

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

April 19, 1978

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REGISTRATION SERVICES UNIT

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 813
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 216
PO&M/DLB:dab
Docket Nos. 50-280
50-281
License Nos. DPR-32
DPR-37

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.a(9), the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit No. 1.

LER-78-006/01T-0

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President - Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (40 copies) ✓
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control

Virginia Electric and Power Co.
Surry Power Station
Docket #50-280
Report #78-006/01T-0

Fire Protection Yard Piping

1. Description of Event:

On April 4, 1978, the station Fire Marshall noted a condition which indicated a potential degradation in the Class I Fire Protection System piping. It appeared that two extensions had been added to the system which may not have been seismically qualified. The extensions serve the main warehouse and the A/B warehouse.

A review by Vepco and Stone and Webster indicated the following:

- a. The branch to the A/B warehouse (two 10" lines) was supplied with material that met the original station specifications, and was installed according to the National Fire Code.
- b. The branch to the main warehouse (one 10" line) was installed to the National Fire Code, but utilized materials that did not meet station specifications.

It is this line to the main warehouse that constitutes a condition that is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.(9).

2. Probable Consequence and Status of Redundant Systems:

The problem was found during a review of the Fire Protection System as detailed in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The branch piping to A/B warehouse can be isolated from the main loop by post indicating valves located adjacent to the main loop. Since isolation can be achieved and the piping was essentially installed to the original criteria, it is Vepco's judgement that the seismic requirements for the fire loop piping have not been degraded by this branch.

The overall system performance would not be degraded in the event of a failure of the branch piping to the main warehouse, since the entire system is a sectionalized loop.

The portion of the loop containing the tee to the main warehouse can be isolated by the sectionalizing post indicator valves. The entire fire system, with the exception of one hydrant, can be supplied through the remaining open loop and therefore the safety of the station and likewise the health and safety of the general public are unaffected.

3. Cause:

This occurrence was brought about by failure of Engineering personnel to develop a design change to implement the modifications. The design change would have been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee for compliance with various regulatory documents.

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4. Immediate Corrective Action:

A design change is being developed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corp. for the portion of the main warehouse branch between the loop and the first isolation valve. The intent of the design change will be to upgrade this section of piping to the original criteria.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

The scheduled corrective action is the implementation of the design change.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Since the condition has been identified, corrective action is to be implemented as soon as possible. Future modifications to the Fire Protection System will be developed through close administrative control as warranted by the increased safety significance of the system.

7. Generic Implications:

There are no generic implications associated with this event.