



**Consumers
Power
Company**

D. Lachman

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May 4, 1977

Regulatory Docket File



Mr James G Keppler
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - ER-77-23 - WASTE
GAS DECAY TANK, T-101A, PRESSURE LOSS.

Attached is a reportable occurrence which is the result of pressure loss from waste gas decay tank T-101A at the Palisades Plant.

Mr Ken Baker was notified that the submission of this ER would be a day or two late.

David P. Hoffman

David P Hoffman
Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator

MAY 9 1977

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Palisades

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK:

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LICENSEE NAME 01 M I P A L L			LICENSE NUMBER 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0					LICENSE TYPE 4 1 1 1 1			EVENT TYPE 4 3	
REPORT TYPE 01 CONT * *		REPORT SOURCE T	DOCKET NUMBER 0 5 0 - 0 2 5 5					EVENT DATE 0 4 1 9 7 7			REPORT DATE 0 5 0 4 7 7	

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 On April 6, 1977, waste gas decay tank T-101A was overpressured to 112 psig and over
03 the next 10 days, while isolated, the tank lost 10 psig resulting in a violation of
04 Technical Specification 3.9.17.a. Total gaseous release was 3.206 curies or .00076%
05 of our yearly limit (primarily Xe-133). No personnel exposures were involved.
06 Activity was below detectability of the plant exhaust stack monitor. (ER-77-23)

SYSTEM CODE 07 M B	CAUSE CODE A	COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER A	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z 9 9 9	VIOLATION Y
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CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Waste gas decay tank (WGDT) T-101A was put into service with the pressure sigma re-
09 moved. The high-pressure alarm is part of the sigma. There is also a pressure re-
10 corder which is independent of the sigma. On April 6, 1977 the volume control tank
(Contd on Attached Sheet)

FACILITY STATUS 11 D	% POWER 0 0 0	OTHER STATUS Shutdown to Hot Standby	METHOD OF DISCOVERY a	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION NA
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FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED 12 G	CONTENT OF RELEASE N	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 3.206 Curies Total	LOCATION OF RELEASE Exhaust Stack
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PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER 13 0 0 0	TYPE Z	DESCRIPTION None
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PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER 14 0 0 0	DESCRIPTION None
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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15 None

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE 16 Z	DESCRIPTION NA
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PUBLICITY

17 NA

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 Cause Description continued on attached sheet.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Palisades

Cause Description (Contd)

was vented to the T-101A WGDT leaving the tank at 91 psig. The oncoming shift assistant operator (AO) asked the shift supervisor if he should isolate the tank. The shift supervisor replied "No," and if venting was needed to monitor the pressure and remove tank from service at 95 psig per operating procedures. At approximately 1700 hours, the chem lab technician opened the volume control tank sample valve and left open for approximately two hours, increasing T-101A pressure by 21 psig. The AO noticed tank pressure at 112 psig and isolated the tank. The tank started leaking slowly almost immediately. On April 10, 1977 the shift supervisor had the Maint Dept tighten the spring tension on all valves. The leakage slowed down immediately at 102 psig; 1 psig was transferred when the tank was sampled. The tank reached 101 psig on April 16, 1977 violating Technical Specification 3.9.17.a. The loss of 9 psig over approximately 88 hours released 3.206 Ci, primarily Xe-133, which is .00076% of the yearly limit. Log sheets indicate that the activity was transferred to the new WGDT, T-68B, that was in service. However, as the activity was below sensitivity of plant effluent monitors, it is hard to prove or disprove this absolutely.