

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

January 19, 1977

Regulatory Docket File

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 003
PO&M/ALH:dgt

Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37



Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S2-76-16.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4
(40 copies USRE-S2-76-16)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

USRE-S2-76-16

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	V A S P S 2	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0	4 1 1 1 0	0 3		
7 8 9	14	15 25	26 30	31 32		
01	CON'T	M I	L I	0 5 0 - 0 2 8 1	1 2 3 0 7 6	0 1 1 4 7 7
7 8	57 58	59 60	61 68	69 74	75 80	

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | As a result of a routine chemical analysis during steady operation, it was found that
7 8 9 | 80

03 | the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) boron concentration was 11.4% by weight, which is below
7 8 9 | 80

04 | the 11.5% low limit set forth in Technical Specification 3.3.A.3. An immediate
7 8 9 | 80

05 | reactor ramp down was begun until the concentration was again within the specifications
7 8 9 | 80

06 | At the time of the dilution, the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) was on recirc with "C"
7 8 9 | 80

07	P C	E	V A L V E X	A	D O 2 0	Y
7 8 9 10	11	12	17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | The dilution of the BIT was most probably caused by leakage through one or both of
7 8 9 | 80

09 | the BIT inlet valves (MOV-2867A and B). These valves are normally closed and open
7 8 9 | 80

10 | automatically on a safety injection signal. After the required concentration was
7 8 9 | 80

11	E	0 9 7	NA	B	NA
7 8 9	10	12 13	44	45	46

12	Z	Z	NA	NA
7 8 9	10	11	44	45

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

13	0 0 0	Z	NA
7 8 9	11	12	13

PERSONNEL INJURIES

14	0 0 0	NA
7 8 9	11	12

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | NA
7 8 9 | 80

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

16	Z	NA
7 8 9	10	

PUBLICITY

17 | NA
7 8 9 | 80

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | Because the capabilities of the Safety Injection System were not impaired by this
7 8 9 | 80

19 | minimal dilution of the BIT, the health and safety of the general public were not
7 8 9 | 80

NAME: T. L. Baucom

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST). Boric acid was then batched to "C" BAST to bring up the boron concentration to 11.9% in the BIT. In addition, the surveillance frequency of the BIT was increased until the source of the dilution was terminated. This event is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2) (USRE-S2-76-16).

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

obtained in the BIT, the MOV's were closed by means of both manual and electrical forces. A 1/4 inch stem movement was observed. Since this closure there has been no apparent dilution of the BIT. To provide long term corrective action, the valves' stroke will be checked during the next cold shutdown to insure positive shutoff.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

affected.