



Exelon Generation®

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December 20, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-18
Docket No. 50-244

LER 2018-002, Loss of Offsite Power to Vital Bus Due to Human Error
Causes Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator "A".

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2018-002 is submitted under the provisions of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines. There are no new commitments contained in this submittal. This submittal is for revision 0 of the LER.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Kyle Garnish at 315-791-5321.

Sincerely,

Paul Swift,
Ginna Plant Manager

PS/ejf

Attachment: LER 2018-002

cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region I
NRC Project Manager, Ginna
NRC Resident Inspector, Ginna

IE22
NRR

Attachment

LER 2018-002



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. Facility Name R E Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	2. Docket Number 05000 244	3. Page 1 OF 3
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4. Title
Loss of Offsite Power to Vital Bus Due to Human Error Causes Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator "A"

5. Event Date			6. LER Number			7. Report Date			8. Other Facilities Involved	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Rev No.	Month	Day	Year	Facility Name	Docket Number
10	26	2018	2018	002	00	12	20	2018	Facility Name	Docket Number
										05000
										05000

9. Operating Mode **11. This Report is Submitted Pursuant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)**

6	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. Power Level	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
000	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(1)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(i)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A)	

12. Licensee Contact for this LER

Licensee Contact Kyle Garnish, Regulatory Assurance Manager	Telephone Number (Include Area Code) 3157915321
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13. Complete One Line for each Component Failure Described in this Report

Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to ICES	Cause	System	Component	Manufacturer	Reportable to ICES
14. Supplemental Report Expected					15. Expected Submission Date				
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No					Month: Day: Year:				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On 10/26/2018 while in Mode 6, the 4160V 12A bus was manually deenergized during troubleshooting of the 52/12BY alternate supply breaker by Station Electricians. While racking out the 52/12BY breaker, an Electrician inadvertently pressed the close push button for 52/12BY instead of the trip push button. The 52/12BY breaker closed and the 52/12AY normal supply breaker opened through interlock. The Electrician did not hear the 52/12AY breaker open so thought it remained closed and that the potential for damage by paralleling power supplies out of phase existed. Intending to put the plant into a safe condition, the Electrician opened the 52/12BY breaker, deenergizing the 12A bus which was supplying 480V vital Busses 14 and 18. As designed, the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator started and supplied associated vital loads. The cause of the event was a human performance error by the Electrician. The electrical lineup was subsequently restored to its normal configuration by Station Operators.

This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), specifically the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form
<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/>)

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1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER		
R E Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1		05000-	244	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
				2018	002	00

NARRATIVE

I. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS

At the time the condition was identified, the plant was in Mode 6 at 0% rated thermal power.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. EVENT

On 10/26/2018 while in Mode 6, the 4160V 12A bus was manually deenergized during troubleshooting of the 52/12BY alternate supply breaker by Station Electricians. While racking out the 52/12BY breaker, an Electrician inadvertently pressed the close push button for 52/12BY instead of the trip push button. The 52/12BY breaker closed and the 52/12AY normal supply breaker opened through interlock. The Electrician did not hear the 52/12AY breaker open so thought it remained closed and that the potential for damage by paralleling power supplies out of phase existed. Intending to put the plant into a safe condition, the Electrician opened the 52/12BY breaker, deenergizing the 12A bus which was supplying 480V vital Busses 14 and 18. As designed, the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator started and supplied associated vital loads.

B. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None

C. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURENCES:

October 26, 2018 19:16 Entered AP-ELEC.3, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Transformer (Below 350 F)

October 26, 2018 19:16 'A' EDG tied onto Busses 14 and 18.

October 26, 2018 19:16 Entered ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power.

October 27, 2018 03:19 Stopped 'A' EDG.

October 27, 2018 04:00 Completed ER-ELEC.1, Restoration of Offsite Power. Electric Plant in 50/50 Normal Electric Plant Lineup with Busses 14 and 18 being supplied by Offsite Power.

October 27, 2018 05:20 Exited AP-ELEC.3, Loss of 12A and/or 12B Transformer (Below 350 F).

Issue documented in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) (Issue Report #04188285).

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

None

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

Self-revealing.



**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET**

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1. FACILITY NAME R E Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000- 244	3. LER NUMBER		
		YEAR 2018	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002	REV NO. 00

NARRATIVE

F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

The "A" Emergency Diesel Generator actuated, which was its expected response.

III. CAUSE OF EVENT:

Direct Cause: Electricians inappropriately operated a 4160V supply breaker from off-site power to vital station loads, failing both to have a breaker racking procedure in hand and to adhere to stop work criteria.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT:

All equipment responded as expected; therefore, this event is not considered to have had any effect on the health and safety of the public.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

Electric Plant was restored to a normal 50/50 lineup with Busses 14 and 18 being supplied by Offsite Power.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

- Stand-down conducted with all Maintenance shops to review governance and set expectations for peer checks, component verification practices, and stop work criteria prior to any work on the next shift.
- Ensure adequate station-specific guidance for breaker racking is available and utilized.

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A search of all Ginna LERs submitted to the NRC determined there has been one prior LER reporting a similar cause. LER #: 90-009-00, Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 14 and 18, Causes Automatic Start and Loading of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator, event date 06/09/1990. While racking out a breaker, a lead electrician proceeded to ensure the breaker was open by lifting the breaker mechanical trip device. However, the breaker charging spring device was lifted instead causing the 11A normal feed breaker to close. Immediately realizing the mistake, the lead electrician reclosed the control power fuse switch and ensured the breaker reopened. (NRC Accession #9007170277)

C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:

None (no component failure)