



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

September 26, 2018

Mr. Robert Craven
Site Director
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241-9516

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2—NRC PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2018010
AND 05000301/2018010

Dear Mr. Craven:

On August 31, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) biennial inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The team was unable to perform a review of the last two remaining corrective actions associated with the White Notice of Violation for external wave run-up (referenced in the previous PI&R inspection report, 05000266/2016007 and 05000301/2016007) in accordance with step 02.04.e of Inspection Procedure 71152 due to the timing of your staff's completion of these actions occurring so close (one business day prior) to the commencement of on-site inspection. Timing was insufficient to allow the team to incorporate this review into the scope of this inspection. As a result, this Biennial PI&R sample will be considered partially-complete, pending the future close-out inspection of those two remaining items.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301; 72-005
License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

Enclosure:
IR 05000266/2018010; 05000301/2018010

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Letter to Robert Craven from Jamnes L. Cameron dated September 26, 2018

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2—NRC PROBLEM
IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2018010
AND 05000301/2018010

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301

License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2018010; 05000301/2018010

Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0002

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: August 13 through 31, 2018

Inspectors: R. Ruiz, Project Engineer, Team Lead
T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector, Point Beach
A. Dunlop, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Robbins, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: J. Cameron, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in the report section addressing corrective action effectiveness.

List of Findings and Violations

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples are declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensee's corrective action program (CAP), use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment. The assessment is documented below.

- (1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: Problem Identification, Problem Prioritization and Evaluation, and Corrective Actions (CAs) – The inspection team reviewed the station's CAP and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs.
- (2) Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits – The team evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments.
- (3) Safety Conscious Work Environment – The team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs.

INSPECTION RESULTS

71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

Observation—Corrective Action Program Effectiveness	71152
Corrective Action Program: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in the areas of identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems adequately supported nuclear safety.	
Effectiveness of Problem Identification: Overall, the station was effective at identifying issues at a low threshold and was properly entering them into the CAP as required by station procedures. The team determined that the station was generally effective at identifying negative trends that could potentially impact nuclear safety. The team walked down portions of the auxiliary feedwater system, the emergency diesel generators, service water/circulating water pump house, and the 125 volt direct-current (VDC) system. For the areas reviewed, the team did not identify any issues in the area of problem identification.	

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues: In-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of Action Requests (ARs), work orders (WOs), and cause evaluations were completed, including a 5-year time period for the safety-related 125 VDC system. The team determined that the licensee had established a low threshold for entering deficiencies into the CAP, that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution, and that CAs were implemented to mitigate the future risk of issues occurring that could affect overall system operability and/or reliability.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions: The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in developing CAs that were appropriately focused to correct the identified problem and to address the root and contributing causes for significant conditions adverse to quality to preclude repetition. The licensee generally completed CAs in a timely manner and in accordance with procedural requirements commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. For NRC-identified issues, the team determined that the licensee generally assigned CAs that were effective and timely.

In one instance, however, the team noted that the procedurally required use of the station's tracking program for Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) (which itself was a CA for a 2013 NRC-identified violation) was not consistently being followed by station personnel. Specifically, as documented in AR 2264676, "NA [Nuclear Assurance] Finding: M&TE Traceability and Control," the licensee's Nuclear Assurance assessors documented the continued identification of examples from 2013 to present, where station personnel failed to enter M&TE into the station's tracking program. This issue is further discussed as a licensee-identified NCV in the table below.

The team also identified that the CA for the 2013 NRC-identified NCV (which was to institute a new, more convenient, computerized method for staff to track M&TE) was less than fully complete in its restoration of compliance. Specifically, the two instances of M&TE that were the subject of the 2013 violation were not corrected in the official M&TE tracking record until pointed out by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee subsequently entered the issue into the CAP as AR 2278184, "2018 PI&R – M&TE Tracking Noncompliance" and corrected the historic record to restore full compliance. This issue was considered to have extremely minor significance and was considered administrative in nature since, at that time of initial discovery in 2013, the licensee performed a confirmatory test on the two subject instruments and both were found to be satisfactorily within calibration.

Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation	71152
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
<p><u>Enforcement:</u></p> <p>Violation: Title 10 CFR 50, Part B, Criterion XII requires that measures shall be established to assure that tools, gages, instruments, and other measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated, and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within necessary limits.</p> <p>Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that tools, gages, instruments, and other measuring and testing devices used in activities affecting quality were properly controlled.</p>	

Specifically, the licensee did not include all M&TE devices in their control tracking program, which could result in instruments not being evaluated if associated M&TE fails its post-calibration.

Significance/Severity Level: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using SDP Appendix A and concluded the violation was of very low safety significance (Green).

Corrective Action Reference(s): AR 2278330

Observation—Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits	71152
Operating Experience and Self-Assessments and Audits: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.	

Observation—Safety Conscious Work Environment	71152
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available. The team observed various station meetings, including those in which new ARs are reviewed, and interviewed station personnel both individually and in focus groups. Additionally, the team interviewed the Employee Concerns Coordinator and reviewed recent case logs and case files.	

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

On August 31, 2018, the inspectors presented the Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution inspection results to Mr. R. Craven, Site Director, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

Condition Reports

- RCE 2170975; D-107 Battery Charger Work – Risk Classification; 11/23/16
- ACE 2165847; Negligent Discharge of a Weapon at PBNP Firearms Range; 10/27/16
- ACE 2171922; NRC Found Scaffolds Discrepancies in CSR; 11/30/16
- ACE 2195593; Two DZ Workers Exceeded Allowable Work Hours (Fatigue Rule); 04/01/17
- ACE 02094169; U1 Reactor Startup Aborted; 11/30/2015
- ACE 02172378; Nuclear Instrument Testing, High Flux Trip Became OOS; 12/02/2016
- ACE 02180143; Clearance Error – P-35A Motor Heaters Found Energized; 01/17/2017

- ACE 02197284; RWP 17-2016 is Over the Dose Estimate; 04/08/2017
- ACE 02214711; 2Q17 NRC Green Finding PI-AA-102 ,OE Program; 07/12/2017

- CE 02183341; Evaluate Issue Concerning CREFS on 1/18/17; 02/02/2017
- HU 02227864; SW Valves not Reclosed per Operator Round Instructions; 10/02/2017
- OR 02229667; 3Q17 NRC NCV of TS License Condition 4F, Fire Protection; 10/11/2017
- OR 02229669; 3Q17 NRC Green NCV of Criterion V, Procedures; 10/11/2017
- OR 02233500; Made Mode Change with Inoperable TDAFW; 10/29/2017
- OR 02236214; Missed Opportunity During LOC; 11/14/2017
- OR 02250270; Task Performance Evaluation Issue Identified; 02/19/2018
- OR 02252399; NRC ID: Corrosion Downstream FP-33 & FP-36 Header Iso Valves; 03/02/2018
- AR 02194725; Abnormal Start of G-04, EDG (PWE); 03/29/2017
- AR 02212700; POR Not Initiated Upon Discovery of Firm Evidence; 06/28/2017
- AR 02229666; 3Q17 NRC Green NCV of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action; 10/11/2017
- AR 02209391; Z-065A Cable Supports Degradation Increasing; 06/08/2017
- AR 02248499; NRC LER 2017-003-00 Closure Review PD; 02/08/2018
- AR 1234567; Example Document for Document Reviewed Section; Revision 2
- AR 1234567; Example Document for Document Reviewed Section; 05/01/2018
- AR 1373101; Cable ZGD03016A Not Protected Against Overload Per NEC; 09/30/2009
- AR 1713497; Short Circuit Issues on Non-Safety Related DC Buses; 12/07/2011
- AR 1930691; NOS Finding? SOER 07-1, Reactivity Management; 01/03/2014
- AR 1966350; Draft Fleet Response L2-14-26, Temporary Lift Assembly Failure Results in a Fatality, Loss of Off-Site Power, Scram, and Equipment Damage
- AR 1966542; INPO IER L2-14-26, Temporary Lift Assembly Failure Results in a Fatality; 05/19/2014
- AR 1987949; NOS Reactivity Management Finding Corrective Actions; 08/29/2014
- AR 1988564; Reactivity Command and Control; 09/02/2014
- AR 1988646; OP-AA-103-1000 Reactivity Management; 09/03/2014
- AR 2012494; Operating Experience Evaluation of WANO SER 2014-02; 12/16/2014
- AR 2012679; Issues Identified within Calculation 2010-0002; 12/11/2014
- AR 2013479; Training Materials associated with Temporary Lift Assembly Failure; 12/16/2014
- AR 2053272; Enhancement from Reactivity Management Assessment; 06/10/2015
- AR 2053929; Add INPO IER L2-15-16 to Instrument Air Lesson Plans; 06/12/2015
- AR 2250712; Siren 017 OOS; 03/08/2018
- AR 2252863; 8' TSC Emergency Ventilation; 03/06/2018
- AR 2053272; Enhancement from Reactivity Management Assessment; 06/10/2015
- AR 2043582; INPO IER L2-15-16, Loss of IA Complicated Post-Scram Recovery; 04/27/2015
- AR 2272613; Issue Discovered with Commercial Grade Dedication; 07/30/2018
- AR 2129412; NRC RIS 2016-05: Embedded Digital Devices in SR Systems; 05/03/2016
- AR 2131739; Part 21 Notification from Electrowitch; 05/13/2016
- AR 2164164; Adverse Trend? ERO Response to Radioactive Release; 10/20/2016
- AR 2190319; ERO Member Call-In Issues; 03/09/2017
- AR 2230694; L1A Evaluate Time Sensitive Actions for PRA; 02/21/2018
- AR 2226079; 2017 IPX ? Site Area Emergency DEP Failure; 09/21/2017
- AR 2203309; Evaluation of ABB GKT Relays Commercially Dedicated for Part 21; 06/06/2017
- AR 2220555; Recurring OSC Improvement Items; 08/16/2017
- AR 2158861; 3Q16 PBN EP Drill Demonstration Criteria Unsat; 09/28/2016
- AR 2158564; 3Q16 PBN EP Drill Objectives Graded Unsat; 09/27/2016
- AR 2178202; SRO Reactivated Without Completing DEP; 01/05/2017
- AR 2242690; Two Calculations Updated EOP Setpoints Without PCRS Being Generated; 01/02/2018
- AR 2227734; 3Q17 ERO Augmentation Drill Non-Responders; 09/30/2017
- AR 2239337; 4Q17 ERO Augmentation Drill Non-Responders; 12/06/2017

- AR 2267349; 2018 ERO Augmentation Drill Non-Responders; 06/06/2018
- AR 2257415; 2018 Call-In Drill SAT with Comments; 04/02/2018
- AR 2158767; Potential Trend ? ERO Response Performance; 09/28/2016
- AR 2096600; RX Vessel Drain Down Instruments not Calibrated Correctly; 12/10/2015
- AR 2233355; Calculation 2003-0020 Contains Errors; 10/28/2017
- AR 2234880; Halon Modification Incorrect Background / Scope; 11/06/2017
- AR 2237895; Calculation Removing Appendix R/NFPA 805 Credited Analysis; 11/28/2017
- AR 2243576; NERC MOD-025-2 Standard Compliance, G-05 Real and Reactive Power; 01/08/2018
- AR 2253405; Potential Incorrect Use of Temp Mod in Support of Maintenance; 03/09/2018
- AR 2259927; CC Pump Modification (EC 273506) Material Issue; 04/17/2018
- AR 2261390; Phoenix Modeling Related to G-05 Components; 04/25/2018
- AR 2250875; 2018 WANO EP Drill Enhancement; 02/22/2018
- AR 2250880; WANO EP Drill – UNSAT Obj. for Exchange of Public Info-JIC; 02/22/2018
- AR 2276005; EP Staff Professional Development Evaluation; 8/14/2018
- AR 2276864; L1A on Temp Configuration Change Review Process; 08/21/2018
- AR 2275347; L1A: CM Health; 08/08/2018
- AR 2275809; L1A to Assess Identified Issues from Nuclear Assessment; 08/13/2018
- AR 2232299; IA-1870 and IA-1876 Orientation Change Required (PWE); 10/24/2017
- AR 2253278; Skin Dose Calculation Error Identified; 03/08/2018
- AR 2013479; WANO SER 2014-01: Temporary Lift Assembly Failure; 12/16/2014
- AR 2263672; L1A – Trends in ERO Position Response; 06/22/2018
- AR 2260485; Level 1 Assessment – Equipment Reliability; 04/19/2018
- AR 2267129 L1A – Longstanding Obsolescence Equipment Resolution; 06/05/2018
- AR 2269262; June Engineering Safety Assessment; 06/20/2018
- AR 2277653; D-105 Battery Voltage Found at 131.8 VDC; 08/27/2018
- AR 2277093; D-05 Cell Internal Impedance and MBT Connections Resistance; 08/22/2018
- AR 2252151; Level 1 Assessment on System Monitoring Plans; 03/01/2018
- Performance Monitoring Plan for 125VDC System; 05/10/2018
- AR 2242641; NRC IN 2017-05, Potential Binding of Schneider Electric/Square-D Masterpact NT and NW 480-VAC Circuit Breaker Anti-Pump Feature
- AR 2268751; NRC IN 2018-08, Failure to Enter the Required Technical Specifications Action Statement for Operation During Recent Surveillance Testing While Using a Reactor Protection System Test Box; 06/18/2018
- AR 2137672; Review of Electros witch Part 21 Installed Switches and PBNP; 06/13/2016
- AR 2138220; Downgrade of QL1 Switches Affected by Electros witch Part 21; 06/15/2016
- AR 2198772; Potential Part 21 for ABB Relays; 04/13/2018
- AR 2203309; Evaluation of ABB GKT Relays Commercial Dedicated for Part 21; 06/06/2017
- (Industry)
- AR 1966542; INPO IER L2-14-26: Temporary Lift Assembly Failure Results in Fatality; 05/19/2014
- AR 2043595; INPO IER L2-15-16: Loss of Instrument Air Complicated Post-Scram Recovery; 04/27/2015
- AR 2064846; INPO IER L2-15-29: Weaknesses in Reactivity Control; 08/05/2015
- AR 2013494; WANO SER 2014-2: Common Mode Failure of Emergency Power; 12/16/2014
- AR 2013518; WANO SER 2014-3: Reactor Scram / SI Caused by Human Errors during Maintenance Activities; 12/16/2014
- AR 2158455; Inaccurate Forced Outage Schedule Templates; 09/27/16
- AR 2158790; Forced Outage Work Orders not Ready to Work; 09/28/16
- AR 2166570; FIN WOs with Risk Attribute Left Blank; 10/31/16
- AR 2166871; Expansion of FINs Role Warrants a New/Revised Governing Doc; 11/01/16

- AR 2167562; Emergent Outage Issues; 11/04/16
- AR 2169574; D-109 Battery Charger Trouble Alarm; 11/15/16
- AR 2169603; D-109 Charger Failure Caused Both Units to be Orange Risk; 11/15/16
- AR 2173470; Documentation of Identified Scaffold Deficiencies; 12/07/16
- AR 2176295; Enhancement Actions from RCE 02170975; 12/21/16
- AR 2183121; MA-AA-100-1002 – Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Re[moval]; 02/01/17
- AR 2205836; Reconsider Specimen Collection/Split/Seal Sequencing; 05/18/17
- AR 2205838; Clarify Steps to Take When Presence of Alcohol is Detected; 05/18/17
- AR 2225525; Door-061 South CR Door Stuck Open; 09/18/17
- AR 2229343; Enhancement Action from Level 1 Assessment Cross Discipline T[eam]; 09/07/17
- AR 2244232; Req'd Forms in Cyber Procedure not ID'd as QA Records; 01/11/18
- AR 2245366; Approval of CSAT Chair not Required on CSAT Signature Page; 01/19/18
- AR 2245367; CSAT Approval of a CDA Assessment not Clearly Documented; 01/19/18
- AR 2245647; Qual. Requirements for CDA Assessment Activities Unclear; 01/22/18
- AR 2245651; CDA Functions Not Identified in Approved Assessment; 01/22/18
- AR 2245838; CDA Process and NAMS Configuration Management Controls; 01/23/18
- AR 2245839; Cyber Security Forms Not Signed; 01/23/18
- AR 2264277; Work Management Quarterly Audit Review trends; 05/15/18
- AR 2264367; Work Order Preparation Adverse Trend on Work Durations; 05/15/18
- AR 2264676; NA Finding: M&TE Traceability and Control; 05/17/18
- AR 2276040; 218 PI&R Operability Rescreening Post Troubleshooting; 08/14/18
- AR 2278017; 2018 PI&R – Corrective Action Inappropriately Closed; 08/29/18
- AR 2278184; 2018 PI&R – M&TE Tracking Noncompliance; 08/30/18
- AR 2278330; 2018 PI&R: Licensee ID Green NCV: MTE Program Effectiveness; 08/31/18
- AR 01956338; 3 Switches have Same Number Designator; 04/09/2014
- AR 02001230; PBNP has Experienced Higher than Anticipated Dose Rates; 10/22/2014
- AR 02086949; 2X01 Lockout Generated; 10/29/2015
- AR 02087060; 2015 INPO AFI RP.1-1: Inconsistent Application of RP Control; 10/29/2017
- AR 02173509; 2P-29 TDAFP Backleakage Change; 12/08/2018
- AR 02180144; Letdown Gas Stripper Vent Stack Elevated Tritium; 01/17/2017
- AR 02180468; 4Q16 LID Green NCV High Flux Trip OOS; 01/19/2017
- AR 02194822; Corporate CARB Review of Apparent Cause Evaluation 2180143; 03/29/2017
- AR 02196379; Worker Alarmed Portal Monitor Upon Exiting RCA; 04/04/2017
- AR 02196468; 1Q17 LID Green NCV Tech Spec 5.5.14 SFDP; 04/05/2017
- AR 02213167; 2017 DBAI: Action Request not Issued After Test Failure; 06/30/2017
- AR 02223605; Could not get Pump to Flow Water; 09/05/2017
- AR 02224407; NRC Identified Transmitter Voltage Limit Measurement PMT; 09/12/2017
- AR 02224951; Impact on Plant Safety for Condition Identified in AR 2198301; 09/14/2017
- AR 02228928; N-32 Failed to Energize; 10/17/2017
- AR 02241492; Issues Identified During PC 6 Part 9 Flood Mitigation Invent; 12/20/2017
- AR 02242553; Fire Barrier Restoration not in CAP as Required; 12/31/2017
- AR 02242577; Cold Temperature/Operator Rounds Alert; 01/01/2018
- AR 02243876; Procedure AOP-40F Incorrectly Removed Note in Procedure; 01/10/2018
- AR 02244411; 1RE-215 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Degraded Mylar Window; 01/12/2018
- AR 02245992; EOP/AOP BG Docs – Untimely Updates; 01/24/2018
- AR 02247124; AR 2245494 Closed Out Without Any Technical Basis; 01/30/2018
- AR 02248781; Inconsistent Record Management for Completed Procedures; 02/09/2018
- AR 02248785; 10CFR 50.59 Reviews for Abnormal Alignments Exceeded 90 Days; 02/09/2018
- AR 02250157; Potential Trend-Ops Lack of Rigor Support Process Adherence; 02/19/2018

- AR 02250270; Task Performance Evaluation Issue Identified; 02/19/2018
- AR 02253088; Inadequate Resolution of PC 71 Part 1 Concerns; 03/07/2018
- AR 02253383; Clearance Order Question; 03/08/2018
- AR 02253620; Actions for AR2223344 May Have Been Ineffective; 03/10/2018
- AR 02255556; Procedure Adherence Gaps Identified – Radiation Protection; 03/22/2018
- AR 02255765; Gaps in Radwaste Shipment Documentation; 03/23/2018
- AR 02256334; SCBA VTM-1934 Does Not Match Site Equipment; 03/27/2018
- AR 02265424; PAB Roof – Radiological Boundary Found Sagging; 05/22/2018
- AR 02223978; Issues Identified with ACE Corrective Actions; 09/07/2017
- AR 02223982; Issues Identified with RCE Corrective Actions; 09/07/2017
- AR 02223963; CAP Screening Issues with NCAQ/CAQ and OFR Reviews; 09/07/2017
- AR 02224053; CA Extensions Lacking Justification Documentation; 09/08/2017
- AR 02222071; Assignment Completion Documentation Missing; 08/25/2017
- AR 02274066; C-102 Annunciator Panel Windows Taped to Prevent Falling Out; 07/31/2018
- AR 02233550; 1CV-309 Boric Acid Indication at Downstream Weld; 10/30/2017

Procedures

- PI-AA-104-1000; Condition Reporting; Revision 18
- EN-AA-203-1001; Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments; Revision 30
- MA-AA-100-1011; Equipment Troubleshooting; Revision 4
- RMP 9021; Control and Documentation for Troubleshooting and Repair Activities; Revision 17
- MA-AA-107-1001; User Responsibilities and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE); Revision 1
- NP 8.7.1; Measurement and Test Equipment; Revision 32
- Table, Age and Replacement Schedule for 125 VDC Batteries D-05, D-06, D-105, D-106, and D-305; 08/15/2018
- MA-AA-212-1000; Rigging and Material Handling, Attachment 10, Engineered Temporary Lift Assembly; Revision 17
- MA-AA-100-1002; Scaffold Installation, Modification, and Removal Requests; Revision 7
- RMP 9043-21; Emergency Diesel Generator G-02 Electrical Inspection; Revision 20

Other Documents

- PBN 18-001; Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report – Security; 02/24/18
- PBN 17-004; Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report – Fitness for Duty and Access Authorization; 05/25/17
- PBN 16-005; Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report – Work Management; 12/07/16
- PBN 18-004; Point Beach Nuclear Assurance Report – Maintenance and Work Management; 07/05/18
- Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Agenda for August 22, 2018, Meeting
- Table, Engineering Changes from August 1, 2013 to August 7, 2018
- Table, Condition Reports Associated with 125V System from August 1, 2013 to July 5, 2018
- Maintenance Rule Data for 125V System during the 4Q for Years 2013 thru 2018
- EC 278757; Install a New Weather Hood Over the Existing G-05 Air Intake; Revision 1
- EC 289956; Accuracy of Level Indication From LT-447; Revision 2
- Calculation N-89-040; Accuracy of Level Indication From LT-447; Revision 2
- Cap-002; Electrolytic Capacitor Testing; Revision 0
- G-676343, Equipment Specification: Reactor Coolant Piping Shop Fabrication, Revision 0
- G-676496, Equipment Specification: Reactor Coolant Piping – Field Erection, Revision 0
- PBN 18-002; Nuclear Assurance Audit Operations; 04/18/2018
- PBN 18-003; Nuclear Assurance Audit Radiation Protection and Radwaste; 03/26/2018
- POD 02228184; NRC Identified Power Supply Voltage Greater than XMTR Max; 10/03/2017

- PBF-2067c; G03 EDG Stby/Idle Generator Default Tour Type; Revision 27
- 480V Safeguards Bus' Major System Loads Diagram
- Management Review Committee Meeting (MRC) Agenda; Daily While Onsite
- WO 40199204-04; Piping KB-01/Perform Inspection on North Piping; 05/24/2018
- WO 40526500-01; G-01 / Mag Pickups Lockwire Missing; 04/18/2017
- WO 40526498-01; G-02 / Mag Pickups Lockwire Missing; 04/18/2017
- Drawing 6090F02501; Elementary Wiring Diagram, Engine Control for G03(G04); Sheets 1–3