



VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY  
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

February 11, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 818  
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 677-S  
PO&M/ALH:clw

Docket Nos. 50-280  
License Nos. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Updated Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-S1-75-16.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "C. M. Stallings".

C. M. Stallings  
Vice President-Power Supply  
and Production Operations

Enclosures  
40 copies of A0-S1-75-16

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Updated Report  
AO-S1-75-16

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME						LICENSE NUMBER						LICENSE TYPE					EVENT TYPE							
01	V	A	S	P	S	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	1
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32															

CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER						EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE										
01	CONT	P	O	0	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	0	0	8	2	2	7	5	0	2	0	2	7	6
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80	80													

### EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | Technical Specification 2.3 was violated on August 22, 1975 and again on August 23, 1975 when Channel II  $\Delta T/T_{avg}$  protection drifted in the nonconservative direction (AO-S1-75-16).

03 |

04 |

05 |

06 |

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION				
07	I	A	E	V	A	L	V	E	X	N	X	9	9	9	Y
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | The apparent mode of failure is moisture accumulation between sensor insulation and the copper lead wire due to inleakage from the terminal lug end of the RTD. Review by prime component supplier (Westinghouse) and the component manufacturer (con't)

09 |

10 |

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION					
11	E	0	9	8	N/A			A	N/A			
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80			

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE				
12	Z	N/A			N/A				
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80		

### PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A			
7	8	9	11	12	13	80		

### PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION					
14	0	0	0	N/A		
7	8	9	11	12	80	

### OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | N/A

### LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION				
16	Z	N/A			
7	8	9	10	80	

### PUBLICITY

17 | N/A

### ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 |

19 |

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr. PHONE: (804) 357-3184

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (con't)

(Rosemount) has not provided a complete solution to the problem of RTD failure upon steam/water impingement. However, a RTD of revised internal construction is now available which is designed to have better resistance to water intrusion. Accordingly, all RTD's on Unit No. 1 were replaced with the improved version during its refueling outage. A similar replacement will be made on Unit No. 2 during its next refueling outage. The performance of the new RTD's will continue to be assessed and evaluated during subsequent operation.