
Technical Specification Task Force Improved Standard Technical Specifications Change Traveler

Eliminate use of term CORE ALTERATIONS in ACTIONS and Notes

NUREGs Affected: 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434

Classification: 1) Technical Change

Recommended for CLIP?: Yes

Correction or Improvement: Improvement

NRC Fee Status: Not Exempt

Benefit: Prevents Unnecessary Actions

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See attached.

Revision History

OG Revision 0

Revision Status: Closed

Revision Proposed by: CEOG

Revision Description:

Original Issue

Owners Group Review Information

Date Originated by OG: 28-Jun-03

Owners Group Comments
(No Comments)

Owners Group Resolution: Approved Date: 29-Jul-03

TSTF Review Information

TSTF Received Date: 29-Jul-03

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OG Review Completed: BWOG WOG CEOG BWROG

TSTF Comments:

Remarked on Rev. 3 pages.

TSTF Resolution: Superseded

Date: 22-Apr-04

TSTF Revision 1

Revision Status: Active

Revision Proposed by: Calvert Cliffs

Revision Description:

Revised to be consistent with the Calvert Cliffs lead plant submittal. Changed Nuclear Instrumentation Required Action A.1 to prohibit positive reactivity additions instead of being deleted.

TSTF Review Information

TSTF Received Date: 23-Sep-05

Date Distributed for Review

18-Dec-06

TSTF Revision 1**Revision Status: Active**OG Review Completed: BWOG WOG CEOG BWROG

TSTF Comments:

(No Comments)

TSTF Resolution: Approved

Date: 23-Sep-05

NRC Review Information

NRC Received Date: 07-Jun-05

NRC Comments:

Date of NRC Letter: 07-Dec-06

TSTF-471 was a T Traveler submitted by Calvert Cliffs and subsequently approved for general use by the NRC.

Final Resolution: NRC Approves

Final Resolution Date: 07-Dec-06

Affected Technical Specifications

1.1	Definitions	
	Change Description:	Delete "CORE ALTERATIONS"
Action 3.8.2.A	A.C. Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.2.A Bases	A.C. Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.2.B	A.C. Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.2.B Bases	A.C. Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.5.B	DC Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.5.B Bases	DC Sources - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.8.A	Inverters - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.8.A Bases	Inverters - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.10.A	Distribution Systems - Shutdown	
Action 3.8.10.A Bases	Distribution Systems - Shutdown	
Action 3.9.1.A	Boron Concentration	
Action 3.9.1.A Bases	Boron Concentration	
Action 3.9.2.A	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1430 1432 Only
Action 3.9.2.A Bases	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1430 1432 Only
Action 3.9.2.B Bases	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1430 1432 Only

18-Dec-06

LCO 3.9.3 Bases	Containment Penetrations	NUREG(s)- 1430 1432 Only
Action 3.9.2.A	Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
Action 3.9.2.A Bases	Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
Action 3.9.3.A	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
Action 3.9.3.A Bases	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
Action 3.9.3.B Bases	Nuclear Instrumentation	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
S/A 3.9.4 Bases	Containment Penetrations	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
LCO 3.9.4 Bases	Containment Penetrations	NUREG(s)- 1431 Only
LCO 3.3.8 Bases	CPIS (Digital)	NUREG(s)- 1432 Only
SR 3.3.8.4	CPIS (Digital)	NUREG(s)- 1432 Only
SR 3.3.8.4 Bases	CPIS (Digital)	NUREG(s)- 1432 Only
S/A 3.9.3 Bases	Containment Penetrations	NUREG(s)- 1432 Only

1.0 Description

In the PWR ITS NUREGs (NUREG-1430-1432), the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS appears in the Required Actions and Surveillance Notes of less than 10 specifications. It is not used in any Applicability statements. Suspending CORE ALTERATIONS or exempting testing except during CORE ALTERATIONS has no effect on the initial conditions or mitigation of any Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient, and these requirements apply an operational burden with no corresponding safety benefit. Therefore, the uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS are removed from the Technical Specifications.

2.0 Proposed Change

The proposed change eliminates the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from NUREG-1430, 1431, and 1432 and all uses of the term from the Specifications and Bases. This affects the following Specifications:

NUREG-1430, 1431, and 1432

3.8.2, A.C. Sources - Shutdown
 3.8.5, D.C. Sources - Shutdown
 3.8.8, Inverters - Shutdown
 3.8.10, Distribution Systems - Shutdown
 3.9.1, Boron Concentration
 3.9.2 or 3.9.3, Nuclear Instrumentation

NUREG-1431

3.9.2, Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves

NUREG-1432

SR 3.3.8.4, CPIS (Digital)

The BWR ITS NUREGs, NUREG-1433 and 1434, make extensive use of the term CORE ALTERATIONS in Applicability statements, ACTIONS, and Surveillances, and especially in the Special Operations Specifications. Therefore, the BWR ITS NUREGs are not modified by this change.

The Bases of each of the affected Specifications described above are revised to reflect the changes made.

3.0 Background

CORE ALTERATIONS is defined in the CEOG NUREG as, "CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components [excluding control element assemblies (CEAs) withdrawn into the upper guide structure], within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position." In the WOG and BWOG NUREGs it is defined as, "CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or

reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.”

TSTF-51, “Revise containment requirements during handling irradiated fuel and core alterations,” eliminated all uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from Applicability statements in the PWR NUREGs and most uses of CORE ALTERATIONS in Required Actions. This Traveler eliminates the few remaining instances of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from the PWR ITS NUREGs.

4.0 Technical Analysis

The term “core alteration” does not appear in the Standard Review Plan or in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Since CORE ALTERATIONS only occur when the reactor vessel head is removed, it only applies in MODE 6. There are only two accidents considered during MODE 6 for PWRs: a fuel handling accident and a boron dilution accident. According to the Standard Review Plan, a fuel handling accident is initiated by the dropping of a [recently] irradiated fuel assembly, either in the containment or in the fuel building. There are no mitigation actions, except some plants credit ventilation systems to reduce the dose consequences. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS, except for suspension of movement of [recently] irradiated fuel, will not prevent or impair the mitigation of a fuel handling accident.

The second analyzed event is a boron dilution accident. A boron dilution accident is initiated by a dilution source which results in the boron concentration dropping below that required to maintain the SHUTDOWN MARGIN. As described in the Bases of Specification 3.9.1, “Boron Concentration,” (which applies in MODE 6), “The refueling boron concentration limit is specified in the COLR. Unit procedures ensure the specified boron concentration in order to maintain an overall core reactivity of $k_{eff} \leq 0.95$ during fuel handling, with control element assemblies (CEAs) and fuel assemblies assumed to be in the most adverse configuration (least negative reactivity) allowed by unit procedures.” The accident is mitigated by stopping the dilution. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS has no effect on the mitigation of a boron dilution accident. Movement of control rods or fuel do not affect the initial conditions of a boron dilution accident as it is assumed that the control rods and fuel are in the most adverse conditions with a large safety margin ($k_{eff} \leq 0.95$). To address the possibility of a misloaded fuel assembly in Technical Specification 3.9.2, a Required Action is added that suspends positive reactivity additions if nuclear instrumentation is not available. This precludes movement of fuel assemblies which could add reactivity to the core.

In summary, with the exception of suspending movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, there are no DBAs or transients that are initiated by, or mitigation affected by, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS. Therefore, if all Required Actions that require suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS also require suspension of movement of [recently] irradiated fuel, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit.

The term CORE ALTERATION is used in the following Specifications:

NUREG-1430, 1431, and 1432

3.8.2, A.C. Sources - Shutdown

3.8.5, D.C. Sources - Shutdown

3.8.8, Inverters - Shutdown

3.8.10, Distribution Systems - Shutdown

3.9.1, Boron Concentration

3.9.2 or 3.9.3, Nuclear Instrumentation

NUREG-1431

3.9.2, Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves

NUREG-1432

SR 3.3.8.4, CPIS (Digital)

An analysis of elimination of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS for each of these Specifications is given below.

3.8.2, 3.8.5, 3.8.8, and 3.8.10

If a required train of electrical power (A.C, D.C, Inverters, or Distribution Systems) is inoperable, the Required Actions require:

- Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS
- Suspension of movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and
- Suspension of operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

As discussed above, because the Required Actions require the suspension of movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, the initiating conditions for a fuel handling accident are prohibited. Because the Required Actions require the suspension of positive reactivity additions that could result in a loss of SDM, the initial conditions for a boron dilution accident are prevented. Therefore, the action to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit and is not needed.

3.9.1

If boron concentration is not within limit, the Required Actions require immediate suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS, immediate suspension of positive reactivity additions, and immediate actions to restore the boron concentration within limits. This Specification is only concerned with a boron dilution accident, as SDM has no bearing on a fuel handling accident. Note that the Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions would also prohibit adding fuel assemblies to the reactor, which could reduce the SDM. The requirement to suspend positive reactivity additions is the only action needed to mitigate a boron dilution event. Therefore, the action to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit and is not needed.

3.9.2 or 3.9.3 (Nuclear Instrumentation)

If a required source range neutron flux monitor is inoperable, CORE ALTERATIONS must be suspended and operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1. An inoperable source range detector has no effect on the initiation or mitigation of a fuel handling accident. Suspending introduction of RCS coolant at less than the required boron concentration prevents a boron dilution accident. Therefore, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS does nothing to prevent any analyzed accident. It is a good practice to not move fuel with less than a full complement of source range detectors. Therefore, Required Action A.1 is revised to preclude positive reactivity additions. However, as stated in 10 CFR 50.36(b), “The technical specifications will be derived from the analyses and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, submitted pursuant to § 50.34.” Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS in this circumstance is not based on the analyses in the safety analysis report and that Required Action is removed.

3.9.2 (Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves) (NUREG-1431 only)

If one or more unborated water source isolation valves are not secured in the closed position, CORE ALTERATIONS must be suspended and actions taken to secure the valve in the closed position. The purpose of this Specification is to prevent a boron dilution accident. CORE ALTERATIONS have no effect on a boron dilution accident, either as an initiator or as mitigation. Suspending CORE ALTERATIONS when a valve is not secured does not provide compensation or reduce the probability of the event. Therefore, the action to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit and is not needed.

SR 3.3.8.4 (CEOG only)

LCO 3.3.8 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 and during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. SR 3.3.8.4 is modified by a NOTE which states, “Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.” This Note is inconsistent with the Applicability. The reference to CORE ALTERATIONS in the Note was overlooked and should have been deleted by TSTF-51, which eliminated CORE ALTERATIONS from the Applicability.

As stated in the Bases of Specification 3.3.8, “The CPIS provides protection from the release of radioactive contamination from the containment in the event a fuel assembly should be severely damaged during handling.” The SR Note requirement that the SR must be met “during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment” is consistent with the Applicability and ensures the SR is met when there is a possibility of a fuel handling accident. Therefore, elimination of the CORE ALTERATION portion of the SR Note will have no effect on the applicability of the SR.

Other Changes

- 1) With the elimination of all uses of the defined term, "CORE ALTERATION," the definition in Section 1.1 is removed.
- 2) The LCO section of the Bases of Specification 3.3.8 incorrectly states that a channel of CPIS is required during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Specification requires a channel of CPIS is required during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Bases are corrected to be consistent with the Specifications.
- 3) The Applicable Safety Analysis and LCO sections of the Bases of Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetration, make statements regarding CORE ALTERATIONS that are incorrect and inconsistent with the Specifications. The references to CORE ALTERATIONS were overlooked and should have been deleted by TSTF-51, which eliminated CORE ALTERATIONS from the Applicability of the Specification.

Benefits of Elimination

There are several benefits to eliminating the ACTIONS and SR Note which reference CORE ALTERATIONS.

The term CORE ALTERATIONS unnecessarily complicates plant operation. Plants go to great lengths to ensure that no prohibited CORE ALTERATIONS take place, such as pausing the lift of the reactor vessel head and having individuals lay on the floor or use video cameras to look under the head to ensure that no control rod drive mechanisms are still latched to avoid accidentally lifting a control rod and violating a Required Action which prohibits CORE ALTERATIONS. These actions have no safety benefit as the boron concentration limit ensures adequate SDM even with the worst configuration of control rods. These actions result in increased personnel dose and provide no safety benefit.

There are a large number of reportable events regarding CORE ALTERATIONS. A review of Licensee Event Reports between 1995 and the present revealed 12 LERs related to failure to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. As described above, these action have no effect on plant safety and distract the plant and the NRC from more safety significant issues.

5.0 Regulatory Analysis

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration

The TSTF has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed generic change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change eliminates the use of the term CORE ALTERATIONS from NUREG-1430, -1431, and -1432, all Required Actions requiring suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS, and reference to CORE ALTERATIONS in a Surveillance Note in NUREG-1432. CORE ALTERATIONS are not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated except a fuel handling accident. Those revised Specifications which protect the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension of movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. This Required Action protects the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident and, therefore, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS is not required. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS does not provide mitigation of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, CORE ALTERATIONS do not affect the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS does not affect the mitigation of the accidents previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed change. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Only two accidents are postulated to occur in the plant conditions in which CORE ALTERATIONS may be made: a fuel handling accident and a boron dilution accident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies prevents a fuel handling accident. Also requiring the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS is an overly broad, redundant requirement that does not increase the margin of safety. CORE ALTERATIONS have no effect on a boron dilution accident. Core components are not involved in the creation or mitigation of a boron dilution accident and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN limit is based on assuming the worst-case configuration of the core components. Therefore, CORE ALTERATIONS have no effect on the margin of safety related to a boron dilution accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, the TSTF concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of “no significant hazards consideration” is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements / Criteria

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s regulations, and (3) the approval of the proposed change will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 Environmental Consideration

A review has determined that the proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.

7.0 References

None.

1.1 Definitions

CHANNEL CHECK (continued)

the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY.

The ESFAS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall also include testing of ESFAS safety related bypass functions for each channel affected by bypass operation. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps.

CONTROL RODS

CONTROL RODS shall be all full length safety and regulating rods that are used to shut down the reactor and control power level during maneuvering operations.

CORE ALTERATION

CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in [Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1962, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites," or those listed in Table E-7 of Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977, or ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity"].

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.3 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>
<p>B. One required DG inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	B.43 Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.2.1</p> <p>-----NOTE----- The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.9 through SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.13 through SR 3.8.1.16, and [SR 3.8.1.18].</p> <p>-----</p> <p>For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," except SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.17, SR 3.8.1.19, and SR 3.8.1.20, are applicable.</p>	<p>In accordance with applicable SRs</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	A.3 Restore battery charger[s] to OPERABLE status.	7 days]
<p>B. One [or more] required DC electrical power subsystem[s] inoperable [for reasons other than Condition A.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met].</p>	<p>B.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>B.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.1¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.3² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.4³ Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

3.9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.8 [Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."]

[One] inverter[s] shall be OPERABLE.]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----
 This second option above applies for plants having a pre-ITS licensing basis (CTS) for electrical power requirements during shutdown conditions that required only [one] inverter to be OPERABLE. The "[or more]" optional wording in Condition A is also eliminated for this case. The first option above is adopted for plants that have a CTS requiring the same level of DC electrical power subsystem/inverter support as is required for power operating conditions.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [or more] [required] inverters inoperable.	A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable. <u>OR</u> A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. <u>AND</u>	Immediately Immediately

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.1¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.3² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.4³ Initiate action to restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, [frequency,] and alignments to required AC vital buses.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required AC, DC, or AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable. <u>OR</u>	Immediately
	A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	A.2.2 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	A.2.3 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration. <u>AND</u>	Immediately

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.1 Boron Concentration

LCO 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

-----NOTE-----
 Only applicable to the refueling canal and refueling cavity when connected to the RCS.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Boron concentration not within limit.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.1 Suspend positive reactivity additions.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2 Initiate action to restore boron concentration to within limit.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified in the COLR.	72 hours

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation

LCO 3.9.2 Two source range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [required] source range neutron flux monitor inoperable.	A.1 Suspend <u>CORE ALTERATIONS</u> .	Immediately
	AND A.2 Suspend operations that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.	Immediately
B. Two [required] source range neutron flux monitors inoperable.	B.1 Initiate action to restore one source range neutron flux monitor to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
	AND B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1.	Once per 12 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.	12 hours

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)] are available,
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1

An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the one train with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to declare features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~, B.1, B.2, ~~B.3~~ and B.4 ³

With the offsite circuit not available to all required trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS are not entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized train.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within [12] hours (Required Action A.2).

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to [2] amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial [12] hour period the battery float current is not less than or equal to [2] amps this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for the inoperable battery charger to 7 days. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g., balance of plant non-Class 1E battery charger). The 7 day Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2, ~~B.2.3~~, and B.2.4 (3)

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting sufficient systems to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement]. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC power source(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in

BASES

APPLICABILITY The inverter[s] required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6, and during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core,
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)] are available,
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4 ③

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS fuel movement [involving handling recently irradiated fuel], and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6).] Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverter[s] and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter [6].
 2. FSAR, Chapter [14].
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BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~, and A.2.5⁴

Although redundant required features may require redundant trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ ~~and~~ [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystems LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6) with coolant at boron concentrations less than required to assure the RCS boron concentration is maintained.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required decay heat removal (DHR) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.5 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the DHR ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.6 is provided to direct declaring DHR inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate DHR actions.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (and A.2)

Continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the RCS, the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity is less than its limit, all operations involving ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position. Operations that individually add limited positive reactivity (e.g., temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations), but when combined with all other operations affecting core reactivity (e.g., intentional boration) result in overall net negative reactivity addition, are not precluded by this action.

A.2

In addition to immediately suspending ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and positive reactivity additions, action to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately.

In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and concentration, there is no unique Design Basis Event that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the best source available for unit conditions.

Once actions have been initiated, they must be continued until the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

positive reactivity additions

With only one [required] source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1 must be suspended immediately. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

B.1

With no [required] source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, action to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, action shall be continued until a source range neutron flux monitor is restored to OPERABLE status.

B.2

With no [required] source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, there is no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and positive reactivity additions are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the source range neutron flux monitors are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3.9.1.1 to ensure that the required boron concentration exists.

The Completion Time of once per 12 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration and ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this time period.

BASES

LCO

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The allowance to have containment personnel airlock doors open and penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated during fuel movement ~~(and CORE ALTERATIONS)~~ is based on (1) confirmatory dose calculations of a fuel handling accident as approved by the NRC staff which indicate acceptable radiological consequences and (2) commitments from the licensee to implement acceptable administrative procedures that ensure in the event of a refueling accident (even though the containment fission product control function is not required to meet acceptable dose consequences) that the open airlock can and will be promptly closed following containment evacuation and that the open penetration(s) can and will be promptly closed. The time to close such penetrations or combination of penetrations shall be included in the confirmatory dose calculations.

This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel] in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity from containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations [and the containment personnel airlocks]. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the RB purge isolation signal. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure releases through the valves are terminated such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated under administrative controls. Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The containment personnel airlock doors may be open during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel in the containment provided that one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel airlock door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.

1.1 Definitions

CHANNEL CHECK	A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.
CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST (COT)	A COT shall be the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY. The COT shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the required alarm, interlock, and trip setpoints required for channel OPERABILITY such that the setpoints are within the necessary range and accuracy. The COT may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps.
CORE ALTERATION	CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)	The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.
DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131	DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in [Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1962, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites," or those listed in Table E-7 of Regulatory Guide 1.109, Rev. 1, NRC, 1977, or ICRP 30, Supplement to Part 1, page 192-212, Table titled, "Committed Dose Equivalent in Target Organs or Tissues per Intake of Unit Activity"].

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.4³ Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>
<p>B. One required DG inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	B.4.3 Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.2.1</p> <p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.9 through SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.13 through SR 3.8.1.16, and [SR 3.8.1.18].</p> <p>-----</p> <p>For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," except SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.17, SR 3.8.1.19, and SR 3.8.1.20, are applicable.</p>	<p>In accordance with applicable SRs</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	A.3 Restore battery charger[s] to OPERABLE status.	7 days]
<p>B. One [or more] required DC electrical power subsystem[s] inoperable [for reasons other than Condition A.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Required Actions and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met].</p>	<p>B.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>B.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.3 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.8 [Inverters shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."]

[One] inverter[s] shall be OPERABLE.]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----
 This second option above applies for plants having a pre-ITS licensing basis (CTS) for electrical power requirements during shutdown conditions that required only [one] inverter to be OPERABLE. The "[or more]" optional wording in Condition A is also eliminated for this case. The first option above is adopted for plants that have a CTS requiring the same level of DC electrical power subsystem/inverter support as is required for power operating conditions.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [or more] [required] inverter[s] inoperable.	A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable. <u>OR</u> A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. <u>AND</u>	Immediately Immediately

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.1¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.3² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.4³ Initiate action to restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, [frequency,] and alignments to required AC vital buses.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required AC, DC, or AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable.	Immediately
	<u>OR</u>	
	A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.1 Boron Concentration

LCO 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

-----NOTE-----
 Only applicable to the refueling canal and refueling cavity when connected to the RCS.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Boron concentration not within limit.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.1 Suspend positive reactivity additions.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2 Initiate action to restore boron concentration to within limit.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified in the COLR.	72 hours

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 [Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

This Technical Specification is not required for units that have analyzed a boron dilution event in MODE 6. It is required for those units that have not analyzed a boron dilution event in MODE 6. For units which have not analyzed a boron dilution event in MODE 6, the isolation of all unborated water sources is required to preclude this event from occurring.

LCO 3.9.2 Each valve used to isolate unborated water sources shall be secured in the closed position.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each unborated water source isolation valve.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>A. -----NOTE----- Required Action A.3 must be completed whenever Condition A is entered. ----- One or more valves not secured in closed position.</p>	<p>A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. <u>AND</u> A.2.1 Initiate actions to secure valve in closed position. <u>AND</u> A.3.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1.</p>	<p>Immediately Immediately 4 hours</p>

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation

LCO 3.9.3 Two source range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE.

AND

[One source range audible [alarm] [count rate] circuit shall be OPERABLE.]

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [required] source range neutron flux monitor inoperable.	A.1 Suspend <u>CORE ALTERATIONS</u> .	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> <u>positive reactivity additions.</u> A.2 Suspend operations that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.	Immediately
B. Two [required] source range neutron flux monitors inoperable.	B.1 Initiate action to restore one source range neutron flux monitor to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1.	Once per 12 hours

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1

An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the one train with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable, with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~, B.1, B.2, ~~B.3~~ and B.4

With the offsite circuit not available to all required trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

If the charger is operating in the current limit mode after 2 hours that is an indication that the battery is partially discharged and its capacity margins will be reduced. The time to return the battery to its fully charged condition in this case is a function of the battery charger capacity, the amount of loads on the associated DC system, the amount of the previous discharge, and the recharge characteristic of the battery. The charge time can be extensive, and there is not adequate assurance that it can be recharged within [12] hours (Required Action A.2).

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to [2] amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial [12] hour period the battery float current is not less than or equal to [2] amps this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for the inoperable battery charger to 7 days. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g., balance of plant non-Class 1E battery charger). The 7 day Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2, ~~B.2.3~~ and B.2.4³

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting sufficient systems to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement]. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC power source(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions) that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The inverter[s] required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 and during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core,
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)] are available,
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, ~~A.2.3~~ and A.2.4³

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE Inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ [recently] irradiated fuel movement, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions.] By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~ and A.2.~~5~~⁴

Although redundant required features may require redundant trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal (RHR) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR actions.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the RCS, the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity is less than its limit, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position. Operations that individually add limited positive reactivity (e.g., temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations), but when combined with all other operations affecting core reactivity (e.g., intentional boration) result in overall net negative reactivity addition, are not precluded by this action.

A.3

In addition to immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately.

In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and concentration, no unique Design Basis Event must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the best source available for unit conditions.

Once actions have been initiated, they must be continued until the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration.

BASES

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table has been modified by a Note that allows separate Condition entry for each unborated water source isolation valve.

A.1

Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with this LCO. With any valve used to isolate unborated water sources not secured in the closed position, all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS must be suspended immediately. The Completion Time of "immediately" for performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Condition A has been modified by a Note to require that Required Action A.3 be completed whenever Condition A is entered.

A.2 1

Preventing inadvertent dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration is dependent on maintaining the unborated water isolation valves secured closed. Securing the valves in the closed position ensures that the valves cannot be inadvertently opened. The Completion Time of "immediately" requires an operator to initiate actions to close an open valve and secure the isolation valve in the closed position immediately. Once actions are initiated, they must be continued until the valves are secured in the closed position.

A.3 2

Due to the potential of having diluted the boron concentration of the reactor coolant, SR 3.9.1.1 (verification of boron concentration) must be performed whenever Condition A is entered to demonstrate that the required boron concentration exists. The Completion Time of 4 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----
The need for a safety analysis for an uncontrolled boron dilution accident is eliminated by isolating all unborated water sources as required by LCO 3.9.2, "Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves."

The source range neutron flux monitors satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO This LCO requires that two source range neutron flux monitors be OPERABLE to ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in core reactivity. To be OPERABLE, each monitor must provide visual indication [in the control room]. [In addition, at least one of the two monitors must provide an OPERABLE audible [alarm] [count rate] function to alert the operators to the initiation of a boron dilution event.]

APPLICABILITY In MODE 6, the source range neutron flux monitors must be OPERABLE to determine changes in core reactivity. There are no other direct means available to check core reactivity levels. In MODES 2, 3, 4, and 5, these same installed source range detectors and circuitry are also required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation [and LCO 3.3.9, "BDPS"]].

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 *positive reactivity additions*

With only one source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, CORE ALTERATIONS and introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1 must be suspended immediately. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

B.1

With no source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, action to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, action shall be continued until a source range neutron flux monitor is restored to OPERABLE status.

B.2

With no source range neutron flux monitor OPERABLE, there are no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity additions are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the source range neutron flux monitors are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3.9.1.1 to ensure that the required boron concentration exists.

The Completion Time of once per 12 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration and ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this time period.

[C.1

With no audible [alarm] [count rate] OPERABLE, prompt and definite indication of a boron dilution event, consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis, is lost. In this situation, the boron dilution event may not be detected quickly enough to assure sufficient time is available for operators to manually isolate the unborated water source and stop the dilution prior to the loss of SHUTDOWN MARGIN. Therefore, action must be taken to prevent an inadvertent boron dilution event from occurring. This is accomplished by isolating all the unborated water flow paths to the Reactor Coolant System. Isolating these flow paths ensures that an inadvertent dilution of the reactor coolant boron concentration is prevented. The Completion Time of "Immediately" assures a prompt response by operations and requires an operator to initiate actions to isolate an affected flow path immediately. Once actions are initiated, they must be continued until all the necessary flow paths are isolated or the circuit is restored to OPERABLE status.]

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES

During ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel]. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Reference 3, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LCO 3.9.7, "Refueling Cavity Water Level," in conjunction with a minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to [irradiated fuel movement with containment closure capability or a minimum decay time of [x] days without containment closure capability], ensures that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan, Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 (Ref. 3), defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure will be 25% of 10 CFR 100 values or the NRC staff approved licensing basis (e.g., a specified fraction of 10 CFR 100 limits).

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----
The allowance to have containment personnel air lock doors open and penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated during fuel movement ~~and CORE ALTERATIONS~~ is based on (1) confirmatory dose calculations of a fuel handling accident as approved by the NRC staff which indicate acceptable radiological consequences and (2) commitments from the licensee to implement acceptable administrative procedures that ensure in the event of a refueling accident (even though the containment fission product control function is not required to meet acceptable dose consequences) that the open air lock can and will be promptly closed following containment evacuation and that the open penetration(s) can and will be promptly closed. The time to close such penetrations or combination of penetrations shall be included in the confirmatory dose calculations.

This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel] in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations [and the containment personnel air locks]. For the OPERABLE

BASES

LCO (continued)

containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. The OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and, therefore, meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure that releases through the valves are terminated, such that radiological doses are within the acceptance limit.

The LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated under administrative controls. Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The containment personnel air lock doors may be open during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel in the containment provided that one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel air lock door will be closed following an evacuation of containment.

APPLICABILITY

The containment penetration requirements are applicable during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment is not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. [Additionally, due to radioactive decay, a fuel handling accident involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [x] days) will result in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100 even without containment closure capability.] Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.

1.1 Definitions

CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

- a. Analog and bistable channels - the injection of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY, and
- b. Digital computer channels - the use of diagnostic programs to test digital computer hardware and the injection of simulated process data into the channel to verify OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required for channel OPERABILITY.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.

CORE ALTERATION

CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components [excluding control element assemblies (CEAs) withdrawn into the upper guide structure], within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR)

The COLR is the unit specific document that provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.3.8.4</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on required containment radiation monitor channel. Verify setpoint [Allowable Value] is in accordance with the following:</p> <p>Containment Gaseous Monitor: ≤ [2X background] Containment Particulate Monitor: ≤ [2X background] Containment Iodine Monitor: ≤ [2X background] Containment Area Gamma Monitor: ≤ [2X background]</p>	<p>92 days</p>
<p>SR 3.3.8.5</p> <p>-----NOTE----- Surveillance of Actuation Logic shall include the actuation of each initiation relay and verification of the proper operation of each initiation relay.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on required CPIS Actuation Logic channel.</p>	<p>[18] months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.8.6</p> <p>Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on required containment radiation monitor channel.</p>	<p>[18] months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.8.7</p> <p>Verify that response time of required CPIS channel is within limits.</p>	<p>[18] months</p>
<p>SR 3.3.8.8</p> <p>Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on required CPIS Manual Trip channel.</p>	<p>[18] months</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in a loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.4³ Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>
<p>B. One required DG inoperable.</p>	<p>B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2¹ Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2² Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	B.4 ³ Initiate action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.2.1</p> <p>-----NOTE----- The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.9 through SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.13 through SR 3.8.1.16, and [SR 3.8.1.18].</p> <p>-----</p> <p>For AC sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," except SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.17, SR 3.8.1.19, and SR 3.8.1.20, are applicable.</p>	<p>In accordance with applicable SRs</p>

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	A.3 Restore battery charger[s] to OPERABLE status.	7 days]
<p>B. One [or more] required DC electrical power subsystem[s] inoperable [for reasons other than Condition A.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met].</p>	<p>B.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.</p> <p><u>OR</u></p> <p>B.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.2 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2.3 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.8 [Inverter(s) shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class 1E AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown."]

[One] inverter[s] shall be OPERABLE.]

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----
 This second option above applies for plants having a pre-ITS licensing basis (CTS) for electrical power requirements during shutdown conditions that required only [one] inverter to be OPERABLE. The "[or more]" optional wording in Condition A is also eliminated for this case. The first option above is adopted for plants that have a CTS requiring the same level of DC electrical power subsystem/inverter support as is required for power operating conditions.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [or more] [required] inverter[s] inoperable.	A.1 Declare affected required feature(s) inoperable.	Immediately
	<p><u>OR</u></p> <p>A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p>	Immediately

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
	<p>A.2.2.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.2.2.3 Initiate action to restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p> <p>Immediately</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage, [frequency,] and alignments to required AC vital buses.</p>	<p>7 days</p>

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown

LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6,
 During movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

-----NOTE-----
 LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more required AC, DC, or AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.	A.1 Declare associated supported required feature(s) inoperable. <u>OR</u>	Immediately
	A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	A.2.1 Suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. <u>AND</u>	Immediately
	A.2.2 Suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration. <u>AND</u>	Immediately

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.1 Boron Concentration

LCO 3.9.1 Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System, [the refueling canal, and the refueling cavity] shall be maintained within the limit specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

-----NOTE-----
 Only applicable to the refueling canal and refueling cavity when connected to the RCS.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. Boron concentration not within limit.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.2.1 Suspend positive reactivity additions.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	A.3.2 Initiate action to restore boron concentration to within limit.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the limit specified in the COLR.	72 hours

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation

LCO 3.9.2 Two source range monitors (SRMs) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One [required] SRM inoperable.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. <i>positive reactivity additions.</i>	Immediately
	A.2 Suspend operations that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.	Immediately
B. Two [required] SRMs inoperable.	B.1 Initiate action to restore one SRM to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1.	Once per 12 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.	12 hours

BASES

LCO

LCO 3.3.8 requires one CPIS channel to be OPERABLE. The required channel consists of [particulate, iodine, gaseous, and area radiation monitors]; Actuation Logic; and Manual Trip. The specific Allowable Values for the setpoints of the CPIS are listed in the SRs.

Only the Allowable Values are specified for each trip Function in the LCO. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable, provided that the difference between the nominal trip setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or greater than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the transient and accident analyses. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its Allowable Value.

Each Allowable Value specified is more conservative than the analytical limit assumed in the transient and accident analysis in order to account for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the trip function. These uncertainties are defined in the "Plant Protection System Selection of Trip Setpoint Values" (Ref. 2).

The Bases for the LCO on CPIS are discussed below for each Function:

a. Manual Trip

The LCO on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trip and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CPIS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. Only one manual channel of CPIS is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, since the CPIS is redundant with the CIAS and SIAS. Only one manual channel of CPIS is required during CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, since there are additional means of closing the containment purge valves in the event of a channel failure.

b. Airborne Radiation and Containment Area Radiation

The LCO on the radiation channels requires that each channel be OPERABLE for each Actuation Logic channel, since they are not totally redundant to each other.

The trip setpoint of twice background is selected to allow detection of small deviations from normal. The absolute value of the trip setpoint in MODES 5 and 6 differs from the setpoint in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 so that a fuel handling accident can be detected in the lower background radiation expected in these MODES.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)SR 3.3.8.3

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the required containment radiation monitoring channel to ensure the entire channel will perform its intended function. Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified in SR 3.3.8.3 and left consistent with the assumptions of the plant specific setpoint analysis (Ref. 4). A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Frequency of 92 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 92 day Frequency is a rare event.

A Note to the SR indicates this Surveillance is required to be met in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 only.

SR 3.3.8.4

A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the required containment radiation monitoring channel to ensure the entire channel will perform its intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified in SR 3.3.8.4 and left consistent with the assumptions of the plant specific setpoint methodology (Ref. 4). The Frequency of 92 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 92 day interval is a rare event.

A Note to the SR indicates that this test is only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident [involving handling [recently] irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)] are available,
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1

An offsite circuit would be considered inoperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains may be required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable, with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO's ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~, B.1, B.2, ~~B.3~~, and B.4 ³

With the offsite circuit not available to all required trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS are not entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.10 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized train.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

Required Action A.2 requires that the battery float current be verified as less than or equal to [2] amps. This indicates that, if the battery had been discharged as the result of the inoperable battery charger, it has now been fully recharged. If at the expiration of the initial [12] hour period the battery float current is not less than or equal to [2] amps this indicates there may be additional battery problems and the battery must be declared inoperable.

Required Action A.3 limits the restoration time for the inoperable battery charger to 7 days. This action is applicable if an alternate means of restoring battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage has been used (e.g., balance of plant non-Class 1E battery charger). The 7 day Completion Time reflects a reasonable time to effect restoration of the qualified battery charger to OPERABLE status.

B.1, B.2.1, B.2.2, ~~B.2.3~~ and B.2.4 ³

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, the remaining train with DC power available may be capable of supporting sufficient systems to allow continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS and~~ [recently] irradiated fuel movement]. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated DC power source(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCO ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions) that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safety operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

BASES

APPLICABILITY

The inverter[s] required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core,
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days)] are available,
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available, and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

Inverter requirements for MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6, LCO .0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3, while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 would require the unit to be shutdown unnecessarily.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, ~~A.2.3~~ and A.2.4⁽³⁾

[If two trains are required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown," the remaining OPERABLE inverters may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS [recently] irradiated fuel movement, operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, and operations with a potential for positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6).] Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with the associated inverter(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LCOs' Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend **CORE ALTERATIONS** movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required inverter[s] and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary inverter power to the unit safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required inverters should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the unit safety systems may be without power or powered from a constant voltage source transformer.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the inverters are functioning properly with all required circuit breakers closed and AC vital buses energized from the inverter. The verification of proper voltage and frequency output ensures that the required power is readily available for the instrumentation connected to the AC vital buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the inverters and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to inverter malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Chapter [6].
 2. FSAR, Chapter [15].
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BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, ~~A.2.4~~, and A.2.5⁴

Although redundant required features may require redundant trains of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem train may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and [recently] irradiated fuel movement. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystems LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM (MODE 5) or boron concentration (MODE 6). Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum SDM or boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum SDM or refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Introduction of temperature changes including temperature increases when operating with a positive MTC must also be evaluated to ensure they do not result in a loss of required SDM.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the unit safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required shutdown cooling (SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate SDC actions.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (and A.2)

Continuation of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or positive reactivity additions (including actions to reduce boron concentration) is contingent upon maintaining the unit in compliance with the LCO. If the boron concentration of any coolant volume in the RCS, the refueling canal, or the refueling cavity is less than its limit, all operations involving ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or positive reactivity additions must be suspended immediately. Operations that individually add limited positive reactivity (e.g., temperature fluctuations from inventory addition or temperature control fluctuations), but when combined with all other operations affecting core reactivity (e.g., intentional boration) result in overall net negative reactivity addition, are not precluded by this action.

Suspension of ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and positive reactivity additions shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

A.2 (2)

In addition to immediately suspending ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and positive reactivity additions, boration to restore the concentration must be initiated immediately.

In determining the required combination of boration flow rate and concentration, there is no unique design basis event that must be satisfied. The only requirement is to restore the boron concentration to its required value as soon as possible. In order to raise the boron concentration as soon as possible, the operator should begin boration with the best source available for unit conditions.

Once boration is initiated, it must be continued until the boron concentration is restored. The restoration time depends on the amount of boron that must be injected to reach the required concentration.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

This SR ensures the coolant boron concentration in the RCS, and connected portions of the refueling canal and the refueling cavity, is within the COLR limits. The boron concentration of the coolant in each required volume is determined periodically by chemical analysis. Prior to re-connecting portions of the refueling canal or the refueling cavity to the RCS, this SR must be met per SR 3.0.4. If any dilution activity has occurred while the cavity or canal were disconnected from the RCS, this SR ensures the correct boron concentration prior to communication with the RCS.

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

positive
reactivity
additions

With only one SRM OPERABLE, redundancy has been lost. Since these instruments are the only direct means of monitoring core reactivity conditions, ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ and introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1 must be suspended immediately. Suspending positive reactivity additions that could result in failure to meet the minimum boron concentration limit is required to assure continued safe operation. Introduction of coolant inventory must be from sources that have a boron concentration greater than that what would be required in the RCS for minimum refueling boron concentration. This may result in an overall reduction in RCS boron concentration, but provides acceptable margin to maintaining subcritical operation. Performance of Required Action A.1 shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

B.1

With no SRM OPERABLE, action to restore a monitor to OPERABLE status shall be initiated immediately. Once initiated, action shall be continued until an SRM is restored to OPERABLE status.

B.2

With no SRM OPERABLE, there is no direct means of detecting changes in core reactivity. However, since ~~CORE ALTERATIONS and~~ positive reactivity additions are not to be made, the core reactivity condition is stabilized until the SRMs are OPERABLE. This stabilized condition is determined by performing SR 3.9.1.1 to verify that the required boron concentration exists.

The Completion Time of once per 12 hours is sufficient to obtain and analyze a reactor coolant sample for boron concentration and ensures that unplanned changes in boron concentration would be identified. The 12 hour Frequency is reasonable, considering the low probability of a change in core reactivity during this period.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted to within regulatory limits.

The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems. The normal subsystem includes a 42 inch purge penetration and a 42 inch exhaust penetration. The second subsystem, a minipurge system, includes an 8 inch purge penetration and an 8 inch exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the two valves in each of the normal purge and exhaust penetrations are secured in the closed position. The two valves in each of the two minipurge penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed automatically by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). Neither of the subsystems is subject to a Specification in MODE 5.

In MODE 6, large air exchanges are necessary to conduct refueling operations. The normal 42 inch purge system is used for this purpose and all valves are closed by the ESFAS in accordance with LCO 3.3.2, "Reactor Protective System (RPS) - Shutdown."

[The minipurge system remains operational in MODE 6 and all four valves are also closed by the ESFAS.

[or]

The minipurge system is not used in MODE 6. All four [8] inch valves are secured in the closed position.]

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods must be approved and may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during [recently] irradiated fuel movements (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY
ANALYSES

During ~~CORE ALTERATIONS~~ or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel]. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 2). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed in Ref. 3,

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LCO 3.9.6, "Refueling Water Level," in conjunction with minimum decay time of [72] hours prior to [irradiated fuel movement with containment closure capability or a minimum decay time of [x] days without containment closure capability], ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure are contained in Standard Review Plan Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 (Ref. 3), which defines "well within" 10 CFR 100 to be 25% or less of the 10 CFR 100 values.

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The allowance to have containment personnel air lock doors open and penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated during fuel movement ~~and CORE ALTERATIONS~~ is based on (1) confirmatory dose calculations of a fuel handling accident as approved by the NRC staff which indicate acceptable radiological consequences and (2) commitments from the licensee to implement acceptable administrative procedures that ensure in the event of a refueling accident (even though the containment fission product control function is not required to meet acceptable dose consequences) that the open air lock can and will be promptly closed following containment evacuation and that the open penetration(s) can and will be promptly closed. The time to close penetrations or combination of penetrations shall be included in the confirmatory dose calculations.

This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident [involving handling recently irradiated fuel] in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations [and the containment personnel air locks]. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that these penetrations are isolable by the Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation System. The

BASES

LCO (continued)

OPERABILITY requirements for this LCO ensure that the automatic purge and exhaust valve closure times specified in the FSAR can be achieved and therefore meet the assumptions used in the safety analysis to ensure releases through the valves are terminated, such that the radiological doses are within the acceptance limit. The LCO is modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths with direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated under administrative controls. Administrative controls ensure that 1) appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the penetration flow path during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, and 2) specified individuals are designated and readily available to isolate the flow path in the event of a fuel handling accident.

The containment personnel air lock doors may be open during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel in the containment provided that one door is capable of being closed in the event of a fuel handling accident. Should a fuel handling accident occur inside containment, one personnel airlock door will be closed following an evacuations of containment.

APPLICABILITY

The containment penetration requirements are applicable during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for the limiting fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1, "Containment." In MODES 5 and 6, when movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment is not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. [Additionally, due to radioactive decay, a fuel handling accident involving handling recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous [X] days) will result in doses that are well within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100 even without containment closure capability.] Therefore, under these conditions no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.

-----REVIEWER'S NOTE-----

The addition of the term "recently" associated with handling irradiated fuel in all of the containment function Technical Specification requirements is only applicable to those licensees who have demonstrated by analysis that after sufficient radioactive decay has occurred, off-site doses resulting from a fuel handling accident remain below the Standard Review Plan limits (well within 10 CFR 100).