VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

June 16, 1976

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 089
PO&M/ALH:jlf

Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. AO-S1-75-21 update.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief (40)
Operating Reactors Branch 4

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

UPDATE REPORT - AO-S1-75-21
Previous Report Date 10/07/75

CONTROL BLOCK: (1–6)

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

	LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01	VASPS1	00-00000-00	4111	01
(7–8, 9–14)		(15–25)	(26–30)	(31–32)

	CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CON'T	DI	0	L	050-0280	092875	061476
(7–8)	(57–58)	(59)	(60)	(61–68)	(69–74)	(75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 With the Unit at refueling shutdown, a safety injection master relay failed to latch
03 when Performance Test 18.2 was being performed on one train. This is in violation of
04 Technical Specification 3.3. The redundant train operated correctly. Therefore, the
05 requirement of the safety injection system would have been fulfilled. (AO-S1-75-21).
06

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07	SF	E	RELAYX	N	W120	Y
(7–8, 9–10)	(11)	(12–17)	(43)	(44–47)	(48)	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 An investigation revealed that the mechanical latch assembly was not functioning pro-
09 perly. The latch adjustment screw was adjusted in accordance with the manufacturer's
10 instruction manual, and the relay performed satisfactorily. The relay was (Con't.)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11	H	000	N/A	B	N/A
(7–8)	(9)	(10–12)	(13–44)	(45)	(46–80)

	FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12	Z	Z	N/A	
(7–8)	(9)	(10)	(11–44)	(45–80)

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13	000	Z	N/A
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12)	(13–80)

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14	000	N/A
(7–8)	(9–11)	(12–80)

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 N/A

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16	Z	N/A
(7–8)	(9)	(10–80)

PUBLICITY

17 N/A

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 The health and safety of the public were not affected by this occurrence because the
19 function of safety injection would have been fulfilled had it been necessary.

NAME: E. M. Sweeney, Jr. PHONE: (804) 357-3184

GPO 881-667

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Type MG-6 Auxiliary Relay, Style 1163828.

Presently, several relays of this type are being utilized as follows:

SIA-A,B Safety Injection Master Relay, initiates all safety injection outputs

SIB1-A,B Supplies input for pressurizer low pressure permissive to block and unblock safety injection.

SIB2-A,B Supplies input for low Tave permissive to block and unblock safety injection.

F1-A,B
F2-A,B
F3-A,B Initiates feedwater isolation on safety injection or steam generator high level.

3-VS-103A,B Controls motor operated valves for Control Room ventilation isolation.

VS-F-15 Control Room ventilation supply fan circuit.

A relay of this type failed on September 28, 1975, and was reported in Abnormal Occurrence Report AO-S1-75-20. Relay VS-103A failed in the energized position during a Performance Test and MOV-VS-103A did not close as required. Had this happened during accident conditions, the ventilation supply fan could have been de-energized and this supply path valve manually closed, thus providing control room isolation.

Failures of this type of relay have been rare and the consequences of these failures have been insignificant since the other train provides redundancy where required. No long term corrective action is deemed necessary at this time.

Virginia Electric and Power Company
Docket No. 50-280 Surry Unit 1
License No. DPR-32

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NO:

RO-280/75-21 (Supplemental)

DISTRIBUTION:

Don Lanham, ADM

cc With Enclosures
Region II Docket Files - 50-280
Region II Inspector with enclosures