



Global Nuclear Fuel

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M180224

December 19, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject: GNF-A Written Follow-up Report – Unplanned Contamination

References: 1) NRC License SNM-1097, Docket 70-1113
2) GNF-A Event Report 53744, 11/19/2018

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(c)(2), Global Nuclear Fuel–Americas, LLC (GNF-A) hereby submits a written follow-up report for Event Notification 53744 that was provided to NRC on November 19, 2018 (Reference 2). As discussed in the initial event report, GNF-A reported an unplanned contamination event due to a dry conversion process (DCP) kiln leak that required additional radiological controls.

Additional information is provided as follows:

Event Details and Safety Significance

On 11/17/18 at approximately 1445 EST, it was discovered that the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Line 1 kiln seal began to leak and caused an alarm on the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) room detection system. This manufacturing process equipment is within an established FMO contamination-controlled area which is designed to contain and control this type of release. The area was not occupied at the time, there were no personnel exposures or releases from the area and the affected process was shut-down.

Immediate Corrective Actions Taken

As a precautionary measure consistent with current NRC radiation protection requirement 10 CFR 20.1101(b), an appropriate additional radiological control was imposed by requiring respiratory protection for entry into the room to keep personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable until the area could be decontaminated in a safe and timely manner. Although the affected equipment was shutdown, the additional radiological control remained place for more than 24 hours.

NRC Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards staff recently clarified its position for this type of reportability determination in a letter sent to Nuclear Energy Institute dated October 5, 2018. Because of this letter, the event was conservatively reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(1).

Probable Cause of Event

DCP conversion kiln seal failure due to age.

Short Term Corrective Actions

- 1) DCP Line 1 conversion process was shutdown.

Completed: November 17, 2018

- 2) The affected area was decontaminated and the additional radiological control for entry into the room was removed.

Completed: November 22, 2018

Longer Term Corrective Action

- 1) Additional actions are being evaluated as part of the corrective action program.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (910) 819-5950.

Sincerely,


Scott Murray, Manager
Facility Licensing

Attachment: Event Notification Description

cc: NRC Region II Administrator, Atlanta, GA
T. Vukovinsky, NRC RII Atlanta, GA
T. Naquin, NRC NMSS, Washington, DC
SPM 18-057

Attachment 1

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 11/17/18 at approximately 1445 EST, it was discovered that the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Line 1 kiln seal began to leak and caused an alarm on the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) room detection system. This manufacturing process equipment is within an established FMO contamination-controlled area which is designed to contain and control this type of release. The area was not occupied at the time, there were no personnel exposures or releases from the area and the affected process was shut-down.

As a precautionary measure consistent with current NRC radiation protection requirements, an appropriate additional radiological control was imposed by requiring respiratory protection for entry into the room to keep personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable until the area could be decontaminated in a safe and timely manner. Although the affected equipment remains shutdown, this additional radiological control remained place for more than 24 hours.

NRC Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards staff recently clarified its position for this type of reportability determination in a letter sent to Nuclear Energy Institute dated October 5, 2018. Because of this letter, this event is conservatively being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(1).

SP Murray, Manager,
Facility Licensing
1400 11/19/18