

FROM: Florida Power & Light Miami, Fla .. R E Uhrig		DATE OF DOC 4-10-75	DATE REC'D 4-15-75	LTR XXX	TWX	RPT	OTHER
TO: Mr Elliott		ORIG one signed	CC	OTHER	SENT AEC PDR <u>XX</u>		SENT LOCAL PDR <u>XX</u>
CLASS	UNCLASS XXXXXXX	PROP INFO	INPUT	NO CYS REC'D 1	DOCKET NO: 50-250/261		

DESCRIPTION:
Ltr re our 4-1-75 telephone conversation.....
furnishing info concerning the safety injection
system at Turkey Point

ENCLOSURES:
(Faint stamps and markings)

PLANT NAME: Turkey Point 3 & 4

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 4-21-75 ehf


- | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| BUTLER (L)
W/ Copies | SCHWENCER (L)
W/ Copies | ZIEMANN (L)
W/ Copies | REGAN (E)
W/ Copies |
| CLARK (L)
W/ Copies | STOLZ (L)
W/ Copies | DICKER (E)
W/ Copies | LEAR (L)
W/ Copies |
| PARR (L)
W/ Copies | VASSALLO (L)
W/ Copies | KNIGHTON (E)
W/ Copies | SPELS
W/ Copies |
| KNIEL (L)
W/ Copies | PURPLE (L)
W/ Copies | YOUNGBLOOD (E)
W/ Copies | |

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|
| REG FILE | <u>TECH REVIEW</u> | DENTON | <u>LIC ASST</u> | <u>A/T IND.</u> |
| NRC PDR | SCHROEDER | GRIMES | R. DIGGS (L) | BRAITMAN |
| OGC, ROOM P-506A | MACCARY | GAMMILL | H. GEARIN (L) | SALTZMAN |
| GOSSICK/STAFF | KNIGHT | KASTNER | E. GOULBOURNE (L) | MELTZ. |
| CASE | PAWLICKI | BALLARD | P. KREUTZER (E) | |
| GIAMBUSSO | SHAO | SPANGLER | J. LEE (L) | <u>PLANS</u> |
| BOYD | STELLO (2) | | M. MAIGRET (L) | MCDONALD |
| MOORE (L) | HOUSTON | <u>ENVIRO</u> | S. REED (E) | CHAPMAN |
| DEYOUNG (L) | NOVAK | MULLER | M. SERVICE (L) | DUBE (Ltr) |
| SKOVHOLT (L) | ROSS | DICKER | S. SHEPPARD (L) | E. COUPE |
| GOLLER (L) (Ltr) | IPPOLITO | KNIGHTON | M. SLATER (E) | PETROUSE |
| P. COLLINS | TEDESCO | YOUNGBLOOD | H. SMITH (L) | HARTFIELD (2) |
| DENISE | LONG | REGAN | S. TEETS (L) | KLECKER |
| REG OPR | LAINAS | PROJECT LDR | G. WILLIAMS (E) | EISENHUT |
| FILE & REGION (2) | BENAROYA | | V. WILSON (L) | WIGGINTON |
| T.R. WILSON | VOLLMER | <u>HARLESS</u> | R. INGRAM (L) | VARGA |
| STEELE | | | | |

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION


- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1 - LOCAL PDR. <u>Honolulu, Fla</u> | 1 - NATIONAL LABS | 1 - PDR-SAN/LA/NY |
| 1 - TIC (ABERNATHY) (1)(2)(10) | 1 - W. PENNINGTON, Rm E-201 GT | 1 - BROOKHAVEN NAT LAB |
| 1 - NSIC (BUCHANAN) | 1 - CONSULTANTS | 1 - G. ULRIKSON, ORNL |
| 1 - ASLB | NEWMARK/BLUME/AGBABIAN | 1 - AGMED (RUTH GUSMAN) |
| 1 - Newton Anderson | | Rm B-127 GT |
| 14 - ACRS HOLDING/SENT | | 1 - J. D. BUNKLES, Rm E-201 |
| TO L.A. Ingram | | GT |





April 10, 1975
L-75-180

Mr. Donald Elliott
Division of Reactor Licensing
Operating Reactors Branch
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555




Dear Mr. Elliott:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Safety Injection System
Docket Nos. 50-250 & 50-251

This letter is submitted to reply to questions asked in your telephone conversation of April 1, 1975, with G. E. Liebler.

1. Valves 3-862A and B, 3-864A and B, 3-865A, B and C, 4-862A and B, 4-864A and B, and 4-865A, B and C, are "locked" in the open position by having their circuit breakers locked open at the Motor Control Centers.
2. Only one RWST is required to satisfy the core cooling requirements during a loss of coolant accident. The RWST water is not required for a normal shutdown of the plant. The RWST can be utilized as an emergency makeup supply to the primary system via the CVCS charging pumps in the event of a loss of the normal supply. However, such makeup would involve only a fraction of the tank contents and would be considerably less than the amount required to satisfy the core cooling requirements.
3. As mentioned in item no. 1 above, the accumulatory isolation valves (865A, B and C) are open and have their circuit breakers locked open at the motor control centers. These valves are not provided with a pressure interlock that will automatically open them when pressure in the RCS is increased above a certain value. Control of these valves to ensure that they are in the proper position with the circuit breakers locked open is accomplished administratively by specific instructions in the plant operating procedures.



April 10, 1975

4. Valve HCV-758 in the Residual Heat Removal System normally functions to control the flow of reactor coolant through the Residual Heat Removal Heat exchangers during a normal plant cooldown and thus control the rate of cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. When the system is functioning as the low head Safety Injection System valve HCV-758 is required to be in the position corresponding to its fixed limit of travel in the open direction. In this position valve HCV-758 will pass the required flow during the injection phase of a loss of coolant accident and will also ensure that adequate flow is provided during post accident recirculation without exceeding the allowable Net Positive Suction Head for the RHR pumps while pumping an assumed saturated fluid from the containment sump.

Valve HCV-758 receives a signal to "fully open" upon initiation of the Safety Injection signal. Valve HCV-758 will also go to this "fully open" position in the event of a failure of the air supply or a failure of the power supply to the solenoid. During normal operation, the air supply to the valve is shut off, causing the valve to assume the proper position for its Safety Injection System function.


Very truly yours,

J. E. Uhrig
7/1

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU:HNP:nch

cc: Mr. Jack R. Newman





April 10, 1975
L-75-180

Mr. Donald Elliott
Division of Reactor Licensing
Operating Reactors Branch
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Elliott:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 & 4
Safety Injection System
Docket Nos. 50-250 & 50-251

This letter is submitted to reply to questions asked in your telephone conversation of April 1, 1975, with G. E. Liebler.

1. Valves 3-862A and B, 3-864A and B, 3-865A, B and C, 4-862A and B, 4-864A and B, and 4-865A, B and C, are "locked" in the open position by having their circuit breakers locked open at the Motor Control Centers.
2. Only one RWST is required to satisfy the core cooling requirements during a loss of coolant accident. The RWST water is not required for a normal shutdown of the plant. The RWST can be utilized as an emergency makeup supply to the primary system via the CVCS charging pumps in the event of a loss of the normal supply. However, such makeup would involve only a fraction of the tank contents and would be considerably less than the amount required to satisfy the core cooling requirements.
3. As mentioned in item no. 1 above, the accumulatory isolation valves (865A, B and C) are open and have their circuit breakers locked open at the motor control centers. These valves are not provided with a pressure interlock that will automatically open them when pressure in the RCS is increased above a certain value. Control of these valves to ensure that they are in the proper position with the circuit breakers locked open is accomplished administratively by specific instructions in the plant operating procedures.

April 10, 1975

4. Valve HCV-758 in the Residual Heat Removal System normally functions to control the flow of reactor coolant through the Residual Heat Removal Heat exchangers during a normal plant cooldown and thus control the rate of cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System. When the system is functioning as the low head Safety Injection System valve HCV-758 is required to be in the position corresponding to its fixed limit of travel in the open direction. In this position valve HCV-758 will pass the required flow during the injection phase of a loss of coolant accident and will also ensure that adequate flow is provided during post accident recirculation without exceeding the allowable Net Positive Suction Head for the RHR pumps while pumping an assumed saturated fluid from the containment sump.

Valve HCV-758 receives a signal to "fully open" upon initiation of the Safety Injection signal. Valve HCV-758 will also go to this "fully open" position in the event of a failure of the air supply or a failure of the power supply to the solenoid. During normal operation, the air supply to the valve is shut off, causing the valve to assume the proper position for its Safety Injection System function.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Uhrig
7/11

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President

REU:HNP:nych

cc: Mr. Jack R. Newman