

Security Panel October 31, 2018

Bill Schuster and Beth Reed, NRC/NRR Janine Mason, DHS/OIP Lance English, NRC/NSIR

Agenda

- Bill Schuster Part 37 Implementation
- Beth Reed NPR Security Related Topics
 - Mailing Sensitive Documents
 - Reporting Events to the NRC
 - Cyber Security
- Janine Mason Critical Infrastructure and NPR Subcouncil
- Lance English Foreign National Program





Physical Protection of Cat I and II Quantities of Materials

William Schuster, Reactor Engineer Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch

> 2018 TRTR Conference October 31, 2018

Part 37 - Background

- Preceded by Orders (RAMQC)
- Final Rule: 78 FR 17007
 Pub. Mar 19, 2018; Eff. May 20, 2013
 Compliance by Mar 14, 2014



Table 1 – Category 1 and Category 2 Threshold

(From Appendix A to Part 37 – Category 1 and Category 2 Radioactive Materials)



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Radioactive Material	Category 1 (TBq)	Category 1 (Ci)	Category 2 (TBq)	Category 2 (Ci)
Americium-241	60	1,620	0.6	16.2
Americium-241/Be	60	1,620	0.6	16.2
Californium-252	20	540	0.2	5.40
Cobalt-60	30	810	0.3	8.10
Curium-244	50	1,350	0.5	13.5
Cesium-137	100	2,700	1	27.0
Gadolinium-153	1,000	27,000	10	270
Iridium-192	80	2,160	0.8	21.6
Plutonium-238	60	1,620	0.6	16.2
Plutonium-239/Be	60	1,620	0.6	16.2
Promethium-147	40,000	1,080,000	400	10,800
Radium-226	40	1,080	0.4	10.8
Selenium-75	200	5,400	2	54.0
Strontium-90	1,000	27,000	10	270
Thulium-170	20,000	540,000	200	5,400
Ytterbium-169	300	8,100	3	81.0





Part 37 - Inspection Implementation

- Oversight responsibility
 - NRC
 - Not located in an Agreement State
 - Part 37 material is under the Part 50 license
 - Agreement States

Part 37 - Inspection Timeframe

Conducted with next security inspection

- Frequency
 - Typically 3 or more years
 - Based on material quantity and form



Part 37 - Inspection Items

- Access Authorization
 - Investigations
 - Access Authorization Program Review
- Security Program
 - LLEA Coordination
 - Security Zones
 - Monitoring and Detection
 - Maintenance and Testing
 - Mobile Devices
 - Security Program Review
- Transportation



Part 37 - Summary

- Taking possession of sources or protecting under Part 73 PSP can present challenges
- Key to compliance is documentation



Regulatory Discussion

Beth Reed, Security Specialist Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch 2018 TRTR Conference October 31, 2018





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
New NRC Process for E-Mailing Official Use Only Documents

- NRC is no longer allowed to e-mail OUO or PII documents to anyone external to the NRC
 - Yellow Announcement: YA-17-0068 (ML#17200D030)
 - Management Directive 12.5
- Types of documents
 - Security Plan RAI's
 - Security Inspection Report
 - License Operator Medical Information
- Temporary fix is to use a third party site (Army)
 - <u>AMRDECT SAFE at https://safe.amrdec.army.mil/safe/</u>









Getting Started Guide ISalute



C Learn More

Sending Non-Public Documents to the NRC

- Sensitive Information
 - Security-Related Information
 - Request for NRC Approved Reviewing Official
 - Responses to Security Plan RAI's
 - Medical Information
 - License Operator Request
- Safeguards Information
 - Physical Security Plan
 - Responses to Security Plan RAI's





Marking Documents under 10 CFR 2.390

- 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1)(i)(A), Mark at the top and bottom of each page with language similar to: "confidential information submitted under 10 CFR 2.390," "withhold from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390,"or "proprietary," to indicate that it contains information the submitter seeks to have withheld.
- For withholding SRI, use: "Security-Related Information Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390."
- Update: Mark the header and footer of the transmittal letter with "Security-Related Information – Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390."
- Include separation statement



Mailing Documents under 10 CFR 2.390

- Single Envelope
- Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001 ATTN: Document Control Desk
- Do not address directly to the PM or Security Specialist



Marking Documents SGI or SGI-M

- The transmittal letter forwarding the physical security plan (PSP) to the U.S. NRC, and each page of the PSP, must be marked "Safeguards Information Modified Handling" (or "Safeguards Information" if applicable) on the header and footer.
- The **transmittal letter** should also include a "separation from enclosure" statement if the letter itself does not contain SGI or SGI-M.
- The first page of the **PSP** needs to include:
 - A statement warning of unauthorized disclosure subject to civil and criminal penalties.
 - The name, title, and organization of the individual who made the SGI or SGI-M designation, and the date it was made.



Transmittal Letter and First Page of the PSP

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - MODIFIED HANDLING

[Facility name & address]

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RTR Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTN: (Project Manager) Physical Security Plan **IDATE1** Revision No. SUBJECT: [INSERT TEXT] مترمري [SIGNATURE] Safeguards Information Determination made by: Warning: Violation of Section 147 of the When separated from Safequards Information designated as Safequards Information - Modified Organization Atomic Energy Act, "Safeguards Handling enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not Name/Title Information," is subject to Civil and Criminal otherwise warrant protection from unauthorized disclosure Date Penalties

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - MODIFIED HANDLING

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - MODIFIED HANDLING

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - MODIFIED HANDLING

Protecting People and the Environment

Mailing SGI Documents

- Must be packaged in two sealed envelopes
 - Outer envelope: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001 ATTN:
 Document Control Desk
 - Inner envelope: Name and address of the intended recipient and marked on both sides, top and bottom, with the words "Safeguards Information-Modified Handling"
- Good idea to use a mail service that will track the package



Who to call and How

- Call the Headquarters Operation Officer (HOO) at 301-816-5100
 - The HOO will notify the appropriate RTR staff (PM, security specialist)
- Be prepared to answer specific questions about event, the facility and the reactor status





Information for the HOO

- Name of facility and caller, and call back number
- Time and date of event
- Reactor Information
 - Туре
 - Power level and max pulse (if applicable)
 - Status
- Event Classification
 - EAL
 - Safeguards events/Security plan requirements
 - Information purposes voluntary
- Technical Specification requirements




Cyber Security

- Finalizing the hypothetical all digital NPR Report
 - To determine if a cyberattack presents a mechanism of release of radioactive material that has not already been evaluated by the NRC
 - Compare consequences of a cyberattack to that of the previously assessed physical security consequences (2006)
- Document is under management review
- Conclusion of report will be used to justify decision for rulemaking





Interagency Resources





The Office of Infrastructure Protection

National Protection and Programs Directorate Department of Homeland Security


Nuclear Sector-Specific Agency

Non-Power Reactor Subcouncil Overview



Homeland Security

Sector Partnership Environment





Non-Power Reactor Subcouncil

Mission: To provide effective coordination of security strategies and activities, policies and communications across Government and between the Government and NPR community.

 To coordinate with emergency management and public health and safety communities regarding consequence-management issues associated with any malevolent act involving the NPR subsector.

Goals: To coordinate efforts to sustain or enhance the necessary protection of the subsector assets through the following activities:

- Identify NPR security and preparedness issues that would benefit public-private coordination, and the communication and coordination of those issues.
- Identify potential enhancements to NPR security and preparedness plans, programs, policies, procedures and strategies.
- Recognize successful programs and practices through the sharing of experiences, ideas, effective practices and innovative approaches related to NPR protection.
- Leverage complementary resources within government and between government and industry.



Non-Power Reactor Subcouncil

NPR Subcouncil (NGCC/NSCC) Leadership

- Oregon State University (NSCC-NPR Co-Chair)
- Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center (NSCC-NPR Co-Chair)
- Nuclear SSA (NGCC-NPR Co-Chair)

Interagency Partners and Roles:

- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
 - Partnership
 - Infrastructure Protection
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
 - Regulation
 - Cyber
- Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA)
 - Voluntary Security Enhancement Program
 - Alarm Response Force Training/Table Top Exercises
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
 - Outreach Visits




Partnership Mechanisms HSIN-CI

- The Homeland Security Information Network Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-CI) is a secure portal that provides a "peer to peer" collaboration space for members to engage in real-time.
- Each subsector has its own subportal within the Commercial Facilities portal.
- Resources available on HSIN-CI include analysis, alerts, bulletins, training, and Suspicious Activity Reporting.
- To register, email: <u>hsinci@hq.dhs.gov</u>



Homeland Security





Homeland Security

For more information visit: https://www.dhs.gov/nuclear-reactors-materialsand-waste-sector Email: NuclearSSA@hq.dhs.gov





NRC'S Counterintelligence Briefing

TRTR Conference – Newport, Rhode Island October 31, 2018

Lance English, Counterintelligence Program Manager - NRC Desiree Davis, Intelligence Analyst - NRC Joseph H. Altman, Special Agent - FBI







Counterintelligence programs aim to identify intelligence threats from state and non-state actors.


As a defensive counterintelligence program participant, you can help the NRC focus efforts on preventing foreign actors from penetrating your institution and protect your research from foreign actors.







- Definition of Counterintelligence (CI)
- Education or Espionage (video clip)
- FBI Presentation CI Awareness
- Importance of Foreign Visitor Screening
- Federal Government Response
- What You Can Do to Help
- Reporting





...not this

Spies look like this...



Education Or Espionage?





FBI Boston Division: Counterintelligence Awareness Briefing

Visitors: Risks & Mitigations

October 2018

Briefing Conducted by: FBI Boston Division SA Joseph H. Altman



FBI Counterintelligence Strategy

OUR MISSION

To protect the United States by identifying, understanding, and combating foreign government activities that pose a threat to national security

➡ Not Just Hostile Intelligence Services

OUR STRATEGY

- 1. Determine what information, technology, or other assets our adversaries want to obtain
- 2. Prioritize which of those are most important to protect
- 3. Determine who has those priority items
- 4. Leverage the broadest set of tools and allies to protect those priority items


Emphasis On Preventing Harm





- Collection against the U.S. has roughly doubled since the end of the Cold War.
- Focus of Foreign Intelligence has shifted from military secrets to critical technology and U.S. proprietary economic information.
- Political and military allies are just as active in technology/economic collection as our traditional adversaries.





100+ Countries Targeted U.S. Technologies

Friend and Foe

Rich and Poor

- Low and High Technologies
 - Government and Private



- Proprietary formulas and processes
- Research and Development Information
- Prototypes or blueprints
- Security and Physical Plant Information
- Employee Lists/Phone Directories
- Access control information
- Software (including source codes)
- Corporate / Marketing strategies
- Customer Data
- Negotiation strategies



Common Tactics / Techniques

- Corporate Insider (access/knowledge)
- Unsolicited Correspondences & Request for Information
- Cyber
- Elicitation
- Exploitation of Joint Venture/Research Relationships
- Acquisition of Technology
- Trade Shows, Exhibits, Symposia, Conventions and Seminars
- Internet Social Networking Risks
- Foreign Visits /Foreign Delegations
- Foreign Acquisition of Technology and Companies
- Exploiting Overseas Travel



Techniques:

- > Peppering: Visitors asking the same question in different styles or one visitor asking the same question to multiple U.S. contractor employees
- (Primary Goal: These techniques are specifically designed to produce potentially embarrassing incidents and appeal to your good side)
- Wandering Visitor: The visitor uses the distraction provided by a large delegation to slip away, out of the control of the escort
- Divide and Conquer: Visitors take the U.S. team members into different areas to discuss issues in order to deprive the U.S. person of his safety net of assistance in answering questions
- Switch Visitors: A collector added to the group without leaving enough time for a background check on the new visitor
- Bait and Switch: The visitors say they are coming to discuss business that is acceptable for discussion, but after they arrive their agenda switches to different questions and discussion topics
- Distraught Visitor: When the visitor's questions are not answered he/she acts insulted or creates an uncomfortable scene in an attempt to psychologically coerce information from the target



Techniques:

- Arriving at a facility unannounced
- Taking notes and photographs
- Last minute or unannounced additions to a visiting delegation
- Foreign Liaison Officer (FLO) or embassy official attempts to conceal official identity during commercial visits.
- Visitors claim business-related interest but lack experience researching and developing technology
- Visitors ask to meet personnel from their own countries and attempt to establish continuing contact with them.



- Do not allow suspicious unannounced foreign visitors access to the facility. Simply tell them no one is available, and that they should schedule an appointment for another date.
- Do not allow last minute additions or substitutions to a foreign delegation to have access to the facility. Ask them to remain in the lobby while the others are permitted access. This could potentially keep an intelligence officer out of the facility and encourage proper visitation procedures.
- Verify personal identification against the original visit request when foreign visitors arrive to ensure they are who they say they are.
- Ensure there is a sufficient number of escorts to control a visiting delegation if it should be split into multiple groups.



- Ensure escorts are briefed as to what is critical within the facility and that they know what requires protection from the foreign visitors
- Ensure facility employees are briefed as to the scope of the foreign visit and to not discuss anything beyond what is approved
- If a visitor becomes offended when confronted during a security incident, recognize the confrontation as a collection technique and ask the visitor to leave the facility if he or she cannot abide by the rules
- Do not permit any cameras or note taking if something in the facility is "sight sensitive"



- If the delegation attempts to make additional contacts with escorts and speakers, make sure they keep discussions to the agreed-upon topics and information
- Conduct a walkthrough of the facility to ensure the visitors will not have audible or visible unauthorized access. Escorts should maintain visual contact with all visitors at all times
- If these or any other suspicious incidents occur, please ensure that they are reported immediately to your security office



- Brief visitors on their obligations and responsibilities including limitations on access or use of computers, copiers, or fax machines, and access limitations to buildings or rooms
- Do not allow visitors to use networked computers; provide standalone computers if needed
- Conduct regular computer audits to detect any efforts by visitors or employees to exceed their approved computer access



"Among the foreign threats to the United States.... China and Russia remain the most capable and persistent intelligence threats and aggressive practitioners of espionage and economic espionage."





James Clapper, Director Office of the Director of National Intelligence Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



Not Just "Spy vs. Spy" Anymore

THEN

- Intelligence officers
- People recruited by intelligence officers

NOW

- Intelligence officers
- People recruited by intelligence officers
- > Hackers
- > Businesspeople
- Academics
- Researchers
- Diplomats
- Anyone else who can get their hands on something of value



Importance of Foreign Visitor Screening



The best first step for a FIS or terrorist is physical access to you and your facility.

- Inserting a thumb drive into a computer replacing a computer cable
- Using the visit to arrange a social off-site



Your best defense is to know with whom you are dealing and whether the US Government can inform you about potential risks.

Federal Government Response

Two White House initiatives will organize U.S. government resources for better vetting of those entering the U.S. It will also put resources at your disposal to understand the identity of individuals seeking access to you and your facility:

- National Security Policy Memorandum 7
 - Integration, Sharing, and Use of National Security Threat Actor Information to Protect Americans; establishes support for the national vetting enterprise
- National Security Policy Memorandum 9
 - -Establishes the National Vetting Center under DHS to coordinate the management and governance of the national vetting enterprise.

The Foreign Access Management Enterprise (FAME) is run by the DHS Chief Security Officer to help DHS and USG agencies better understand the threat posed by foreign visitors.

- FAME is a short-term resource as the larger robust capability is built







What You Can Do to Help



- Implement comprehensive foreign visitor screening.
 - Knowing about potential risks will help safeguard you, your personnel and your facility.
- Contact the NRC Counterintelligence Program Manager regarding requests for access by foreign visitors.
 - In return, you will receive notification if derogatory information was found.
 - Consider the results conjunction with other applicable requirements to determine whether an individual may be granted unescorted access

Inform your local FBI contact regarding foreign visitor access requests.







Remember, YOU are the first line of defense against espionage!

If you feel you are being solicited for information:

- Never feel obligated to answer questions that make you feel uncomfortable
- Be observant and take note of the person questioning you
- Maintain professional composure
- REPORT, REPORT, REPORT (<u>ReportIt@nrc.gov</u>)



Points of Contact:

Lance English NSIR/DSO/ILTAB 301-492-3006 Lance.English@nrc.gov Desiree Davis NSIR/DSO/ILTAB 301-492-3979 Desiree.Davis@nrc.gov



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