

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

October 24, 1975



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 751
PO&M/JTB:clw

Docket Nos. 50-280
License Nos. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-S1-75-23.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.


Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "C. M. Stallings".

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures
40 copies of A0-S1-75-23

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid



12531

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

A0-S1-75-23

CONTROL BLOCK: 1

Regulatory Docket File

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Received 11/14/75 Filed 10-24-75

LICENSEE NAME

LICENSE NUMBER

LICENSE TYPE

EVENT TYPE

01 V A S P S 1 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 0 0 1

CATEGORY

REPORT TYPE

REPORT SOURCE

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

01 CONT P O T L 0 5 0 - 0 2 8 0 1 0 1 3 7 5 1 0 2 1 7 5

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 At refueling shutdown, during the performance of the periodic calibration of Pressur- 80
03 izer Pressure Instrumentation, channels P-1-455, P-1-P456, and P-1-457 were found to 80
04 be indicating high by 26.4 psi, 42.0 psi and 29.4 psi, respectively. As a result the 80
05 High Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint was conservative by 41.4 psi, 57.0 psi and 44.4 80
06 psi for the three channels respectively. The Low Pressure Reactor Trip (con't) 80

SYSTEM CODE

CAUSE CODE

COMPONENT CODE

PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

VIOLATION

07 I A A I N S T R U N F 1 2 0 Y

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 The model of pressure transmitter used (Fisher-Porter 50 EP) incorporates an adjust- 80
09 able suppression-elevation spring which establishes the instruments operating range. 80
10 Adjustment of the suppression-elevation spring adjusts the point at which (con't) 80

FACILITY STATUS

% POWER

OTHER STATUS

METHOD OF DISCOVERY

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

11 H 0 0 0 N/A B N/A

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED

CONTENT OF RELEASE

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY

LOCATION OF RELEASE

12 Z Z N/A N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

13 0 0 0 Z N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

14 0 0 0 N/A

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE

DESCRIPTION

16 Z N/A

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 Attached sheet.

19

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr.

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

EVENT DESCRIPTION (con't)

and the Low Pressure Safety Injection Setpoint were non-conservative by 11.4 psi, 27.0 psi and 14.4 psi, respectively. (Figures reflect that setpoints used are 15 psi conservative relative to limits of Technical Specification 2.3-2). AO-S1-75-23

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

diaphragm movement begins to deflect the range beam. The suppression-elevation spring ~~is~~ is a coarse zero adjust. Fine zero adjust is by the "zero spring" which adjusts the static loading of the force motor. The manufacturer's calibration procedure specifies that the "zero spring" be used for adjustments of no greater than 0.5 per cent. (over adjustment of the "zero spring" could result in a greater tendency toward both zero and span shift). Discussion with instrument technicians and a review of previous calibrations indicates that the zero spring had been used for single and cumulative adjustments of greater than 0.5 per cent. The drift of P-1-455, P-1-456, and P-1-457 has thus been attributed to overranging of the zero spring in prior calibrations.

To prevent recurrence of this error the procedure has been revised to specify re-zeroing of the coarse adjustment at each calibration with zero spring adjustment of no greater than 0.5 per cent.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

Due to the small magnitude of the setpoint error the activation of a reactor trip or safety injection would not have been significantly delayed. Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the general public were not affected.