

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Richmond, Virginia 23261

March 16, 1977

Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Serial No. 102 PO&M/TAP:dgt

Docket No. 50-280 License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.2, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits a copy of Reportable Occurrence No. RO-S1-77-08.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

n Stallings

C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations

Enclosures 40 copies R0-S1-77-08

cc: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 4





LICENSEE EVENT REPORT	
	(PLEE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
$ \begin{array}{c c} 1 & 5 \\ LICENSEE \\ NAME \\ \hline 0 \\ 7 \\ 8 \\ 9 \\ \hline 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\$	LICENSE TYPE 4 1 1 1 0 0 3 26 30 31 32
CATEGORY REPORT TYPE REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER 01 CON'T P O L L 0 5 0 0 2 8 0 0 7 B 57 58 59 60 61 68 69	EVENT DATE REPORT DATE 2 2 0 7 7 0 3 0 9 7 7 74 75 80
EVENT DESCRIPTION	from the Boric Acid Storage Tank
03"B" and the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) was secured by7890404diaphragm in valve 1-CH-98. A 150MWe/hr rampdown was	riefly to replace a leaking 80 initiated when recirculation was
7 8 9 05 <u>halted. This event is contrary to Technical Specifica</u> 7 8 9 06 per Technical Specification 6 6 2 6(2) (RO-S1-77-08)	etion_3.2.C.6 and is reportable
Image: constraint of the systemCausePrime codePrime componentComponent componentComponent supplierComponent manufacture $[0]7]$ $[P]$ C $[E]$ $[V]A$ $[L]$ V $[A]$ $[G]$	NT BO NREP VIOLATION 5 Y 47 48
CAUSE DESCRIPTION OB Due to excessive wear of the diaphragm in value 1-CH- 7 8 9 O9 of leakage. The diaphragm failure experienced was mos	98, the valve displayed evidence 80 st probably related to valve
7 8 9 10 overtightening when shutting. However, because the di 7 8 9 METHOD OF	80 Laphragm material (con't)
FAULTY STATUS% POWER POWEROTHER STATUSMicholo of Discovery 11 E 1 0 0 NA B NA 789101213444546	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 12 Z Z NA NA NA NA	LOCATION OF RELEASE
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 13 0 0 Z NA	
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION	с. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С. С.
7 8 9 11 12 OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES	80
7 8 9 LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION	80
[1]6] [Z] [NA 7 8 9 10 PUBLICITY	80
1 1 NA 7 8 9	80
18Because the capabilities of the Safety Injection Syst78	em were not impaired by this 80
19event, the health and safety of the general public were not affected.78980	
NAME:T, L. Baucom	PHONE:

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (CONTINUED)

has a limited life span, this could have been a contributing factor to the failure. This has been a recurring failure; therefore, to reduce the probability of further such occurrences, two programs have been devised.

- 1. A preventive maintenance program which directs the periodic replacement of all diaphragms in borated systems before the end of their life span has been implemented as of March 1, 1977.
- 2. A training program to educate the affected individuals in the proper care and operation of Grinnell diaphragm valves is under development.

During this repair, the BIT remained at full capacity and would have performed as expected if it had been required.