VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND. VIRGINIA 23261 October 24, 1975

Regulatory!

File Cy

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Serial No. 751 PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket Nos. 50-280 License Nos. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-S1-75-23.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

Le. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations

Enclosures 40 copies of A0-S1-75-23

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid

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	LICENSEE	EVENT REPOR	AO-SI-	75-23
CONTROL E			(PLEASE PRINT ALL RE	OURED INFORMATION]
LICENSEE NAME 01 V A S P S 7 8 9	LICENSE NUM 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 14 15		LCENSE 4 1 1 1 1 0 26 30	EVENT TYPE 011 31 32
CATEGORY         REPORT           010001         P         0         T           7         8         57         58         59	SDURCE DOCKET NUM	2 8 0 1 <u>1</u> 68 69	EVENT CATE 0 1 3 7 5 74 7	REPORT DATE 1 0 2 1 7 5 5 80
EVENT DESCRIPTION	nutdown, during the perf	ormance of the	periodic calibrat:	ion of Pressur-
7 8 9 03 Lizer Pressure 1	Instrumentation, channel	s P-1-455, P-1-	-P456, and P-1-457	80 were found to
	nigh by 26.4 psi, 42.0 p	si and 29.4 psi	, respectively.	
Linka Lawrence in the second second	Reactor Trip Setpoint wa	s conservative	by 41.4 psi, 57.0	المسيسي ومستعد ومناجع ومستعد والمستعد
7 8 9 06 (psi for the th 7 8 9	ree channels respectivel		essure Reactor Trip	o (con't) 80 80
SYSTEM CAUSE CODE CODE 7 8 9 10 11 12	COMPONENT CCDE SUPP I N S T R U N 2 17 43			80
CAUSE DESCRIPTION	ressure transmitter used	(Fisher-Porter	50 EP) incorpora	tes an adjust-
7 6 9 09   able suppression	on-elevation spring whic	h establishes t	the instruments op	erating range.
	the suppression-elevatio	n spring adjust	s the point at wh	······································
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0 N/A		. DISCOVERY DESCI	80 NIPTION
FORM OF ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE	N/A	N/A	LOCATION OF REL	]
7 8 9 10 PERSONNEL EXPOSURE NUMBER TYPE		44 45		08
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7 8 9 11 12 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCI	ES	·.		80
15   N/A 7 8 9				
LOSS OR DAMAGE TO	FACILITY			
16 Z N/A 7 8 9 10	······································		- 	ا 80
			·	
7 8 9 ADDITIONAL FACTORS				80
18Attached she78	et.		· ·	 
19	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		·.	
789 NAME:E	. M. Sweeney, Jr.		(804) 357	-3184

## EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

and the Low Pressure Safety Injection Setpoint were non-conservative by 11.4 psi, 27.0 psi and 14.4 psi, respectively. (Figures reflect that setpoints used are 15 psi conservative relative to limits of Technical Specification 2.3-2). A0-S1-75-23

## CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

diaphram movement begins to deflect the range beam. The suppression-elevation spring  $\underline{F}$  is a coarse zero adjust. Fine zero adjust is by the "zero spring" which adjusts the static loading of the force motor. The manufacturer's calibration procedure specifies that the "zero spring" be used for adjustments of no greater than 0.5 per cent. (over adjustment of the "zero spring" could result in a greater tendency toward both zero and span shift). Discussion with instrument technicians and a review of previous calibrations indicates that the zero spring had been used for single and cumulative adjustments of greater than 0.5 per cent. The drift of P-1-455, P-1-456, and P-1-457 has thus been attributed to overranging of the zero spring in prior calibrations.

To prevent recurrence of this error the procedure has been revised to specify re-zeroing of the coarse adjustment at each calibration with zero spring adjustment of no greater than 0.5 per cent.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Due to the small magnitude of the setpoint error the activation of a reactor trip or safety injection would not have been significantly delayed. Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the general public were not affected.