

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

February 9, 1977

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 818
230 Peachtree Street, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Serial No. 047
PO&M/TAP:dgt
Docket No. 50-280
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. RO-S1-77-02.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,



C. M. Stallings
Vice President-Power Supply
and Production Operations

Enclosures

40 copies RO-S1-77-02

cc. Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 4

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

--	--	--	--	--	--

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME:

01	V	A	S	P	S	1
----	---	---	---	---	---	---

 LICENSE NUMBER:

0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

 LICENSE TYPE:

4	1	1	1	0
---	---	---	---	---

 EVENT TYPE:

0	3
---	---

REPORT TYPE:

L

 REPORT SOURCE:

L

 DOCKET NUMBER:

0	5	0	-	0	2	8	0
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

 EVENT DATE:

0	1	2	0	7	7
---	---	---	---	---	---

 REPORT DATE:

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | During the conduct of refueling PT-13, Test of Main Steam Safety Valves Setpoint, two
03 | valves (SV-MS-101B & 102B) were found in excess of the setpoint limits of plus or
04 | minus three percent. They were 1140 versus 1085 PSIG and 1130 versus 1095 PSIG
05 | respectively. This was in violation of Technical Specification 3.6.A. Corrective
06 | action was to reset and retest the two valves. (RO-S1-77-02)

SYSTEM CODE:

C	C
---	---

 CAUSE CODE:

E

 COMPONENT CODE:

V	A	L	V	E	X
---	---	---	---	---	---

 PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER:

A

 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER:

D	2	4	3
---	---	---	---

 VIOLATION:

y

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | Two Dresser Industries safety valves were found to be in excess of the three percent
09 | tolerance in their relief point. Cause was due to normal setpoint drift. The valves
10 | were adjusted and retested satisfactorily.

FACILITY STATUS:

H

 % POWER:

0	0	0
---	---	---

 OTHER STATUS:

NA

 METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

B

 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION:

NA

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED:

Z

 CONTENT OF RELEASE:

Z

 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY:

NA

 LOCATION OF RELEASE:

NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER:

0	0	0
---	---	---

 TYPE:

Z

 DESCRIPTION:

NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER:

0	0	0
---	---	---

 DESCRIPTION:

NA

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15 | NA

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE:

Z

 DESCRIPTION:

NA

PUBLICITY

17 | NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 | The combined capacity of the main steam safety valves exceeds the total steam flow
19 | corresponding to the maximum steady-state power that can be obtained (Continued)

NAME: T. L. Baucom

PHONE: (804) 357-3184

ADDITIONAL FACTORS (CONTINUED)

during normal operations. In the case of the complete loss of load incident without a reactor trip, the pressurizer safety valves and power operated relief valves, in conjunction with the main steam safety valves, will prevent overpressurization of the reactor coolant system. For the setpoint drift involved in this instance, only B loop would have been affected. The five valves would have lifted at 1110, 1120, 1130, 1135, and 1140 PSIG instead of 1085, 1095, 1110, 1120 and 1135 PSIG. Therefore, four out of five valves would have opened prior to the 1135 PSIG limit, and the fifth would have opened shortly thereafter. This small variation, plus the capabilities of the main steam power operated relief valves and the condenser steam dump system would have insured that sufficient steam relief capacity was available to prevent overpressurizing the steam generator. Additionally, although both units utilize identical relief valves, which are subject to some setpoint drift, to date the drift has been inconsequential and the relief setpoints have been readjusted within specific tolerances. Hence, the valves have demonstrated satisfactory performance and do not endanger the health or safety of the general public.

U.S. E.P.A.
REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II
ATLANTA, GA.

FEB 11 10 05 AM '77