

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

July 17, 1978

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 400  
PO&M/DLB:das  
Docket No. 50-281  
License No. DPR-37

1978 JUL 19 10 55  
REGISTRATION  
MAILS UNIT  
SERVICES

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit No. 2.

Report No.	Applicable Technical Specification
LER 78-025/03L-0	TS 5.6.2.b.2

Originally this event was thought to be non-reportable. However, following further consideration it was decided that a report should be submitted. As a result this report is approximately two weeks late based on 30 days from discovery date.

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,



C. M. Stallings  
Vice President - Power Supply  
and Production Operations

Enclosures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (30 copies)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies) ✓  
Office of Management Information  
and Program Control

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

782010312

Apr 25/11

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE A REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V A S P S 2 | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 | 4 1 1 1 1 | \_\_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_\_  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 | 0 6 0 1 7 8 | 0 7 1 4 7 8 | \_\_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_\_  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During a routine inspection, an annular two-inch gap was found around the 2B battery  
0 3 | room ventilation duct where it penetrates the wall between the battery room and the  
0 4 | emergency switchgear room. This is contrary to T.S. 3.21.G.1 and reportable per T.S.  
0 5 | 6.6.2.b.(2). The health and safety of the public were not affected.  
0 6 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 7 | \_\_\_\_\_  
0 8 | \_\_\_\_\_

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE  
A B | B | C | X X X X X X | X | Z  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.  
7 8 | 7 8 | 0 2 5 | 0 3 | L | 0  
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
D Z | Z | Z | Z | 0 0 0 0 | Y | N | X | Z 9 9 9  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The defect appears to be a condition undetected from the construction period. The gap  
1 1 | was packed with fire resistant material.  
1 2 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 3 | \_\_\_\_\_  
1 4 | \_\_\_\_\_

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION  
E | 1 0 0 | NA | B | Fire Protection Inspection  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | LOCATION OF RELEASE  
Z | Z | NA | NA  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | DESCRIPTION  
0 0 0 | Z | NA  
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | DESCRIPTION  
0 0 0 | \_\_\_\_\_ | NA  
7 8 9 11 12 80

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | DESCRIPTION  
Z | \_\_\_\_\_ | NA  
7 8 9 11 12 80

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | DESCRIPTION  
N | \_\_\_\_\_ | NA  
7 8 9 10 80

NAME OF PREPARER T. L. Baucom

PHONE: (804)-357-3184

NRC USE ONLY

Surry Power Station  
Docket No.: 50-281  
Report No.: 78-025/03L-0  
Event Date: 6-1-78

## Defect in Fire Wall

### 1. Description of Event:

With the unit operating at rated power, a routine fire protection inspection disclosed a defect in the concrete fire wall between 2B battery room and the emergency switchgear room. The defect was a two inch annular gap around the battery room supply duct where the duct passed through the wall from the emergency switchgear room to the battery room. The condition is contrary to Technical Specification 3.21.G.1 and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

### 2. Probable Consequences/Status of Redundant Systems

In the event of a fire in the 2B battery room, flames might have propagated through the defect. Due to spacing of equipment in the emergency switchgear room, heat and flames would not have been able to reach safety related equipment. In the case of fire in the emergency switchgear area, flames would not have penetrated the defect because of an out flow of air through the defect. The health and safety of the general public were not affected.

### 3. Cause:

The defect appears to have been overlooked when the supply duct was installed during construction. The defect was found as the result of increasing attention to detail in current fire protection inspections.

### 4. Immediate Corrective Action:

Upon discovery, a fire watch was posted.

### 5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

The gap was packed with fire resistant material.

### 6. Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence:

Since repair has been made, a recurrence is highly unlikely.

### 7. Generic Implications:

None