (10)	N/A (11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13 000 (9–11)	Z (12)	N/A (13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14 000 (9–11)	N/A (12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A (7–80)

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16 Z (9)	N/A (10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 N/A (7–80)

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 (7–80)

19 (7–80)

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr. PHONE: (804) 357-3184

GPO 881-667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

The unit was returned to hot shutdown for maintenance, at which time a low temperature alarm in the line occurred. The immediate action was to check the heat tracing circuits, which revealed the subject circuits were tagged out. The circuits were energized and the heat tracing returned to normal. (AO-S2-76-04).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

to include the tag-out review prior to criticality.

While critical, the temperatures in the lines were always above the alarm point. Flow through the lines was normal at all times and no Engineered Safeguards features were affected. Therefore, there were no safety implications and the health and safety of the general public was not affected.