VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

June 27, 1978

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Courission Region II, Suite 818 230 Penchtrae Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Evant Report for Surry Unit No. 1.

Report No.

Applicable Technical Specification

LER-78-015/03L-0

T.S. 6.6.2.b (3)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

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C. M. Stallings Vice President Power Supply

Encloaures (3 copies)

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (30) copies -Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3) copies Office of Management Information and Program Control



Serial No. 365 POEM/DLR:wbh Docket No. 50-230 License No. DPR-32

For 280

(7-77)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
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CON'T	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0 7 0 5 2 8 7 8 8 0 6 2 6 7 8 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
02	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
03	discovered there was a foreign material on the valve seating surfaces. Despite its
04	presence, it is not believed this foreign material would have significantly affected
0 5	the valve operation to the extent that the health and safety of the general public
06	would have been jeopardized.
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08	80
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	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
	be used during valve maintenance contributed to this problem. It is also believed the
12	substance was used during dry valve testing to preclude the possibility of seating surf
13	face damage. The valves were cleaned and procedures modified to include more precise
14	inspection by Quality Control personnel following maintenance and prior to operations.
	ACILITY % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 H 28 0 0 0 0 29 N/A C 31 Designated Valve Inspection
	CIVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 80 ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A
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7 8	9 11 12 13 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80
1 S 7 8	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
19	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION N/A X/A
20 7 8	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY N/A N/A
	NAME OF PREPARER T. L. Baucom PHONE:(804)_357-3184

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Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Docket No: 50-280 Report No: 78-015/03L-0 Event Date: 5-28-78

FOREIGN MATERIAL IN CERTAIN VALVES

1. Description:

With the unit at refueling shutdown station personnel were conducting an inspection of sixteen suspect valves to insure cleanliness prior to unit startup. On 5-28-78, Containment Spray Isolation Valves (MOV-CS-101C, 1D) were found to contain about 10 to 50 milliliters each of a material that appeared to be grease, adhering to the seating surfaces of the disc and body. On 6-3-78, a Recirculation Spray Isolation Valve (MOV-RS-156A) was found to contain a similar foreign substance, also appearing to be grease. The quantity was about five to ten milliliters. Again, on 6-19-78, Residual Heat Removal valve (MOV-RH-100) was found to contain a thin coating of a material that was later evaluated as grease on its disc and body seating surfaces. Discussions with maintenance personnel also revealed that MOV-RS-156B was found to contain a foreign substance when initially opened in late April 1978 for maintenance. All other valves inspected were free of foreign materials.

The inspection had been initiated upon receipt of information that lubricating substances may have been used to enhance the "blue" technique and to lubricate the dry sliding seating surface contact areas in the valves.

The event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(3).

2. Probable Consequences/Status Of Redundant Systems

Although the values found to contain foreign material were values that would be called upon to provide isolation of the reactor containment building under abnormal conditions, the effect of the foreign material would be negligible under all operating conditions. The redundant features of the systems in which these values are installed provide further assurance of leakage prevention reducing even further the effect of the foreign materials. These features are:

- In RHR system, the counterpart of MOV-RH-100 inside containment is a manual valve, normally shut during all operating and accident conditions.
- (2) In the Containment Spray system, there are check values inside containment that serves as a back-up to the normally closed MOV-CS-101C, D.
- (3) The Recirculation Spray system is a closed system outside of containment and in addition there is a check valve inside containment that backs-up pump discharge valves MOV-RS-156A & B.

On these bases, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

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FOREIGN MATERIAL IN CERTAIN VALVES

3. Cause:

According to the best recent information available, the material had been introduced into the valves by personnel to lubricate and enhance bluing (fitting) the valve discs during dry testing.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

The affected valves were thoroughly cleaned and reassembled under QC surveillance.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

With the values cleaned, relapped and tested, no further corrective action of a repair nature was required.

6. Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

On May 30, 1978, an administrative policy was issued to all station employees delineating the materials to be used in type C testing (10CFR50, App. J).

The procedures governing valve repair were changed on June 1, 1978 to include a specific step for QC witness of valve close out.

7. Generic Implications:

The generic nature of this problem has been precluded through the procedures outlined above.