


REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

November 15, 1977



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Serial No. 514
PO&M/ALH:dgt
Docket No. 50-281
License No. DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. LER 77-021/01-T-0.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,


C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40 copies LER-77-021/01-T-0) ✓
Operating Reactors Branch 4

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LER 77 - 021/01-T-0

Virginia Electric and Power Company
Surry Power Station
Docket No. 050-0281
Event Date 10-11-77

During zero power testing following refueling, the valve pit containing emergency service water valves MOV-203A/B/C/D was observed to be flooding. The water reached the motor operators affecting their ability to respond to ECCS signals.

The valve pit was immediately dewatered and the source of the flooding was determined to be two open drain valves in the emergency service water lines. The valves were shut and the flooding ceased. Concurrently, compensatory administrative controls were enacted, i.e. operations personnel were stationed at the valves to operate them manually if conditions demanded. Also, the motor operators were removed for repairs. The repairs were completed and the valves made fully operable in 12 hours.

During the refueling outage, the emergency service water lines were entered for inspection and adjustment of the emergency service water valves. Subsequent to the "tag-out" of the system, the two-inch drain valves were opened to drain residual water from the lines. Through personnel error, the valves were overlooked when the system was returned to service. The actual flooding occurred at a later time when the emergency service water valve was operated. Personnel were standing-by the condenser manways awaiting clearance to enter when the valve pit flooding occurred and was immediately observed. The opening of the emergency service water valve admitted water to the piping and thereby to the open drain valves from which the flooding occurred. It was later determined that had the emergency service water valves actuated by an ECCS signal, the valves would have reached their full open position before the flooding could have disabled the motor operators.

The station has an approved design change to implement modifications to limit the effects of flooding to safety related systems. Seven of the eight sections of that design change have been completed. Completion of the eighth section, involving sump level alarms, has been delayed by material procurement problems and manpower allocations, but is now being pursued as a priority action. In addition, other corrective measures are being considered, among which are:

- a. blank flanging of drain valves
- b. reconfiguration of the valve pit

The choice and status of the corrective actions will be the subject of a supplement report.

The health and safety of the general public were not affected by this event at the time of the flooding, immediate compensatory actions were taken; and had operation of the emergency service water valve not occurred and precipitated the flooding, response to a true ECCS signal would have been proper.

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