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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 August 4, 1978
Serlal No. 452
POSM/DLB:das
Docket No. 50-230
License No. DPR-32

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit No. 1.

Report No.

Applicable Technical Specification

LER 78-018/03L-0

TS 6.6.2.B.(2)

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours,

C. M. Stallings

Vice President - Power Supply and Production Operations

Enclosures (3 copies)

oc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (30 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control

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Surry Power Station, Unit 1

Docket No: **0**50-281

Report No: 78-018/01T-0(03L)-0

Event Date: 07-05-78

Title of Report: MS Safety Valve Setpoint Drift

1. Description of Event:

During refueling startup, Periodic Test 13, test of Main Steam Safety Valve setpoint indicated two (2) valves were not within plus or minus three percent (± 3%) of the setpoint as required by the periodic test. Safety valve SV-MS-105B drifted in the conservative direction (4.1% below setpoint). Safety valve SV-MS-101B drifted over its setpoint but remained within the setpoint range of other safeties in the system. The event is considered contrary to Technical Specification 3.6 and ASME Code and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Systems:

The operation of the Main Steam Safety valves is designed for full opening at the setpoint. The combined capacity of the safety valves exceeds the total steam flow corresponding to maximum steady state power operation. Though two of the five safety valves were outside of the plus or minus three percent $(\pm 3\%)$ setpoint, at no time were any of the safety valves unable to perform their full intended function. The health and safety of the general public were not affected by this occurrence.

3. Cause:

Setpoint drift is anticipated thus necessitating verification each refueling. Though the safety valves deviated from their setpoints, they maintained the capacity for pressure protection and steam flow relief.

4. Immediated Corrective Action:

The safety valves that were out of specification were immediately reset to within plus or minus one percent (\pm 1%) of their setpoint and retested to confirm proper pop point.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action:

None was required since all valves were capable of being set to "nameplate" pressure.

6. Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

None

7. Generic Implications:

None