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CP-201900018
TXX-19003

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Ref 10 CFR 50.73

1/16/2019

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-446
AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 446/18-002-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73, Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo), hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report 446/18-002-00, "Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System" for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2.

This communication contains no new licensing basis commitments regarding CPNPP Unit 2.

IE22
NRR

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Gary L. Merka at 254-897-6613.

Sincerely,



John R. Dreyfuss

Enclosure

c - Scott A. Morris, Region IV
Margaret Watford O'Banion, NRR
Resident Inspectors, Comanche Peak

NRC FORM 366 (04-2017) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant	05000 446	1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Automatic Actuation Of Auxiliary Feedwater System

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	03	2018	2018	- 002	- 00	01	16	2019		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*			
1	☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☑ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. POWER LEVEL	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)
100	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
		☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT	TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include Area Code)*
Timothy A. Hope, Manager, Regulatory Affairs	6370

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☑ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

At 0315 on December 3, 2018, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) experienced a loss of the 138 kV West Bus. Since the 138 kV East Bus was out of service for transmission line maintenance, this resulted in a transfer of the Unit 2 safety buses to the alternate off site power source and an actuation of both Unit 2 blackout sequencers and an automatic start of both Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (MDAFWPs) and the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFWP). The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start since they were not required to start due to a successful bus transfer. There was no impact on Unit 1.

The cause of this event was a power fault on off site equipment not owned by CPNPP. The Unit 2 MDAFWPs and the TDAFWP were stopped and returned to automatic. The off site source was recovered at 0416 on December 3, 2018. All times in this report are approximate and Central Standard Time unless noted otherwise.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER		
			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant	05000-	446	18	- 002	- 00

NARRATIVE

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT

A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B) of this section." The system that actuated was the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System.

B. PLANT CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT

At 0315 on December 3, 2018, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 2 was in MODE 1 operating at 100% power.

C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT

At the start of this event, the 138 kV East Bus was out of service for transmission line maintenance.

D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES

At 0315 on December 3, 2018, CPNPP experienced a loss of the 138 kV West Bus [EIIS: (FK)(JX)]. Since the 138 kV East Bus was out of service for transmission line maintenance, this resulted in a transfer of the Unit 2 safety buses to the alternate off site power source and an actuation of both Unit 2 blackout sequencers and an automatic start of both Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (MDAFWPs) [EIIS: (BA)(P)] and the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (TDAFWP) [EIIS: (BA)(P)]. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start since they were not required to start due to a successful bus transfer. The MDAFWPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The off site source was recovered at 0416 on December 3, 2018. There was no impact on Unit 1.

E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL PERSONNEL ERROR

Operators (Utility, Licensed) in the Unit 2 Control Room received alarms related to "Loss Of Startup/Station Service Transformers."

II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES

A. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE

Not applicable - There were no component or system failures with any CPNPP components during this event. The loss of the 138 kV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment owned by another electric company.

B. FALURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECTS OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT

Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were Identified during this event.

C. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS

Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were Identified during this event.

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant	05000- 446	18	- 002	- 00

NARRATIVE

D. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION
Not applicable - No CPNPP component or system failures were identified during this event.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED
The Unit 2 safety buses transferred to the alternate off site power source, both Unit 2 blackout sequencers actuated, and both Unit 2 MDAFWPs and the Unit 2 TDAFWP automatically started as designed.

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY
This event did not involve the inoperability of any safety systems. Off site power is not credited in Chapter 15 of the CPNPP Final Safety Analysis Report, therefore, offsite power is not considered a safety system.

C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT
During this event, the 345kV switchyard was available and stable. Unit 2 remained at 100 percent power and Unit 1 was not affected by this event. All plant safety systems responded as designed during this event. This event had no impact on nuclear safety, reactor safety, radiological safety, environmental safety or the safety of the public. This event has been evaluated to not meet the definition of a safety system functional failure per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The loss of the 138 KV West Bus was caused by a fault on off site metering equipment that is owned by another electric company.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The MDAFWPs and the TDAFWP were returned to automatic. The off site source was recovered at 0416 on December 3, 2018. There were no component or system failures with any CPNPP components during this event.

VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
There have been no previous similar reportable events at CPNPP in the last three years.