VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

October 24, 1975

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 751
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket Nos. 50-280
License Nos. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. AO-S1-75-23.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures
40 copies of AO-S1-75-23

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid

12531

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

AO-S1-75-23

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Received w/Ltr Dated 10-24-75

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 VASPS1	00-000-00	4 1 1 1 0	01
7 8 9 14	15 25	26 30	31 32

CON'T	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01	P 0	T	L	0 5 0 - 0 2 8 0	1 0 1 3 7 5	1 0 2 1 7 5
7 8	57 58	59	60	61 68	69 74	75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 At refueling shutdown, during the performance of the periodic calibration of Pressur-
03 izer Pressure Instrumentation, channels P-1-455, P-1-P456, and P-1-457 were found to
04 be indicating high by 26.4 psi, 42.0 psi and 29.4 psi, respectively. As a result the
05 High Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint was conservative by 41.4 psi, 57.0 psi and 44.4
06 psi for the three channels respectively. The Low Pressure Reactor Trip (con't)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	I A	A	I N S T R U	N	F 1 2 0	Y
7 8 9	10	11	12 17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The model of pressure transmitter used (Fisher-Porter 50 EP) incorporates an adjust-
09 able suppression-elevation spring which establishes the instruments operating range.
10 Adjustment of the suppression-elevation spring adjusts the point at which (con't)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	H	0 0 0	N/A	B	N/A
7 8	9	10 12	13 44	45	46 80

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	N/A	N/A
7 8	9	10	11 44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	0 0 0	Z	N/A
7 8 9	11	12	13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	0 0 0	N/A
7 8 9	11	12 80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	N/A
7 8 9	10	80

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 Attached sheet.

19

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr. PHONE: (804) 357-3184

GPO 881.667

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

and the Low Pressure Safety Injection Setpoint were non-conservative by 11.4 psi, 27.0 psi and 14.4 psi, respectively. (Figures reflect that setpoints used are 15 psi conservative relative to limits of Technical Specification 2.3-2). AO-S1-75-23

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

diaphram movement begins to deflect the range beam. The suppression-elevation spring is a coarse zero adjust. Fine zero adjust is by the "zero spring" which adjusts the static loading of the force motor. The manufacturer's calibration procedure specifies that the "zero spring" be used for adjustments of no greater than 0.5 per cent. (over adjustment of the "zero spring" could result in a greater tendency toward both zero and span shift). Discussion with instrument technicians and a review of previous calibrations indicates that the zero spring had been used for single and cumulative adjustments of greater than 0.5 per cent. The drift of P-1-455, P-1-456, and P-1-457 has thus been attributed to overranging of the zero spring in prior calibrations.

To prevent recurrence of this error the procedure has been revised to specify re-zeroing of the coarse adjustment at each calibration with zero spring adjustment of no greater than 0.5 per cent.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Due to the small magnitude of the setpoint error the activation of a reactor trip or safety injection would not have been significantly delayed. Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the general public were not affected.