

## San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar

March 25, 2019

### Webinar Public Questions Transcript

**NOTE:** This document contains all of the questions, comments, and feedback provided by the registered attendees for the NRC's San Onofre Special Inspection Webinar, which was held on March 25, 2019. These questions, comments, and feedback were received before and after the webinar via the webinar registration email, and during the webinar via the questions feature. With 22 exceptions noted below, the questions, comments, and feedback are provided as they were received by the NRC, with no corrections made to grammar, punctuation, spelling, or language. For the 22 exceptions, the comments contained information that was considered Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information, therefore these 22 comments were redacted and are marked **[REDACTED]**.

Received before the webinar:

- Once the canisters are in the ground, can they be removed for shipment to a NUCLEAR repository IF approved, by D.O.E. like W.I.P.P. **[REDACTED]**
- Why did the NRC let SCE use a practice spent fuel cannister that was materially smaller (making it much easier to load) than the ones actually used? Erik Simpson referred to this as "negative training," but why was staff not trained on the actual differences between the different sized canisters?
- Why did the NRC let SCE load spent fuel in pin supported shim cannisters that the NRC had not approved?
- Why is the NRC not requiring SCE to develop a "ready retrievability" capability for damaged spent fuel in loaded cannisters?
- Why did the NRC allow SCE to not report the 3 August 2018 event for six weeks after the report was due, and only took action after a whistle blower disclosed the event?
- Why has the NRC not conducted a single public spent fuel proceedings in San Diego?
- Why have NRC officials chosen to physically interact with the San Diego public through meetings controlled by SCE, the utility the NRC is supposed to regulate? Especially, in light of the past problems at these meetings with regulatory capture and censorship of the public, which has suppressed free discussion. **[REDACTED]**
- Will the spent waste be moved further inland, across the 5 FWY deeper into Camp Pendleton to a safer, more geologically stable place? If so, are you consulting directly with the Acjachemen Nation to ensure no cultural, sacred or burial sites are threatened?
- How will the region of San Onofre be prevented from becoming a de facto longterm nuclear waste storage site, since it was never intended to become such, even per former NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko's assessment. How will the unexpected and accelerated consequences of climate change and its impacts, beach erosion, tidal rise, extreme weather be addressed?
- How are the 4 cannisters with faulty shims being addressed and how can they be inspected and retrieved?
- If the spent fuel pools are dismantled, there will be no alternate plan for any radiation leaks, unexpected "accidents" or unforeseen circumstances.
- If the spent waste can be safely transferred in the future, how will you ensure it does not offload the waste onto an underprivileged or indigenous community?

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- I believe the Holtec system is unsafe because it cannot ensure inspection, repair and safe transfer of the spent waste in any future radiation incidents, in accordance with NRC regulatory rules. It is my understanding that they are in violation of their license. **[REDACTED]**
- Pls also advise the longterm ramifications of metal-to-metal contact. My understanding is through cracks can be created in as little as 16 years and pose a potential hazard for a larger radiation incident.
- Do you acknowledge that there are no means of inspecting the Holtec System with damaged canisters?
- Do you acknowledge that the Holtec canisters are not designed or approved for transport?
- In your report...why have you avoided the fundamental design flaw of the Holtec system in the loading process? Knowing that is causing "gouges" and no defense in depth. - This has nothing to do with oversight or better management practices.
- How much rate-payer money will be lost if the loading into this defective system continues to only need to be repackaged for transport.
- What is the status of canister #30?
- Do you realize we are entrusting in you to put safety first ahead of corporate interests?
- WE ARE ASKING FOR YOU TO STAND UP>>>>AND DO THE RIGHT THING> STOP THIS TRANSFER AND DEMAND THAT ALL WASTE IS STORED IN THICK WALLED CASKS.
- Thank you, **[REDACTED]**
- At a previous CEP meeting, when Tom Palmisano discussed worker training, he commented that retention was a challenge. Please show documentation that may shed light on the reasons for high turnover. Be sure to tell us how many workers left or were required to stop working in an environment with any level of radiation exposure because readings indicated their body had reached the max allowable amount of radiation exposure.
- Refer to timeline posted for the sequence of events when the download of cannister 29 did not descend properly. After the problem was detected, workers (apparently to appropriately trained workers) came on the scene and directed the corrective action. When the cannister was being properly lowered, it is noted that there were 2 instances of "interference". What caused the interference?
- The time span from when the download was first started, until completion constituted a significant delay in the normal download time. The cannister release radiation during this stage. It's not contained because it's not yet underground and covered. I understand the cannister #30 was loaded but had to be paused, could not be downloaded to storage because of safety issues and work stoppage. How much radiation has been released during these abnormal events? How does effect your yearly allowable totals?
- Has the NRC done a full and proper evaluation of the engineering design and machining of the parts (sleeve, ring, gussets, that surround the cannister during download) to determine why there is interference during downloading? Is the equipment and design in need of re-design, replacement to allow safe download procedures to be implemented?

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- When calculating potential damage in the event of a cannister drop, has anyone evaluated what happens to the fuel rods inside the cannister. If the cannister remains intact, but experiences a drop, the contents would surely be disrupted/damaged. Explain.
- Tom Palmisano commented in a previous CEP meeting that there were damaged fuel rods. How many, where, and how are they being contained? I understand that these cannot be transported. How do you plan to remedy that?

Received during the webinar:

- Where is Eric Simpson
- Please post detailed analysis of scratching, gouging. When will you do this?
- What are the plans to move the canisters away from the 8 million people within 50 miles of SONGS?
- why are you not allowing questions as you present
- It's pretty clear that the primary cause of this incident was a lack of oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- Where is Eric Simpson
- was the practice cannister the same size as the actual storage cannister
- What is the current NRC position regarding previously identified concerns related to canister scratching and denting during the loading process?
- The Union of Concerned Scientists states that storing nuclear waste in dry storage still leaves a risk of cancer of 10% and the possibly uninhabitable land of 2%. Will you consider this in future plans for new nuclear power plants, especially considering cheaper, faster to install wind and solar energy pose 0% of those risks?
- What are the plans when a canister falls over during transit?
- What are the plans when aged containers/canisters were to start leaking excessive radiation, say in 10 years?
- Has the NRC examined the dummy canister for scratches or gouges?
- What are the ways to remove canisters from their current "on the beach" location eventually? Has this been attempted with current canisters?
- Would the canister retain its shape after falling into the vault so it couldnt be removed?
- Who pays for the \$116,000 Civil Penalty for the violation that the whistleblower reported? SCE ratepayers, or...?
- what was the name of the NRC inspector on site during scratch review
- How did you inspect scratches on other canisters?
- what technology was used to inspect for scratches?
- Very informative presentation!
- How did you inspect depth and length of cracks?
- Are you going to have a permanent inspector on site for the remaining canister moves?
- What is the present condition of the stranded canister #39?

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- How are the scratched canisters inspected?
- Will the model that was used to determine that the drop will result in 0% chance of loss of containment boundary be made available for review by the public?
- What is the time limit that the NRC has determined the creation of scratches during initial dry cask loading operations doesn't matter? 100 years? 20 years? 1000 years?
- Edison has total current assets exceeding 3.6 billion. Do you think a fine of \$116,000 will have any effect on SCE?
- is audio okay? loss phone audio.
- @SCE\_SONGS said on Twitter, "There is no credible scenario in which anyone would be harmed by the spent fuel at San Onofre." Considering unpredictable human error, natural disasters, possibility of attack,... can you say with 100% certainty that all 8 million people within 50 miles of the nuclear waste in dry storage are safe?
- Is the overpack for a damaged canister available and has it been approved by the NRC for storing a breeched canister?
- Hi, [REDACTED], former Californian and elected official in Cotati, Calif. My question is about the implications of these discoveries, findings and responses to other sites in similar activities. Are other NPPs in compliance with new practices?
- With the licensee going from 2 to 8 people directly involved in the cask transport, did the licensee determine the additional dose for the activity? How did the licensee balance ALARA with nuclear safety? Also, what additional personnel safety precautions were developed to address the change in the number of people in the line of fire?
- Once the licensee resumes fuel movement, will the NRC have inspectors on site observing the first moves?
- The 2017 NWTRB report had expressed concerns about damaged fuel which can have a reaction which builds up hydrogen gas. Was that factored into the analysis for a dropped canister?
- I don't know anyone in the Public that thinks this is a good idea when they are shown the public information and the potential risks. The risks are NOT zero - even science knows that; but seems NRC is not aligned with Public concerns...only aligned with SCE and the data it provides. I do not see this as even a viable solution for the short term and less so for 20 years out.
- Do you believe that the NRC may have been at fault to some degree for allowing this situation to even occur in the first place?
- Did SCE pull the canisters out of the silos to conduct inspection of the scratches
- Is it true that SCE informally informed the NRC about the downloading incident prior to the official report, and the NRC worked with the SCE to cover-up the incident?
- At the CEP right after the event, SCE said they had paused downloading operations for a period of time to review their operation, but did not disclose the near-drop event, nor did that state that the pause was due to that drop. Did the NRC review SCE's response to the event in terms of their statements to the public in your review of the event?
- In the prior meeting, SCE described the use of a string attached to the canister so they could monitor the position of the canister. Was this feature included in the final design of

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the downloading protocol? What other changes were made between the last meeting and this one?

- **[REDACTED]** San Diego Resident
- The July 22 Unsecured Load Event remains unreported in violation of 72.75. Why? **[REDACTED]**
- **[REDACTED]**
- What are your significant obstacles to relocating the ISFSI across the 5 freeway away from the tideline.
- Has the NRC analyzed the consequences of all the different problems actually all happening in the worst possible sequence?
- I'm disconcerted but happy to see the changes implemented in procedures. Thank you for the personnel added BUT how often are checks made on SCE being as I do not trust them to not try to cut corners. Also I remember a witness to one mistake in loading containers spoke up as to an error yet SCE didn't. Hence the mistrust as proven.
- Please answer the question, why did the NRC allow the notice delay
- Workers fear retaliation according to SCWE surveys. Why wasn't this procedural weakness identified for "corrective action," and why wasn't it mentioned in the Webinar. Is there any corrective action being taken on this procedural weakness? **[REDACTED]**
- (In the previous Q I'm referring to things like fuel damage from the drop combined with the incomplete steps to maintain seismic qualifications resulting in damaged fuel being let loose in an earthquake during transport (and it WILL be transported again sooner or later, won't it?)
- No, the question is why did the NRC permit SCE to use a smaller canister?
- How will the known metal to metal damage due to canister design be monitored? Is it true that this metal to metal contact can lead to a through-line crack that might pose a potential hazard?
- **[REDACTED]**, Resident of San Diego, **[REDACTED]**. Please ask why has did the NRC allow SCE to use a dummy canister that was not the same size as the actual canister being used.
- Is the NRC considering any enforcement actions regarding Edison's previous decision to continue downloading canisters with the knowledge that they were being scratched during downloading, something that was not approved or considered in the FSAR?
- Have they tried dropping the training canister?
- Hard to understand repeat of the questions. Any way to put them in print up on the screen to read? His mic connection not great.
- Michael Bloodgood, we will be taking your deposition on the fact that you are not asking the questions submitted. this is a serious breach of your duty as a public official
- we intend to show our judge your film of your improper conduct
- Will the NRC instruct staff to simulate the gouging of the canisters from the various causes that occurred with the Edison/Holtec design? It seems that would be more accurate than trying to get an accurate analysis from the limited visual inspection by Edison.

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- In the drop analysis, what was the % chance that the containment boundary was breached, given that the previous analysis concluded that there was a 28% chance.
- Rate-payers pay for everything, folks. Come on now.
- What is your reference for analysis damage to fuel from drop? please provide
- you mentined increases in personal enhancements, land indication enhancements, adding quality assessment manager, training of personnel. how does this affect the overall cost for this project?
- **[REDACTED]**, Surfrider Foundation
- So then the ratepayers have to pay the penalty? Will they just pass this penalty on to ratepayers, or will shareholders shoulder the penalty?
- why did the NRC let sce load spent fuel in pin-supported shim cannisters not approved by the NRC
- "It is concerning that the Holtec canisters are not ASME N3 certified.
- Why doesn't the NRC require this?
- These are pressure vessels with no pressure monitor or pressure release valve.
- If a canister were to fall, it seems you have not factored in Damaged Fuel, hydride gas buildup, temperature and pressure buildup."
- The NRC kept the event secret until after the whistle blower disclosed it
- How long do you anticipate until SCE finishes its corrective actions and the NRC signs off on the corrections? My bottom line is there an estimate for how long before fuel movement resumes?
- Why did not the NRC inform the public of the drop incident after it was disclosed informally by SCE?
- Will the NRC staff do an analysis of corrosion rates resulting from gouging/scratching combined with exposure to sea air and salt?
- How much damaged is allowed to canisters by ASME Sec III Class 1 pressure vessels? Definition of damage?
- You mentioned the cannisters will be 1 inch thicker. have heard they might be anywhere the thickness as those in Europe 10 to 19 inches thick?
- why is the NRC appearing before the public on 28 march in a SCE controlled meeting. why does the NRC not hold its own meeting with its citizens?
- How many inspectors are watching the process?
- retrieve and remove fuel from a storage cask???
- The pdf titled "NRC Enforcement Action dated March 25" is a bad link from the GoToWebinar "Handouts" toolbar. Can you make it available for download?
- Could he please repeat that?
- Was there any consequence tfor Tom Palmisano for lying to the public about the drop until a whistleblower testified against him at the same meeting. Tom had just tolfed the public that they were going to give the team a rest, not that they had a near miss.
- **[REDACTED]**, Orange County Register. Is there a timetable or time estimate for resuming canister loading? How many canisters have been loaded and how many remain to be loaded?

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- **[REDACTED]** - SoCal350
- Which canister was "inspected"? How are you defining "inspection"?
- THE NRC is censoring public input by not asking the questions and by not having the NRC personnel present who can answer these questions
- Why are some questions not being answered correctly?
- The gentleman just stated Edison showed they retrieved and removed fuel from a storage cask. I believe that is false.
- Now that the canisters are all damaged, what recourse is there to re-containerize the fuel?
- How does the imposed \$116,000 penalty affect the vendor?
- The ability to offload a canister has not been demonstrated by Edison....a video was used at another location with a dummy canister.
- Why has the NRC not conducted a single public spent fuel proceeding in San Diego?
- Have any NRC, SCE personnel been interviewed by the FBI, or the NRC Inspector general
- How have the scratches been inspected on the actual canisters that are damaged from loading.
- eric says this was negative training
- no the question is why did the NRC permit it, Michael you have to get an answer to this question
- How is the inspection of already loaded canisters being done?
- Is the temperature of the canister with the high burn up fuel too hot to replace in the pool for dealing with damaged fuel?
- these nrc personnel are contradicting eric simpson, is that why eric is not there today
- How does Edison plan to offload a canister in the case of an incident? Why do you not require a hotcell on site while fuel is being stored there?
- Does SONGS employ a red team strategy?
- There now have been multiple safety violations that have occurred during the period of January 2018 to August 2018 regarding SCE storing of spent fuel at San Onofre. Is an independent FBI investigation into the on-going safety problems necessary, why or why not?
- audio cuts out, upgrade your internet
- Michael please quit censoring the questions, this is improper
- How many people signed up for this webinar?
- Aren't you missing a big opportunity to learn more with a dummy canister being more like the actual canister? As much as possible
- FSAR ML18192B094 Sec 9.5 must be enforced not weakened! vii. ...ample clearance...no risk of scratching or gouging of MPC... Thus ASME Sec III Class 1 prohibition against damage to pressure retaining boundary is maintained.
- Do you feel there are inadequate policies in place for waste storage and inspection? What will have to happen for the waste to be transported off site?

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- why has the NRC not appeared before the public at an NRC meeting in San Diego
- What radiation protection is required for workers during fuel cask transfer?
- This seems in line with our current discussion, please address!
- How bad does a crack need to be before NRC will not allow transport of high burnup fuel?
- You have plenty of time to answer all my questions, right?
- Are these MPC 37 Canisters able to be monitored and inspected internally??? Are these holtec canisters dual purpose and ready for transport?
- why did the nrc allow sce to download pin supported shim cannisters when they were not approved by the NRC
- NRC says crack growth rate is 16 years. Are you addressing crack growth rate in your analysis?
- What is the plan for aging management evaluation given the metal to metal to contact design issue?
- damaged fule can't be moved, what's the plan to repack or render damaged fuel safe for transport?
- why were no pictures taken of the 3 August incident
- Will canisters that are already downloaded and known to have been scratched or gouged be extracted for inspection ? How will it be determined if the extent of damage is acceptable?
- Have the 4 canisters with faulty shims been inspected?
- When assessing the licensee's corrective actions, did the NRC assess the impact on ALARA due to having additional personnel near the cask during transport and download?
- How can you seeing microscopic cracks or characterize depth, length and width of cracks with a camera? What else are you using? We need to see evidence.
- **[REDACTED]**  
yes i have questions, but cannot get thru?  
if
- All cannisters in storage should be evaluated for scraches or cracks, wear, not just a sample. Will you do that?
- Michael again you are censoring the questions
- PLEASE ASK ALL THE QUESTIONS!
- When will you complete analysis of scratching and gouging?
- Please ask the questons and not filter the important ones out.
- Please ask the questions I described above.
- Michael you are conducting this meeting like one in russia or some other totalitarian state
- Will uou allow restart before this is done?
- Will the NRC offer any other public webinars to address public concerns, given that there has been a breach of trust with SCE not reporting the "near drop" incident?



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- Why has the NRC not conducted a single public spent fuel proceedings in San Diego?
- The public is concerned about the scratches. Ratepayers paid into the fund that is paying \$1 million per canister. We do not accept damaged canisters. Holtec must be held accountable to this - not Edison suggest the NRC remove ANOTHER regulation and enforcement. (i.e. fuel retrievability)
- Q: The July 22 Unsecured Load Event remains unreported in violation of 72.75. Why? **[REDACTED]**
- This question is unrelated to ongoing inspections
- There now have been multiple safety violations that have occurred during the period of January 2018 to August 2018 regarding SCE storing of spent fuel at San Onofre. Is an independent FBI investigation into the on-going safety problems necessary, why or why not?
- we submitted six questions today. are you going to answer any of them. you have asked some of the questions but we have not had any responsive answers.
- Will the NRC be revisiting San Onofre soon? Or do a surprise visit?
- This is not about future inspections
- In the prior meeting, SCE described the use of a string attached to the canister so they could monitor the position of the canister. Was this feature included in the final design of the downloading protocol? What other changes were made between the last meeting and this one?
- No these are not
- Is the NRC responsible for this situation taking place?
- will the overall changes incurred affect the overall success of the project? will they be able to meet the demands financially?
- THIS IS DISGRACEFUL
- My questions were not asked. My speech has been censored
- I AM VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT MY QUESTIONS WERE NOT ASKED!
- Please ask the questions I described above.
- **[REDACTED]** had none of his questions answered.
- Why aren't you having your own local meeting? Shouldn't be Edison controlled meeting.
- WE DEEPLY CARE about this topic. Please keep up the greater communications that are happening. In support...
- Thank you for having this webinar. RIV is doing a great job being open with the public. Be careful when answering questions that you don't come off as defensive. YOU should consider improving the reader of questions section of the webinar.
- Why is a downloading system that lacks precision being allowed. I doubt loading a missile would use this system.
- The groundswell is enormous and people will only get more frustrated with this situation.

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Received following the end of the webinar:

- I had a schedule conflict so that I was unable to attend the beginning of today's online meeting. I attempted twice to log in during the meeting's time window and only observed the screen showing the screen that appears when the organizer is not present. I inferred that the meeting concluded early.

However, I heard the vocal concerns of opponents to nuclear power while I attended a meeting on March 21, 2019 regarding SONGS Decommissioning of the California State Lands Commission in Oceanside, California. The opponents were exaggerating the risk of some tiny scratches with a depth of perhaps 0.005 inches that might occur as the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters are lowered into the concrete over pack. The rugged stainless steel canister has walls that are 5/8 (0.625) inch thick. Thus, the wall thickness would be decreased from 0.625 inches to 0.62 inches - or one part in 0.008 - This is an insignificant change.

Any NRC decisionmaking should be informed by the principle of "Risk-Informed Decisionmaking." I've attached a document from the NRC website that summarize the process for SNF. I include by reference the NRC document SECY-18-0060 dated May 23, 2018 regarding risk-informed decisionmaking. (The latter document is too large to be included in this message.) Concisely, decisionmaking should be driven by real, not imagined risks. Mitigation measures should be scaled to the actual risk.

I've personally met some of the SONGS opponents and observed their non-fact-based claims. In particular, the claims regarding the so-called "Koeberg Tank" are used to create the impression that these canisters are vulnerable to stress corrosion cracking. The NRC has studied the topic extensively since those concerns were raised vociferously. The reality is that if such cracking were observed, any problems would be resolvable as the process occurs very slowly.

Thus, I recommend that the SNF transfer at SONGS to dry cask storage should restart. I request confirmation that my views will be considered by the NRC in this matter. I also request to be informed regarding NRC's actions in this matter.

Sincerely, **[REDACTED]**

- Aloha!

Many thanks for the webinar offered yesterday.

I sincerely another webinar that is more broad-based will be offered to address the many concerns local residents have about the future regarding the San Onofre decommission. Beyond the near drop, many residents in Southern California continue to have grave and valid concerns regarding longterm storage and the many issues this poses for San Onofre, given it was never intended for longterm storage.

I haven't heard responses re: how the 4 canisters with faulty shims have been addressed, nor how metal-to-metal contact in the defective Holtec design will be handled to ensure no through-line cracks or hazards result from this contact.

Given that we are speaking about hot nuclear waste, "suspecting" there is no problem, seems to be not enough due diligence on protecting the safety of the public.

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I sincerely hope the waste will be moved deeper inland to Pendleton as an interim solution, and under the express consult of the Acjachemen Nation, as there are sacred, burial & heritage sites that should remain protected. Any siting within Pendleton, must take place with their consultation.

How San Onofre's decommissioning process remains an issue of valid and serious concern. Given SCE's historically egregious track record regarding safety, we cannot trust them to do the "right" thing by the public at large. SCE appears motivated to complete the decommissioning process as hurriedly as possible for their own interest rather than to ensure the decommissioning is handled in the safest, most ethical and humane manner possible.

May the NRC assume this greater responsibility to provide transparent oversight and engage the public in order to protect this precious area, and all inhabitants, flora, fauna, marine life and human.

The ancestral territory of the Acjachemen Nation never seems to be addressed at SCE community panel meetings; therefore, I hope the NRC will ensure that the sacred sites of this First Nation are adequately protected and that they are consulted regarding the interim and longterm solutions for San Onofre's nuclear waste.

Sincerely, [REDACTED]

- The prepared presentation was fine, however the Q&A session was unprofessionally executed. There are several problems with it. First the questions should be read as presented. The person presenting the question was trying to paraphrase multiple similar questions, which I lost confidence that the questions as asked were actually being presented to the panel. It also resulted in several awkward pauses. Then suddenly ended. I seriously had my doubts that there were more questions that had been asked that should have been answered. As a member of the industry, I think it is imperative that we (industry and NRC) act in a transparent and manner that inspire trust. The Q and A session did just the opposite in my opinion. Questions should be read as presented (assuming they are not vulgar etc). And questions should be taken throughout the allotted time. The way it ended appeared that a frustrated person was looking for an excuse to end it.

Additionally at least one of the answers to question did not actually answer the question asked. I believe the panel misheard the question and would have answered it, but should have been clarified by the person reading the questions when it became obvious the answer was not correct. The question asked was if SCE was trying to hide the event, at which time the panel, answered that the NRC was not trying to hide it. While the was also truthful, it did not answer the question asked. That could, be potentially seen as dodging the question at worst, or just not paying enough attention caring to get the question correct. While I believe the panel, was trying to be open and honest the proceeding do not give that appearance. Again perception is important.

I have watched three of the webinars and this was by far the worst Q and A of the bunch. Not that any were great but they were better. Posting the question as written live and then answering them without taking editorial liberty would help

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- I submitted a question about HOW is the inspection of existing dry cask storage done and it wasn't answered.  
I want to know technically how it is done? Are cameras used? Robots? Is inspection done inlet and outlet vents? Is inspection done top to bottom? What is checked? Scratches? radiation? other?  
Thanks for asking. **[REDACTED]**
- I appreciated the opportunity to listen in on the NRC Virtual Public Meeting/Webinar Regarding San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Spent Fuel Activities. The information discussed was very valuable. Holtec is one of our vendors and it is important to stay current on their activities and issues at other facilities. I felt the discussion was very factual and the responses provided to questions were straight-forward and appropriate. I recognize there was failure in oversight, however, I was surprised the entire focus was on SCE rather than Holtec, but I do understand SCE holds the license. Good job!
- Linda Howell and NRC Staff,  
Thank you for the hearing on March 25th. It was filled with important details.  
After the March 25 hearing, SCE safety procedures are encouraging. I want to be sure what I heard. I hope you will at the March 28th SCE CEP meeting make clear, 'Is the NRC confident that the Holtec vertical loading system can place each canister in its protective sleeve without a scratch to its surface.'  
We need to resume loading the canisters to clear the cooling pools as soon as possible.  
Thank you.  
I look forward to speaking to the NRC representative at the SCE CEP meeting this Thursday March 28th.  
Best Regards, **[REDACTED]**
- Hello,  
I just received an email asking for feedback about the webinar.  
I have two comments:
  - I watched this webinar, along with the others you've had in the past six months or so, and there's always sound issues. My co-workers and others I've talked to have experienced this too, so I know it's not just an issue with my computer. There will be 10-second periods where the sound will just go out. It would be great if that could be fixed for the next webinar.
  - The question/answer portion of this webinar was extremely short, and only answered 5 or 10 questions. Is there a way that the questions can be shown, maybe in a separate window, as they are submitted? It would make for a more transparent experience.Thank you, and I look forward to your response.  
Best, **[REDACTED]**