


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

July 13, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 120
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S2-76-09.


The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40 copies) ✓
Operating Reactors Branch 4



Regulatory Docket File

709

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME:

01	V	A	S	P	S	2
----	---	---	---	---	---	---

 LICENSE NUMBER:

00	-	00	00	00	-	00
----	---	----	----	----	---	----

 LICENSE TYPE:

4	1	1	1	0
---	---	---	---	---

 EVENT TYPE:

0	3
---	---

REPORT TYPE:

L

 REPORT SOURCE:

L

 DOCKET NUMBER:

0	5	0	-	0	2	8	1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

 EVENT DATE:

0	6	1	5	7	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

 REPORT DATE:

0	7	0	6	7	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | With Unit Two at full rated power, it was observed that MOV-2862B would not operate
03 | when cycled by the console control switch. Previously the valve operator had performed
04 | satisfactorily when operated in accordance with Electrical Test Procedure (ETP-5). The
05 | failure to operate by control switch was evaluated as resulting from actuation of the
06 | thermal overloads in the breaker housing. MOV-2862A, the redundant valve in the (CONT)

SYSTEM CODE:

S	F
---	---

 CAUSE CODE:

E

 COMPONENT CODE:

V	A	L	V	O	P
---	---	---	---	---	---

 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER:

A

 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER:

L	2	0	0
---	---	---	---

 VIOLATION:

N

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | The cause of this event was the proper operation of the thermal overloads due to mech-
09 | anical binding of the valve plug thus stopping the valve. The three-point adjustment
10 | screws (MOV-2862B) were loosened relieving the tension on the valve plug. (Continued)

FACILITY STATUS:

E

 % POWER:

1	0	0
---	---	---

 OTHER STATUS:

N/A

 METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

C

 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:

Electrical Test Procedure

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED:

Z

 CONTENT OF RELEASE:

Z

 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY:

N/A

 LOCATION OF RELEASE:

--

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER:

0	0	0
---	---	---

 TYPE:

Z

 DESCRIPTION:

N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER:

0	0	0
---	---	---

 DESCRIPTION:

N/A

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE:

Z

 DESCRIPTION:

N/A

PUBLICITY

17 | N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | The health and safety of the general public were not affected by this occurrence.
19 | There were no adverse safety implications, since the redundant valve (MOV-2862A) (cont)

NAME: T. L. Baucom PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

Low Head Safety Injection Pump suction path was cycled immediately and proven operable. MOV-2862B was operated manually. This condition is reportable per Technical Specification (T.S.6.6.2B[3]). Prior to initiating maintenance on MOV-2862B the redundant valve (MOV-2862A) was tested for operability (T.S.3.3B[4]). (USRE-S2-76-09).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

This removed the mechanical binding and permitted the motor operator to run at acceptable current resulting in normal operation. Long term corrective action will be to inspect both valve internals at the next cold shutdown. Since MOV-2862A and MOV-2862B are new valves this is a "first time" failure. Since MOV-2862A was determined operable, efforts were devoted to grooming of MOV-2862B. The redundant valve (MOV-2862A) has been similarly adjusted to assure operability.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

was operable thereby assuring a source of borated water to the Low Head Safety Injection System if necessary. Also if necessary the valves could have been manually isolated.