

CHAIRMAN Resource

From: Tom Gurdziel <tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 18, 2018 9:59 PM
To: Screnci, Diane
Cc: Giessner, John; Bridget Frymire; 'Ed Stronski'; Lyon, Jill:(NMP); Holden, Tammy L:(GenCo-Nuc); CHAIRMAN Resource; qainfo@nsr.go.jp
Subject: [External_Sender] Reference to ML12219A131

Hello Diane,

Thank you for the reference to INPO 11-005 Addendum. I have already read it many times and, in fact, have a printed out copy in a bookcase about 4 feet away from me (while I am at this computer). I think a point I was trying to make at the recent Exelon/Nine Mile Point/FitzPatrick Open House while talking with a good number of NRC inspection people was that, aside from this statement on page 27:

“The need for automatic isolation circuitry that could render important safety systems inoperable should be reevaluated.”

and the continuing one paragraph,

NO Action has been taken to identify similar logic in US plants.

The perfect example of how to design safety system logic to work when you need it to, would be the Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 actuation logic for the Emergency (or Isolation) Condenser system designed way back in the 1960s.

And, let me say that, if such logic was used March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc./Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 plant, their Isolation Condensers would have gone into service. And if they could have gotten make up water to replace that boiled off (from inside their Isolation Condensers), probably, (in my opinion), the Unit 1 core there would NOT have become corium. (Of course, that would have required that the Site Emergency Director knew that their Isolation Condensers did not have already installed make up water tanks (like Nine Mile Point, Unit 1), and required periodic filling; which he did not know.)

So, the point was this. Even though this inadequate logic statement has been available in INPO 11-005 Addendum for SIX YEARS, organizations such as WANO, IAEA, and even INPO have not provided me any evidence that they find it important.

Additionally

I spent the second half of my Open House visit with two or three Operations type people and got into a discussion of high back pressure trips of safety-needed steam driven pumps (because I think there is some technicality that they are not really safety-related). (But, let's face it, they really are.) Anyway I was talking with a really sharp senior operator from FitzPatrick, I think, and a newly hired PRA specialist, who really impressed me with her very detailed knowledge of Fukushima stuff. Anyway, they DO NOT have the high back pressure trips disabled: their plan is to jumper them out or disable them in some way during an accident. I said this is totally unacceptable, or words to that effect.

I believe that changing these high back pressure trips to “alarm only” notifications/signals is also a lesson-learned (by somebody) but I do not have the time to search for the exact reference right now. (It is not in INPO 11-005 Addendum: I just looked.)

Finally

Do you remember providing me with access to the various presentations and information gathering sessions held by the National Academies when they were doing their Lessons Learned reports? It doesn't work anymore but it was: “RCSOTP_20_Fukushima_LTBL_” with a password of “Emergency”. I listened and read each one available to me. One point

made in one session mentioned, and showed a picture of, a “valve mimic board”. It didn’t end up being a National Academies Lesson Learned but, since I knew the value of a working valve mimic board from my time in the Unit I control room, I brought up the subject at the Open House meeting.

Thank you,

Tom



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