


VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

April 15, 1976



Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 982
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Reportable Occurrence No. USRE-S1-76-02.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

G. M. Stallings
G. M. Stallings

Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures
40 copies USRE-S1-76-02

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

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(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME						LICENSE NUMBER						LICENSE TYPE				EVENT TYPE								
01	V	A	S	P	S	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	1	1	0	0	3		
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32															
CON'T			CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER				EVENT DATE				REPORT DATE									
01	P	O	L	L	0	5	0	-	0	2	8	0	0	3	1	8	7	6	0	4	1	3	7	6
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80													

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02	With the unit shutdown, Auxiliary Feedpump Discharge Valve MOV-FW-151A failed to																							80
03	open when the main feedpump breakers were opened. This is in violation of Technical																							80
04	Specification 3.6. The redundant valve opened satisfactorily. A similar event																							80
05	occurred on 12-11-75 and is described in AO-S1-75-28.																							80
06																								80

SYSTEM CODE		CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE				PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION		
07	C	H	E	R	E	L	A	Y	X	A	A	1	0	9	Y
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	47	48					

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08	An investigation revealed that the valve malfunction was caused by the timing relay																							80
09	which is a part of the control circuit. The relay plunger failed to activate a micro																							80
10	switch necessary for the valve opening operation. The timing relay/micro switch(Cont'd)																							80

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER			OTHER STATUS				METHOD OF DISCOVERY		DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION			
11	C	0	0	0	N/A	A	N/A							
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46						

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED		CONTENT OF RELEASE		AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY				LOCATION OF RELEASE			
12	Z	Z	N/A	N/A							
7	8	9	10	11	44	45					

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
13	0	0	0	Z	N/A					
7	8	9	11	12	13					

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER		DESCRIPTION							
14	0	0	0	N/A					
7	8	9	11	12					

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	N/A																							80
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
16	Z	N/A						
7	8	9	10					

PUBLICITY

17	N/A																							80
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	The health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence because the																							80
19	redundant valve opened, as did all of the other similar valves.																							80

NAME: _____ PHONE: _____

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

assembly was removed and bench tested. The plastic plunger was binding with the plunger guide plate. After positioning the guide plate properly and lubricating it, the relay operated satisfactorily 50 times during 50 tests. A replacement timing relay/micro switch assembly was obtained from inventory. The same problem was initially found. Corrective adjustments were made, bench testing was satisfactorily completed, and this assembly installed in the circuit. The valve was returned to service following operational testing. Since the valve is normally open during power operation and all other valves operated properly, it is felt that no further corrective action is required at this time. However, plunger action will be verified monthly until such a time that the cause of plunger binding can be isolated and corrected.